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ABSTRACT
The study focuses on the dynamics of intra-community 
Chinese political development and the emergence of the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) as a major political force at the multi­
ethnic political centre during Malaya's transition from colony to 
independent nation state. During the pre-independence years of the 
MCA's existence, 1949-1957, the party was a hybrid institution 
which combined ideological and organisational elements of both 
Westernised and traditional political elites, represented by the 
Straits Chinese British Association (SBCA), the Kuomintang Malaya 
(KMTM), and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce-huay kuan establish­
ment. Embodying both modem and traditional elements, the MCA 
proved a dynamic organisation capable of meeting changing Chinese 
needs arising from the Emergency, the growth of an assertive Malay 
nationalist movement, and the accelerating momentum towards 
decolonisation.
Following an internal reappraisal in the early 1950s of 
its initial character as a traditional mutual aid organisation 
involved mainly in Emergency-related welfare activities, the MCA 
became a catalyst for the development of a Malayan-centred Chinese 
political consciousness. Its leadership chose a communally-based 
political alliance with the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), rather than partnership with the multi-racial Independence 
of Malaya Party (IMP), as the best means of serving Chinese
interests. The party’s pivotal role in mainstream Malayan politics 
is most clearly demonstrated by its cooperation with the UMNO in 
jointly leading the independence campaign, including the Alliance 
negotiations with the British and the Malay Rulers which resulted 
in the promulgation of a constitution that defined the economic, 
cultural and political rules for independent Malaya. Although the 
constitution enshrined Malay ’’special rights” and upheld Malay 
cultural and political dominance, the MCA achieved its crucial 
objective of citizenship based on jus soli, thus laying the basis 
for legitimate Chinese participation in the political life of 
independent Malaya.
PREFACE
My interest in embarking on an intensive study of the 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)'*' was spurred by the scarcity of 
published materials on the development of Chinese politics in 
Peninsular Malaysia (i.e. the states of pre-1963 Malaya) in the 
period after the Second World War. Standard works on Malaysian 
politics, such as those by G.P. Means, K.J. Ratnam, R.S. Milne,
R.K. Vasil and K. van Vorys, have tended to treat Chinese politics 
as one component part in the complex overall mosaic of multiracial 
politics in Malaysia. I wanted to give greater focus to the unique 
dimensions of Chinese political development within that mosaic.
This study would not have been possible without the 
generosity of Datuk Lee San Choon, MCA Party President from mid 1974 
to April 1983. Datuk Lee granted me permission to consult the party’s 
archives, thus giving me access to a large and rich body of hitherto 
unconsulted MCA as well as Alliance materials. Several other MCA 
leaders were equally cooperative and generous in facilitating my 
research. Their frank and stimulating discussions during interviews 
greatly broadened my understanding of the MCA and Chinese politics 
in general. I am particularly, indebted to Dr. Neo Yee Pan, the 
present acting Party President, whose interest in my work made it 
possible for me to observe the workings of the party through direct 
access to party general assemblies, meetings and seminars at the 
national, state and local levels.
1. Known since the establishment of Malaysia in 1963 as the Malaysian 
Chinese Association.
Past MCA leaders were also most generous with their time. 
They provided invaluable information which supplemented that found 
in party documents, I am especially grateful to have had the 
opportunity to talk at length with Tun Tan Siew Sin, who gave me 
first-hand accounts of his father, the late Tun Tan Cheng Lock. I 
likewise gained immeasurably from the personal reminiscences of 
Tun H.S, Lee, Tun Omar Qng Yoke Lin, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, Tan Sri T.H. 
Tan, Ng Ee Teong and Douglas K.K, Lee.
The generosity and cooperation of leaders in the United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO) helped me place MCA politics in 
their proper context. I am particularly grateful to have had the 
opportunity to interview Tunku Abdul Rahman, whose role in Malaysian 
politics needs no elaboration. Other UMNO veterans such as Datuk 
Senu and Encik Khir Johari, and present day leaders such as Datuk 
Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Datuk Musa Hitam, Tengku Razaleigh and 
Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, likewise shared their wisdom and knowledge 
of the dynamics of Alliance and Barisan Nasional politics.
I am also grateful to Chinese leaders from the Gerakan 
Rakyat Malaysia, Democratic Action Party (DAP) and other parties 
for having provided me with invaluable insights into the MCA and 
the broader spectrum of Chinese politics at large. I especially 
wish to thank Dr, Lim Kheng Yaik, Dr. Goh Cheng Teik;and Alex Lee 
of the Gerakan; Lim Kit Siang and Lee Lam Thye of the DAP; and 
Tan Sri Dr, Tan Chee Khoon, now retired from active politics but 
previously a major force in the Labour Party and Pekemas.
In addition, I want to thank the many helpful individuals 
in the MCA, UMNO, Gerakan, DAP and other parties whom I have not,
Vin the interest of space, been able to mention by name here. I am 
also indebted to the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, where I was given access to research facilities as a 
Research Associate. In particular, I would like to thank Mrs, 
Patricia Lim, the ISEAS Librarian, for making available to me the 
Instituted collection of the Tan Cheng Lock papers. The staff of 
Arkib Negara, Euala Lumpur, likewise rendered me invaluable 
assistance when I consulted its records.
Finally, I am deeply grateful to my thesis supervisor,
Dr, Ruth McVey, for her guidance, insistence on high academic 
standards and patience.
In presenting this thesis I hope to make a meaningful 
contribution to the study of Chinese politics in Peninsular
Malaysia, a subject too long slighted by serious scholarship. I
am acutely aware, however, of the limitations of my study. I 
especially regret that, despite my desire to present as much new 
data as possible, I have had to keep the discussion within
manageable bounds and thus be selective both in time frame and 
scope of analysis. Nonetheless, I hope that my findings will 
suggest fruitful areas for possible future research and stimulate 
more thorough academic attention to the subject of Chinese politics 
in Malaysia.
INTRODUCTION
This study of the development of the Malayan Chinese , 
Association (MCA) from 1949 to 1957 seeks to provide a deeper 
understanding of both the dynamics of intra-community Chinese 
political evolution and also the emergence of the MCA as a major 
force at the multi-ethnic political centre during a watershed 
period; the transformation of Malaya from colony to independent 
nation state.
The discussion of MCA party organisation, function, 
policies and activities focuses mainly on the manner in which 
the party reflected and served the needs of the Chinese community. 
During the pre-independence years of the party’s existence, which 
were undoubtedly its halcyon years, the MCA was a microcosm of 
mainstream Chinese political development in the sense that it 
mirrored the prevailing non-communist political culture in both 
form and content. It was in that period an unusual hybrid insti­
tution which combined the ideological and organisational 
characteristics, as well as the resources, of the elitist 
westernised and the mass-based political cultures of the Chinese 
community in Malaya, Embodying both modem and traditional 
elements, the MCA was a dynamic, effective organisation congruent 
with the fast-changing Chinese needs arising from the Emergency 
(1948-1960), the growth of an assertive Malay nationalism and the 
accelerating movement toward decolonisation.
This thesis argues that the MCA played a crucial role in 
nurturing the growth of a Malayan-centred Chinese political 
consciousness. It was the vehicle which expressed the will of 
conservative Malayan-centred Chinese nationalism, linking up the 
concerns of that community with mainstream Malay nationalist develop­
ments, particularly through its political alliance with the United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO). The party's pivotal role in 
Chinese politics is most clearly demonstrated by its achievement in 
the independence movement of obtaining constitutional safeguards 
that legitimised Chinese participation in the political process of 
independent Malaya.
The thesis is organised chronologically. The discussion 
begins with a background chapter on patterns of Chinese community 
organisation and political activity from the mid-nineteenth century 
up to the period when the MCA was formed in 1949. The chapter analyst 
the prevalent forms of Chinese political culture represented by the 
Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) and the Kuomintang Malaya 
(KMTM) as well as their relationship with the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP), which represented the third prevalent Chinese political 
culture in the pre-World War II period.'* The discussion then 
examines the changes brought about by the Japanese Occupation on 
leadership patterns, organisational and mobilising principles 
within the Chinese community. After the war the MCP emerged as a
1. The term political culture is used here to denote the political 
orientation, attitudes, beliefs, sentiments and style of both 
leaders and followers within the specific social and political 
groupings covered in this study.
powerful political force, but its position was quickly undermined 
by developments during the British Military Administration (BMA) 
and Malayan Union period. Soon after the inauguration of the 
Malayan Federation in February 1948, the MCP launched its armed 
insurrection, once again changing the balance of power within the 
Chinese community.
It was against the backdrop of a State of Emergency that 
the MCA was formed in February 1949. Chapter 2 begins with a brief 
discussion of the origins of the party, particularly the role 
played by Tan Cheng Lock. The focus of attention concentrates on 
an analysis of the ideological content as well as social and 
organisational structure of the party. From an examination of the 
social sources of leadership and membership recruitment, we can see 
that the MCA was ideologically wedded to the two conservative pre­
war strands of political culture represented by the SCBA and KMTM. 
Its organisational and mobilisational principles, however, were 
founded upon the traditional associational network represented by 
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (CCC) and huay kuan (voluntary 
association) establishment. Despite its KMTM ideological cast and 
its CCC-huay kuan organisational base, the MCA was also at the same 
time, a recognisable modern day political party with strong Malayan- 
centred objectives, the foremost of which was to wean the Chinese 
community from China-oriented preoccupations and to integrate 
Chinese concerns into mainstream Malayan nationalist developments.
The remaining chapters trace the MCA's development 
chronologically. Chapter 3 looks at the party's earliest days,
when its activities consisted mainly of welfare work undertaken to 
alleviate hardships suffered by the Chinese community during the 
Emergency. The party performed extensive relief activities among the 
Chinese squatter population resettled in New Villages, Party 
leaders also liaised closely with the colonial authorities to deal 
with other urgent Emergency-related problems, most notably the 
issue of Chinese manpower recruitment and the plight of Chinese 
detainees,
The party's Emergency welfare work and its CCC-huay kuan 
organisational base made it resemble more a traditional mutual aid 
organisation than a modern day political party. With moves by the 
British Government to prepare Malaya for self-rule, the top party 
leadership was concerned to give the MCA a more efficient political 
machinery to take advantage of impending political reforms, 
principally the introduction of local level elections. In 1952-53 
the top leadership implemented a reorganisation campaign, described 
in Chapter 4, to weaken the KMTM and CCC-huay kuan elements in the 
party in order to strengthen its Maiayan-centred nationalist 
credentials as well as its election-participation machinery. While 
the reorganisation campaign was only partially successful - it did 
not rid the MCA of its KMTM and CCC-huay kuan links - it did help 
to dispel the party's image as a purely welfare organisation and 
embarked the MCA on an overtly political course of action.
Chapter 5 discusses the MCA's first experience with 
multi-ethnic politics when it was represented in the Communities 
Liaison Committee (CLC) together with leading figures of the Malay 
and Indian communities. The CLC discussions (1949-1951) were the
first of many subsequent negotiations between the UMNO and 
MCA leaders on socially salient issues, particularly citizenship 
and special rights, which culminated in the Alliance independence 
negotiations of 1956-57.
With the introduction of local level elections in Kuala 
Lumpur in 1952, the MCA initially experimented with two forms of 
inter-ethnic political accommodation, namely, multi-racial 
integration and communally-based cooperation. Party president Tan 
Cheng Lock led the party in the direction of multi-racial integra- 
tionist politics with the Independence Malayan Party (IMP), while
H.S. Lee and Ong Yoke Lin, the party leaders in Kuala Lumpur, 
sought a communally-based alliance with, the UMNO. The outcome of 
the Kuala Lumpur election showed the latter to be the more viable 
and acceptable means of political accommodation at the elite as well 
as electoral grassroots level. Consequently, the UMNO-MCA Alliance 
was expanded and strengthened, thus leading to the institutionali- ; 
sation of communally-based politics in Malaya, and setting the MCA 
on its collaborationist political course.
Spurred by its electoral successes at the local and state 
level, the UMNO-MCA Alliance concentrated on seizing the initiative 
of the independence movement. Chapter 6 examines the means and 
process whereby the Alliance out manoeuvred its main rival, the IMP, 
for leadership of the nationalist movement, and successfully 
persuaded the British Government to speed up the timetable for 
independence,
The organisational and mobilisational principles of the 
MCA enabled it to tap the financial and manpower resources of the
CCC-huay kuan establishment and its mass-based Chinese-educated 
clientele. This, together with the political ability and sophis­
tication of the party English-educated top leadership, underlay 
the MCA's usefulness to the UMNO. Although the UMNO felt uneasy 
about the continued pro-Kuomintang orientation in the party lower 
echelons, the Maiayan-centred commitment and loyalty of the English- 
educated top leadership assuaged UMNO fears concerning the MCA's 
nationalist credentials.
The prominent role played by the MCA in the independence 
campaign generated for it a great measure of popularity within the 
Chinese community at large. This support, combined with the party's 
initiative on Chinese education exemplified by the campaign against 
the 1952 Educational Ordinance (which threatened the existence of 
Chinese schools) and the UMNO's accommodation of Chinese economic 
and cultural interests during the country's first Federal General 
Elections of 1955, produced a high point in the party's status and 
political fortunes.
Chapter 7 examines the complicated and protracted final 
stage of the independence campaign, when the MCA negotiated a 
constitutional deal with the UMNO and the MIC. The British 
Government had established the Reid Constitutional Commission to 
recommend the terms of Malayan independence, but the Federation of 
Malaya Constitution 1957 was based more on the Alliance independence 
blueprint, the Alliance Merdeka compact, than on the Reid proposals. 
The basic compromise reached between the MCA and the UMNO in the 
Alliance Merdeka compact was citizenship based on the principle of 
jus soli for non-Malays in exchange for privileged economic and
cultural treatment for Malays. In supporting the UMNO position on 
Malay special rights, the English-educated MCA top leadership lost 
the support of a group of second level Chinese-educated leadership, 
who in turn led a breakaway movement to seek a pro-Chinese consti­
tutional deal from Whitehall.
The rest of the chapter analyses the process and means 
whereby the top leadership undercut the position of the breakaway 
leadership and reimposed control over the party and the Chinese 
community at large. Patronage of the UMNO and the British 
authorities, and the discrediting of the breakaway movement as a 
pro-Kuomintang force, were the main ingredients which accounted for 
the top leadership's success. The breakaway experience, however, 
marked the beginning of disillusionment of the Chinese-educated 
second echelon leadership and membership regarding the efficacy and 
desirability of the top leadership's collaborationist mode of 
political accommodation as a means of achieving Chinese goals.
The concluding chapter summarises the major themes and 
arguments of the thesis, illustrating how the MCA had evolved from 
its pre-World War II conservative political culture represented by 
the KMTM and SCBA; how it drew upon the organisational and 
mobilising resources of the CCC-huay kuan establishment to create 
a widespread support base; and how it developed into an effective 
modern day political machinery playing a prominent role in the 
independence movement through the medium of collaborationist 
politics within the Alliance. The study concludes with a brief 
appraisal of the continued viability of the MCA's collaborationist 
political philosophy as the most effective means of achieving
Chinese goals in the post-independence period, compared to the 
integrationist and confrontational approaches espoused by other 
present day Chinese-based political organisations.
1CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE MALAYAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION
This chapter introduces the historical forces which 
shaped the Chinese community in Malaya up to the formation of the 
Malayan Chinese Association in 1949. A broad understanding of the 
evolution of Chinese power structures, perceptions, and methods of 
mobilisation and control, and the interrelationship of contending 
power groups within the community prior to 1949, is necessary to 
appreciate the origins of the MCA as well as the manner in which 
the party itself manifested the interplay of socio-political forces 
in the Chinese community.
The historical forces are described from two perspectives: 
first, the organisational structures of the Chinese community; and 
second, the processes through which the community carried out and 
regulated its relations with the colonial and Malay cuthorities.
The exposition of the first perspective centres on the socio-economic 
structures and political groupings which evolved within the 
community with the advent of mass Chinese immigration to Malaya 
from the early nineteenth century onwards: namely, secret societies,
voluntary associations and political organisations such as 
the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA), the Kuomintang 
Malaya (HMTM) and Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The second 
perspective illustrates the manner in which the Chinese community
2interacted with the authorities through their changing organisa­
tional structures and through institutions such as the Kapitan China 
system in the nineteenth century and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, 
voluntary associations and political groupings after 1900.
Generally speaking, one can discern three distinct phases 
in the pattern of Chinese immigration and settlement in Malaya:
(1) the earliest period, from the beginning of the fifteenth 
century to the founding of the Straits Settlements by the British, 
which saw the establishment of the Baba (Straits Chinese) community;
(2) after the advent of mass immigration from the 1820s onwards,
when the Laukeh^ community emerged and flourished; and (3) from the
1900s to the outbreak of World War Two, when political groupings
2
took shape and political activities proliferated.
1.1 Early Chinese Settlement in Malaya: the Babas
Chinese settlement in Malaya dates back to the founding 
of the Malacca Sultanate when traders, mainly Hokkiens from Fukien 
Province, began to settle in the thriving seaport of Malacca. The 
legacy of this early settlement was the emergence of the Bab a (known 
also as Straits Chinese or Peranakan) community, which exists today
1. "Laukehs” (literally, old guests) refers to established Chinese 
immigrants and to Malayan-born Chinese who were socialised within 
a completely Chinese milieu. Newly-arrived immigrants were 
commonly called "Sinkehs" (new guests).
2. For a historical account of Chinese immigration to Malaya, see 
Purcell V., The Chinese in Malaya, Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1967 (reprint), chs.1-5.
3as a minority cultural group in the former Straits Settlements of 
Malacca, Penang and Singapore.1 Baba culture is predominantly 
Chinese, but overlaid with Malay and European elements. While Babas 
have retained Chinese religious, cultural and familial practices, 
they have been socially, culturally and, to a lesser extent, 
biologically assimilated into Malay society. Most Babas speak 
Malay or patois Malay, eat Malay food and practice certain Malay 
customs, but few have converted to Islam. After the founding of the 
Straits Settlements (Penang in 1786, Singapore in 1819, and Malacca 
in 1824) and the commencement of British colonial rule, the Babas 
became fluent in English and proficient in western modes of tran­
sacting business. They also took to western styles of dressing and 
recreational habits, but retained most of their Chinese and Malay 
traits.
The Babas were the earliest mercantile and professional 
class within the Chinese community in Malaya. Being the first 
settlers and trading pioneers, they had accumulated capital which 
enabled them to set up business enterprises with the onset of 
British colonial rule. When Singapore was founded in 1819, wealthy 
Baba merchants from Malacca moved to the area and financed the
1. Studies on Baba society and culture include the following:
Clammer, J.R., Straits Chinese Society: Studies in the Sociology 
of the Baba Communities of Malaysia and Singapore, Singapore 
University Press, 1980; Png Pob Seng, "The Straits Chinese in 
Singapore: A Case of Local Identity and Socio-cultural Assimi­
lation”, JSEAH, Vol.10, no.l, 1969; and Tan Chee Beng, "Baba 
and Nonya: A Study of the Ethnic Identity of the Chinese 
Peranakan in Malacca”, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1979, 
chs.4-10.
4gambier and pepper agricultural industries of Singapore and Johore.
These Baba capitalists also acted as compradors between the European
import-export agency houses and Chinese retailers and shopkeepers.
In addition, the Babas were numerically strong in the professional
classes of the Straits Settlements, joining the legal, medical and
teaching professions, and serving as clerks in the colonial 
2
administration.
The mass arrival of Chinese immigrants and their control
of the tin and agricultural industries after the 1820s eclipsed
Baba predominance of the economic life of the Straits Settlements.
In addition, with the mass influx of immigrants the size of the Baba
community was proportionately diminished. In 1911 the percentage
of local-born Chinese stood at 23% in the Straits Settlements and
3
8% in the Federated Malay States. The Baba proportion was much 
smaller than these percentages indicate, since by 1911 many of 
the locally bora were from the growing immigrant population, 
virtually none of whom took on attributes of the Baba culture. 
Surrounded and outnumbered by the immigrants, the Babas gradually 
became resinicised, especially in their increased use of the Chinese 
dialects. However, they did not completely assimilate into Chinese
1. Lee Poh. Ping's study of the early economic history of Singapore 
reveals that the Malacca Baba merchants dominated the Chinese 
commercial class in Singapore. Lee Poh Ping, Chinese Society 
in Nineteenth Century Singapore, Oxford University Press, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1978, pp.13-27,
2. Png, p.103.
3. Nathan, J.E., The Census of British Malaya, London, 1922, p.95.
5culture, but still retained many Anglo-Malay socio-cultural traits 
that made it possible for them to become effective political and 
cultural brokers between the Malay, Chinese and colonial societies.
1.2 Mass Settlement in the 19th and 20th Centuries; the Laukehs
The free inflow of immigrants to Malaya continued unabated 
until the enactment of the Immigration Restriction Ordinance (1929) 
and Aliens Ordinance (1933) curbed the process. Bringing with them 
their way of life, their ethical systems and their socio-economic 
modes of organisation, the immigrants established community patterns 
in Malaya which were extensions of their life styles in their home 
villages and towns. This phenomenon resulted in the creation of an 
"encapsulated' China-oriented Laukeh community within a British 
colonial structure (after 1874) and an indigenous Malay population.1 
Before discussing the types of organisations developed by the immi­
grants in Malaya, it is necessary to describe the Chinese proto­
types on which they were based.
1. The concept "encapsulated community" is based on M. J. Swartz's 
and F.G. Bailey's definition of the power relationship between 
the host society, the "encapsulating" system, and the local 
level "encapsulated" system. See Bailey, F.G., Stratagem and 
Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1969; and Swartz, M.J., Local Level Politics: Social and 
Cultural Perspectives, University of London Press, London, 1969. 
Judy Strauch applies the concept to the Malaysian context in 
her study, Chinese Village Politics in the Malaysian State, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981, ch.l.
61.2.1 Southeast China Origins
Three principal types of socio-economic organisations 
existed in the south eastern provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien, the 
area where the majority of immigrants came from. The first, and 
by far the most important, was the lineage system; the second, the 
voluntary association; the third, the secret society.
The village in Southeast China was the outcome of lineage
settlement,* and in the nineteenth century local government was
managed largely by the leading branch families of lineages. Imperial
officials delegated this local gentry the responsibility to oversee
the progress of public works, to assure local defence, and to
2
provide relief in times of floods and famines. Local autonomy was 
even more pronounced in Kwangtung and Fukien, the two provinces 
which provided the great bulk of immigrants to Malaya. There, not 
only were whole villages populated by single lineages, but in certain
1. Hsiao, K.C., Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth 
Century, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1960, p.324.
For a discussion of the organising principles, functions and 
size of Chinese lineages, see Feng, H.Y., The Chinese Kinship 
System, Harvard University Press, n.d; Freedman, M,, Chinese 
Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung, Athlone Press, London, 
1966; Freedman, M. (ed.), Family and Kinship in Chinese Society, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1970; Freedman, M., Lineage 
Organisation in Southeastern China, Athlone Press, London, 1958. 
Hsu, F.L.K., Clan, Caste and Club, D.V. Nostrand Co. Inc., 
Princeton, 1963; Hu, H.C., The Common Descent Group in China 
and its Functions, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, New 
York, 1948. Lang, 0., Chinese Family and Society, Yale Univer­
sity Press, New Haven, 1946; Liu, Hui-Chen Wang, "An Analysis
of Chinese Clan Rules: Confucian Theories in Action", in Nivison, 
D.S. and Wright, A.F.(eds.), Confucianism in Action, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1966.
2. Hsiao, chs. 7, 8. See also Chu Tung Tsu, Local Government under 
the Ching, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1962, ch.10.
7areas one single lineage settled over a few villages. It can be 
seen, therefore, that immigrants came to Malaya from a region in 
China dominated by highly organised strong lineages which enjoyed 
a large degree of political autonomy. The lineage system of rural 
China, however, was not transplanted to Malaya, as lineages did not 
migrate in toto. Usually, only the more destitute or adventurous 
members of the lineage would leave their home villages in search of 
a better livelihood overseas.
The existence of the lineage as the basic unit of social
organisation meant that when people moved out of their villages,
they sought to combine in organisations which would perform similar
mutual aid and mutual protection functions. These characteristics
2
were common to the voluntary organisations (huay-kuans) founded by 
groups of Chinese outside their home villages both in China and 
overseas. Voluntary associations in China proliferated in urban 
centres populated by different lineages and diverse dialect groups. 
Three major types of voluntary associations developed: the dialect/ 
territorial association, the trade guild and the clan or surname 
association. The dialect/territorial association admitted members 
based on common dialect group and territorial origins; the trade 
guild admitted members from the same craft, trade or service; and
1. Potter, J.M., "Land and Lineage in Traditional China”, in 
Freedman, M. (ed.), Family and Kinship..., p.136.
2. "Huay kuan” is used in this study to refer generally to an 
organisation or grouping of people, and does not refer only to 
the dialect/territorial association as is sometimes the case.
8the clan association recruited members having the same surname.
The principal functions of these voluntary associations were the 
provision of worship for common ancestors and gods; the settlement 
of disputes among members; the extension of aid to poorer members; 
and the supervision of burials of members. The trade guild concen­
trated on protecting its de facto monopoly in each craft and 
regulated conditions of work for members. Other minor types of 
voluntary associations also existed which looked after the general 
cultural and recreational needs of members. These included literary, 
dramatic, musical, pugilistic and mutual aid/funerary clubs.
The third type of socio-economic grouping in China, apart
from the lineage and voluntary association, was the secret society.
The secret society was not based on common blood or trade interests,
2
though membership was normally confined to the same dialect group.
It has been suggested that secret societies rose as an expression of
protest by an oppressed peasantry which had been already organised
into sects of shamanistic origins. The antiquity and long-standing
political potential of these sects can be seen in the fact that they
led the revolt which culminated in the founding of the Han dynasty 
3
in 200 B.C. Throughout the ages, bands of vagabonds and wanderers,
1. For an account of the historical origins and functions of these
associations, see Morse, H.B., The Gilds of China, Longmans,
Green and Co., New York, Bombay and Calcutta, 1909.
2. For an account of secret societies in China, see Chesneaux, J.,
Secret Societies in China in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1971; and Blythe, 
W., The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1969, pp.14-35.
3. Blythe, p.16.
9usually victims of flood, famine, war or oppressive rule, gathered 
around charismatic leaders to harass the local authorities. They 
were united by secret rituals of initiation and oaths of loyalty to 
their society. The elaborate ceremonial rituals were based on 
precepts derived from popular Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, 
ancestor worship and belief in astral travel.
During the Ching dynasty, secret societies had developed 
into effective political organisations mobilising support against 
government and authority. They also constituted an extra-legal and 
alternative means of social mobility, allowing their members to 
achieve leadership status and to bypass the established hierarchical 
structure topped by the official and scholar.^- The largest and most 
influential secret societies in Southeast China were a group known 
collectively as the Triad Brotherhood (or the Heaven and Earth 
League or the Hung Brotherhood). The Triad Brotherhood had far 
wider political, social and economic control over its members than 
any form of social grouping other than the lineage. It was wide­
spread in both rural and urban areas and was also supported by the 
emerging proto-proletariat of the coastal ports. Its rigid hierar­
chical order, the quasi-patriarchical powers of its leaders, the 
juridical sway it exercised over members and the esoteric nature of 
its ceremonial rituals all served to augment the members* sense of 
absolute identification and loyalty, although they also may have 
belonged to voluntary associations and other groupings.
1. Blythe, p.18; Chesneaux, p.14.
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1.2.2 Patterns of Organisation in Malaya
Mass Chinese immigration to Malaya was prompted as much 
by the economic opportunities created by the British mercantile and 
administrative presence in the Straits Settlements and encouragement 
by the Malay authorities of tin-rich states as by adverse social and 
political conditions in China. British merchants residing in the 
Straits Settlements and Malay sultans were quick to grasp the fact 
that great profits could be made in the agricultural and tin mining 
industries of the west coast Malay States, provided the necessary 
pioneering work and clearing of jungle land were undertaken by a 
regular and large supply of cheap coolie labour. The British 
Government encouraged the flow of emigrants leaving China by forcing 
a treaty upon the Manchu Government which lifted the long-standing 
and traditional ban on emigration.*
The flow of immigrants to Malaya started in earnest after 
the 1820s. In 1824, the Chinese population in Singapore was 31% 
(3,317 people) of the total population. In 1860, it had jumped to 
61% (50,043). In Penang, it stood at 28% (8,270) in 1820. By 1860, 
it had grown to 46% (28,018). In the Malay States, the Chinese 
presence prior to the 1850s was insignificant. After that date, it 
increased so rapidly that it exceeded the Malay population in the 
tin rich areas. In 1891, there were 50,844 Chinese to 26,578 Malays 
in Selangor; in the Kinta district there were 39,513 Chinese to
1. Chan Ta, Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study of Over­
seas migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and 
Social Change, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1939, 
pp.49-53. The treaty was signed after China’s defeat in the 
Arrow War.
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14,472 Malays. By 1901, the overall Chinese population in the 
Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang) 
had exceeded the Malay population, the figures being 299,739 to 
285,27s.1
1.2.2(a) Secret Societies and the Kapitan China System
Upon their arrival in Malaya, groups of immigrants 
combined in organisations drawn from prototypes with which they were 
familiar in China to meet organisational and functional needs 
occasioned by the harsh pioneering conditions of the new society.
Of the three principal types of organisations in China - the lineage, 
the voluntary association and the secret society - the lineage, as 
we have seen, was not transplanted to Malaya.
However, political conditions in Malaya were conducive to 
the growth of secret societies and voluntary associations. The 
decentralised nature of Malay political power and the practice of 
indirect British rule after intervention in 1874 allowed the 
immigrants to exercise autonomy in the regulation of community 
affairs. Secret societies were the most prevalent organisational 
form throughout the nineteenth century, largely because they were 
more effective than voluntary associations in mobilising diverse 
Chinese masses in Malaya.
1. Taken from Report on the Census of the Straits Settlements taken 
on 5 April 1891, Government Printing Office, Singapore, 1892, 
p.31; Census of the State of Perak 1891, Perak Government 
Printing Office, Taiping, 1892, p.3; F.M.S. Census Papers 1901, 
Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 39 02, p.30; and, Purcell,
The Chinese in Malaya, p.68.
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Recruitment into voluntary associations, sis we have seen, 
wsis based on commonality of dialect and territorial origins, surname 
or craft affiliations, but in Malaya, the immigrants came from 
varied dialect and territorial backgrounds, and even fewer had 
common surname or craft affiliations. Secret societies, on the other 
hand, recruited across such barriers and members were bound together 
by the rituals of sworn brotherhood around a charismatic and semi- 
mystical head. Mak Lau Fong observes in his sociological study of 
secret societies in Peninsular Malaysia: "When sworn brotherhood 
binds Triad membership together, dialect differences are naturally 
de-emphasised, and the clan system is consigned to a secondary 
position.
A second, perhaps more important, reason why secret >
societies emerged as the dominant form of organisation stemmed from 
the class structure and sex ratio of the immigrant population in 
nineteenth century Malaya. These Chinese immigrants were largely 
young adult males drawn from the peasantry and working classes of 
China. The low female sex-ratio and working class structure of the 
immigrant population was particularly conducive to the tightly 
organised and male-oriented character of secret societies. However, 
as the female numbers increased and the population became sexually 
balanced, and as social mobility created an urban-based middle class 
mercantile population, voluntary associations assumed greater
1. Mak Lau Fong, The Sociology of Secret Societies: A Study of 
Chinese Secret Societies in Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia, 
Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1981, p.32.
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organisational relevance within the community, particularly after 
secret societies were banned by the colonial authorities in 1890, 
as we shall soon see.
Secret societies in Malaya until the imposition of the 
1890 ban were neither illegal or anti-government, as was the case in 
China. For example, though banned in China, the Triad Brotherhood 
was legal in Malaya and in fact comprised the predominant group of 
secret societies in the country. Instead of opposing the government, 
the Triads in Malaya worked to promote their members' livelihood 
through cooperative efforts of land clearing for agricultural and 
tin mining enterprises, and through fending off encroachments 
from rival secret societies. They became so powerful and influential 
that they' controlled the recruitment process of new immigrants from 
China to work in the plantations and tin mines. They also governed 
the economic activities of the immigrants and maintained law and 
order in their respective territorial preserves.^ In contrast to 
their outlawed status in China, secret societies in nineteenth 
century Malaya were the vehicles through which the British and Malay 
authorities conducted economic and political relations with the 
immigrant Chinese population, and the more influential secret society 
leaders were recognised as Kapitan Chinas by the authorities.
1. Blythe’s study is the best historical account of secret societies 
in Malaya. Other works include: Comber, L., Chinese Secret
Societies in Malaya, J.J. Augustin, New York, 1959; and Wynne, 
M.L., Triad and Tabut, Government Printing Office, Singapore, 
1941.
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The Kapitan China system, first introduced into Malacca 
by the Portuguese after 1511, underpinned the system of indirect 
rule used to govern the Chinese and other communities. The 
Portuguese appointed leaders of the various communities - Malay, 
Chinese, Arabs and Indians- as kapitans (captains) to act as 
political intermediaries between the colonial government and the 
indigenous population, and these kapitans were invested with certain 
executive, administrative and judicial powers. Upon replacing the 
Portuguese as the colonial power in Malacca after 1640, the Dutch 
continued the kapitan system. The British, who established their 
presence in Malaya after 1786, found it particularly useful in 
dealing with the Chinese in areas under their control, as did the 
Malay authorities faced with supervising the activities of the fast 
growing Chinese immigrant population in the Malay states.*
The Kapitan China system existed in the Straits Settlements
until 1826, when a Charter of Justice extended the jurisdiction of
the Recorder's Court in Penang throughout the Straits Settlements,
thus ending the foxmal role of the Kapitan Chinas as intermediaries
2
between the colonial government and its Chinese subjects. In the 
Malay states the system functioned officially until 1901. In both 
cases, however, unofficial Kapitan Chinas continued to be appointed 
long after the system had technically discontinued - until the 1880s 
in the Straits Settlements and as late as the 1930s in the Malay
1. Wong,CvS.., ;A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans, Government Printing 
Office, Singapore, 1963, pp.1-2; Mak, pp.26-27.
2. Wong, p.28.
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states. The system survived its official abolition because the 
authorities still depended on the services of Chinese political 
intermediaries to develop and exploit the commercial potential of 
the Straits Settlements and the Malay states, but lacked the adminis­
trative capacity to govern the Chinese community directly. The 
intermediaries were required to collect revenue from taxes imposed 
on local goods (tin, gambier and pepper) produced by the immigrants 
and to operate revenue-generating excise farms related to gambling 
and pawnbroking activities and the sale of pork, spirits and opium.
The unofficial Kapitan Chinas were also needed to maintain law and 
order and to attend to the general welfare within their local 
communities.
With the emergence of secret societies as the basic source
of social order within the Chinese community in nineteenth century
Malaya, secret society leaders were increasingly appointed as Kapitan
Chinas. These Kapitan Chinas cum secret society leaders - the most
famous of whom included Yap Ah Loy, a Kapitan China founder of Kuala
Lumpur and leader of the local Hai San secret society, Kapitan Chung
Keng Kwee of the Hai San in Larut and Kapitan Chin Ah Yam of the Ghee
Hin also in Larut - were major actors in the economic as well as
2
political life of the period. Besides their role in organising 
Chinese labourers for tin mining, land development and other activities, 
they became embroiled in Malay internecine feuds and thus played a
1. Blythe, p.83; Purcell, p.103.
2. Wong, ch.3; and, Middlebrook, S.M., "Yap Ah Loy 1837-1885", 
JMBRAS, Vol.24, pt.2, 1951.
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significant role in the events leading to British intervention in 
the Malay states.'*’
C. Trocki*s study on Johore and Singapore 1784-1885 shows
that the colonial and Malay authorities utilised a variant of the
Kapitan China system, the Kangchu (river chief or master) system,
as a major means of developing the pepper and gambier economy of
southern Malaya and regulating the activities of the immigrant 
2
Chinese labourers. Under the Kangchu system, land, usually near
the water front or waterways, was leased out to individuals or
groups of Chinese for cultivation and development, and lessees were
given the right to collect taxes, operate excise farms and exercise
functions of government over the immigrant population under their
charge. Secret societies were deeply involved in the operation of
the Kangchu system as exemplified by Tan Kee Soon, who was the head
3
of the Ngee Heng secret society and also the Kangchu of Tebrau.
Once the authorities recognised secret society leaders as 
men of authority within their own communities, secret societies 
became a major channel of social mobility within Chinese society.
1. For a discussion of the historical factors behind British inter­
vention, see Cowan C.D., Nineteenth-century Malaya: The Origins 
of British Political Control, Oxford University Press, London, 
1961. Parkinson, C.N., British Intervention in Malaya 1867-1877, 
University of Malaya Press, Singapore, 1960. Khoo Kay Kim, "The 
Origins of British Administration in Malaya", JMBRAS, Vol.39, 
pt.l, 1966. McIntyre, W.D., "Britaints Intervention in Malaya", 
JSEAH, Vol.2, no.3, 1961.
2. Trocki, C.A., Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Develop­
ment of Johore and Singapore 1784-1885, Singapore University 
Press, 1979, see especially ch.4.
3. Ibid., pp.104-105.
17
As political office and positions of leadership could not be 
inherited or attained through other means such as educational 
achievement, as was the case in China, wealth became a major 
criterion of leadership status within the Chinese community in 
Malaya.* However, an individual who became a secret society leader 
through physical prowess and dexterity in the martial arts could 
also become a Kapitan China or a Kangchu. Heading a secret society 
was also an important source and preserver of wealth because of the 
economic opportunities offered by the position. Wealthy merchants 
naturally aspired to become patrons of secret societies, because the 
authorities were willing to deal with them as heads of secret 
societies and also because secret societies offered opportunities 
to amass greater wealth.
Although secret societies were useful to the colonial
authorities as organisational vehicles of Chinese pioneering efforts
in Malaya, their drawbacks eventually led to the imposition of a
ban. The principal reason behind the colonial government's decision
to make secret societies illegal was the frequent outbreaks of
secret societ feuding, most commonly caused by economic and dialect
group rivalries, which disrupted the political and economic life of
2
the Straits Settlements. Between 1867 and 1889, the government 
vacillated between a policy of recognition and partial suppression
1. Wang Gungwu, "Traditional Leadership in a New Nation: the Chinese 
in Singapore and Malaya", in Alisjahbana, S.T. (ed.), The 
Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia. 
Malaysian Society of Orientalists, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, pp.172-175.
2. See Lee Poh Ping, ch.4; Blythe, pp.75-79, 94, 201-202.
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of secret societies in its quest for a successful formula to regulate
their activities.^ It also established a Chinese Protectorate in
2
1877 to help curb abuses arising from secret society powers. All 
these measures, however, failed to bring the secret societies to 
heel. With the gradual extension of the British administrative 
capacity, both in terms of taxation and security, the government 
finally decided that the convenience of having secret society leaders 
perform Kapitan China functions was far outweighed by the societies' 
anti-social behaviour and thus enacted the Societies Ordinance of 
1889, which effectively caused secret societies to become illegal 
organisations.
With the imposition of the ban, secret societies lost 
their previous status and powers within the Chinese community, and 
degenerated into underworld gangs involved in organised crime, 
drug-pushing, extortion and prostitution rackets. Although secret 
society leaders were no longer accredited leaders of the community, 
they continued to exert influence through their position as bosses 
of the underworld. They maintained personal relations with the new 
leaders of the community - the leaders of voluntary associations, 
and political groupings - by offering "protection" for the business 
activities of these leaders, by serving as their personal bodyguards 
or by becoming their partners in business deals. Despite their
1. Purcell, pp.169-172.
2. For an account of the functions of the Chinese Protectorate, see 
Jackson, R.N., Pickering Protector of Chinese, and Ng Siew Yong, 
"The Chinese Protectorate in Singapore 1877-1900", JSEAH, Vol.2, 
no.l, March 1961.
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illegal status, secret societies still possessed considerable 
organisational and financial muscle, and their support was covertly 
sought by the leaders of the Chinese community after 1900 (and up 
to the present).
1.2.2(b) Voluntary Associations: the Huay Kuans and Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce
Voluntary associations were formed in the period when 
secret societies dominated Chinese society in Malaya. While secret 
societies were concerned with facilitating the pioneering activities 
of the community, voluntary associations catered to general social 
and recreational needs of members such as the supervision of ancestor 
and deity worship, the overseeing of burials and maintenance of 
cemeteries, the settlement of disputes and the provision of mutual 
aid. The earliest huay kuans were dialect/territorial and clan 
associations, formed in the Straits Settlements as early as the 
1810s and in the Malay States in the 1850s. These were commonly 
formed by secret society leaders and the membership of the huay 
kuans overlapped with that of secret societies.'*'
1. For an account of the origins and development of voluntary
associations in Malaya, see Freedman, M., "Immigrants and Asso­
ciations: Chinese in Nineteenth Century Singapore".in Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, Vol.3, No.l, October 1960; Moese, 
W. , Reinknect, G. and Schmitz-Seiber, E., "Chinese Regionalism 
in West Malaysia and Singapore", unpublished study, Hamburg 
University, 1979, pp.180-462; Wan Ming Sing, "The History of 
the Organisation of hinese Community in Selangor with Particular 
Reference to the Problems of Leadership", M.A. thesis, University 
of Malaya, 1967; and the writer’s M.A. dissertation, "Chinese 
Social Organisation in Malaya and Singapore: A Study of Chinese 
Associations with special reference to the Teochew Community"
M.A. dissertation, University of Auckland, 1973.
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Secret societies were eclipsed by voluntary associations 
in importance and influence after the Societies Ordinance of 1889
suppressed the former and allowed the latter to operate freely.
Other factors also accounted for the growing importance of voluntary 
associations. As Chinese society had less of a frontier character
and as law and order were increasingly supplied by the British, the
community leaders became more and more capable of supporting 
voluntary associations. Rapid increases in the number of female 
immigrants after 1911 led to the establishment of a sexually balanced 
community, with a high percentage (63.5) of locally b o m  persons by 
1947.^ The growth of the modem commercial sector based on wealth 
generated by the tin and rubber industries in the period 1900-1941 
resulted in the development of urban centres and urban-based Chinese 
middle and working classes.
During the inter-war period, voluntary associations 
proliferated to meet the social, cultural and recreational needs of 
a consolidated and established Laukeh community in Malaya. Seven 
major types of voluntary associations existed: (1) the dialect/ 
territorial association formed at the provincial, prefecture, county 
and village level; (2) the clan/surname association; (3) the trade 
guild and Chamber of Commerce; (4) the cultural, dramatic and/or 
musical society; (5) the social/recreational society; (6) the 
religious/moral uplifting society; and (7) the mutual aid/funerary 
society. Of these, the huay kuan at the provincial level and the
1. del Tufo, M.W, Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of 
Population. London, ff.M.S.O., pp.57, 84.
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Chinese Chamber 6f Commerce (CCC) were the largest and most
important types of organisation.
The provincial huay kuan was the paramount organisation 
within each dialect group and the CCC was the most important pan­
dialect organisation. The CCC may be said to be a transitional form
of organisation between a traditional association and a modem 
organisation. On the one hand, it derived from the ancient Chinese 
merchant guild and, on the other hand, it reflected a new Chinese 
organisational form.. The CCC was promoted by the Ching government 
at the turn of the twentieth century as part of the Manchu reformist 
movement to generate nationalism and modernise China in the face of 
the western imperialist threat to China’s sovereignty. In 1902, the 
Ching government encouraged trade guilds in each city in China to 
combine in chambers of commerce to promote commerce and national 
unity.*
Chinese Chambers of Commerce were introduced in Malaya
after 1905 by Manchu officials as part of the Chinese government’s
campaign to promote commerce and Chinese nationalism among the hua
2
chiao (overseas Chinese) in Southeast Asia. Their efforts resulted 
in the formation of the Singapore CCC in 1906, and other Chambers
1. Garrett, S.S., ’’The Chambers of Commerce and the YMCA”, in 
Elvin, M. and Skinner, G.W. (ed.), The Chinese City Between 
Two Worlds, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1974, p.217.
2. Suyama, Taku, ’’Pang Societies and the Economy of Chinese 
Immigrants: A Study on Communalism in Southeast Asia” in Review 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 7, Singapore, 1977, p.16.
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were subsequently formed throughout Malaya - in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, 
Malacca, Ipoh, Seremban and other Chinese urban centres. In Malaya, 
the CCC served at least as a way of negotiating disagreements 
between dialect groups that would otherwise have been fought along 
sectional lines. They promoted a sense of unity that cut across 
dialect boundaries and were instrumental in engendering the spirit 
of Chinese nationalism within the Chinese community in Malaya. They 
were also instrumental in providing for a united front in dealing 
with the authorities in the absence of the Kapitan China system.
The day-to-day functions of the CCC centred primarily on 
the promotion of Chinese commerce, but they were concerned also with 
the regulation of community affairs which had previously been 
performed by the Kapitan Chinas. However, the CCC leaders' role was 
much more circumscribed, as the colonial government had greatly 
increased its administrative and judicial capability. With the 
reduced autonomy of the Chinese community, the powers of the CCC 
leaders were limited to the promotion of Chinese commerce and 
community welfare services.
CCC leaders formed a number of other inter-dialect organi­
sations to promote Chinese unity and carry out social welfare and 
recreational activities within the community. These included the 
Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall in Kuala Lumpur, the Perak Chinese 
Association in Ipoh, and the Johore Bahru Chinese Association. The 
pre-eminence of the CCC and their subsidiary pan-Chinese associations 
reflected the commercial importance and social dominance of 
merchants within Chinese society in Malaya.
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1.3 Political Groupings, 1900-1941
The rise of the CCC, directly promoted by the Manchu 
Government as a pan-Chinese vehicle for generating Chinese nationalism 
ushered in the political awakening of the Laukeh community in Malaya. 
However, this increased political consciousness was not expressed 
through the CCC, which was not a political party, as much as through 
two overtly political groupings even more closely linked to parent 
bodies in China, the Kuomintang Malaya (KMTM) and the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP). A third major political actor during the 
period was the pro-British indigenous Straits Chinese British Asso­
ciation (SCBA).
In this section we will discuss these three political 
organisations from the standpoint of their origins, their sources of 
support and their inter-relationships with each other and the 
colonial government.
1.3.1 The Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA)
The SCBA was formed in Singapore and Malacca in 1900 to 
safeguard the political privileges enjoyed by Chinese who were 
Straits-bom British subjects, as well as to promote their social 
and educational welfare.* Although the SCBA displayed a British-
1. Straits-bom Chinese could acquire British nationality after
1867 in accordance with Section 8 of the Naturalisation Ordinance. 
Lee Yong Hock, "A History of the Straits Chinese British Asso­
ciation 1900-1959", BA Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 
1960, p.8. See also pp.10-16. The Penang SCBA was not formed 
until 1920. See Ooi, Diana, "A Study of the English-speaking 
Chinese of Penang 1900-1941” , MA Thesis, University of Malaya, 
1967, pp.94-100.
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oriented political affiliation, it was also the first political 
organisation in Malaya to articulate the need to generate a common 
Malayan identity among the different communities in the country. 
However, it remained a small party even in its heyday - for 
example in 1931, it had only 1,060 members out of an estimated 
Straits Chinese population of 200,000.* Nonetheless, its political 
impact and significance was considerable, thanks in large measure to 
its highly capable leadership and the role the colonial government 
permitted it to play in the political life of the Straits Settlements.
SCBA leaders were English*educated professional men and
2
wealthy merchants acculturated to British ways and ideas. At the 
same time a considerable proportion of Babas had become resinicised 
as a result of prolonged economic and social contact with the Laukeh 
population. The process of resinification, encouraged by increasing 
inter-marriage between Laukehs and Babas, occurred mostly along 
cultural and social lines. Few Babas displayed political orientations 
towards China, but maintained instead an Anglophilic political 
identification as expressed by the SCBA. However, some of the 
resinicised Baba leaders were able to operate on both Baba and Laukeh 
planes, thus taking advantage of what both cultures offered in terms 
of social status and political power. In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, a few wealthy Baba merchants were able to span
1. Ooi, p .105.
2. For a breakdown of the occupational and educational background 
of the office-holders of the Singapore SCBA from 1900-1941, see 
Yang Ching Fatt, "A Preliminary Study of Chinese Leadership in 
Singapore, 1900-1941”, JSEAH, Vol.9, no.2, September 1968,
p.264.
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the two cultures and become secret society leaders. A prominent
example was Tan Kim Cheng, a Ghee Kin headman and unofficial
Kapitan China in Singapore during the 1860s to 1880s. After 1900
a small group of Baba leaders, most notably Dr. Lim Boon Keng, were
2
involved in China-oriented politics, but their contribution to the 
development of Chinese nationalist politics in Malaya was insigni­
ficant compared to that of the Laukeh leaders.
The most prominent leaders in the SCBA was Tan Cheng Lock,
Dr. Lim Boon Keng, Song Ong Siang, Han Hoe Lim and Lim Cheng Ean.
These men were appointed by the colonial government to serve on the
Straits Settlements Legislative Council, where they were active in
pressing for political and educational reforms. Arguably, their
most important achievement was their success in 1932 in persuading
the government to open up the Straits Settlements Civil Service to
3
non-European Ci.e. Asian) British subjects.
Of central relevance to this study are the ideas of Tan 
Cheng Lock, who headed the Malacca SCBA from 1928 to 1935, and who 
subsequently was instrumental in forming the MCA, which he led from 
1949 to 1958.
1. See Khoo Kay Kim, The Western Malay States 1850-1875: the Effects 
of Commercial Development on Malay Politics, Oxford University 
Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1.972, pp.202-207.
2. See Yen Ching-Hwang, "The Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore 
and Malaya 1899-1911n, JSEAS, Vol.7, no.l, March 1976.
3. Lee Yong Hock, pp.54-55.
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Like other SCBA leaders in the early period, Cheng Lock
emphasised that the local-born Straits Chinese were loyal only to
the British Government and were proud of their status as British
subjects. In a speech delivered on 3 November 1924 in the Straits
Settlements Legislative Council, he said:^
... I can assure you we are animated by a sense of 
loyalty and duty to serve this Empire and Throne to 
whom we owe allegiance, and inspired by an earnest 
and keen desire to make this country and the Empire 
our real and permanent home.
However, Cheng Lock's Anglophilism was overlaid with a. Malayan-
centred patriotism which questioned the continuation of colonial
tutelage for the people of Malaya. He urged the government to grant
self-rule to Malaya and advocated implementation of policies which
would generate a common Malayan consciousness among the various races.
For example, in 1926 he said:2
Our ultimate political goal should be a united self- 
governing British Malaya with a Federal Government 
and Parliament for the whole of it, functioning at a 
convenient centre, say, at Kuala Lumpur, and with as 
much autonomy in purely local affairs as possible 
for each of its constituent parts. I think that it 
is high time that we commence to take action towards 
forging the surest and strongest link of that United 
Malaya by fostering and creating a true Malayan 
spirit and consciousness amongst its people to the 
complete elimination of the racial or communal 
feeling.
Cheng Lock urged the government to introduce legislative reforms so 
that the Legislative Council would contain an elected majority. He 
argued that the introduction of franchise and an elected unofficial 
majority in the country’s legislature would stir the people's
1. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, 
3 November 1924, B120.
2. Ibid., 1 November 1926, B161.
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interest in political affairs and put an end to the prevalent mood 
of political apathy.*
He also asked the government to introduce educational
i
t
reforms to generate a spirit of Malayan consciousness and identity
2
among the different races:
I hope that the policy of the Government in the 
matter of education, as well as in other matters, 
is one of Malaya for the Malayans and not only 
for one section of the people; and I also hope 
that the policy of Government will be one of 
Malaya for the people who have made Malaya, who 
are loyal to the country, to the Empire and to
the King, so that thereby you will get a contented
people, a people who from year to year will grow
more contented and more and more loyal to our 
King, country and Empire.
Cheng Lock was against High Commissioner Sir Cecil Clementi's proposal
to introduce free primary education in the Malay language as a means
to Malayanise the children of the various races. Like some Baba and
all the Laukeh leaders, he did not want the Chinese in Malaya to
adopt Malay characteristics at the expense of shedding their Chinese
heritage. Addressing the Legislative Council on 12 February 1934,
he said he endorsed the government's intention to use education as
a means to create a common sense of Malaya consciousness. He hoped,
however, that the process of Malayanisation envisaged would not
3
result in the non-Malays being assimilated into Malay culture:
1. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settle­
ments , 3 November 1924, B160.
2. Ibid., 8 December 193Q, B174-175.
3. Ibid., 12 February 1934, B18.
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I hope and presume that the term "Malayanization" 
does not at all imply that the Government has the 
least intention in view, however remote, ultimately 
to attempt the mixing ethnologically of the various 
races living in Malaya, so that the product of this 
race mixture will be a homogenous amalgamation in 
whom the Malay characteristics will predominate, or 
to make non-Malays adopt the Malay language as their 
own.
He added that the Babas should not acquire more Malay traits, but 
should instead "be brought into harmony with their native Chinese 
ethos" in order that Chinese customs and traditions would be 
preserved in Malaya. ^
Cheng Lock's speeches reveal some important themes.
Firstly, his stress on the need for the creation of a common Malayan 
identity among the different races and his call for self-rule were 
ideas which were politically progressive in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Secondly, while the SCBA and the Straits Chinese vowed political 
loyalty to the British Government, they also wanted to retain their 
Chinese cultural roots. These dual objectives of the Babas reflect 
the extent to which they had been resinicised as a result of their 
being engulfed by the Laukeh masses and the revival of interest in 
China generated by the rise of Chinese nationalism. Cheng Lock him­
self, very much a resinicised Baba, demonstrated his concern for 
the preservation of Chinese language and culture many years later 
during his term of office as MCA President.
Basically an elitist organisation dominated by English- 
educated professionals and intellectuals, the SCBA's influence within
1. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, 
12 February 1934, B22.
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the Chinese community at large, compared to the mass based KMTM and 
MCP, was small. Nonetheless, its leaders were politically articu­
late and were the only voices of the Chinese community recognised by 
the colonial government. Thus, their backing was sought by the 
Chinese parties and by the CCC-huay kuan establishment.
Throughout the period from 1911 to 1941 the SCBA carefully 
avoided identifying itself with Laukeh nationalist activities 
organised by either the left or right wing. It goes without saying 
that the Anglophile capitalist leadership of the SCBA found the 
Communist movement highly objectionable. Speaking in the Straits 
Settlements Legislative Council in October 1932, Tan Cheng Lock 
described the MCP as a movement led by "a few misguided Hylams of 
the class of domestic servants to sow the seed of the poison of 
communism...."* In the same speech, he also endorsed the government's 
containment of the KMTM's activities. While Cheng Lock's unsympa­
thetic attitude towards the MCP accurately reflected the general 
feeling of the Baba community, a small group of SCBA leaders, notably 
Dr. Lim Boon Keng, a founder member of the SCBA, openly identified 
with the KMTM and were actively involved in its inception and subse­
quent development. The SCBA, however, did not condone the open 
pursuit of KMT activities by its leaders and when it decided that
Lim Boon Keng had gone too far in his identification with the KMT,
2
he was no longer elected to any position in the Association.
1. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, 
19 October 1932, B144.
2. Pang Wing Seng, "The 'Double-Seventh* Incident 1937: Singapore 
Chinese Response to the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War",
JSEAS, Vol.4, no.2, September 1973, p.294.
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Baba identification with Chinese nationalism was strongest
during the National Salvation Movement (NSM) 1937-1941 when the
Chinese community in Malaya was deeply involved in fund-raising
campaigns in support of China against the Japanese invasion.* The
British Government sympathised with, the anti-Japanese activities and
allowed the Chinese in Malaya to mobilise support for China's war 
2
effort. Many Baba leaders openly organised relief fund collections
and concerts in aid of the NSM. On the whole, however, SCBA leaders
who held office in government bodies such as the Legislative Council
3
and Municipal Commissions refrained from participating in the NSM, 
probably because they were against any form of political loyalty 
except identification with the British and with Malaya.
While SCBA leaders generally stayed away from the KMTM, 
they maintained links with the CCC and huay kuans out of the need 
to have close economic and social ties with the wealthy and influential 
Laukeh associational leadership (and partly because the CCC and huay 
kuans, although allied to the KMTM, did not become a political wing 
of the KMTM, as we shall shortly see) „ Many Baba leaders had strong
1. For a discussion of the National Salvation Movement, see Leong, 
Stephen, "The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya during 
the National Salvation Period 1937-1941", JSEAS, Vol. 8, no.l, 
March 1977; Akashi, Yoji, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation 
Movement 1937-1941, Centre for East Asian Studies, University
of Kansas, 1970.
2. Leong, Stephen, M.Y., "Sources, Agencies and Manifestations of 
Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941", Ph.D. thesis, 
University of California, 1976, pp.597-598.
3. Pang, pp.293, 295.
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economic and professional links with Laukeh CCC and huay kuan 
leaders and several successful commercial enterprises were the 
result of joint business ventures by Baba and Laukeh merchants: 
e.g., the Ho Hong Bank, the Overseas Chinese Bank and the United 
Saw Mills in Singapore.* In addition, a number of SCBA leaders, 
including Tan Cheng Lock, held office in the CCC and dialect/ 
territorial huay kuans.
Despite the social, business and limited political inter­
action between the Babas and Laukehs, the English education, pro- 
British orientation and strong attachment to western political 
concepts set most of them apart from the Chinese-educated^ Sino- 
centric CCC and huay kuan leaders. The fundamental difference in 
political outlook was further demonstrated in the postwar period at 
the time of the formation of the MCA, when (as is discussed later) 
the Baba leaders, anxious to portray the new organisation as a 
Malayan-centred party, were highly concerned about the pro-KMT 
orientation of their Laukeh co-founders.
1.3.2 The Kuomintang Malaya (KMTM) and the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP)
The KMTM and MCP represented in Malaya the two dominant 
and conflicting political movements of twentieth century China. Both 
drew on their parent organisations for ideology, cadres, and other 





Tlie Kuomintang Malaya was formed as a result of the efforts 
by Chinese republicans led by Sun Yat Sen to mobilise overseas 
Chinese support behind his nationalist, anti-Manchu movement which 
culminated in the Revolution of 1911. The predecessor of the KMTM, 
the Tung Meng Hui, was established in 1906 in Singapore. After the 
overthrow of the Ching Dynasty the Singapore lodge of the KMT was 
formed in 1912; a year later several KMTM branches were set up 
throughout Malaya and the party soon received the support of a 
considerable proportion of the Laukeh community.^
Communism was first introduced to Malaya by radical
elements within the KMT. In 1923 Sun Yat Sen decided to reorganise
the KMT in China along the Soviet Communist cell system in the hope
of making it strong enough to undertake the re-unification of China.
Following the Sun-Joffe Pact of 1923 under which members of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were permitted to join the KMT as
individuals, many Communists came into the KMT between 1923 and 1927
(when the split between the KMT and CCP took place). In Malaya
these Communists or left KMTM members were organised in the Malayan
Revolutionary Committee of the KMTM. Following the break-up between
the Nationalists and Communists in China, the MCP was formed in
2
Malaya by 1930 by this group.
1. For a discussion on the origins of the KMT in Malaya, see Png Poh 
Seng, "The Kuomintang in Malaya", JSEAH, Vol.2, no.l, March 1961.
2. Hanrahan, G.Z., The Communist Struggle in Malaya, University of 
Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, ch.l; and Khoo Kay Kim, "The 
Beginnings of Political Extremism in Malaya, 1915-1935", Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Malaya, 1973, ch.5.
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The KMTM and the MCP both concentrated their efforts on 
capturing the support of three main groups: the traditional asso- 
ciational network CCC and huay kuans, the Chinese schools and the 
trade unions. Generally speaking, the KMTM managed to win over the 
CCC and huay kuans,. the MCP dominated the trade unions, and the two 
parties shared control of the Chinese schools.^"
Winning the allegiance of the CCC and huay kuans was 
extremely valuable to the KMTM, because it afforded access to the 
most established and widespread organisational base for mobilising 
the manpower and financial resources of the Laukeh community. The 
preference of the Chinese traditional leadership in Malaya for the 
Republican over the Communist cause is understandable in the light 
of their class interests.
Between 1920 and 1940, prominent CCC and huay kuan leaders
who joined or supported the KMTM included Tan Kah Kee, Lee Kong
Chian and Lim Keng Lian in Singapore; Ho Pao Jin in Malacca; Lau
Pak Khuan and Ong Chin Seong in Perak; Lee Hau Shik (H.S. Lee) in
Selangor; Wong Shee Fun in Johore; and Ong Keng Seng and Saw Seng 
2
Kiew in Penang. These CCC leaders were responsible for organising
1. A fourth group, the shadowy and illegal secret societies, was not 
easily accessible to political recruitment but their support was 
nonetheless sought by the KMTM and MCP. On the whole, given their 
close ties with the CCC and huay kuans, it is not surprising that 
they supported the KMTM more than the MCP. See Means, G.P. , 
Malayan Politics, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1976 (2nd ed.), 
pp.11-12, and Siaw, pp.164-165.
2. Leong, "Sources, Agencies...", pp.162-164, 256-257, 415-416.
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and co-ordinating several pro-KMT campaigns in Malaya - mounting 
fund-raising efforts for various flood, famine and refugee relief 
activities in China, organising memorial services in honour of 
China's statesmen, and, after 1937, supervising NSM campaigns. The 
KMT Government assiduously wooed the CCC-huay kuan leaders and 
maintained close links by sending out high-ranking officials on 
diplomatic missions. However, despite these ties and despite 
membership by individual leaders in the KMTM, the organisations 
themselves did not become political arms of the KMT Government or 
allow themselves to fall under the domination of the KMT Consuls in 
Malaya.^” Ever concerned that the British colonial administration 
might undertake reprisal action against them, the CCC-huay kuan 
leaders not only guarded their independence from the KMT but they 
also played a significant role in muting the KMTM's anti-imperialist 
ideology.
Chinese schools were a natural target for KMTM and MCP
competition as they were important vehicles for the political and
social indoctrination of Chinese youths. In Malaya, they were even
more suitable as agents of politicisation by political parties as
they did not come under the direct control and supervision of the
colonial government. The British administration, which financed free
Malay primary education and partially financed English education
(usually carried out by missionary bodies) , left the Chinese community
2
to sponsor Chinese education.
1. The independence of the CCC from the KMT Consul in Singapore 
during the NSM is described by Pang Wing Seng, p.281; and Akashi,
p. 66.
2. For a discussion of British educational policies, see Loh, Philip 
F.S., Seeds of Separatism: Educational Policy in Malaya 1874-1940, 
Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975.
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The Chinese community continued to enjoy considerable 
autonomy in educational affairs despite attempts by the government 
to regulate the proliferation of Sino-centric activities in Chinese 
schools by requiring them to register with the Education Department 
after 1920. However, the government was unsuccessful in controlling 
the spread of Chinese nationalism in Chinese schools partly because 
it allotted most of its attention and financial resources to the 
financing of free Malay education and the subsidising of English 
education, and partly because Chinese nationalistic feelings took 
such a strong hold within the Laukeh community that they could not 
be easily suppressed by the colonial government.
Many more Chinese children and youths went to Chinese 
medium schools than to English medium schools. For example, in 
1938, Chinese enrolment figures showed that 91,534 pupils attended 
Chinese schools, compared to 26,974 in English schools.^- In 1947, 
an estimated 55% of all Chinese children between the ages of six to
2
twelve attended Chinese schools, compared to 10% in English schools. 
Clearly the great majority of Chinese students who became future 
grass-roots and community leaders in Malaya were exposed to schools 
inculcating Sino-centric values, whether Nationalist or Communist.
The major patrons of Chinese schools in the pre-independence 
period were the dialect/provincial huay kuans and, to a lesser extent,
1. Purcell, p.222.
2. ’’Annual Report Chinese Schools 1947”, mimeo. , Director of 
Education file, 699/47, part 2.
/
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clan associations, which formed management committees to operate 
the schools.^ In the nineteenth century the schools followed a 
traditional curriculum (based on Confucian and other Chinese 
classics) which had not changed for over a century in China. After 
1911, the KMT government played a direct role in reforming the 
Chinese educational system in Malaya as part of its campaign to 
modernise China and to inculcate loyalty among Chinese (both in 
China and Southeast Asia) towards Republican China. School curricula 
were redesigned to emphasise the teaching of Sun Yat Sen's San Min 
Chu I (three principles of nationalism, democracy and people's 
livelihood) and to include modem scientific subjects. After 1917, 
Kuo yu (Mandarin) was introduced as the common medium of instruction 
in all modem Chinese schools. Hitherto all Chinese schools had 
taught in the dialects of sponsoring huay kuans or schoolmasters.
The use of kuo yu in Chinese schools was one of the most important 
factors in breaking down traditional dialect group barriers in Malaya 
It served as a unifying vehicle, paving the way for inter-dialect 
group cooperation in the management of community affairs, and 
generating a sense of pan-Chinese nationalism within Chinese society 
in Malaya.
Modem schools in Malaya continued to be financed and 
managed principally by the huay kuans. However, the KMT government,
1. For a discussion of the development of Chinese education in
Malaya, see Lee Ah Chai, "Policies and Politics in Chinese Schools 
in the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States 1786- 
1941", M.A. thesis, University of Malaya, 1958; and Yung Yuet 
Ling, "Contributions of the Chinese to Education in the Straits 
Settlements and the Federated Malay States 1900-1941", M.A. thesis 
University of Malaya, 1967.
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which set up a number of committees within the Chinese Ministry of 
Education to plan for Overseas Chinese education, contributed 
educational grants and helped to train and recruit teachers for 
service in Malaya (as well as other Southeast Asian countries). The 
KMT government also directed overseas Chinese schools to register 
with the Ministry of Education in China, and teachers to register 
with the Chinese Consulate at their places of employment.^"
In the competition between the KMTM and MCP for the 
allegiance of Chinese schools in Malaya, the KMTM initially possessed 
a clear advantage, due to the role the KMT government played in the 
development of modern Chinese education in Malaya, and equally 
important, the fact that the majority of the patrons of Chinese 
schools were pro-KMT huay kuan leaders. However, there were two 
periods when the MCP was particularly successful in mobilising 
support from Chinese schools. These were the united front period 
of 1924-1927, and the Nationalist Salvation Movement of 1937-1941.
Operating within the KMTM before their expulsion after 
1927, Communist organisers successfully propagated Marxist-Leninist 
teachings in Chinese schools. Communist doctrine was also dissemi­
nated among the Chinese student population through the establishment
2
of several night schools opened by Hainanese teachers. The early 
successes enjoyed by Communist activists in Chinese schools received 
a setback following their expulsion from the KMTM. However, during
1. Lee Ah Chai, pp.174-202; Yong, pp.91-100; and Leong , "Sources, 
Agencies....", pp.394-407.
2. Leong, "Sources, Agencies...", pp.223-224; Khoo, pp.198-212.
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the NSM, when the MCP cooperated with the KMTM for a period of time 
in jointly organising China-relief campaigns, it was highly 
successful in mobilising the support of Chinese students. MCP- 
affiliated NSM bodies, such as the Anti-Enemy Backing Up Society, 
the Anti-Enemy Elimination of Traitors and Voluntary Corps, and 
the Chinese Anti-Enemy National Salvation Society, effectively 
appealed to nationalist as well as anti-imperialist sentiments to 
increase their support base within the student and worker population. 
The KMTM was less successful in mobilising popular support, because 
its CCC-huay kuan allies restrained the KMTM-backed NSM bodies from 
preaching anti-imperialist doctrines popular with students and 
workers, for fear of incurring the displeasure of the British autho­
rities. Also, the KMT Government did not wish the KMTM to pursue
an anti-British line in Malaya for it wanted Britain as an ally in
2
the Sino-Japanese conflict. One can see, therefore, that although 
the KMTM was better placed to capture the support of Chinese schools 
and generally had the advantage, shortly before the outbreak of 
World War Two a great deal of the initiative had passed to the MCP.
Consistent with their ideological and class orientations, 
the MCP dominated the labour movement, while the KMTM found natural 
allies in the CCC and huay kuans. The origins and development of 
the labour movement in Malaya stemmed from the radicalisation of 
Hainanese society at the turn of the century, which led to the 
transformation of their traditional trade guilds into unions, and
1. See Leong, ’’Sources, Agencies...’’, ch.7.
2. Ibid., pp.436-437.
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from the desire of the Comintern and CCP to organise Malayan 
labour.
The early Communist movement in Malaya was dominated by 
the Hainanese, a phenomenon which Khoo Kay Kim explains in terms of 
the early and pervasive hold which communism had on Hainan Island, 
and the particularly low social and economic status of Hainanese 
workers within the Chinese community in Malaya.1 Traditional trade 
guilds of the Hainanese dialect group were the first to display 
pro-Communist sentiments, and the nascent modern trade union move­
ment took shape in the late 1920s from a cluster of Hainanese- 
dominated unions of rubber tappers (centred especially in Negri 
Sembilan), house servants, shoemakers, carpenters, seamen and 
mechanics.^
Trade union activities were stepped up in Malaya when the 
Comintern, aided by the CCP, established the Nanyang General Labour
3
Union in 1924 to undertake organisation of labour in Southeast Asia. 
Following the formation of the MCP in 1930 the Malayan General Labour 
Union (known subsequently as the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade 
Unions) was established, and it successfully organised labour in the 
fast-growing economic sectors based on tin and other mining activities, 
rubber, transportation, stevedoring, light manufacturing and other 





cooperation along class lines, MCP mobilisation of labour in Malaya 
was limited to the Chinese population; little attention was paid to 
the organisation of non-Chinese labour, especially Indian plantation 
workers, in the period before World War Two.* The overwhelming
majority of MCP leaders and labour organisers, being China-born and
Chinese-educated, were deeply imbued with a sense of Chinese 
chauvinism which tended to overshadow the multi-racial aspect of the 
party's class struggle objective.
While the MCP controlled the modern Chinese labour movement 
in Malaya, the KMTM generally had the support of the traditional 
trade guilds which comprised both employers and workers within their 
ranks. Many workers remained loyal to their employers, the wealthy 
leaders of the CCC and huay kuans, or were afraid to sympathise
openly with the MCP, mainly out of fear of losing their sources of
financial support, and partly because of fear of potential persecu­
tion by pro-KMTM secret societies as well as pressures from the 
government against the Communist-dominated trade unions.
The MCP's successful organisation of Chinese labour intro­
duced new factors into the organisational fabric of Chinese society 
by offering alternative channels and principles of mobilisation and 
organisation to traditional ones based on the voluntary association. , 
New routes to leadership positions were also opened, allowing for 
the emergence of populist labour leaders. The mobilising potential
1. See Stenson, M.R., Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to 
the Communist Revolt of 1948, Oxford University Press, London, 
1970.
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of the trade union was highlighted during 1936 and 1937 when the MCP 
successfully orchestrated a series of strikes in rubber estates, tin 
mines and other industries to demonstrate worker solidarity in 
opposition to low wages, long hours, poor working conditions and 
abuses arising from the Chinese contract system.'*' However, due to 
swift and effective police action, these strikes were quickly 
contained. More strikes were organised during the NSM period, but 
these were likewise suppressed by effective government action.
1.3.3 Attitudes of the British Authorities
The colonial government nurtured the SCBA leadership, giving 
Straits-born Chinese leaders a role in the administration of the 
Straits Settlements through participation in the Straits Settlements 
Council. In contrast, the government was rigidly hostile 
towards the MCP, and it vacillated between a policy of repression and 
tolerance of the KMTM.
The crucial factor which made it possible for Chinese 
agents to propagate Chinese nationalist ideas freely and successfully 
in Malaya at the turn of the century was the British policy of non­
interference in the affairs of the community. After a period of 
relatively unhampered opportunity to mobilise support among the 
Chinese population in Malaya between 1912 and 1920, the KMTM faced 
increasing suppression by the colonial government, which was extremely 
concerned at the propagation of anti-imperialist and class struggle
1. Yeo Kim Wah, ’’Communist Involvement in Malayan Labour Strikes: 
1936”, JMBRAS, Vol.49, pt.2, 1976.
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teachings by leftist and Communist elements of the party. The
authorities attempted to contain the movement by arresting and/or
deporting radical leaders, school teachers and other activists, and
by imposing a ban on the organisation in the Straits Settlements in
1925 which was extended to the Federated Malay States in 1930.^
However, these measures failed to check the growth of KMT influence
in Malaya, partly because the effectiveness of the ban was undermined
by an agreement between the British and KMT governments in late 1930
2
to allow direct membership of Malayan Chinese in the KMT in China,
and partly because individual CCC and huay kuan leaders helped to
promote KMTM activities within the traditional associations. After
1937, the KMTM was allowed to operate openly within the context of
the NSM in aid of China's anti-Japanese war effort, as the British
Government was sympathetic to China’s plight Calthough it officially
3
professed a neutral stand in the Sino-Japanese conflict).
The British authorities were consistently hostile towards 
the Communist movement. Following the first signs of Communist 
activities in Malaya, the police kept up close surveillance on the 
movement. Pro-Communist schools were closed, premises of trade 
unions sacked and Communist schoolteachers and strike leaders arrested 
or deported. Anti-Communist measures were implemented most harshly
1. Purcell, p.213; Leong, "Sources, Agencies...", pp.118-119, 
212-221.
2. Leong, "Sources, Agencies...", p.218.
3. Ibid., pp.249-253.
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whenever the Communist leadership made public showings of its 
strength, such as the Kreta Ayer demonstration of 1926, the country­
wide labour strikes of 1936-1937 and the May Day Rally of 1940.^ 
Arrests and deportations of leaders following the Kreta Ayer incident 
decimated the first flowering of the Communist movement. During the 
early 1930s, the MCP slowly rebuilt its support and, through the 
labour strikes of 1935-1936, demonstrated the success of its unioni­
sation efforts. However, the movement’s growth was once more 
temporarily halted by the arrests of several union leaders. It 
regained momentum following the inauguration of the NSM.
Because the British authorities had allowed the Chinese 
in Malaya to organise on behalf of China'a anti-Japanese war effort, 
the MCP was able to capitalise on the opportunity through the esta­
blishment of several NSM-affiliated front organisations, such as the 
Anti-Enemy Backing Up Society and others mentioned earlier. For a 
short time the KMTM and the MCP jointly sponsored NSM activities, but 
the cooperation broke down when the KMTM realised that the Communists 
were gaining popular support at their expense. Despite the termina­
tion of the alliance, MCP support grew rapidly because of its strong 
organisation and the powerful appeal to the Chinese lower classes and
students of its nationalist, anti-imperialist, and class struggle 
2
ideology. Popular support for the MCP reached an all time pre-war
1. For a discussion of the Kreta Ayer Incident of 1924 and the May 
Day Rally of 1940, see Leong, ’’Sources, Agencies...", pp.224-229, 
525-536; and Khoo, pp.218-226.
2. Leong, "The Kuomintang-Communist United Front...", pp.34-46.
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high, at the end of 1939 and early 194Q, when its membership and that
of affiliated labour and NSM organisations was estimated at between
80,000 and 105,000.^ On May Day 1940, the MCP held a rally attended
2
by 15,000-20,000 participants. The highly successful rally was
I
I followed up by a series of strikes staged by the Singapore General





The open display of anti-British sentiments at the 1940
May Day rally produced an inevitable reaction by the colonial
authorities, who undertook swift and effective police reprisals
against MCP student leaders and trade union agitators. By July 1940,
3229 Communist leaders had been arrested, and police raids on all
MCP-connected organisations seriously undermined their activities.
By early 1941, for example, membership in the Singapore General
Labour Union had dropped 75%, to 4,120 from May 1940 to a total of 
4
some 20,000.
British containment of the MCP counted more than any other 
single factor in curbing the growth of the Communist movement during
1. Leong gives the following breakdown: MCP membership 2,000,
Malayan General Labour Union 40,000, AEBUS 30,000. Leong, 
"Sources, Agencies...", pp.495-6. J.B. Brimmell places MCP 
membership at 5,000, with the party controlling a base of some
100,000 workers and students. Brimmell, J.H. , Communism in 
Southeast Asia: A Political Analysis, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1959, p .148.




the inter-war period. With the removal of this constraint by the 
Japanese occupation of Malaya between December 1941 and August 1945, 
the MCP expanded rapidly and eventually emerged temporarily as the 
leading political force in Malaya.
1.4 Impact of the Japanese Occupation
The Japanese Occupation of Malaya produced radical changes
in the power structure and leadership patterns of Chinese society in
the country.^ The CCC-huay kuans lost their leadership role when the
Japanese military administration replaced them with the Japanese-
sponsored Overseas Chinese Association (OCA) which had a branch in 
2
every town. Hundreds of CCC-huay kuan leaders were arrested, 
interned or killed for their role in the National Salvation Movement. 
Those who were spared collaborated with the Japanese in enforcing the 
policies of the OCA, thus discrediting themselves and losing the 
support and respect of the Chinese population at large.
The prestige of the MCP, in contrast, grew by leaps and 
bounds. The party went underground with the arrival of the Japanese
1. For an account of Japanese treatment of the Chinese community 
during the war, see Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down, Jitts & Co., 
Singapore, 1946; Akashi, Yoji, "Japanese Policy Towards the 
Malayan Chinese 1941-1945", JSEAS, Vol.l, no.2, September 1970.
2. The principal functions of the OCA were the collection of the $50 
million "gift" from the Chinese community, the remittance of 
Chinese manpower for the Japanese war effort and the establishment 
of Chinese agricultural colonies to produce food. See "Japanese 
Administration in Malaya - a study of the Japanese Military 
Administration of Malaya including the organisation, policies, 
and controls of the Administration", mimeo., 8 June 1944, BMA 
file, AD1V9/1.
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and established a military wing, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese 
Army (MPAJA) to lead a highly effective underground resistance 
movement with the assistance of the British Force 136.^ The Communist 
guerillas drew widespread clandestine support not only from rural 
and urban Chinese lower classes, but also from Chinese petty bourgeois 
and capitalist elements who almost universally identified with the 
anti-Japanese cause.
Although the KMTM likewise went underground, it failed to 
put together a cohesive or well trained fighting force, due largely 
to inept leadership as well as to the dissolution of the CCC-huay 
kuans which had been its previous mainstay and support base. Small 
bands of KMTM guerillas, estimated to total below 400, operated in 
the remoter parts of Kedah and northern Malaya, compared to the
2
MPAJA's force of almost 7,000 operating throughout the country.
1.5 Political Developments in the Immediate Post-War Period
1.5.1 MCP Ascendance
When the British re-occupied Malaya in September 1945, the 
arriving officers of the British Military Administration (BMA) which 
lasted till March 1946 , had to deal with the reality of the MCP as 
the dominant political force in the country. The Deputy Chief of 
Civil Affairs of the BMA reported: "There is no doubt that in all the 
villages throughout the Malay States the Chinese Resistance Forces




are in command and it must be admitted that without their assistance 
in those places law and order could not be maintained...." He 
observed that the AJA /MPA.JA/ was made up of young Chinese who had 
little respect for the traditional community leaders: "... there is 
no doubt that the latter for the time being have lost their leader­
ship of the various Chinese communities and that such leadership has 
passed to the Chinese Communists and Chinese youth movements"."*"
During the early months of the BMA, the MCP operated alongside the 
BMA as an "alternative government"; People's Committees were set up 
in several small towns to collect funds (mainly enforced contributions 
from Chinese businessmen), hold courts and discipline offenders,
2
provide jobs for the unemployed and distribute relief to the needy.
In Kuala Lumpur, the party took over the premises of the Selangor 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and the Chinese Assembly Hall, and set 
up a number of organisations to usurp the functions previously 
performed by the CCC and huay kuans; for example, the Selangor
3
Commercial Union was set up to be the MCP's substitute for the CCC.
The early post-war period provided ideal conditions for 
the radicalisation and organisation of labour, because of seriously
1. H.C. Willan, Brigadier, D.C.C.A.O., B.M.A., "Report on the 
Military Government of the Malay Peninsula for the period ending 
12 September to 30 September", mimeo., p.3, BMA File C/l/l/4(3).
2. Stenson, p.67.
3. The objectives of the Selangor Commercial Union were: (1) to 
rehabilitate industry, commerce and the economy, and (2) to settle 
all business and commercial disputes among members. Min Sheng 
Pau, 9 September 1945.
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depressed economic conditions, the ability to operate without legal
restraint, and because the war time experience had eroded older
forms of labour control and patronage. Not only did the MCP surpass
all its previous successes in organising Chinese labour, it also,
for the first time, brought vast numbers of Indian plantation workers
into the labour movement.'*’ By September 1947 the labour wing of the
MCP, the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), controlled
214 out of 217 registered trade unions and claimed the allegiance of
2
some 75% of all organised workers.
1.5.2 The Non-Communist Revival
In early December 1945 the BMA neutralised the MCP as a
potential military and political rival by successfully persuading the
MPAJA to disband and getting some 6,800 guerillas to turn in their 
3
arms. It is not clear why the MCP chose to cooperate with the
British, but its action was consistent with its moderate position as
reflected in an eight-point program released just prior to the
4
arrival of the British. The MCP leadership probably decided that 
British assurances of free and unhindered participation for Communist
1. See Stenson, ch. 6.
2. ’’Report on the Military Government of the Malay Peninsula for 
the period ending 12 September to 30 September”, p.7, BMA file 
C/1/1/4 C3).
3. Purcell, p.267.
4. McLane, C.B., Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration
of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1966, pp.306-307.
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leaders in the political rehabilitation of post-war Malaya, in 
return for laying down arms, offered a means of gaining eventual 
political control of Malaya. The party, however, kept secret supplies 
of weapons and ammunitions in the jungle, and maintained a potential 
fighting force in the MPAJA Ex-Comrades Association, should the need 
for revolution arise.
Contrary to Communist expectations, its presence was 
progressively excluded from government bodies. In early 1946, when 
the BMA convened a number of Local and Regional Advisory Committees, 
Communist representatives were appointed to serve on them. Repre­
sentation on these bodies, however, was heavily weighted in favour of 
conservative leaders. Sample lists containing the names and occupa­
tions of Chinese representatives reveal that the majority were well- 
knownCCC and huay kuan personalities,who were literate in English. 
These included Khoo Teik Ee, Yong Shook Lin and H.S. Lee in Selangor, 
Khaw Seng Lee in Penang, and Ong Seong Tek in Pahang. ^  When the BMA 
was succeeded by the Malayan Union Government in April 1946, the 
policy of excluding Communist representatives on government bodies 
was more pronounced. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs noted in a 
correspondence that Chinese leaders invited to serve on official
r
bodies should be drawn from "the long established and more conserva­
tive section of the community...." He added that leftist elements 
were, in his opinion, "not yet fitted to serve on any representative •
1. See BMA file, MAL/4G15; and Secretary for Chinese Affairs file, 
SCA/C/3/1 C12/46).
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body”. No Communist representatives were appointed to the Malayan 
Union Advisory Councils when these were set up after April 1946.
British patronage of the traditional Chinese leadership
was crucial in reviving the position of CCC and huay kuan leaders and
their KMTM allies. Apart from appointing them to government bodies,
the British authorities helped to rehabilitate their businesses.
For example, a Loan Committee was set up in April 1946 to administer
2
funds to re-establish Chinese tin mines. In addition, a War Damage
Claims Commission was set up to process claims for compensation of
property destroyed during the war and several CCC leaders successfully
3
applied to the Commission for such assistance.
British political and economic promotion of Chinese conser­
vative leaders restored their influence and power within the Chinese 
community. Colonial re-affirmation of the "middleman" role of the 
CCC-huay kuan leaders made the positions held by Communist leaders 
irrelevant, except when they related to working class unrest. The 
influence of the MCP waned among all but the disaffected proletariat 
and others who felt they had little stake in the colonial system.
1. Letter from S.E. King, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, to J. Calder, 
Resident Commissioner, M.U., dated 10 April 1946, Secretary for 
Chinese Affairs file, SCA C/3/4 (50/46),
2. Proceedings of the Malayan Union Advisory Council, 9 June 1947,
The Chinese Tin Mines (Rehabilitation Loans) (Amendment) Bill 
194, B109.
3. See, for example, letter from the Mersing (Johore) Chamber of 
Commerce to the Governor of the Malayan Union dated 11 July 1946, 
Federal Secretariat file, 11228/48.
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The revival of CCC-huay kuan influence saw a corresponding 
rise in the position of the KMTM. Taking advantage of the opportunity 
for unrestricted political organisation and association in the 
immediate post-war period, the KMT Central Executive Committee in 
Nanking supervised the revival of KMT branches in Malaya and the 
launching of a nation-wide campaign to register old and new members.*-
Between early 1946 and mid-1948, rivalry between the KMTM
and the MCP became intense, and taking up where it left off before
the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the KMTM set out to woo the allegiance
of Chinese youths, students and workers, The Acting Secretary for
Chinese Affairs described the KMTM-MCP rivalry in Singapore in the 
2following terms:
At present it is only a tug of war with the school 
children and labour unions as the rope. In 
Singapore if the Youth Democratic League put up a 
school, the SMCY /San Min Chu Yi/ Youth Corps 
immediately start another one next door. How they 
can always get the premises beats mci. I hear that 
the KMT are trying to start a GLU /.General Labour 
Union/ here.
The youth wing of the KMTM, the SMCY, was particularly active and 
effective in mobilising Chinese students and youths, representing, in
1. See, letter from Siew.Kye Wai, Chinese Affairs Officer, to 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs, n.d., Secretary for Chinese 
Affairs file, SCA/218/48(2). The opening of new KMTM branches 
and San Min Chu Yi (the KMT Youth Wing) branches are reported in 
the following press reports: China Press, 26 April, 6 May, 31 
July and 21 November 1946; Kwong Wah Jit Pao, 6 and 9 May 1947.
2. Letter from the Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Singapore, 
E.C.S. Arkins to W. Blythe, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, 
Malayan Union, dated 24 May 1946, Secretary for Chinese Affairs 
file, SCA 85/46(3).
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an important sense, a "self-defence corps" for the CCC KMTM establish­
ment against MCP pressure and thuggery. The KMTM's efforts at 
labour organisation were largely unsuccessful (as in the case of its 
pre-war attempts) except in the Kinta region, where it successfully 
organised a union of tin mine workers against the MCP-led Perak 
Mining Labourers’ Union.^
Prominent CCC figures who played leading roles in reviving
the KMTM during this period included several individuals who were
founder members of the MCA a few years later; these included Lau Pak
Khuan, H.S. Lee and Lim Keng Lian. Lau Pak Khuan, the CCC strongman
in Ipoh, was a member of the KMTM Central Supervisory Council who
visited the KMT Government in January 1947 to observe the proceedings
2
of the Chinese National Congress. H.S. Lee, the CCC leader in
Selangor, led a campaign requesting the Malayan Union Government to
declare the October 10 anniversary (Double Ten) of the 1911 Revolution
a public holiday in Malaya, a request which met with a negative 
3
response. Lim Keng Lian, a former president of the Singapore CCC, 
was appointed by the KMT government to serve as China’s Vice-Minister
4
of Overseas Affairs.
Consular representatives of the KMT government likewise 
played active roles in reviving the KMTM. These officials helped to
1. Blythe, p.387.
2. China Press, 15 January 1947.
3. Letter from H.S. Lee to the Chief Secretary, Malayan Union, dated 
3 March 1947, Secretary for Chinese Affairs file, SCA H/l/7/l(4).
4. Straits Times, 9 May 1947.
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organise fund-raising campaigns, nationalist rallies and celebrations 
of the Double Ten^ to generate moral and material support for the KMT 
government which was locked in the final stages of its bitter struggle 
with the CCP for supremacy in China. As during the NSM in 1937-1941, the 
colonial government allowed Chinese in Malaya to participate freely 
in China-oriented activities. The attitude of the government, until 
the outbreak of the Communist insurrection in June 1948,was to allow 
foreign political parties to organise legally in Malaya as long as 
they did not work against the ’’peace, good order and welfare” of 
Malaya.^
Unlike the authorities' tolerant treatment of the KMTM,
the activities of the MCP were progressively suppressed. After
October 1945, the PMFTU organised several strikes among rubber
plantation, tin mine, light industry, transportation and manual
workers, and were initially successful in getting employers to meet
most of the strikers' economic demands due to the pressing need for
labour to rehabilitate the war-ravaged plantations, mines and other
industries. Employer and government resistance hardened after the
end of 1946 and Communist-inspired strikes were met by harsh police
and military action, and by mass arrests of strike activists. The
activities of the PMFTU were increasingly curtailed, until it was
3
proscribed in May 1948.
1. For press reports on these KMTM activities, see, for example,
Straits Times, 11 October 1945; China Press, 12 October 1946,
10 October 1947; Nanyang Siang Pau, 12 October 1948; Kwong Wah 
Jit Pau, 21 May 1948.
2. See Minutes by E.D. Fleming, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, dated
10 August 1948, Secretary for Chinese Affairs file, SCA (FM) 156/48.
3. See Stenson, chs. 8 and 9.
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In contrast to the KMTM and the MCP, the SCBA commanded 
little attention after the war. It had become politically obsolete 
with the introduction of political reforms by the British government 
which aimed at creating a common citizenship and establishing 
eventual self-rule in Malaya. SCBA leaders no longer enjoyed 
official patronage because the Association was too small and incon­
sequential a force within Chinese community politics to be used as 
a counter to the MCP. Realising that the SCBA’s political life 
had come to an end, leaders such as Tan Cheng Lock looked for an 
alternative political organisation to achieve their political 
ambitions. Meanwhile the SCBA itself increasingly became a social 
organisation promoting the cultural activities of the diminishing 
Bab a community in Malaya.
1.6 The Malayan Union and Malayan Federation; the Chinese 
Response
During 1946-19 48 the British government introduced major 
constitutional changes in Malaya. In April 1946 the transitional 
British Military Administration gave way to the Malayan Union 
scheme„which aimed at achieving two basic objectives related to the 
political reorganisation of post-war Malaya: (1) to centralise and 
rationalise the administration of the fragmented pre-war political 
units - the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States and the 
Unfederated Malay States, and (2) to create a form of common 
citizenship to integrate the indigenous Malay and immigrant non-
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Malay population and thus pave the way for eventual self-rule.
The Malayan Union scheme, however, was never fully imple­
mented, because it met with determined and effective Malay opposition 
led by the newly formed United Malays National Organisation (UMNO;
established in March 1946) and the Malay rulers (who had initially 
signed the MacMichael treaties which formed the constitutional basis 
for the implementation of the Malayan Union scheme). Malay opposition 
stemmed from a conviction that the scheme was an unacceptable 
infringement of Malay sovereignty and that the Sultans had been 
forced to sign the MacMichael treaties. Furthermore, the scheme 
contained citizenship provisions that were so liberal that the 
Malays feared that they would be politically and economically domi­
nated by the Chinese, who made upi43% of the total population in
2
Malaya and Singapore in 1941. Malay fears of Chinese domination 
should be seen in the context of the very poor state of Sino-Malay 
race relations during the period. When the MCP had functioned as a 
de facto government before the consolidation of BMA rule, it 
summarily executed several Malay village ketua (headmen) for alleged
1. See Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future 
Constitution, HMSO, London, 1946. For a discussion of the origins 
of the Malayan Union scheme, see Stockwell, A.J., British Policy 
and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948, 
The Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph No.8,
Kuala Lumpur, 1979, ch.2.
2. See Stockwell, ch.4 for a discussion of Malay opposition to the 
scheme. See also, Sopiee, M.N., From Malayan Union to Singapore 
Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysian Region 1945-65, 
Penerbit Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp.21-29.
The percentage of Chinese population is cited from Purcell, 
Appendix II. Malays formed 41% and Indians 14% of the population.
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collaboration with the Japanese. Between September 1945 and April 
1946, several Sino-Malay clashes occurred in the country - in Johore, 
Negri Sembilan, Perak, Penang, Pahang, Trengganu and Kelantan - as 
a result of Malay reprisals and Chinese counter-reprisals.'*’
The lack of Malay cooperation stymied the full implementa­
tion of the Malayan Union scheme. Conceding to the inevitable, the 
British government renegotiated a new constitutional arrangement in 
consultation with the UMNO and the Malay rulers. The new constitu­
tion, the Malayan Federation Agreement, which became effective on 
February 1948, satisfied both British and Malay requirements. It met 
the basic British objectives of a strong central government and 
common citizenship. On the other hand, it safeguarded Malay
sovereignty and the special position of Malays as well as providing
2
for a restricted form of citizenship.
While the Federation of Malaya Agreement satisfied the 
Malays, it was opposed by the Chinese and other non-Malays, who 
unsuccessfully attempted to block its implementation. Chinese 
objections, both those of the conservative and the radical leader­
ships, were directed principally at the stringent citizenship clauses
1. Bamadhaj, H., "The Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya on 
Malay Society and Politics 1941-1945", M.A.thesis, University of 
Auckland, 1975, part 3, and Goh, N., "Sino-Malay Relations in 
Malaya 1945-1955", B.A.(Hons.) Academic Exercise, University of 
Malaya, Singapore, 1960, ch.l.
2. Summary of Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Summary of the 
Report of the Working Committee Appointed by a Conference of His 
Excellency the Governor of the Malayan Union, Their Highnesses 
the Rulers of the Malay States and the Representatives of the 
United Malays National Organisation, Government Printer, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1946, pp.6-8. See also Stockwell, p.92.
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and the lack of equal rights for Malays and non-Malays. Having 
failed in the anti-Federation movement during 1947, the conservative 
Chinese leadership led by Tan Cheng Lock spent the following ten 
years fighting the citizenship provisions contained in the Federation 
Agreement, succeeding partially in 1952 and completely in 1957, as 
we shall see.
J. de V. Allen has suggested that the lack of Chinese
response to the Malayan Union scheme was a major factor, together
with Malay opposition, in the British decision to abandon the 
2
experiment. To my mind, the significant point to consider is the 
British attitude towards the Malay reaction; the Chinese response, 
whether positive or negative, was secondary and possibly irrelevant. 
The British gave priority to Malay views because the legitimacy of 
their rule in the country had traditionally depended on recognition 
obtained from the Sultans, and in return the colonial government had 
safeguarded the sovereignty of the rulers. By abandoning this
1. The conservative Chinese leadership also opposed the exclusion 
of Singapore from the Federation and the lack of an elected 
majority with equal Chinese and Malay representation in the 
Federal Legislative and executive Councils. See Constitutional 
Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Consultative Committee 
Together with Proceedings of Six Publio Meetings. A Summary of 
Representations Made and Letters and Memoranda Considered by the 
Committee, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1947, Appendix G.
The Chinese left-wing leaders wanted a fully elected Legislative 
and Federal Councils with a 55% Malay representation. Further­
more, they wanted Malay to be the National Language and the new 
citizenship to be teimed "Melayu". See the AMCJA-PUTERA People*s 
Constitution in the Straits Times, 11 September 1947.
2. Allen, J, de V., The Malayan Union, Monograph Series No.10, 
Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, 1967, pp.15, 16, 19.
58
protection of political sovereignty of the Sultans under the Malayan 
Union proposals, the British were losing Malay conservative support 
at a time when the Communist threat to their rule was becoming 
serious. Furthermore, opposition by the Malay aristocracy and UMNO 
leaders who served as key civil servants threatened to undermine the 
functioning of government. In contrast, the Chinese played no role 
in validating the legitimacy of British rule, nor did they contribute 
substantially to the bureaucracy.
While it was true that the Chinese conservative leadership
was too busy rehabilitating itself both politically and economically,
while restoring its authority over the Chinese community, to involve
itself deeply in the Malayan Union debate, it nonetheless did not
display the degree of apathy claimed by Allen and in some government
statements of the time.1 As Cheah Boon Kheng observed: "The Malayan
Union proposals were favourable to the Chinese and had aroused
sufficient interest among them. They were now eager to obtain further
details of the scheme". He added that the Chinese press whole-
heartedly welcomed the equal citizenship provisions, though questions
2
were raised as to their implementation. In addition, Chinese
1. An official report on the Malayan Press response to the Malayan 
Union White Paper stated that Chinese press reaction was 
indifferent. However, the report contradicted itself by revealing 
that Chinese language and Chinese-controlled English newspapers 
had in fact discussed the pros and cons of the constitutional 
proposals at great length. Malayan Press Comment on the White 
Paper on Malayan Union, Press Intelligence Publication, B.M.A.,
n.d., pp.2, 5, 6.
2. Cheah Boon Kheng, "Malayan Chinese and the Citizenship Issue, 
1945-1948", Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (University 
of Sydney), Vol.12, no.2, December 1978, pp.102-103.
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representatives on the newly-convened Malayan Union Advisory Council 
(H.S. Lee, Dr. Ong Chong Keng, Tan Eng Chye, Dr. Soon Kim Lan and Dr. 
Tan Cheng Leng) welcomed the proposals and sought at the same time 
further clarification on the advantages and disadvantages of Malayan 
Union citizenship.^
The only Chinese group that came out strongly against the 
Malayan Union was the MCP, which in February 1946 denounced the scheme 
as a ploy to retain control of Malaya, to convert Singapore into a 
permanent colony and military base, to weaken Communist control over 
workers, and to offer a meaningless grant of citizenship to non- 
Malays . ^
When it became clear that the tripartite talks between the 
British Government, the UMNO and the Malay rulers (August-November 
1946) would lead to the replacement of the Malayan Union by the 
Malayan Federation proposals, an anti-Federation movement emerged led 
by the All Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCJA; known also as the 
Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action) formed on 14 December 1946.
1. Official Statement on the Malayan Union Citizenship Proposals 
Issued by H.E. The Governor, Malayan Union, on 18 April 1946. 
Summary of Views on the Proposals Received from Persons, 
Organisations and other Sources, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 
1946, see headings of Correspondence No. W.L. 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 
16, 54 and 64.
2. Min Sheng Pau t 5, 8, 19 and 22 February 1946.
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The AMCJA was spearheaded by the small, centre-left Malayan
Democratic Union (MDU)1 and by MCP front organisations such as the
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, the Women’s Federation, and
2
the New Democratic Youth League. It was expanded in February 1947 
and renamed the AMCJA-PUTERA (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat, or Centre of 
People’s Power) after the original organisation was joined by a group 
of radical Malay cultural and social organisations affiliated with 
the left wing Malayan Nationalist Party (MNP). The influential Baba 
leader Tan Cheng Lock, who strongly opposed the Federation citizenship 
proposals, served as the movement's chairman from its inception to 
its demise in late 1947, and succeeded for a brief period in getting 
the backing of the CCC-huay kuan establishment.
The AMCJA-PUTERA attempted to put pressure on the authori­
ties through militant activities such as anti-Federation mass rallies
3
and demonstrations, and boycotting the Cheesemen Consultative 
Committee, which had been set up to consult non-Malay opinion on the 
Federation proposals. The CCC-huay kuans initially avoided association
1. The MDU which lasted from December 1945 to June 1948, was formed 
in Singapore with the backing of the MCP. It drew its leadership 
and support from a small group of English-educated intellectuals 
who sought political reforms and self-rule for Malaya. See Cheah 
Boon Kheng, The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communists United 
Front in Malaya 1945-1948, Times Book International, Singapore,
1979, chs.7-10.
2. The anti-Federation movement also received support from a few 
Indian organisations, such as the Indian Chambers of Commerce of 
Selangor and Singapore and the Singapore Ceylon Tamils' Association.
3. Rallies were held on 27 January in Seremban, 8 February in Malacca, 
31 March in Singapore, 20 May in Kuala Lumpur, 20 September in 
Singapore, 29 September in Kuala Lumpur, and 4 October in Penang. 
These rallies were reported in the Straits Times, Kwong Wall Jit Pau, 
Min Sheng Pau and other major newspapers.
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with, the movement, and attempted to work through, official channels
to articulate their opposition, H.S. Lee and Leong Yew Koh, the two
appointed Chinese members on the Cheeseman Consultative Committee,
presented the CCC-huay kuan views. These two leaders said in a
session of the Malayan Union Advisory Council on 25 August 1947 that
they had not endorsed the Federation citizenship proposals.* Other
Chinese leaders on the Council likewise stated their opposition.
2
Dr. Lee Tiang Keng, for example, said:
The Revised Proposals are a flagrant injustice to 
the domiciled Chinese community. They spurn Chinese 
goodwill and co-operation, treat their past services 
to the country with contempt and deny the heritage 
of those who were born here. The implicit racial 
and religious discrimination is a cantankerous worm 
which will very likely gnaw the bowels of the 
Commonwe a1th.
When it had become clear that the colonial government was
not heeding the protestations of the Chinese representatives in the
Cheeseman Consultative Council or in the Malayan Union Advisory
Council, the CCC-huay kuan leadership decided to cooperate with the
AMCJA-PUTERA and helped to stage a nation-wide hartal on 20 October 
3
1947. These leaders pulled out of the movement shortly thereafter,
1. Proceedings of the Malayan Union Advisory Council, 25 August 1946 
pp.24-25.
2. Ibid., p.28.
3. The Chinese press reported that the hartal was widely observed. 
The Straits Times, however, claimed it was only a partial success 
See, Min Sheng Pau, 22 October 1947; Kwong Wah Jit Pau,
21 October 1947*' and Straits Times, 21 October 1947. The Min 
Sheng Pau report contains an interesting racial breakdown of the 
participants of the hartal in the town of Alor Star. It claimed 
that 89.9% of the Chinese inhabitants took part, 67% of the 
Indian inhabitants and 5% of the Malay inhabitants.
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however, because of concern at the perceiyed pro-Malay bais in the 
AMCJA-PUTERA's People's Constitution* and because of deep suspicions 
of the MCP role in the anti-Federation movement.
While the weaknesses of the movement were considerable, it
failed not because of problems inherent in the campaign itself but
because the colonial government had made it clear that it would
consider only conservative Malay opinion in the new constitutional
arrangement. In the face of unbending British resolve to proceed with
the Federation, Chinese business and community declared their refusal
to accept appointments to serve on the Federal Legislative Council
2
and other government bodies. This resolve was, however, embarrasingly 
shortlived. When the Federation was inaugurated on 1 February 1948, 
the Federal Legislative Council and State Councils were represented 
by familiar CCC stalwarts such as H.S. Lee, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng, Ee
Yew Kim, Woo Ka Lim, Yong Shook Lin, Khoo Teck Ee, Leung Cheung Ling,
Tan Siew Sin, Toh Eng Hoe, Leong Yew Koh and Ng Sui Cam.
The CCC "betrayal" of the anti-Federation cause could be
interpreted as a move by these pragmatically minded businessmen to 
salvage what could still be saved from a seemingly lost cause. They 
apparently hoped that their representation on government bodies might
1. Tan Cheng Lock told Gerald de Cruz of the MDU and secretary of the 
AMCJA-PUTERA that the CCC-huay kuan leaders strongly opposed the 
AMCJA-PUTERA's demand that Malayan citizens be called "Melayu'V 
for fear of losing their "racial individuality, culture and inde­
pendence". Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Gerald de Cruz dated 7 
October 1947, TCL Papers, TCL/1/15.
2. Straits Times, 20 January 1948.
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well give them an opportunity to redeem the situation from within the 
system by manipulating the constitutional processes available to them 
as representatives on government bodies. More fundamentally, the 
’’betrayal'* by the CCC leaders lies in the raison d ’etre of the Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce and the whole system of Kapitan China-type 
leadership and patronage, where all effectiveness depended on the 
spokesmen having access to the authorities.
By February 1948, when the Federation of Malaya was 
inaugurated, the Chinese conservative leadership, due largely to the 
patronage of the colonial government, had made considerable progress 
in re-establishing its position within the community. The CCC-huay 
kuan leadership had by that time been permitted to have its represen­
tatives appointed to the newly-convened Federal Legislative Council 
as a reward for finally complying with the Federation proposals. In 
contrast, the MCP’s position was fast deteriorating, especially in 
the first months of 1948, when its labour movement was being decimated 
by government measures in the form of police action, establishment of 
an officially-sponsored reformist labour movement, and introduction of 
restrictive legislation which forced the dissolution of the PMFTU on 
12 June 1948.
Feeling that free and open channels of organisation and 
mobilisation were no longer available to it, the MCP under its hard­
line new Secretary-General Chin Peng decided to prepare for armed 
insurrection to seize power.
The outbreak of the uprising inevitably brought about shifts 
in the balance of power within the Chinese community. Not only were
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the MCP and its front organisations removed from the political arena, 
the KMTM was also proscribed in May 1949 following a government ban 
on operations by foreign political parties in Malaya.'*' With the MCP 
in the jungle and hoping to seize power through armed revolt, and 
with the KMTM banned, the traditional CCC-huay kuan leadership had 
to consolidate its resources and explore new mobilising and organising 
techniques to strengthen its support base and to aid the colonial 
government's anti-insurgency campaign. In this complex and turbulent 
milieu the MCA was bom.
1. Straits Times, 10 May 1949.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MCA
The MCA was formed on 27 February 1949.^ A watershed in 
the development of Chinese politics in Malaya, the formation bridged 
the divide between traditional and modem modes of community organi­
sation in both ideological and structural terms. AT the same time, 
it also spanned the gap between the Laukeh (KMTM-CCC-huay kuan) and 
Baba (SCBA) political cultures to produce a synthesised Malayan- 
centred Chinese political culture. The interplay of diverse influences 
within the MCA created a Janus-like organisation which simultaneously 
displayed the characteristics of a modem political party and a 
traditional association in organisation, function and ideology.
2.1 The Formation of the MCA
The immediate impetus for the formation of the MCA was the 
outbreak of the Emergency. Faced with a militant Communist challenge, 
Chinese conservative leaders sought to consolidate their position 
within the community. Meanwhile, the colonial government actively 
encouraged them to centralise their resources through the formation 
of a political party in order to gamer Chinese support behind its 
anti-insurgency campaign.
By early 1949, the government realised that a large 
proportion of the Chinese population, especially rural squatters,
1. Existing studies on the MCA discuss party activities with little 
analysis of party ideology, social sources of support and member­
ship, relationship with the CCC-huay kuan establishment and the 
party’s role in the independence movement. See Roff, M., "The 
Malayan Chinese Association 1548-1965”, JSEAH, Vol.6, no.2,
September 1965, and Chan Heng Chee, "The Malayan Chinese Asso­
ciation”, M.A. thesis, University of Singapore, 1965.
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supported the Communist cause, whether voluntarily or under intimi­
dation from guerillas. It contemplated two alternatives to cut off 
this base of support from the MCP: either to bring the squatters
under direct government scrutiny or to deport them. Deportation 
was thought to be an unviable solution on a long term basis, and 
squatter resettlement was taken up as the remedy to the problem.'*'
To successfully implement a comprehensive squatter resettlement 
programme, the colonial government needed the back-up services of 
Chinese community middlemen, the CCC-huay kuan leaders. These 
influential leaders who had been accommodated within the KMTM were 
now organisationally diffused, as the KMTM had been banned following the 
proclamation of Emergency rule. The British High Commissioner, Sir 
Henry Gurney, wanted a centralised pro-British Malayan Chinese party 
to fill the vacuum and provide effective leadership in the anti­
insurgency campaign. Gurney urged H.S. Lee, president of the
Selangor CCC and Federal Legislative Councillor, to help in the
2
formation of such a party. Addressing the Federal Legislative
Council shortly before the MCA was inaugurated, Gurney said; "Such
an Association can clearly be of very real help in many directions,
including solution of the squatter problem, which will call for
heavy expenditure, and the restoration of contact between isolated
3
Chinese communities and the authorities".
1. Short, A., The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960,
Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1975, ch.7.
2. Interview, H.S, Lee, 22 July 1975.
3. Address by Henry Gurney, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative 
Council, 17 February 1949, B771.
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The inaugural meeting of the MCA was held in Kuala Lumpur
under the sponsorship of the 16 Chinese Federal Legislative
Councillors, the majority of whom were prominent CCC-huay kuan
figures.* The meeting was attended by 300 people, including 178
delegates from the organising committees of all the states except 
2
Kelantan. Tan Cheng Lock (who became the first party president from 
3
1949-1958) was appointed chairman of the Protem Committee. Yong
Shook Lin and Leung Cheung ling were appointed as joint secretaries
4
and Khoo Teik Ee as treasurer. Cheng Lock's appointment as party
president received the clear endorsement of the colonial authorities.
Sir Henry Gurney's favourable assessment of Cheng Lock's leadership
5
ability is reflected in the following:
... he commands considerable respect among the 
Chinese. He is 66 years old; he has had 
experience in Malayan policies, he is sincere; 
and he is able to rise above the arguments of 
the different dialect groups in Chinese society.
He is sincere in his efforts to do the best for 
the Chinese in Malaya. He has, therefore a 
strong influence with moderate Chinese opinion 
here. He is still independent and will support 
Government if he is convinced that Government 
desires to treat the Chinese fairly.
1. These were Tan Siew Sin, Leong Yew Koh, H.S. Lee, Yong Shook Lin, 
Khoo Teik Ee, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng, Ee Yew Kim, Toh Eng Hoe, Khoo 
Khoon Huat, Leung Cheung LLng, Ng Sui Cam, Mrs. B.H. Oon, Woo Ka 
Lim, Lim Khye Seng, Lee Woon Mun and Liew Kwong Hon.
2. Straits Times, 28 February 1949.
3. Trengonning, K.G., "Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist",
JSEAS, Vol.10, no.l, March 1979, and Soh Eng Lim, "Tan Cheng 
Lock: His Leadership of the Malayan Chinese", JSEAH, Vol.l, no.l, 
1960, discuss Cheng Lock's leadership of the MCA.
4. Malay Mail, 27 February 1949.
5. Letter from Gurney to J.J. Paskin dated 4 April 1949, C0537/ 
52849/48/49(14).
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While the organising energy and momentum for the formation 
of the MCA came from the combined efforts of H.S, Lee, Leong Yew Koh, 
Yong Shook Lin, Khoo Teik Ee and Tan Siew Sin, the guiding light 
behind its inception was Tan Cheng Lock. Cheng Lockes role in the 
MCA's formation deserves further elaboration, for the concept of a 
Malayan-centred Chinese political party was his brainchild, as 
demonstrated in the following tribute made by Yong Shook Lin: "The 
idea of an Association or League in which all Malayan Chinese who 
intend to have their permanent homes in Malaya should be qualified 
to become members was conceived in the fertile brain of Mr, Tan 
Cheng Lock.Furthermore, Cheng Lock's thinking on the ideological 
function of such a party subsequently formed the innovative element 
in MCA party philosophy.
As early as November 1943, Tan Cheng Lock propounded the 
need for Chinese living in Malaya to form a pan-Malayan political 
party. He conceived the idea while living in India, where he and 
his family had sought refuge from the Japanese Occupation. Cheng 
Lock wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonel 
Oliver Stanley, to inform him that overseas Chinese from Southeast 
Asia who had fled to India had organised themselves into an Overseas 
Chinese Association. Describing the Association's Malayan Chinese
1. Letter signed by Yong Shook Lin dated 8 March 194*1 (addressee 
unknown), TCL Papers, SP13, Item 175. /The Tan Cheng Lock 
(TCL) Papers collection is found at both the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and the Malaysian National 
Archives, Kuala Lumpur. Papers headed "SP” are in the Kuala 
Lumpur collection and those headed "TCL/" are found in 
Singapore^/
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members as people with "a big stake and important and extensive 
interests in Malaya1*, Cheng Lock wrote: "On our return to Malaya,
those of our members who are Malayans will constitute themselves 
into a Malayan Chinese Association devoted to the interests of the 
country". Cheng Lock informed the Colonial Secretary that the 
proposed Malayan Chinese Association would aid the British Govern­
ment Upon reoccupation of Malaya to deal with problems 11 relating to 
reparations from war damage" and other "post-war problems affecting 
its /Malaya’s/ future".^" The MCA was thus originally conceived as 
an organisation to protect Chinese capitalist interests in antici­
pation of a period of economic and political rehabilitation in 
Malaya. When the party was finally formed five and a half years 
later, the political circumstances which prompted Cheng Lock to 
propose the idea had changed, but one factor remained constant - it 
was formed to advance Chinese capitalist interests during a 
politically and socially turbulent period, in the event brought 
about by the Communist insurrection.
The formation of the MCA did not materialise when Cheng 
Lock first proposed it as no support for the idea was forthcoming from 
the colonial authorities or the CCC-huay kuan establishment. Cheng 
Lock himself did not possess the organisational resources and 
support base to successfully launch a pan-Malayan political party, 
as evidenced by his failure to set up the Malayan Chinese League.
1. Tan Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems: From a Chinese Point of View,
Tannsco, Singapore, 1947, pp.5, 7. The suggestion drew no 
response from the Colonial Office.
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During the five year span, however, Cheng Lock continued to sow the 
idea of the need for a Chinese political party. His involvement in 
the anti-Federation movement (discussed in Chapter 1) gave him deeper 
and more sophisticated perceptions regarding the function and role 
of such a party. The anti-citizenship clauses of the Malayan 
Federation constitution made him realise as never before how vital 
it was for Chinese to acquire citizenship in order to safeguard their 
political liberties and economic interests. At the same time, 
witnessing the discord between Malays and non-Malays wrangling over 
the Malayan Federation proposals, Cheng Lock modified his initial 
idea to form a party to look after purely Chinese interests.
Instead he began to favour political solutions aimed at promoting 
relations among the different races. These ideas were laid out in 
his proposals for a Malayan Chinese League and a National Unity 
Organisation.
In early May 1948, Cheng Lock announced his intention of
forming the Malayan Chinese League with the following three major
objectives: protection of Chinese political and economic interests;
promotion of inter-racial harmony; and attainment of self-government
for Malaya.'1’ Of the three objectives, Cheng Lock laid the greatest
2
stress on the first:
1. ’’Rules of the Malayan Chinese League", mimeo,pn.d. The rules 
were essentially those drafted by Tan Siew Sin in 1946 for a 
proposed Malacca Chinese Union. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock 
to Haji Ibrahim Ma dated 17 February 1949, TCL Papers, TCL/111/90.
2. "Rules of the Malayan Chinese League", Section 7.
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It is unlikely in the ultimate shape of things to 
come in the New Malaya that those of its residents 
who do not share the burden of civic responsibilities 
will be permitted to enjoy civic rights, and that 
the non-citizens can continue in an unrestricted 
manner to own property, exploit the country and 
participate in all the privileges of carrying on 
trade, commeree__and business etc. for the personal 
enrichment /sic/, while regarding the country as 
primarily a temporary place of residence for them 
to make money in.
It is merely a question of time that those people 
in Malaya who do not identify themselves with the 
interests of this country and enrol themselves in 
the ranks of its loyal citizens, making it their 
permanent home, will inevitably suffer from certain 
legal disabilities that will be imposed upon them 
to restrict their liberty to exploit the land.,..
Here, as in the argument he forwarded when proposing the Malayan 
Chinese Association in 1943, Cheng Lock's over-riding concern was 
that the economically privileged position of the Chinese mercantile 
class should be protected through political action. Realising that 
less than 10% of the Chinese population would receive Malayan 
citizenship under the existing Federation Constitution, Cheng Lock 
wrote that it was clearly a "matter of self-preservation" of Chinese 
interests that the Chinese organised themselves politically to 
acquire citizenship.'*'
Aside from the advancement of Chinese economic interests, 
Cheng Lock wanted the Malayan Chinese League to serve as a vehicle 
to instil loyalty towards Malaya. He wrote: "My own idea is to wean 
the China-born from China and Chinese politics and encourage them to 
transfer their love, for the good of all concerned including them­
selves, to Malaya ... through the organisation of the Malayan
1. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Haji Ibrahim Ma dated 7 February 
1949; MCA headquarters.
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Chinese League...." He saw the l,Malayanis ation" of Laukehs as 
the first and most crucial stage in his plan to propagate an all- 
embracing Malayan consciousness and identity among the various 
races.
Explaining how the proposed Malayan Chinese League could
2
enhance racial harmony, Cheng Lock wrote:
We have the ideal - a new Malayan consciousness 
among all who regard Malaya as their home and 
the object of their loyalty.
I have suggested the idea of a Malayan Chinese 
League in order to help develop among those 
Chinese who have decided to make Malaya their 
permanent home, a consciousness of Malayan 
unity and loyalty which will draw them closer 
to other Malayan communities.
This Malayan Chinese League ... together with 
other communal organisations should be branches 
of a central National Unity Organisation which 
would be based on the goodwill and co-operation 
of the domiciled communities in Malaya. Thus 
we shall move from present realities to our 
ideal of a common Malayan consciousness and 
Malayan unity.
Cheng Lock did not draw up a constitution and other specific details
regarding the organisational and functional structure of the
National Unity Organisation aside from indicating that it would
embrace "all parties, races and classes" to promote unity, goodwill
and cooperation among all Malayans permanently resident in the 
3
country. Although Cheng Lock's ideas about the National Unity
1. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to C,L. Peet dated 30 September 1948, 
taken from Tan Cheng Lock, A Collection of Correspondence, Tiger 
Standard Press, Singapore, n.d., pp.18-19.
2. Tan Cheng Lock, "National Unity in Malaya", mimeo., c.August 
1948, TCL Papers, SP13, Item 140.
3. Straits Times, 4 May 1948.
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Organisation were not fully developed, the concept was significant 
because it was an early (perhaps the first) recognition by a Chinese 
leader of the value of coalition politics as potentially the best 
means of serving Chinese political interests in a multi-racial 
Malaya.
Cheng Lock's plans to establish the Malayan Chinese 
League did not materialise.^ Lacking a support base outside his 
home state of Malacca, he failed in his efforts to get the patronage 
of the CCC-huay kuan establishment, especially in Chinese-dominated 
urban centres such as Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Penang, to give shape 
to his idea. However, with the outbreak of the Emergency, Cheng 
Lock's proposal for a Chinese political party became relevant to 
the interests of both the colonial government and the CCC-huay kuan 
establishment, thus setting in motion the events which culminated 
in the formation of the MCA.
A potentially serious obstacle to the formation of the 
party would have arisen if the Malay leaders in the UMNO had opposed 
the movement. Fortunately, the UMNO raised no objections. In July 
1948 Datuk Gnn, the leader of the UMNO, stated that "law-abiding 
Chinese should band together in a political party to help the govern­
ment in the fight against Communism". He said; "I would appeal to the 
leaders of the Chinese community to organise themselves and to come
1. Tan Cheng Lock, "Progress of the Malayan Chinese League", mimeo.,
11 April 1948, TCL Papers, SP13, Item 133. Nothing developed 
beyond plans to set up provisional working committees.
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in together with us, and we can stamp this danger out”, Onn’s 
endorsement allayed fears held by British officials and Chinese 
leaders, and paved the way for the founding of the MCA,
Sir Henry Gurney and Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner
General for Southeast Asia, were also instrumental in obtaining the
UMNO’s support for the formation of the MCA. The High Commissioner
assured the sponsors of the new party that there would be no Malay
objection, an indication that he had worked behind the scenes to
2
ensure a favourable UMNO reception of the MCA. Malcolm MacDonald, 
for his part, used the newly convened Communities Liaison Committee 
(CLC) as a forum for Tan Cheng Lock to meet Onn to obtain the Malay 
leader’s approval for the MCA. Onn’s support was sought and
3
obtained at the first meeting of the CLC held on 29 December 1948,
2.2 The Social Background of Party Leadership and Membership
At this juncture it is useful to present some findings 
on the social background of the leadership and membership of the 
newly-formed MCA. It shows the way in which differences in social 
sources of recruitment and variations in social background affected 
the ideological and functional structure of the party.
1. Speech by Onn bin Jaafar, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative 
Council, 5 and 6 July 1948, B315.
2. Interview H.S. Lee, 22 July 1975. Gurney wrote to J.D, Higham 
to inform him that: ’’Neither Onn nor the politically minded 
Malays in general have expressed any opposition to the MCA”, 
C0537/4790(18).
3. Thio Chan Bee, Extraordinary Adventures of an Ordinary Man, 
Grovesnor Books, London, 1977, p.86.
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In order to compare and contrast the varying degrees of 
control exerted by different groups of leaders at different levels 
of the party hierarchy, I examined a sample of party office holders 
at the national, state and grass-roots level for the period 1949-57. 
The sample consisted of 32 Central Working Committee (CWC) members, 
198 Working Committee members of six State Branches and 648 
office holders of 76 Area and District Branch Committees in Johore 
and Perak.* The social background of the office holders is examined 
in relation to: (a) place of birth, (b) education, (c) occupation,
(d) appointments to government bodies, and (e) office holding in 
public organisations, both Chinese associations and multi-racial 
societies.
2.2.1 The National Leadership
The picture which emerges shows that the majority of MCA 
national leaders were Malayan-born, English-educated, wealthy 
businessmen and/or professionally qualified men who held positions 
in government bodies as well as Chinese associations and multi-racial 
organisations. A second and small definable group in the CWC 
consisted of Chinese-educated men who were essentially state repre­
sentatives and not national leaders in that they did not play 
significant roles in the multi-ethnic political centre. These 
individuals had been elevated into the CWC to solidify the linkage 
between the English-educated westernised national leadership and the
1. The information was compiled from lists of particulars of party 
office-holders kept at the MCA headquarters.
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Chinese-speaking Laukeh base at the party grass-roots level.
Between 1949 and 1957, the most prominent national MCA 
leaders in the CWC inclded the following: Tan Cheng Lock, Tan
Siew Sin, Khoo Teik Ee, H.S. Lee, Leong Yew Koh, Yong Shook Lin,
Ong Yoke Lin, T.H. Tan, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, Too Joon Hing, Ng Ee 
Teong and Yong Pung How. Of the state representatives, the better 
known individuals included Lau Pak Khuan from the state of Perak,
Wong Shee Fun from Johore, Goh Chee Yan from Malacca, Lim Teng 
Kwang from Kedah, Foo See Moi from Kelantan and Wu Cheok Yee from 
Trengganu.
Twenty-six out of the 32 CWC members were Malayan-born.
Of the remaining six, four were b o m  in China (H.S. Lee, Lau Pak 
Khuan, Ng Sui Cam and Goh Chee Yan), one in Hong Kong (Leung Cheung 
Ling), and one in Burma (Dr. Lee Tiang Keng). Regarding their 
educational status, 23, a large majority, were educated up to the 
post secondary level: 10 went to universities and colleges in
England, two to universities in both England and Hong Kong, two to 
Canada and Hong Kong, three to Hong Kong, one to China, and five 
were locally trained in Malaya and Singapore. Of the remaining nine, 
seven were educated up to the secondary school level. Only two men 
were not educated beyond the primary school level. The majority was 
educated in English medium institutions, but a large proportion could 
speak Mandarin since they either had attended Chinese schools up to 
the primary level or they had received private tuition. Central 
Committee meetings were held in English, and party minutes and 
documents were recorded in English. Chinese translations of these 
were then made for the benefit of CWC members not literate in English
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such as Lau Pak Khuan, and for distribution to state branches..
Most of these CWC leaders were also conversant in Malayj however, 
literacy in Malay was not a necessary precondition towards the 
attainment of leadership status in the Association till the early 
1970s, when the language was widely used within government and 
bureaucratic circles.
All the 32 leaders were men of considerable wealth and 
some were certainly among the wealthiest in Malaya. The wealth of 
these men was mainly derived from tin mines, rubber and other agri­
cultural estates, banking, shipping, real estate development, 
import-export agencies, wholesale and retail trading, and other 
miscellaneous commercial enterprises and small-scale manufacturing 
industries. The widespread network of Cheng Lock's business concerns 
illustrates the extent of his wealth. His main income came from 
several rubber estates in Malacca,but he also held directorships in 
several companies) including a bank (the Overseas Chinese Banking 
Corporation), an insurance company (the Overseas Assurance Corpora­
tion Ltd.), a number of British-based import-export agencies 
(including Sime, Darby and Co. Ltd., and Cycle and Carriage Co. Ltd.), 
a newspaper company (the Malayan Tribune Press Ltd.) and an ice 
factory. H.S. Lee was another successful businessman.. Among his 
extensive commercial undertakings were tin mining and banking 
concerns, and a newspaper company (the China Press).
Fifteen, or slightly under half of the 32 men were 
professionally qualified men: six advocates and solicitors (trained 
mainly in Britain), three doctors, two architects, two engineers, 
one chartered accountant and one journalist. These men also
78
engaged in commercial enterprises besides carrying out their pro­
fessional practices. Leong Yew Koh, for example, had large tin 
mining interests in Perak in addition to his law practice in Ipoh. 
Khoo Teik Ee was one of the most successful lawyers in Kuala Lumpur 
and was also a prominent businessman. Ng Sui Cam in Penang was a 
mechanical engineer, a landed proprietor and real estate developer.
As we have seen earlier, wealth has traditionally been 
the most important criterion of social mobility within the Chinese 
community in Malaya. The fact that the CWC members were all 
wealthy men indicated that it still functioned as an effective 
criterion in the 1950s,^ Although most leaders in the party would 
have the political contacts in government to bring development 
projects to benefit the local community, a wealthy party office 
holder could dispense financial patronage on a personal basis in 
addition to carrying out his political duties towards his supporters. 
The wealthy leader was expected to make donations from his private 
fortune towards all sorts of charitable causes within the local 
community. He was also well placed to advance the interests of his 
supporters by employing them in his business concerns or by giving 
them loans or preferential trading terms. At the very least, he 
could give them introductions for making the necessary business 
contacts to set up or widen their businesses. It is clear that the 
towkay leader in the party was (and is today) a much respected 
figure.
1. It remains the case to a considerable extent today, a point 
which was made by several MCA and other Chinese leaders.
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All 32 CWC men held government appointments, ranging from 
Federal bodies to local boards. These bodies included the Federal 
Legislative Council, State Legislative Councils, Town and Municipal 
Boards, Chinese Advisory Boards, State War Executive Committees, 
Rubber Licensing and Replanting Boards and State Housing Boards. It 
was not unusual for a CWC member to hold several positions at. 
once. H.S. Lee, for example, was a member of the Federal Legislative 
Council, the Selangor State Advisory Council, the Kuala Lumpur Town 
Board, and the Chinese Tin Mines Rehabilitation Loans Board. Tan 
Siew Sin served on the Federal Legislative Council, the Malacca 
Chinese Advisory Board, and the Central Advisory Council on Education.
Most of the 32 men held office on multi-racial bodies.
These included community service organisations such as the Rotary 
Club, the Jaycees, and the Red Cross Society (renamed Red Cresent 
Society); recreational and sports clubs such as golf, tennis, bad­
minton and shooting societies; and welfare institutions for the 
handicapped, blind and deaf. (The few state representatives in the 
CWC who had been educated in Chinese tended not to participate 
actively in these multi-racial bodies because of language barriers.) 
Office holding in multi-racial societies offered immense opportuni­
ties for Chinese leaders to forge personal contacts with senior 
British and Malay officials in government. In Malaya, as in most 
other plural societies, recreational activities such as playing 
golf constitute an effective informal channel for consolidating 
political and social ties between individuals coming from different 
socio-cultural and racial backgrounds. The English-educated CWC 
members were therefore able to advance their political careers more
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easily than their Chinese-educated colleagues, since they could make 
the necessary personal contacts with English and Malay government 
officials through participation in the activities of multi-racial 
clubs and societies and thus gain appointments to serve on the 
highest government bodies.
Although the English-educated CWC leader achieved leader­
ship status of national prominence through the forging of multi­
racial contacts within the country's highest political circles, it 
appears that this process took place only after they had established 
strong reputations as respected and acceptable leaders within the 
Chinese community itself. Non-Chinese leaders quite naturally 
judged the political worth of their Chinese allies on the strength 
of the latter's standing within their own community and ability to 
influence Chinese public opinion. Leadership status within the 
community was measured by the degree of the individual's standing 
in the Chinese associational network, and office holding in Chinese 
associations was in turn seen as a manifestation of the individual's 
high social standing within the community. The wealth of the 
English-educated leaders enabled them to move up the Laukeh social 
ladder and hold high positions in the CCC-huay kuan establishment.
The CWC members held major positions in almost every type 
of Chinese association. The following table lists examples from 
different types of Chinese associations which came under the control 
of the MCA CWC for the years 1949-1957:^
1. This information was obtained through cross references made
between lists of MCA office holders and lists of office holders 
of Chinese associations submitted to the Registrar of Societies.
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Office Eolding of MCA CWC Members in Major Types of 
Chinese Associations for the years 1949-^1957
Types of Chinese Associations









The Sungei Patani (Kedah) CCC
Office Holders
Tan Cheng Lock)
Tan Siew Sin )Presidents 
Goh Chee Yan )
Lau Pak Khuan (president) 




Leung Cheung Ling 
Ong Yoke Lin
Lee Tee Siong (president) 
Wong Shee Fun (president) 
Ng Sui Cam (president)
Foo See Moi (president)
Wu Cheok Yee (president) 
Lim Teng Kwang (president)
2. The Chinese Assembly Hall/
Chinese Association
The Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall
The Perak Chinese Association
The Johor Bahru Chinese Association
The Penang Chinese Town Hall
H.S. Lee (president)
Khoo Teik Ee 
Leung Cheung Ling 
Yong Shook Lin 
Y.T. Lee
Lau Pak Khuan (president) 
Y.C, Kang 
Too Joon Hing
Wong Shee Fun (president) 
Yap Kim Hock
Ng Sui Cam (president)
3. The Dialect/Territorial Huay Kuan
The Federation of Kwangtung Huay 
Kuan (includes the Cantonese, 
Teochew and Hakka dialect groupings)
H«S, Lee )
Lau Pak Khuan) 
Leung Cheung Ling 




The Federation of Hokkien Huay Kuan
The Federation of Fui Chew Huay 
Kuan (Hakka)
The Federation of Kheng Chew Huay 
Kuan (Hainanese)
The All-Malaya Ko Chow Huay Kuan 
(Cantonese)
The Selangor Nam Hoi Huay Kuan 
(Cantonese)
The Selangor Eng Choon Huay Kuan 
(Hokkien)
The Selangor Kwong Siew Huay Kuan 
(Cantonese)
The Penang Toi Sin Ning Yang Huay 
Kuan (Cantonese)
4. The Clan/SurnameAssociation
The Penang Lee Shi Ching Shing 
Lee Clansmen
The Kulim Soon Clan Association
5. The Trade Guild
The Federation of Chinese Guilds 
and Associations
The Combined Committees of 24 Chinese 
Labour Guilds, Penang
The Perak Coffee Shopkeepers’ 
Association
The Chinese Hawkers' Association,
Batu Pahat
6 . The Cultural, Social/Recreational 
Association
The Chin Woo Association
Office Holders
Khoo Teik Ee 
Tan Cheng Lock
Soon Cheng Sun
Foo See Moi 
Too Joon Hing
H.S. Lee (president)
Y .T , Lee 
Gunn Chit Wah 
Leung Cheung 'Ling?;
Lee Wun Moon
Lee Wun Moon 
Soon Cheng Sun
Lau Pak Khuan (president) 
Lee Wun Moon (president) 
Too Joon Hing 
Tan Suan Kok
Lau Pak Khuan (president)
A number of points emerge from the above table; firstly, it can be 
seen that some CWC members had been presidents of the Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce, the most important type of Chinese association
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in Malaya, in nine states. (These men were also the state Chairman 
of the MCA branches.) All the CCC in Malaya came under
the supervision of a pan-Maiayan body, the Associated Chinese
Chambers of Commerce (ACCC) formed in 1947 under the chairmanship of
H.S. Lee, who was also chairman of the Selangor CCC. The ACCC
throughout the 1950s came under the control of the MCA CWC since the
chairmanship of that body was filled by the presidents Of the CCC 
of the different states on a rotating basis.
Secondly, the MCA CWC exercised an extraordinary degree of 
control over the entire Chinese associational network through 
multiple office holding in the most important categories of asso­
ciations. H.S. Lee, for example, had been the president of the 
Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Selangor Chinese Assembly 
Hall, the Federation of Kwangtung Huay Kuan, and the All-Malaya Ko 
Chow Huay Kuan. Lau Pak Khuan had been the president of the Perak 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Perak Chinese Association, the 
Federation of Kwangtung Huay Kuan, and the Federation of Chinese 
Guilds and Associations. Leadership within this CCC dialect/ 
territorial huay kuan-trade guild nexus automatically made these 
MCA CWC members superior in social status over all other Chinese 
leaders who held office in minor mutual aid, cultural, sports, 
dramatic, social, and moral uplifting associations.
In addition to controlling the Chinese associational net­
work, the MCA CWC also played a significant role in promoting Chinese 
education in Malaya. Chinese schools had traditionally depended for 
their survival on donations from wealthy community leaders. These 
rich patrons were invited to sit on the schools * Boards of Managers,
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which controlled all the affairs of the schools, including decisions 
affecting the employment of teaching staff and textbook curricula, 
MCA CWC members who had been chairmen of the Boards of Managers of 
some of the biggest Chinese schools in the country included the 
following: H.S. Lee (the Kuen Cheng Girls' School in Kuala Lumpur), 
Y.T. Lee (The Confucian Chinese School in Kuala Lumpur), Wong Shee 
Fun (The Foon Yew School in Johore Bahru), Goh Chee Yan (the Pay 
Teck Girls* School in Malacca), and Lee Fong Yee (the Chin Hwa School 
in Seremban). Leung Cheung Ling was the vice-chairman of the United 
Chinese School Committees Association (UCSCA), the coordinating body 
of the Boards of Managers of Chinese Schools. The control exerted 
by MCA top ranking leaders over the Boards of Managers (and by second 
echelon leaders over Chinese school teachers' associations discussed 
in the following section) explained the major role played by the MCA 
in Chinese educational affairs, as evidenced by the discussion on 
the 1952 Education Ordinance in Chapter 6.
While the westernised national leaders played prominent 
roles in government bodies at the political centre and in multi­
racial societies, the state representatives with their Laukeh social 
orientation dominated the activities of Chinese traditional asso­
ciations and educational institutions. We shall see shortly that 
while the national leaders belonged to the multi-racial political 
elite of the country, the state representatives were the real power 
brokers within the Chinese community.
One final feature which emerges from the pattern of 
office holding of the MCA CWC is the disproportionately large role 
played by leaders from Baba backgrounds. Of the CWC members, only
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four (Tan Cheng Lock, Tan Siew Sin, Lim Chong Eu and Lim Khye Seng) 
came from Baba families. These men had held office in the SCBA and 
in other Baba societies such as the Penang and Malacca Chinese 
Recreational Clubs. The number of leaders and members in the party 
who came from Baba backgrounds was minute compared to those with 
Laukeh backgrounds, reflecting accurately the tiny Baba population 
in the country. Though the number of Baba leaders in the MCA was 
extremely small, the first four presidents of the party from 1949 
to 1974, Tan Cheng Lock, Lim Chong Eu, Cheah Toon Lock and Tan Siew 
Sin, were all Baba leaders who had held office in the SCBA prior to 
their joining the MCA. This phenomenon suggests that Baba leaders 
from the SCBA had one crucial political advantage over other English- 
educated leaders in the Association. Their westernised political 
and social background combined with their activities in the SCBA had 
given them greater and easier access to officials in the colonial 
government than most other Chinese leaders. It must be remembered 
that the SCBA had once played a far more important role in Malayan 
colonial affairs than any other Chinese organisation in the country. 
Ex-SCBA leaders in the MCA had gained intimate insight into the 
workings of government at the highest levels, and were perhaps 
regarded to be better equipped to lead the party than MCA 
leaders lacking their political experience and government contacts. 
During the period leading up to the formation of the MCA and 
immediately after, Cheng Lock was the Chinese leader best known to 
the highest government officials (such as Malcolm MacDonald and 
Henry Gurney), as he had established his reputation during his term 
of service in the Straits Settlements Legislative Council, His 
election to the presidency of the MCA may have been due to this
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consideration as much as to the fact that the Association was his 
brainchild.
It appears, therefore, that the political mobility of a 
Baba leader within the party hierarchy was determined to a great 
extent by the degree of influence he had within the highest govern­
ment circles. At the same time, no SCBA leader who had joined the 
MCA was likely to get far in the party hierarchy unless firstly, 
he had close social and economic ties with the Laukeh leaders in 
the party, and secondly, he held office in the most important 
Chinese associations,. The four presidents of the MCA with Baba 
backgrounds fulfilled all these requirements; they had all been 
resinicised to the extent of being able to fit well into the 
commercial and social world of the Laukeh leaders.
One final point to be made on the social background of the 
CWC members is the pattern of dialect groupings. Of the 32 men, 12 
were Hokkiens, 11 Cantonese, 6 Hakkas, 2 Hainanese and 1 Teochew. 
Clearly there was no domination by a single dialect group at the top 
level of the MCA. The distribution of dialect grouping in the CWC 
broadly reflected that within the Chinese community at large. In 
1957, the proportion of the different dialect groups in Malaya was: 
Hokkiens 31.7%, Hakkas 21.8%, Cantonese 21.7%, Teochews 12.7%, 
Hainanese 5.3%, Kwongsai 3.0%, Hokchiu 2.0%, Henghua 0.5%, Hokchia
0.4%, others (mainly from North China) 1.5%.1 The predominance of 
Hokkiens in the CWC reflects the Hokkien proportion within the
1. Fell, H., 1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya, 
Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Report no.14, Table 
3.3, p.14.
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the community at large. Though the Hakka and Cantonese proportion 
within the community was almost equal, more Cantonese than Hakkas 
were to be found in the CWC. This might have been due to the fact 
that the party's central office was located in Kuala Lumpur, with 
its predominantly Cantonese population. Though the minor dialect 
groups such as the Kwongsais, Hokchius and Henghuas were not repre- 
sented in the CWC, it will be shown that they were represented at 
the lower levels of the party hierarchy. The multiplicity of 
dialect groupings found in the CWC was a major reason why English 
was used as the common language of communication among the largely 
English-educated members.
In conclusion, from the above analysis of the social back­
ground of the CWC members, one can see that an individual could rise 
to the top level of the party hierarchy if he fulfilled two criteria: 
he had to be wealthy, and he had to be a recognised and respected 
leader within the Chinese associational network. If the individual 
aspired to be a national leader, he had to fulfill two further 
criteria: he had to be literate in English, and have close connections
with British officials and Malay leaders in the highest circles of 
government.
2.2.2 The State Leadership
The second rung leadership in the MCA consisted of office 
holders in the Working Committees of the different state branches.
In this section the office holders of the Working Committees for 
the state branches of Perak, Selangor, Johore, Negri Sembilan,
Malacca and Penang are examined. The social background of these men
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is analysed principally in terms of occupational and educational 
status, and office holding in government and other public bodies.
There were 49 men in the Perak Working Committee (for the 
term 1953-55) and 29 men in the Selangor Working Committee (for the 
term 1952-53). A large majority, 40 out of 49 in Perak and 26 out 
of 29 in Selangor, described their occupations as either businessmen 
or merchants. An examination of their business activities discloses 
that the majority were engaged in tin mining, rubber planting and 
processing, banking, insurance, shipping, real estate development, 
import-export agencies, and general wholesaling and retailing 
trading in items such as foodstuffs, hardware, clothing, cigarettes, 
petroleum and kerosene. The number of professionally qualified men 
in the two Working Committees was very small; 9 out of 49 in Perak, 
and only 3 out of 26 in Selangor. Of the 9 in Perak, there were 4 
lawyers, 2 chartered accountants, 2 doctors and 1 engineer. Of the 
3 in Selangor, there was 1 lawyer, 1 architect and 1 accountant.
The educational background of these men indicates that 
the majority were Chinese-educated, The number of Engl ish-e due ate d 
was 15 (out of 49) in Perak; in Selangor the proportion was slightly 
higher, 12 out of 29. The low number of English-educated men 
explains the correspondingly small number of professionally trained 
men rioted above.
The predominance of Chinese-educated leaders in the two 
Working Committees likewise accounts for the small proportion of 
men who held office in government bodies. Since it was necessary 
for an individual to be at least bilingual in order to be appointed 
to government bodies, Chinese-speaking wealthy towkays usually did
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not qualify for those posts. In the Perak Working Committee, only 
13 out of 49 held office in bodies such as the Federal Legislative 
Council, the State Legislative council, the Chinese Advisory Board, 
and Town and Municipal Boards. The proportion of men in the Selangor 
Working Committee who held similar positions was slightly higher,
12 out of 29. This is probably due to the fact that MCA leaders 
living in Kuala Lumpur tended to have higher chances of getting 
appointments to government bodies than their colleagues who lived 
away from the country’s political centre. This is also explained 
by the fact that the proportion of English-educated men in the 
Selangor Working Committee was higher.
The educational background of these men was also a deter­
mining factor in the low incidence of office holding in multi-racial 
societies. The Selangor Working Committee, with its slightly 
higher proportion of English-educated men, had a correspondingly 
higher proportion of men who participated in the activities of multi­
racial organisations than the Perak Working Committee. Ten out of 
the 29 men in Selangor held office in community service organisations 
such as the Rotary Club, the Jaycees, the St, John’s Ambulance 
Society, and social clubs such as the Royal Selangor Golf Club and 
the Lake Club. In Perak, only 9 out of 49 participated in the 
activities of similar multi-racial organisations.
Although the majority of these Working Committee members 
did not hold office in government bodies or multi-racial organisations, 
office holding in Chinese associations was almost universal. They 
were represented on the committees of every category of association, 
ranging from the CCC, the Chinese Assembly Hall/Chinese Association,
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the dialect/territorial huay kuan, the clan/surname association, and 
the trade guild to the recreational, cultural, and mutual aid 
society. The Perak and Selangor CCC were controlled by men from 
the MCA Working Committees of the two states. The positions of 
president, vice-president and secretary were filled by men such as 
Ang Keh Tho, Chong Khoon Lin, Cho Yew Fai, and Chin Chee Meow in 
Selangor, and by men such as Cheong Chee, Foong Seong, Chin Swee 
Onn and Wong Kin Sun in Perak. Major trade guilds came under the 
leadership of the following men: the Selangor Chinese Guilds and 
Associations was led by Leong Chee Cheong and Chong Shih Guan; the 
Selangor Chinese Hardware Dealers’ Association by Chong Shih Guan; 
the Selangor Shopkeepers' Association by Leong Chee Cheong; the 
Assembly of Perak Chinese Associations and Commercial Guilds by 
Cheong Chee; and the Perak Gold Merchants' Association by Ho Sau 
Sau. Both Perak and Selangor were rich tin mining states; the 
Chinese Mining Association in the two states was therefore a key 
organisation. This body also came under the control of the MCA 
state leaders: the Selangor Chinese Mining Association was led by 
men such as Moe Pak Kion and Chan Kwong Hon, and the Perak Chinese 
Mining Association by men such as Ng Yin Fong, Ong Chin Seong and 
Foong Seong.
The dialect/territorial huay kuans which were led by 
these MCA state leaders spanned a variety of dialect groups. These 
included the Kwangtung, Hokkien, Kwong Siew, Teochew Pooi Ip, Koo 
Kong Chau (Cantonese) , Nam Hoi (Cantonese) and Char Yong (Hakka) 
Huay Kuan in Selangor. In Perak, they included the Kwangtung, 
Hokkien, Ka Yin Chiu and Fiu Chiu (Hakka), Teochew Pooi Ip and
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Kheng Chew (Hainanese) Huay Kuan, This pattern indicates that the 
second echelon leadership in the MCA comprised men from the major 
dialect groups in the country. However, there were more Cantonese
| and Hakkas than any other dialect groups in the Working Committees
i
| of Perak and Selangor. This is largely because Cantonese and
(
I Hakkas formed the majority of the Chinese population in the two
states.
|
| The Chinese educational system in Perak and Selangor came
under the control and influence of the two MCA Working Committees.
It has been shown that control was exerted by the financial leverage
which these men had over Chinese schools through their representation 
on the schools' Boards of Managers. The following Working Committee 
members sat on the Boards of Managers of the following schools: Woo 
Saik Hong in the San Min Middle School in Teluk Anson, Ng Yin Fong 
in the Chung Hwa School in Kampar, Yeoh Kim Tian in the Pooy Lam 
High School and Yuk Choy High School in Ipoh, Chong Khoon Lin in the 
Confucian Chinese School in Kuala Lumpur, and Moe Pak Kion in the
I Kuen Cheng Girls' School and the Chung Hwa School in Kuala Lumpur.
Besides being patrons and managers of Chinese schools, MCA leaders 
also exerted immediate control over the activities of Chinese school 
teachers. This was done through control of the highest coordinating 
body of Chinese school teachers, the United Chinese School Teachers' 
Association,(UCSTA). Between 1953-1955, the UCSTA was under the 
chairmanship of Lim Lian Geok of the MCA Malacca Working Committee,
Before we proceed to make a comprehensive comparison of 
the differences and similarities in the social background of the top 
and second echelon leadership of the MCA, we should briefly consider
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the social background of the members of the Working Committees of 
Johore, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Penang.
The Johore Working Committee for the years 1953-1955 
comprised 29 men. Of the 29, an overwhelming majority of 27 listed 
their occupation simply under the all-encompassing category of 
"merchant”. Based on the economic activities of the Perak and 
Selangor Working Committee members, one may assume that the Johore 
state leaders were also successful towkays engaged in fairly large 
scale business enterprises. Only two out of the 29 men had received 
professional training (they were both doctors). It follows that the 
majority of the Johore Working Committee members were Chinese- 
educated or non-educated towkays who in turn dominated the Chinese 
associational network in Johore, especially the CCC and dialect/ 
territorial huay kuans, and played influential roles in the Chinese 
schools. Finally, because of language obstacles, only the handful 
of English-educated leaders in the state were represented on govern­
ment bodies and multi-racial organisations.
The overwhelming majority of the 45 men in the Negri 
Sembilan Working Committee (for the years 1951-52) appeared to have 
been Chinese-educated or non-educated towkays. This can be seen 
from the fact that 43 out of the 45 described their occupations 
either as businessmen or property owners. The remaining three men 
were a retired civil servant, a secretary, and a Chinese school 
teacher. The occupational pattern of the Negri Sembilan Working 
Committee reinforces the picture which has emerged: that the second 
echelon leadership of the MCA was dominated by Chinese-speaking 
successful towkays.
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The occupational backgrounds of the Malacca and Penang 
Working Committees (for the years 1952-53) display an interesting 
variation to that found in the other states. It has been seen that 
only 9 out of 49 men in Perak were English-educated professional 
men; in Selangor there were 3 out of 28; in Johore 2 out of 29; 
in Negri Sembilan 3 out of 45. In Malacca, the proportion was 
noticeably higher: 8 out of 28. In Penang it was even higher; 14 
out of 18. The deviation seen here does not, however, fundamentally 
alter the pattern of the argument so far. This deviation stemmed 
from the fact that Malacca and Penang had the largest concentration 
of Baba Chinese in the country. Thus one would expect to find a 
larger proportion of westernised English-educated Chinese in the 
Working Committees of the two states than in any other state. This 
variation in educational status does not mean that the state leaders 
in Malacca and Penang came from a different social class than 
leaders from other states, Like Cheng Lock and Siew Sin in the CWC, 
Baba state leaders in Malacca and Penang had to be accepted by the 
Chinese community at large before they could rise up the party 
hierarchy. In other words, they came from the same social and 
commercial circles as the Chinese-speaking towkay leaders, and 
actively participated in the affairs of Chinese associations, 
especially the CCC,
What then were the differences and similarities in the 
social background of the top and second run leadership of the Asso­
ciation? The most significant difference between the two groups was 
that the top leadership had a predominantly larger proportion with a 
westernised English-educated background. The larger proportion of
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professionally-trained men at the top also suggests that they were 
educated up to higher levels than the second rung leaders.
The larger proportion of English-educated men at the top 
resulted in a higher proportion holding office in government bodies 
and multi-racial organisations. Thus, many more CWC members parti­
cipated in the multi-ethnic political activities at the centre than 
members of the State Working Committees from Laukeh backgrounds, 
who were severely handicapped by language considerations. Essen­
tially, however, the English-educated professional men and Chinese- 
educated or non-educated Laukeh towkays in the MCA at the top and 
second rung level came from the same social class in the country 
despite differences in educational and occupational status. They 
comprised the Chinese mercantile, capitalist elite of Malaya.
The multiplicity of dialect groupings in the CWC and State 
Working Committees indicates that the top and second rung leadership 
was not monopolised by any particular dialect group. It also 
indicates that dialect group origins need not necessarily impede an 
individual's political mobility at that level of the party hierarchy. 
(This, however, was not the case at the grass-roots level as will be 
shortly seen.) The language of communication in the State Working 
Committees tended to be the predominant dialect of the locality or 
Mandarin, and rarely English as in the case of CWC.'*'
1. For example, the predominant dialect in Kuala Lumpur was, and 
still is, Cantonese; Cantonese and Hakka are used in Ipoh; 
Hokkien in Malacca and Penang; and Teochew and Hokkien in 
Johore Bahru.
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2.2.3 The Grass-Roots Leadership
The social background of the MCA grass-roots leadership is 
examined through the results of a survey of the occupational status 
of a total number of 648 office holders in the Working Committees of 
43 Area Branches in Johore and 33 Area Branches in Perak.'*' The term 
of office of these men spanned the years 1950-52,
Out of the total 489 office holders in Johore, 399 (81.7%) 
engaged in commercial enterprises. The majority were small scale 
retail traders dealing in foodstuffs,, clothing, medical supplies, 
hardware and other miscellaneous merchandise. A few were coffee- 
shop owners, and some others were rubber dealers engaged in the rubber 
trade of the countryside and in the processing of latex into smoked 
rubber sheets. These traders in the small towns and villages consti­
tuted the bulk of the economic middlemen who have traditionally
provided a range of commercial services for the Malay peasantry,
o
often exploitatively.
Only 30 (6.1%) of the Johore grass-roots leaders dealt in 
businesses which approximated in scale the commercial holdings of 
the top and second echelon leadership in the Association, These 
included mining, plantation, real estate, banking, insurance and
1. The Johore Area Branches were grouped under the District Branches 
of Johore Bahru, Segamat, Muar, Pontian, Kluang, Kota Tinggi,
Batu Pahat and Mersing. The Perak Area Branches came under the 
District Branches of Kinta, Kuala Kangsar, Taiping, Batang 
Padang, Lower Perak and Dindings,
2. See, for example, Ungku Abdul Aziz, "Facts and Fallacies on the 
Malay Economy", Straits Times, 28 February-5 March 1957,
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wholesale trading interests. Another 44 (8.9%) of these office 
holders were not self-employed traders or businessmen but belonged 
to the lower income wage earning, working class: they were mostly
shop assistants, clerks, craftsmen and manual labourers * A few of 
them were farmers and fishermen. Finally, only 16 (3*3%) out of the 
489 men in Johore belonged to the professional class. Here again, 
as with the case of the merchants, a qualitative difference existed 
between the types of professions these were engaged in compared to 
the men higher up the party hierarchy. Most of the grass-roots 
leaders were poorly paid school teachers in Chinese schools. Some 
others were Chinese physicians (sinsehs) and dentists who were 
either trained in China or were self-taught in the rudimentary skills 
of these disciplines. Unlike the largely western trained pro­
fessional men found in the upper level of the party hierarchy who 
had lucrative practices in the bigger towns, these men were modestly 
renumerated for their professional services in the smaller towns 
and villages.
The occupational pattern of the 159 grass-roots leaders in 
Perak reveals a similar trend to that found in Johore. 138 (88,8%) 
of these men described their occupations either as merchants or 
rubber dealers. They were mostly small scale retailers and traders. 
Fifteen out of the total 159 men in Perak (9.4%) were fairly wealthy 
men engaged mainly in the tin mining industry (ivhich is located 
principally in Perak.) Four out of the 159 were wage earners; 2 were 
shop assistants and the other 2 were clerks. Finally, only 2 men 
were professionally trained: a school teacher in a Chinese school 
and an accountant.
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The dearth of western trained professional men and the 
predominance of petty traders among the grass-roots leaders of the 
MCA indicates that they were mostly Chinese-educated or non-educated 
men belonging to the lower middle and lower income groups within the 
Chinese community. They were also either first generation immigrants 
or were local-born Chinese who had preserved the social, cultural 
and traditional values of their forefathers from China.
During the early 1950s, a number of village councils and 
squatter committees were set up in the small towns and New Villages 
as part of the government’s anti-insurgency campaign to win the 
loyalty of the rural Chinese population. These MCA grass-roots 
leaders were selected to represent the interests of their local 
communities on these councils and committees. Aside from holding 
office in these government consultative bodies, the MCA grass-roots 
leaders also monopolised office holding in the Chinese associa­
tions in the small towns. They were also the chairmen and managers 
of the local Chinese schools. This last office was significant, 
especially in villages, since the chairman of the local school 
committee was responsible for the smooth running of village affairs 
and was entrusted with informal power to settle disputes between 
villagers.* Therefore, one can see that MCA village leaders who 
controlled the local Chinese schools had the highest-ranking social 
status within the village community.
1. For a discussion on the role played by School Committees in 
village affairs, see, Newell, W.H., Treacherous River: A Study 
of Rural Chinese in North Malaya, University of Malaya Press, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1962, p.38. Maeda, Kiyoshige, Alor Janggus; A 
Chinese Community in Malaya, The Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies, Kyoto University, 1967, pp.35-36.
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The small number of the grass-roots MCA office holders who 
belonged to the rural proletariat Cfor example, rubber tappers and 
labourers) and the peasantry - 3.2% of the total in Johore, and none 
in Perak - clearly shows that the MCA was a party led by merchants, 
from the CWC right down to the lowest level. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that the MCA has been commonly referred to as a "towkay 
party”. Most people have believed that the towkay leaders of the 
party, be they wealthy capitalists or small traders, were self-­
seeking opportunists who put personal business interests before those 
of the party's, an image which has impared the Association's ability 
to gain the support of the lower income and working classes within 
the Chinese community.
The fact that the party was dominated by the towkay class 
emerged in a government report on the party's work in the New 
Villages. The report stated that the common villager was not keen 
to join the MCA, since that would make him a target for reprisals 
from the Communist terrorists, but it added that the elitist composi­
tion of the party also acted as a deterrent. The report read; "The 
work of the MCA is more useful and important than many people suppose, 
but unfortunately its leaders are mostly from the towkay class. The 
comman man regards it as an association of capitalists...."^
A similar observation was made by Victor Purcell when he 
was invited out to Malaya by the party to advise it on its Emergency 
activities and to evaluate the political position of the Chinese
X "Report No.5 in Lab. M. Conf, 1/52", Appendix, mimeo., n.d,, 
c.1952, TCL Papers, Spl3, Item 175, Kuala Lumpur.
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community under the Templer Administration. Purcell immediately
noticed the elitist make up of the party leadership and warned the
1
party of the inherent danger of such a situation. He wrote:
The economic interests of the MCA leaders may 
ultimately be found to be incompatible with 
those of the mass of the Chinese.. It would be 
disastrous if the MCA, because of. its middle- 
class composition at the higher levels, came to 
be regarded as a "reactionary” right wing 
bourgeoisie of bankers, businessmen, and lawyers 
intent merely on safeguarding their own economic 
interests. This would be to repeat in Malaya 
the mistakes of the KMT in China.
Almost as if prompted by Purcell's warning, the MCA party
organ, the Malayan Mirror, carried an article which sought to
reassure the Chinese population that the party was not a towkay
organisation. It stated that several men from the "labouring and
working classes" were represented on the Working Committees on all
MCA branches, and went on to proclaim: "Let it be understood that
the MCA is not a rich man's Association, pandering to the wants of
the well-to-do. It bears the standard of Democracy today, and rich
2
and poor alike have equal say in its management." This piece of 
party propaganda did not tally with the real situation* it was no 
wonder that the self-projected image of the party failed to take 
hold. During the mid-1960s, the party president, Tan Siew Sin was 
still attempting to dispell the party’s towkay image.. Addressing
1. "Report on a Visit to Malaya from 10 August to 20 September at 
the invitation of the Malayan Chinese Association by Victor 
Purcell and Francis Caraell", mimeo., pp.73-74, TCL Papers, 
TCL/VI/1.
2. Malayan Mirror, Vol.l, No,10, 30 October 1953.
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tlie party General Assembly, he said;
Our opponents and our detractors have always stated 
that the MCA is an association which exists for the 
rich and the well-to-do, or for those who want to 
become rich through politics. It may not be true, 
it may not be fair, but if this belief becomes 
increasingly accepted by wide sections of the 
Chinese public, then the MCA is doomed.
2.2.4 Relationships within the Party Hierarchy
The differences in the social backgrounds of the MCA 
leadership at different levels of the party hierarchy led to the 
development of a power linkage system between the different groups 
in the party. The three groups of party leaders - the national 
leaders, the state leaders and the grass-roots leaders - interacted 
with each other through a patron-client relationship based on 
reciprocal political and economic ties and services. I shall examine 
this relationship, starting from the bottom of the party hierarchy, by 
looking at the services the grass-roots leaders provided for leaders 
higher up the party, and at the services they expected in return 
from the leaders •
The MCA grass-roots leaders were the power brokers of the 
Chinese population located in small towns and New Villages. Being 
office-holders of the local associations and the local school 
committees, they were responsible for the smooth running of community 
affairs and the settlement of domestic disputes between local 
residents. These MCA grass-roots leaders were commonly regarded as
1. Speech by Tan Siew Sin at the MCA Central General Assembly on
9 November 1963. (Party documents, unless otherwise indicated, 
are found at the MCA headquarters).
community headmen and had the highest ranking social status within 
the local Chinese population. The Chinese settlements where MCA 
grass-roots leaders exercised influence were Laukeh communities 
which had remained encapsulated from the multi-ethnic superstructure 
and the Malay host environment.1 The MCA grass-roots leaders 
needed the political linkage services of the English-educated 
national leaders to obtain government funds for development projects 
and other services for their communities.
While the dependency of the MCA grass-roots leaders on
the top leaders was dictated by political concerns, their dependency
on thie second rung leaders was economically motivated. Petty 
bourgeois traders and retailers of small Chinese communities 
servicing rural areas depended on urban towkays, the wealthier 
tradesmen and wholesalers, to obtain credit and supplies to run 
their businesses, and to provide transportation and marketing 
facilities for their rubber, rice and other merchandise. In 
exchange for these economic services, MCA grass-roots leaders 
pledged political support and the popular backing of their local 
communities for the party's state leaders.
Backed by the political support of the grass-roots leaders,
the second rung leaders constituted the power brokers between the
1. Examples of such communities are Sanchun New Village described 
by J. Strauch in Chinese Village Politics..., chs.3-6, and Titi 
in Negri Sembilan discussed by Laurence Siaw in Chinese Society 
in Rural Malaysia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Oxford University Pres§, 1983.
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English-speaking national echelon and the Laukeh base of the party. 
The party national leadership needed the influence which the state 
leaders could bring to bear on local level leaders to attract mass 
support for the MCA. The state leaders were happy to provide this 
service for the top leaders because they in turn sought favours 
from the latter. The membership of the top leaders in the multi­
ethnic political elite of Malaya put them in a position to dispense 
political and economic patronage to their clients in the state 
branches of the party. The personal ties of certain MCA national 
leaders such as Tan Cheng Lock and Tan Siew Sin with UMNO leaders 
rendered them particularly useful to the Laukeh second rung leaders, 
as it was common knowledge that the UMNO would be the key political 
force in independent Malaya. The state leaders wanted to have 
access to the new Malay political elite for public political and 
private economic gain. Publicly, they wanted to play a role in the 
movement for independence and to influence the course of post­
independence politics with a view to safeguarding and promoting 
Chinese interests. This public involvement in the national 
politics of the country would further enhance their prestige and 
status within the Chinese community. Privately, they hoped to 
further their commercial interests through making contact with key 
members of the future government of independent Malaya. The MCA 
top leaders were the much sought after middlemen who could provide 
the intermediary services linking up the Malay centre and the 
Laukeh periphery.
The party's top echelon looked to the Laukeh lower 
echelon leaders as the foundation for building the MCA into a
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mass-based party. Westernised Chinese leaders by themselves were 
in no position to set up a widely-based party because their social 
sources of party recruitment would be confined to the English- 
speaking section of the Chinese community, which constituted a 
mere 7.6% of the total Chinese population in Malaya in 1957. In 
contrast, the Chinese-speaking and Chinese-educated proportion of 
the Chinese population stood at 90.6% of the total number.^
2.2.5 Membership and Party Recruitment
The social background of party membership and the social 
sources of party recruitment also underline the extent to which the 
westernised national leaders had to depend on the linkage services 
provided by lower echelon Laukeh leaders to attract support for 
the party. MCA members were recruited mainly from the widespread 
network of traditional associations and the New Villages, and to a 
lesser extent, from the secret societies.
The party membership statistics for the years 1949-1957
2
indicate that it was a fairly widely-based organisation. In
1. Population Census of the Federation of Malaya 1957, Report 
no.14, Tables 5.3 and 9b(l), pp.23, 94.
2. Though it is known that political parties tend to inflate 
their membership figures, it is nevertheless useful to use 
official party membership figures for they may indicate an 
overall pattern of growth over a period of time. The 
membership figures cited here were obtained from the MCA 
headquarters.
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November 1949, a mere eight months after the Association's inaugura­
tion, the party boasted an impressive membership of 103,000* The 
support given to the new party by Chinese association and business 
leaders, who became office holders in the party, immediately drew a 
large proportion of the membership of Chinese associations to the 
MCA. When the party embarked on its Emergency welfare work, its 
membership increased dramatically. In May 1950, there were 145,000 
members. The introduction of the party sweepstake (discussed in 
the following chapter) gained it several thousand more members 
attracted by the generous financial inducements contained in the 
lottery. In February 1953, the party membership reached the quarter 
million mark. By 1957, on the eve of Malaya's independence, the MCA 
had well over 300,000 members, and it was by far the most widely 
based party in the country.^"
The Chinese associational network was easily the most 
important source of membership recruitment for the MCA. It has been 
shown that the bulk of the party leadership at all levels were made 
up of leaders from the whole range of Chinese associations in the 
country. When an association leader joined the MCA, those Chinese 
who belonged to the associations in which he held office likewise 
joined the party in the hope that their patron would dispense 
generous patronage in return for their political support. The pro­
portion of Chinese association membership in the MCA was so great 
that when elections were introduced in Malaya on a Federal basis in
1. By 1954, the membership of the MCA had exceeded that of the UMNO. 
The figures were 300,000 and 200,000 respectively. "Statement by 
UMNO/MCA Alliance released in London 17 May 1954", mimeo., TCL 
Papers, TCL/8/52a. At present the UMNO's membership is far 
larger than the MCA's.
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1955, the state branches informed the party headquarters that the 
Chinese association in each state should select candidates on 
behalf of the party. The Penang MCA, for instance, claimed that 
this action was wholly justified since the 16,000 odd members of 
the Penang State Branch were all members of various Chinese guilds 
and associations in Penang.^
The New Villages formed the second major source of member­
ship recruitment. The Association's welfare work on behalf of the 
squatter population which were resettled in New Villages reaped rich 
harvests for the party, and its membership grew by leaps and bounds. 
Several party branches reported large increases in their membership 
due to the recruitment of New Villages. The chairman of the Kedah/ 
Perlis State Branch, for example, noted that party membership in the
two states had trebled within two years because of the party's
2
Emergency welfare work among the New Villages there. The importance
of recruitment of New Villagers and squatters to the party is
evident in the following speech regarding efforts to get the govern-r
3
ment to lift the curfew imposed on the village of Tanjong Malim:
1. Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Working Committee of the 
MCA Penang and Province Wellesley Branch to discuss Settlement 
Elections and to take necessary action, held at the premises of 
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce on 20 December 1954.
2. Address by Soon Cheng Sun at the special meeting of the MCA 
Kedah/Perlis Branch on 3 May 1952.
3. Notes for the President on the Conduct of the Meeting of the 
Working Committee on 22 June 1952.
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There have been many expressions of a appreciation 
by the local inhabitants of RQ’s work in this 
affair, which gave us a chance to help and serve 
and made known to remote villages the name of
MCA. In proof of this, let it be known that the
membership in Tanjong Malim in the MCA jumped, 
almost overnight, from a pre-curfew 200 to a 
post-curfew 2,000.
The party also reported that several branches were being
established in New Villages throughout the early 1950s.. The Annual
Report of the Perak State Branch for 1954 revealed that several MCA
officials had visited the New Villages in Perak in the course of
carrying out their Emergency welfare work. As a result of this,
"they were able to establish branches in Kampong Tawas, Bukit Merah,
Kanthan Bahru, Pasir Pinji, and several other New Villages".^ Party
2
leaders reported the same happening elsewhere in the country.
The party’s concerted campaign to establish branches in New
Villages resulted in the creation of a widespread branch network in
the rural areas. This fact may be established by comparing
statistics compiled on the New Villages and on MCA branches and 
3
membership. Out of the 444 New Villages created during the period 
1949-1960, 314 New Villages (70.7%) had MCA area branches. The
1. Report of the MCA Perak State Committee for the year ended 30 
June 1954 to be submitted to the Sixth Annual General Meeting 
on 28 December 1954, p.4. Leong Yew Koh (LYK) Papers, SP3, 
no.61.
2. See, for example, Minutes of the MCA General Committee and Area 
Representatives Muar, held on 22 August 1954.
3. The list of party branches is obtained from the MCA headquarters. 
The information on the New Villages is taken from: Fernandez, 
D.Z., "New Villages in Peninsula Malaysia Created During the 
Emergency 1948-1960" Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, 
n.d. (c.1975), Appendix A and D.
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importance of the New Village population as a source of membership 
recruitment can be seen in a comparison of the size of party member­
ship of the different state branches and the New Village population 
in each state. By 1957, the Perak State Branch had the highest 
membership figures - 84,197 or 28% of the national membership.
Perak was also the state with the highest Chinese New Village 
population - 236,961 or 30.7% of the total - and the greatest 
number of New Villages - 134 or 30% of the total number of New 
Villages created between 1949 and 1960. The next two state branches 
in terms of membership, Selangor and Johore, were also the states 
with the second and third largest Chinese New Village population.
The party membership of the Selangor State Branch stood at 18.3% 
of the national total in 1957, and the New Village population in 
the state was 22.4% of the total. Johore had 12.2% of the national 
party membership and 24.9% of the total New Village population.
Having access to this large rural source of membership 
recruitment, the MCA rapidly became well entrenched in the rural 
areas. The geographical distribution of membership in Malacca 
indicates that the party was basically a rural-based organisation.
In 1951, the Malacca State Branch reported that out of a total 
state membership of 8,690, slightly over half (4,909) came from 
small towns and villages, while the rest came from Malacca town.
By 1957, the rural-urban disparity had increased: out of a total
number of 12,350 members, 7,352 or 59.6% came from the countryside,
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while 4,998 or 40.4% came from the town of Malacca. The picture 
of the MCA as more rural than urban based is reinforced by the 
occupational breakdown of party membership to be discussed shortly.
The MCA also recruited from secret societies, but little
data exists on this source of recruitment as MCA leaders are
reluctant to acknowledge the links they had (and still have) with
illegal organisations and bosses of the underground world. Secret
society heads did not usually hold: office at the higher ranks of
2
the party hierarchy and remained grass-roots leaders. As we have 
seen in Chapter 1, secret society members comprised a considerable 
proportion of the membership of voluntary associations and 
naturally were recruited by the MCA to become the rank and file of 
the new party. Furthermore, it may be safely assumed that when a 
Laukeh association leader cum secret society boss joined the MCA, 
he would have recruited members of his secret society for the MCA 
in order to secure his political base in the party.
MCA party leaders tended to call upon the services of 
secret societies to perform ’’bully boy" tasks, especially in
1. Report of the MCA Malacca State Working Committee for the year 
ended 30 June 1952 to be submitted to the Second Annual General 
Meeting of the Malacca Branch to be held on 31 December 1952j 
p.2; and Report of the MCA Malacca State Working Committee to 
be submitted to the Fifth Ordinary Annual General Meeting held 
on 17 March 1957, p.2.
2. Laurence Siaw observed that in the town of Titi where he 
conducted his field work, there were several Wah Kee secret 
society members in the local MCA branch, Chinese Society in 
Rural Malaya, p. 122.
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conjunction with those undertaken by the party youth wing to
mobilise support for the party in local election campaigns following
the introduction of electoral politics in Malaya after 1952.
Leaders of opposition parties were highly critical of the MCA ties
with secret societies which were especially evident at election
times. Opposition leaders accused MCA youth members who were also
secret society members of harassing, intimidating and beating up
the supporters of opposition parties during election campaigns.
For example, V. David of the Labour Party said that the MCA Youth
Section accommodated "most of the ’number one' thugs and gangsters"
in the towns and villages.^ On another occasion, D.K. Seenivasagam,
the leader of the Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP), accused the
chairman of the MCA Youth Section in Chendong Village (near Ipoh)
of being the leader of the Wah Kee secret society in the village.
Seenivasagam added that the M3A Youth Section was in fact a Wah Kee
organisation: "Wah Kee is Mah Ching /MCA Youth/ and Mah Ching is 
2
Wah Kee". On yet another occasion, the chairman of the Labour 
Party based in the village of Pajam (near Seremban) accused the MCA 
Pajam Youth Section of being the local cover for secret society
1. Speech by V. David, Dewan Ra*ayat Debates, 21 April 1961,
Col.210.
2. Speech by D.K. Seenivasagam, Dewan Ra’ayat Debates, 21 April 
1961, Col.183. Laurence Siaw stated that a number of Wah Kee 
youths organised themselves as the "MCA Youth Group" to 
support MCA candidates in the annual local council elections 
held in Titi. Siaw, p.149.
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thuggery in the area. He apparently supplied enough evidence to 
back up his accusation, as the Special Branch opened an investiga­
tion into the matter.^
The overwhelming majority of the MCA membership was, and
is, male. The female proportion of the total membership has been
so insignificant that in 1973, 24 years after the Women Sub-
Committee was originally set up, Chinese women formed a mere 7.9%
2
of the total membership. The leading female figures in the party 
were the English-educated wives of national leaders. They tended 
not to participate in the mainstream of party activities, but 
preoccupied themselves by organising traditional women's activities 
such as cooking, sewing and child-care classes for the benefit of 
the less educated Chinese women members and wives of party members.
The dearth of female membership in the party was a 
reflection of the general lack of participation by females in the 
activities of Chinese associations and organisations, and also a 
reflection of the traditional role played by females in Chinese 
society where the female has traditionally been regarded as inferior 
in social status to the male and has little role in the public
1. See letter, from the Hon. Secretary, Pajam MCA Youth Section, 
to the Chairman, MCA National Youth Section, dated 11 October 
1966.
2. Figure supplied by MCA headquarters.
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affairs of the community.
2.2.6 The Social Background of Party Membership
The social background of party membership is examined in 
relation to occupational and educational status, income and dialect 
groupings. Broadly speaking, one can say that the most substantial 
portion of MCA members belonged to the lower income group: the
working proletariat, the craftsmen, the white collar wage earners, 
farmers and fishermen. A smaller though considerable section 
belonged to the middle-income group: merchants and professional
men.
The earliest information on the occupations of the total
2
membership of the party was compiled in 1962. In that year, there 
were 67,700 members. Of these, 23,603 (34.9%) were listed as 
"businessmen1' and 1,865 (2.8%) as "shopkeepers". Thus the 
capitalist/petty bourgeois element in the party stood at 37.7% of
1. Since the early 1970s, the MCA leadership, realising that 
female Malay voting power is a significant factor in UMNO 
politics, has made a concerted attempt to recruit more female 
members and to give them a more responsible role in party 
affairs. The female proportion of party membership has 
increased from 7.9% in 1973 to approximately 15% today.
2. Broad trends in occupational breakdown of party membership 
between the early 1950s and 1960s are not significantly 
different. This fact emerged after conversations with some 
MCA members who have been in the party since the early 1950s, 
and from an interview with the official in charge of the 
national membership section, Mr. Shu Soo Neng (on 27 February 
1976), who has been a party member since the late 1950s.
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the total membership. The professional class - listed as teachers, 
students, technicians, engineers, doctors, nurses, lawyers, 
accountants and civil servants - formed an insignificant 1.7% 
(1,183) of the total. The working proletariat class - listed as 
rubber tappers, mine workers, construction workers, hawkers, 
miscellaneous labourers, blacksmithst masons, carpenters, dhobies, 
barbers and tailors - formed 48.3% (32,705), which was the biggest 
proportion of the total membership. The white collar working class 
- clerks and shop assistants - constituted 1.9% (1,277) of the 
total. The remaining 10.4% (7,067) were listed as farmers and 
fishermen.
The occupational background of the party membership 
indicates the rural-urban distribution of party members. Generally 
speaking, the capitalist/petty bourgeois and professional section 
of the party membership were spread over the major urban centres 
and smaller towns. White collar workers, craftsmen, domestic 
workers and construction workers were found in the same areas.
These occupation categories add up to 50.7% of the total member­
ship figures in 1957. At a conservative estimate, one may say 
that at least half of this 50.7% (25%) were found in the smaller 
towns. The rural section of the party - the farmers, fishermen, 
rubber tappers, mining and manual labourers - stood at 49.3% of 
the total membership. One may conclude, therefore, that approxi­
mately three-quarters (25% plus 49.3%) of the MCA party membership 
was drawn from outside the major urban centres in Malaya. The 
low farmer/fishermen proportion CIO.4%) of the party membership
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reflects the low number of Chinese in the country engaged in these 
occupations which are the traditional preserves of the Malay 
population.1
Census statistics on the rate of literacy within the
Chinese community bear out the observation made earlier that the
bulk of the MCA grass-roots leadership and membership were mainly
Chinese-educated or non-educated. In 1957, 70.1% of the Chinese
male population over 10 years old was literate in any language.
2
Of these only 14.4% was literate in English and 3.9% in Malay.
Thus, at least 52.1% of the Chinese male population over 10 years 
old was literate in Chinese (Mandarin) and 29.9% was illiterate.
While the upper levels of the party leadership were not
monopolised by a particular dialect group, this was not the case at
the grass-roots level. The historical settlement of dialect groups
in Malaya resulted in the predominance of certain groups in certain
3
areas in the country. The Hokkiens, for example, were generally 
concentrated in coastal areas, particularly in the former Straits 
Settlements, while the Hakkas and Cantonese were mainly found inland, 
especially in old tin-mining towns such as Ipoh and Kula Lumpur.
1. In 1957, e.g., the Chinese percentage of the total population
in Malaya engaged in rice growing was 2.3% compared to the Malay 
percentage of 95.5%. Chinese fishermen made up 31.6% of the 
total fishing population while the Malay percentage was 67.4%. 
Taken from Population Census of the Federation of Malaya 1957, 
Report No.14, Table 11.
2. Population Census of the Federation of Malaya 1957, figures 
coinpiled from Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 in Report No. 14.
3. For an account of this phenomenon, see Moese et al., pp.163-176.
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Teochews were concentrated generally in areas adjacent to Province 
Wellesley and in West Johore. Some small towns were peopled 
almost entirely by a single dialect group. Sitiawan in Perak has 
a large Hokchiu population, while Raub and Bentong in Pahang have 
a predominantly Kwongsai population. Given this situation, it was 
usually difficult for a party member who did not belong to the 
predominant dialect group of the locality to be voted into the 
local Working Committee. The importance of dialect group origins 
as a criterion of political mobility at the party grass-roots 
level is borne out by the fact that leaders in the CWC usually made 
it to the top if they originally came from local bases in the party 
where their dialect group was predominant. Tan Siew Sin and Lim 
Chong Eu are Hokkiens from the predominantly Hokkien towns of 
Malacca and Penang; H.S. Lee is a Cantonese from Kuala Lumpur 
which has a large Cantonese population. Usually a leader had to be 
a Kwongsai to be acceptable to the party rank and file in Raub and 
Bentong and he had to be a Hokchiu to be accepted by the rank and 
file in Sitiawan.
The information on the occupational and educational 
status of the party rank and file shows that the large majority 
were either China-born or locally born Laukeh Chinese. Since the 
party constitution (from 1949-1959) stipulated that any Chinese 
over 18 years old who had lived in Malaya for at least a period of 
five years were eligible for membership^ the bulk of the party 
membership in the early 1950s could not have been Malayan citizens
1. Rules of the Malayan Chinese Association, Ling Wah Press, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1949.
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since the Malayan Federation Constitution of 1948 rendered the
overwhelming majority of the Chinese population ineligible for
Federal citizenship. By the end of 1950, only about 24% of the
Chinese population in Malaya had become citizens.'*' In 1954, two
years after the liberalisation of certain citizenship requirements
in 1952, the non-citizen proportion of the Chinese population still
2
remained as high as 50%.
2.3 Development of an MCA Ideology
The MCA embraced three world views, reflecting different 
priorities on issues of primary concern to the conservative Chinese 
leadership of Malaya. The three perspectives - the westernised 
outlook (which incorporated the Baba outlook), the traditional CCC- 
huay kuan outlook and the KMT outlook - were not held by exclusive 
groups of leaders within the party. Many leaders had more than 
one ideological perspective and they all had certain goals in 
common. For example, all the leaders wanted the MCA to be proctec- 
tive of Chinese interests and supportive of the anti-Communist cause, 
as well as to be effective within the wider framework of multi­
racial Malayan politics. In addition, they all believed in
objectives published in the party's first constitution in 1949,
3
which were:
1. 500,000 persons out of a total Chinese population of 2,100,000. 
Ratnam, K.J., Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, 
University of Malay Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, p.84.
2. 1,210,227 were citizens out of a total Chinese population of 
2,334,000. Figures taken from Proceedings of the Federal 
Legislative Council, 4 May 1955, Col.234.
3. Rules of the Malayan Chinese Association. (These rules were 
passed at a general meeting held on 12 June 1949).
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(a) To promote and maintain inter-racial goodwill 
and harmony in Malaya.
(b) To foster and safeguard the social, political,
Cultural and economic welfare of the Malayan 
Chinese by legitimate or constitutional means.
(c) To promote and assist in the maintenance of peace 
and good order for the attainment of peaceful and 
orderly progress in Malaya.
(d) Generally to do all such acts and things as may 
be incidental to or connected with or conducive 
to the attainment of any of the above-mentioned 
objects.
However, there were different priorities among the three major 
groups regarding issues of primary concern.
The world view of the Laukeh leaders was moulded by their 
bourgeois capitalist mentality and their positions of leadership in 
voluntary associations. These towkay leaders saw accummulation of 
wealth as the primary path to power and status. Voluntary associa­
tions offered the organisational structure by which this status 
could be developed and recognised, while at the same time providing 
contacts and opportunities for advancing their economic objectives. 
A primary function of leadership in voluntary associations was the 
dispensation of material assistance for social welfare, educational 
and other mutual aid purposes required by the local community. 
Office holding in the MCA was thus regarded by many Laukeh leaders 
as mirroring that of voluntary associations. To them, the MCA 
appeared another institutionalised means to acquire status and 
prestige, to advance their business activities and to distribute 
largesse through community oriented welfare work.
The KMT world view was held by party leaders who had been 
active in the KMTM before it became defunct after 1949. Indeed, 
in the early 1950s the list of prominent MCA state office holders
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read like a "Who’s Who" of the pre-war KMTM leadership. These men 
included Lau Pak Khuan, Leong Yew Koh, Ong Chin Seong, Peh Seng 
Khoon, Cheong Chee and Foong Seong in Perak; H.S. Lee, Ang Keh Tho, 
Cho Yew Fah, Leong Chee Cheong and Chong Shih Guan in Selangor;
Ong Keng Seng, Saw Seng Kiew and Ng Sui Cam in Penang; Goh Chee 
Yan and Ho Pao Jin in Malacca; Wong Shee Fun in Johore; Yap Mau 
Tatt and Lee Tee Siong in Negri Sembilan; and Lim Keng Lian,
Chuang Hui Tsuan and Chua Ho Ann in Singapore.’*'
The ideological perspective of these ex-KMTM leaders was
coloured by the political objectives of Chiang Kai Chek's govern­
ment, which emphasised, in its relations with overseas Chinese, the 
propagation of a pan-Chinese nationalism and the mobilisation of 
overseas Chinese support and loyalty behind the KMT anti-Communist 
cause. Following its defeat by the CCP in late 1949, the Taiwan- 
based KMT government courted overseas Chinese leaders in the hope 
of obtaining moral and financial backing behind its campaign to 
regain China. Pro-KMT leaders in Malaya publicly championed the 
KMT cause within the Chinese community in Malaya.
The world views of Laukeh and ex-KMTM leaders in Malaya 
were essentially the same as those found in other overseas Chinese 
communities. Leaders of Chinese voluntary associations in South­
east Asia and elsewhere, like Laukeh leaders in Malaya, concerned 
themselves with the pursuit of status-orientated and local-level 
community service goals. Leaders of pro-KMT organisations outside
1. These names have been compiled from reports in Chinese news­
papers, namely Nanyang Siang Pau and China Press, describing 
KMT functions held by Chinese leaders in Malaya for the period 
1948-1956.
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Malaya, like their counterparts in the KMTM, likewise involved 
themselves in pro-KMT overseas Chinese politics.* In contrast, the 
westernised MCA leadership defined new ideological and organisa­
tional functions for the MCA aimed at making the new party 
specifically pertinent to Maiayan-centred needs created by the rise 
of strident Malay nationalism, the stringent citizenship clauses of 
the Federation of Malaya constitution, and the outbreak of the 
Communist insurrection. The westernised leaders explicitly did not 
want the MCA to merely copy traditional functions carried out by 
the CCC-huay kuan nor to be embroiled in pro-KMT overseas Chinese 
politics.
These English-educated leaders (a few of whom were British- 
trained lawyers) understood the political and constitutional 
processes which defined the political game in colonial Malaya, and 
possessed the political sophistication and experience to use the 
MCA as an effective bargaining counter when dealing with the 
British. In contrast, Laukeh party leaders, both from the CCC-huay 
kuans and KMTM, not only lacked the skills but also the motivation 
to play such an innovative role.
In the early 1950s, the MCA manifested all three 
ideological approaches, leading to confusion and uncertainty over 
the party’s exact identity. The English-educated leadership 
insisted that the party was the first Malayan-centred Chinese 
political party; on the other hand, the CCC-huay kuan element led
1. See Skinner, G.W., Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community 
of Thailand, Cornell University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1958, and 
Purcell, V., The Chinese in Southeast Asia, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1965 (2nd.ed.).
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many to regard it as merely another traditional association. And 
finally, the activities of pro-KMT leaders made others believe 
that the new party was in fact the KMTM in a different guise.
Arguing the views of the modernist leadership, party
president Tan Cheng Lock constantly emphasised the Malayan-centred
political objectives of the party. He stressed the point that the
MCA was formed principally to educate Chinese in Malaya to regard
Malaya as the sole object of their loyalty. Speaking on this theme
at a public meeting in 1951 Cheng Lock said that the MCA would
politically educate the Chinese uto became genuine Malayans1* who
would cooperate with the other races so that the ideal of "one
Malayan Nationality animated by Malayan consciousness and Malayan
patriotism" would be realised in the near future.'*’ At the annual
assembly of the Central General Committee in 1951, Cheng Lock
emphasised that the MCA had been formed to "foster and to engender
a truly Malayan outlook, consciousness and patriotism among the
domiciled Malayan Chinese in order to forge and fortify their ties
with this country and unity as an integral part and parcel of the
Malayan people, and to help develop their sense of civil responsi-
2
bility, duty and obligation to their country of adoption".
Cheng Lock argued that the political metamorphosis of the 
Chinese into true Malayans could only come about if they were 
accorded constitutional rights and privileges equal to the Malay
1. Speech by Tan Cheng Lock at Port Dickson Road Resettlement Area, 
Seremban, on 18 January 1951, TCL Papers, SP13, Item 172.
2. Speech by Tan Cheng Lock at the MCA Annual Central General 
Committee meeting held on 21 April 1951.
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community. The citizenship clauses of the 1948 Federation of 
Malaya Agreement had reduced the Chinese to a position which Cheng 
Lock described as "helots and pariahs without rights and responsi­
bilities of citizenship".* He emphasised that the MCA would be
dedicated to obtaining "a full measure of justice in all things"
2
for the Chinese community.
The MCA’s role as initiator of political action to protect 
Chinese interests was likewise articulated by other English- 
educated party leaders. Tan Siew Sin, for example, pointed out:
"In the context of present-day events, the necessity for a strong 
political organisation to protect the rights and interests of the 
Chinese needs no argument. Today it is clear that the Chinese must 
either unite or perish. They are already political pariahs and
3
should remember that it is easier to go downhill than uphill".
The westernised leadership was immediately concerned to achieve 
their political objectives, as is evidenced by their participation 
in the Communities Liaison Committee and overtures to UMNO leaders 
to form an electoral pact and political alliance during the 1952 
Kuala Lumpur municipal elections.
The pro-KMT ideological manifestation of the MCA ran 
counter to the claims of the English-educated leadership that the 
MCA would act as midwife to the birth of a Maiayan-centred loyalty
1. Address by Tan Cheng Lock at Taiping and Ipoh on 10 April 1949 
entitled "The Chinese in Malaya", in Tan Cheng Lock, A Collection 
of Speeches, Ih Shih Press Ltd., Singapore, n.d., p.19.
2. Speech by Tan Cheng Lock at Port Dickson Road Resettlement Area 
on 18 January 1951.
3. Speech by Tan Siew Sin entitled "Why the Malayan Chinese Asso­
ciation is Necessary", c.April 1953.
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and consciousness among Chinese in Malaya. The activities of pro- 
KMT party leaders, which often included public showings of support 
for Chiang Kai Shek's regime, raised fears that the MCA was a tool 
of the Taiwan government out to propagate pan-Chinese nationalism 
and a foreign loyalty within the community. As this posed a serious 
problem for the party, we shall examine in some detail the role of 
the KMT in the early development of the MCA.
As we have seen in Chapter 1, the KMTM successfully re­
organised itself during the period of the British Military Adminis­
tration. By the outbreak of the Communist insurrection in June
1948, the KMTM had re-established its pre-war influence over the 
associations. Although the KMTM officially ceased to function with 
the prohibition on foreign political party activity in May 1949, 
party branches all over the country remained open till mid September
1949.* The welfare of the KMT was thereafter kept alive by the 
presence of Nationalist Chinese consular representatives stationed 
in the major towns of Malaya. The KMT consuls departed from Malaya 
after June 1950, when Britain, upon its recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China, cut off diplomatic ties with Chiang Kai Shek’s 
government in Taiwan.
The closure of KMTM branches and the withdrawal of KMT 
diplomats left the party members without an organisational structure 
and formal leadership. The formation of the MCA must have appeared 
a well-timed solution to the quandary in which the disbanded KMTM 
found itself. The MCA was established before the KMT consuls left 
the country, and knowing the fall of Peking to be imminent, Chiang's
1. Nanyang Siang Pau, 9 and 15 September 1949.
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representatives in Malaya used the little time remaining to them to 
mobilise support for the proposed MCA which they hoped would take 
the place of the KMTM as a vehicle for propagating the Nationalist 
cause within the Chinese community.
The role played by the KMT consul based in Ipoh bears
testimony to the deep interest which the KMT had in the founding of
the MCA. A few weeks before the inaugural meeting of the MCA was
held, the Ipoh KMT consul, Haji Ibrahim Ma, started to prepare the
groundwork in Perak to harness support from the Chinese associations
for the proposed party. He convened a series of public meetings of
CCC-huay kuan leaders in Ipoh to discuss the possibility of forming
a society which would become the Perak Branch of the MCA,^ Although
the society was not formed, the occasion gave Ma the opportunity to
spread pro-MCA feelings among the most powerful community leaders in
Perak. Ma urged all community leaders under his consular jurisdiction
to attend the inaugural meeting of the Association held in Kuala
Lumpur. He also instructed Chinese leaders in Penang, Kelantan and
Trengganu to do likewise. In addition, he advised those leaders to
cast their presidential vote for Cheng Lock, whom he believed to be
2
the most suitable candidate for the office.
Although Cheng Lock had not supported the KMTM in the pre­
war years, even endorsing the government ban on the party in 1925,
1. Letter from Haji Ibrahim Ma to Tan Cheng Lock da:ted 24 February 
1949, TCL Papers, TCL/3/84. To my knowledge, Ma was the only 
Muslim KMT consul to have served in Malaya.
2. Letter from Haji Ibrahim Ma to Tan Cheng Lock dated 15 February 
1949, TCL Papers, TCL/3/94.
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he became more favourably disposed towards the party after the war 
as a result of the Communist threat. Cheng Lock regarded the KMTM 
as a useful counter measure to the MCP and responded favourably to 
overtures made to him by KMT consuls, becoming a good friend of Haji 
Ibrahim Ma. He was regularly invited to address functions organised 
by pro-KMT leaders to celebrate events such as the Double Ten anni- 
versary and the birthdays of Sun Yat Sen and Chiang Kai Shek. The 
speeches he delivered on those occasions contained a pronounced 
degree of racial chauvinism. For instance, he concluded his 
address to the Double Ten celebration held in Malacca in October 
1950 with a resounding salute to China's greatness; "China is un- 
breakable and indestructable like her Great Wall. She cannot fail, 
China will last forever, for her roots touch the earth and her 
spirits is continually in the heavens. China for ever, God save 
C h i n a ! C h e n g  Lock's endorsement of KMT celebrations appeared to 
have been motivated by a great sense of pride in his Chinese heritage; 
he did not at any stage advocate political support for the KMT.
Not only did the KMT consuls advise huay kuan leaders to
elect Cheng Lock as party president but they also directed leaders
of the KMTM to help organise the setting up of MCA branches through- 
2
out the country. When the MCA was formed, the KMTM branches had
1. Address by Tan Cheng Lock at the Malacca Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce on the occasion of the Double Ten celebration, 10 
October 1950, TCL Papers, SP13, Ucapan Tan Cheng Lock, Item 34,
2. Nanyang Siang Pau, 31 March 1949, reported that the Trengganu 
KMTM Branch was instrumental in forming the MCA State Branch,
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not ceased to function (.they were closed seven months after the 
formation of the MCA), and KMTM members rallied to set the new 
organisation on its feet. H.S. Lee, a leading KMT figure in the 
country, and chairman of the Selangor Chinese Chambers of Commerce, 
helped to convene the MCA inaugural meeting,aided by five KMTM 
branches in Selangor.^"
British intelligence reports of the period noted the
2
prominent role played by the KMTM in the formation of the MCA. In
Johore, it was reported that the MCA enrolled members through the
assistance of local Shu Pao She (libraries or reading rooms) which
3
functioned as KMTM organisations in disguise. Intelligence reports
also noted that known KMT leaders, H.S. Lee and Lau Pak Khuan, were
instrumental in bringing in the support of the KMTM apparatus in
4
Malaya for the new party.
The involvement of the KMTM in the MCA's formation led some
5
observers to regard the two organisations as synonymous. Likewise,
1. Nan yang Siang Pau, 20 February 1949. H.S. Lee made a bid for
control of the MCA, but the Chinese leaders behind the party's 
formation decided that Tan Cheng Lock was the more suitable can­
didate as party president, mainly because they feared H.S.
Lee’s pro-KMT elignment would create problems for the new party. 
Moreover, Cheng Lock was highly regarded by the colonial 
authorities.
2. See, for exmaple, extract from Singapore Political Report, No.2, 
February 1949, C0537/52849/48/49(4).
3. Extract from Review of Chinese Affairs for October 1949, C0537/ 
4761/52849/48(35).
4. Extract from Pan-Malayan Review, No,6, 16 March 1949, C0537/ 
52849/48/49(16) .
5. See, for example, extract from Singapore Political Report for 
November 1950, C0537/52849/48/50(17).
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the colonial authorities noted that MCA assistance to the government 
in the anti-insurgency campaign was in reality KMTM assistance. 
Although the government welcomed the role played by the MCA in the 
Emergency , it was afraid that the KMTM would nse the new party as a 
cover for its activities after it became illegal. The authorities were 
apprehensive about the potentially negative political consequences 
of the KMTM tie-up with the MCA as indicated by the following intelli­
gence report: "There is a risk that the Malayan Chinese Association 
will be one of the covers /of the KMTM7, and this, coupled with events 
in China, will continue to keep Chinese eyes focussed either on their 
ancestral homes, or on the communal aspect of their problems in 
Malaya".'*'
The KMT affiliation of prominent MCA office holders mani­
fested itself in several ways, For instance, during the Emergency 
when the recruitment of manpower within the Chinese community fell 
abysmally short of the target needed to fight the Communists(discussed 
in the following chapter), Leong Yew Koh, who later served as the 
secretary-general of the MCA, proposed an alternative means of 
securing manpower. He suggested to Sir Henry Gurney that the latter 
recruit 10,000 soldiers from the Kuomintang forces based in Taiwan, 
or the Kuomintang 26th Army then interned in North Vietnam. (Leong 
Yew Koh himself had served as a Liaison Officer with the 26th Army 
during the war.) He proposed that when the Emergency was over the 
Kuomintang soldiers could either be repatriated to Taiwan or resettled
1. Extract from Federation of Malaya Political Report for July 
1949, C0537/4761/52849/48/49(30).
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in Malaya."1 Another well-known MCA leader, Yap Mau Tatt, advised
Cheng Lock: "It is absolutely necessary to rally KMT personnel to
2
come in with the MCA tinder the MCA banner”.
Many Chinese soon came to regard the MCA as a revived KMTM,
3
as is evident in the following editorial comment:
It is undeniable that the office bearers of the 
Singapore Branch after its election, such as the 
Vice-Chairman, Chua Ho Ann and Dr. Ho Pau Jin, 
the Hon. Secretary, So Hau Siang, and the 
Executive Secretary, Lee Leng Keng, are all 
utterly powerful ones of a foreign political 
party, the KMT. How can the powerful ones of 
the KMT be able to occupy the important posts 
of the MCA and to manipulate the MCA?.... Broadly 
speaking, the MCA is a political organisation 
of the Malayan Chinese while the KMT is a party 
of the Overseas Chinese in Malaya. There seems 
to be no particular divergence between these two 
political parties. It is not even strange to see 
these two organisations amalgamated into one body.
The openly pro-KMT activities of the Singapore leadership 
aroused the anger of the English-educated national leadership in 
Kuala Lumpur, and one particular incident led the party headquarters 
to censure the behaviour of the Singapore leadership. The vice- 
chairman of the Branch, Chua Ho Ann, led a delegation to visit 
Taiwan on the occasion of Chiang Kai Shek's birthday. While in Tai­
wan, Chua was reported to have said that he officially represented
1. Letter from Leong Yew Koh to the Officer Administering the 
Government dated 15 November 1950, TCL Papers, TCL/15/64c.
The suggestion drew a negative response.
2. Letter from Yap Mau Tatt to Tan Cheng Lock dated 29 September 
1951, TCL Papers, TCL/15/54.
3. Sin Pao, 18 August 1953, MCA headquarters.
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the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore who wished to pay 
their respects to President Chiang. A Taiwan-based paper carried 
the following account of Chua’s visit
The leader of the Singapore and Malaya Team, Mr.
Chua Ho Ann, in his speech reported that the over­
seas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya had a strong 
affection for their free fatherland and a high 
respect for the national saviour, President Chiang.
He mentioned that spiritually they were one hundred 
percent behind the free fatherland, and materially 
they were so willing to contribute money^ and man­
power in aid of the military expenses /in the 
campaign to regain mainland China/, if it had not 
been for the various inconveniences caused by the 
local legal restrictions.
The UMNO leadership was particularly galled by the incident.
It informed the MCA that such actions on the part of KMT leaders in
the Association were bound to undermine current negotiations between
the two parties to consolidate the coalition arrangement. In its
letter of protest to Cheng Lock, Dr. Ismail bin Abdul Rahman noted:
"The statement has naturally caused misgivings among the Malay
community, and we in UMNO expect to be severely attacked by Malays
for allying ourselves with people who owe allegiance to a foreign,
2
albeit friendly, country." An emergency meeting convened by Cheng
3
Lock decided to ask Chua to resign his post in the MCA.
1. China Press (Taipeh) t 16 November 1953. Quoted from a trans­
lation from the minutes of a Special Meeting of the MCA held on 
2 December 1953.
2. Quoted from the minutes of a Special Meeting of the MCA held on 
2 December 1953.
3. The decision was not imposed,as Chua Ho Ann insisted that the 
Taiwanese press had misrepoyted his speeches given during his 
visit. He said he went to Taiwan purely as a representative of 
several Chinese associations in Singapore and the visit had 
nothing to do with the MCA. Minutes of the Working Committee 
Meeting on 24 February 1954.
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From -1949 to -1956, all th-e pro-<-KMT leaders in the MCA 
organised and participated in celebrations such as the Double Ten. 
These activities often made front page headlines in the Chinese 
press, and though some MCA leaders made it a point to explain that 
they participated in these celebrations in their capacity as leaders 
of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and huay kuans and not as MCA 
office bearers, this distinction was often lost on the general 
public.
The Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs, R.H. Oakeley, 
felt it necessary to advise Cheng Lock of the harmful consequences 
of the pro-KMT activities carried out by leaders within the party.
He pointed out that the efforts of the Department for Chinese 
Affairs to improve political relations between the Malays and Chinese 
were "being continually hindered by publicity given to Missions to 
Formosa by 'Malayanf Chinese, and by publicity given to celebrations 
of political anniversaries such as that of the Double Tenth".^ He 
pointed out that these factors would undermine any demand made by 
the MCA for better citizenship rights for the Chinese community. In 
October 1952, a month after the receipt of Oakeley’s letter, the MCA 
headquarters took an official stand on the subject for the first 
time. The party headquarters asked all branches to inform party 
members not to attend future KMT celebrations nor to send congratu­
latory despatches to President Chiang. In addition, it directed all 
MCA leaders to discourage Chinese in Malaya from involving 
themselves in Taiwan^oriented activities: "The Chinese in Malaya, in
1. Letter from R.K. Oakeley to Tan Cheng Lock dated 19 September 
1952, MCA headquarters.
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demanding for equal rights in Malays, should not attend the Double 
Tenth National Day Celebration and to call themselves Overseas 
Chinese thereby losing the right of such a demand"."*
The party headquarters was deluged by angry letters from
party leaders and members objecting to the official line on the matter.
Heading the pro-KMT counter-attack, Tan Kee Gak of Malacca replied
that the party had no right to dictate to the Chinese on the matter.
He said that if the party were foolhardy enough to try and impose its
2
ruling, there would be mass resignations from it. Another pro-KMT
stalwart, Ong Chin Seong of Perak told the party headquarters that it
had no power to act on the subject since in his opinion the Chinese
3
in Malaya had not severed their emotional links with Free China.
In addition, the Communist insurrection in Malaya had heightened 
support from the capitalist elements in the MCA for Chiang's govern­
ment in Taiwan. The celebration of KMT anniversaries was, therefore, 
regarded by them as a necessary demonstration of their 
belief in a non-Communist Malaya and a non-Communist China.
Double Ten celebrations continued to be held till the eve 
of Malaya’s independence, to the consternation of the MCA national 
leadership which could not control such activities and was acutely 
aware that the KMT presence in the party threatened its very
1. Quoted from Sin Lit Pau, 15 October 1952, MCA headquarters.
2. China Press, 10 October 1952.
3. Letter from Ong Chin Seong to T.H. Tan dated 30 November 1953 ,
MCA headquarters.
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existence. A party document described the predicament:
If the KMT elements among our members are allowed 
to assert themselves, we may expect real trouble 
from the Government because the KMT has been out­
lawed by the Emergency Regulations. If the KMT 
should again rise to the surface through the MCA, 
our Association will be outlawed one of these 
days. Any tendency by the KMT to take control of 
the MCA must be arrested without hesitation....
It was never intended that the MCA should concern 
itself with China politics; nor should China 
politics be allowed to influence MCA policies.
The memorandum further stated that a remedy must be sought to counter 
the KMT hold over the MCA in the states of Singapore, Johore, Negri 
Sembilan, Perak, Penang and Malacca. It suggested that the party 
headquarters embark on a massive membership drive aimed at recruiting 
the Malayan-born Chinese within the community.
However, this measure could not be fully implemented, 
since the most important source of membership recruitment for the 
Association was the pro-KMT Laukeh Chinese associational network.
If the party were to purge itself of its KMT elements, it would 
have to reduce its leadership to the non-Laukeh section of the 
Chinese community - i.e. the small Baba and English-educated 
population of the Chinese community. The party leadership was not 
attracted by the idea, and thus the KMT problem was quietly over­
looked until the issue regained prominence during the independence 
constitutional negotiations.
1. Unsigned memorandum entitled "The problems facing the Asso­
ciation are growing in seriousness", mimeo., c.late 1953.
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While manifestations of the MCA as a Mai ay an-cent red 
party as well as a revived KMTM were discernible in the first two 
to three years of its existence, it behaved most consistently and 
conspicuously as a CCC-huay kuan prototype, performing social 
welfare activities within the community. This phenomenon stemmed 
from the exigencies of the Emergency and the involvement of the 
party in the government's counter-insurgency campaign, as we shall 
see in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MCA'S ROLE IN THE EMERGENCY
The Communist insurrection which broke out in June 1948 
| was essentially a Chinese problem. The Malayan Communist Party,
I apart from a thin sprinkling of Malay and Indian sympathisers, was
i
| a solidly Chinese organisation drawing its sources of social support,
manpower, supplies and intelligence from the Chinese population, 
especially the rural squatter population which totalled close to 
half a million.^ Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the 
colonial authorities realised that the successful suppression of 
the insurgency depended not merely upon an effective military 
strategy but also upon cutting the guerillas off from the major 
source of their life support system - the squatter population. The 
Briggs plan, which envisaged the resettlement of squatters in New 
Villages, was conceived to isolate the squatter population from the 
guerillas - in Maoist analogy, to separate the fish from the water.
1. A. Short *s study, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960, 
Frederick Mullter Ltd., London, 1975, is the most comprehensive 
account of the Emergency. Other studies on the subject include 
O’Ballance, E., Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960, 
Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1966; Clutterbuck, R., The Long,
Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960, Cassell & Co. Ltd.,
London, 2nd ed., 1967; Henniker, M.C.A., Red Shadow Over Malaya,
William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., Edinburgh and London, 1955;
Barber, N., Malaya 1948-1960: The War of the Running Dogs,
Fontana Paperback, London, 1971.
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Lacking administrative resources and experience in dealing with the 
Chinese community directly, the colonial authorities had to rely on 
the MCA to help implement the New Village programme and other
I counter-insurgency measures affecting the Chinese.
If
| The MCA’s officially designated role as hand maiden of
I
i
counter-insurgency shaped the nature of party functions and activities
|
| during its first years of existence. The exigencies of the Emergency
|
| and the squatter resettlement programme resulted in the MCA carrying
out social welfare and mutual aid work traditionally performed by 
voluntary associations. The MCA increasingly gained a reputation 
more as an umbrella CCC-huay kuan organisation than a political 
party, an outcome which the westernised leadership attempted to 
rectify in a campaign to reorganise the party,
3.1 The Fundamental Issue:..the Squatter Problem
The squatter problem was a central issue in the government’s 
counter-insurgency effort and thus of critical concern to the MCA.
The problem emerged in the early 1930s when mass unemployment drove 
thousands of workers and their families from tin mines, estates and 
factories to live off the land. These migrants to the countryside 
had difficulty in obtaining legal titles to the land they cultivated* 
as the colonial administration had attached stringent terms to non- 
Malay land ownership as reflected in the 1933 Amendment of the Malay
Reservations Act.'*' By 1940, it was estimated that farmers illegally 
squatting on Malay Reservations, Forest Reserves, State Mining and 
Agricultural Land as well as privately-owned estates had reached 
150,000.2
The squatter population increased dramatically during the 
Japanese Occupation. Many urban dwellers, joined also by rubber 
tappers and tin mine workers moved to the countryside to cultivate 
food and seek refuge from the excesses of the Japanese Military 
Administration. The Japanese administration for its part, encouraged 
cultivation of agricultural land by non-Malays to meet its objectives 
of self-sufficiency in food production. By the end of the war, the 
squatter population which was largely Chinese in composition, had 
grown to close to half a million.
The surrender of the Japanese and the establishment of the 
British Military Administration (BMA) introduced no changes in the 
squatter situation. A communication from the H A  to the Colonial 
Office stated that in view of the post-war food crisis, the BMA
1. P. Kratoska argues that contrary to a belief which has gained 
general currency in Malaysian historical writings, the colonial 
government had encouraged non-Malay cultivation of rice land 
until the onset of the Depression^when it gave in to Malay desire 
to restrict non-Malay land usage. Kratoska, P.H., "Rice Culti­
vation and the Ethnic Division of Labour in British Malaya", 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.24, no.2, April 
1982, pp.280-314. Studies which discuss the squatter problem 
include, Nyce, R., Chinese New Villages in Malaysia: A Community 
Study, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute , Singapore,
1973; Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Beyond the Tin Mines: The Political 
Economy of Chinese Squatter Farmers in the Kinta New Villages, 




found it essential that all government forest lands which had been
cleared and cultivated during the Japanese Occupation must continue
to be used, rent free, by squatters. In addition the BMA wanted the
Colonial Office to authorise the granting of free concessions for
squatters to cultivate cleared rubber lands.^ With the easing of
the food crisis, the Malayan Union government was pressed to review
its squatter policy. In late 1946, the Department of Forestry
decided to reclaim the 150,000 acres of forest reserves which had
2been felled during the Occupation and the BMA period. The strongest 
lobby which put pressure on the government to change its squatter 
policy was the United Planting Association of Malaya (UPAM). The 
UPAM wanted to have back 70,000 acres of rubber land occupied by 
squatters, for the new planting and replanting of rubber; it urged 
the government to change existing land legislation to facilitate an 
immediate and simplified method of evicting squatters from rubber 
plantations.^
1. Communication from the BMA to the Colonial Office, no signature, 
c.December 1945, Malayan Union File, 5706/46(A).
2. See communication from the Acting Resident Commissioner, Negri 
Sembilan, to the Chief Secretary of the Malayan Union, 10 
September 1946, M.U. File* 5705/46(1), and circular entitled 
"Removal of Illegal Occupants of State Land", mimeo., n.d.,
M.U. File, 5705/46(3).
3. See letter from H.K. Dimoline, Secretary of UPAM to the Chief 
Secretary of the Malayan Union, 6 December 1967, M.U. File, 4949/ 
47(10), Dimoline pointed out that under the existing laws, the 
issuing of court orders for eviction were "slow, cumbersome and 
expensive". See also letter from the President of UPAM to Sir 
Edward Gent, 24 May 1948; M.U. File, 4949/47(25).
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Confronted by these demands, the government found itself 
in a quandary. When the BMA issued free temporary occupation 
licenses to squatters for a period of two years, starting from 
January 1946, it made no provisions for looking after the welfare of 
squatters in the event of their being evicted from rubber estates 
and forest reserves. During the immediate post-war years, squatters 
had opened up huge tracts of land miles away from government adminis­
trative centres, and the Malayan Union Government found it lacked 
manpower in the District Offices and Agricultural Department to 
control and administer them. Its unease over the problem is reflected 
in an exchange of minutes between the Deputy Chief Secretary and the 
Assistant Economic Secretary, the former confessing that he had not 
known "that this problem was so vast and complicated".* At a loss 
for a solution, the government procrastinated until it was forced to 
take action with the outbreak of the Emergency, when it became 
apparent that Chinese squatters were providing food, supplies, 
intelligence and recruits to the MCP.
During the Occupation the MCP and its military wing, the 
Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), had built up a sense 
of solidarity with the squatter population through its anti-Japanese 
campaign. Immediately after the war, the MCP established itself as 
the de facto government in the rural areas before British rule was 
properly re-established; thus, when the MCP began its militant 
campaign to liberate Malaya from British imperialistic rule, it had
1. Minutes sheet addressed to the Deputy Chief Secretary from the 
Acting Economic Secretary dated 10 May 1948, including comments 
by the Deputy Chief Secretary dated 18 May 1948, Federal Secre­
tariat File, 2318/38.
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little difficulty in re-asserting its previous power over the
squatter population. Many squatters were enrolled as part-time
workers in the Min Yuen (People’s Organisation) when it was formed
in early 1949 by the MCP as an auxiliary fighting and propaganda 
1
unit.
Faced with this threat, the government finally stated a
definitive policy on the squatter problem. During a meeting
between the High Commissioner, the Acting Solicitor-General and
officials of the UPAM, the government declared that eviction of
squatters could be made only when alternative land was obtained,
and that the resettled squatters be given security of tenure
initially in the form of temporary occupation licenses which could
subsequently be converted to permanent titles. It directed the
state and settlement governments to examine the availability of
2
state land which could be alienated for squatter resettlement.
A Squatter Committee was set up in January 194*9 to advise the
government on measures to be taken to bring squatters under its
direct administrative control. The Committee’s recommendations 
3
were:
1. For more information on the Min Yuen, see Short, pp.24, 111-112, 
213.
2. "Note on a meeting held at King’s House on 15 June 1948 to 
discuss the eviction of squatters on estates” , mimeo., M.U.
File, 4949/1947. See also ’’Note of a meeting held in the 
Committee Room of the Federal Legislative Council Chamber to 
discuss the Squatter Problem", mimeo., M.U. File, 4949/47(40a).
3. Report of Committee appointed by His Excellency the High 
Commissioner to Investigate the Squatter Problem, Council Paper
no.3 of 1949, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur.
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(a) that wherever possible squatters should be settled 
in areas already occupied by them;
(b) that where such settlement of existing areas is 
impossible, an alternative suitable area should be 
made available for resettlement;
(c) that squatters who refused settlement or resettlement 
on the terms offered should be liable to compulsory 
deportation;
(d) that the T.O.L. (temporary occupation licensing) 
system under which most squatters secured titles 
to their land be modified to afford a greater 
security of terms to encourage acceptance of re­
settlement and to establish confidence in the bona 
fides of the government.
The initial implementation of squatter resettlement was 
complicated by differences of opinion between the Federal government 
and state authorities over the issue of land rights. Since the 
jurisdiction of land matters lay with state authorities, they 
asserted their prerogative by insisting that the eviction and re­
settlement of squatters be left to them without any interference 
from the Federal government. The state governments were initially 
reluctant to act on squatter resettlement because they preferred to 
deport squatters. One Mentri Besar (Chief Minister of the state 
government) considered an even more drastic way of solving the 
squatter problem. He suggested "burning out squatters and leaving 
them to work out their own salvation, i.e. by going into settled 
areas, towns and so on, or into other and temporarily less objec­
tionable squatter areas, or best of all, slipping over the Siamese 
border."^ Deportation to China as a solution to the squatter problem 
was rendered untenable by the Communist victory in China. By
1. Quoted from Short, p.180.
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November 1949, the CCP had taken over all the southern ports in 
that country. Shipping services were dislocated and the repatriation 
process which the Malayan authorities had entered into with the 
Nationalist Government came to an end.*" As a result of this, the 
state governments were forced to regard the squatters as part of 
the permanent population in Malaya, and to accept the need for their 
long-term settlement or resettlement.
In consequence, when Lt.-General Sir Harold Briggs arrived 
in Malaya on 22 March 1950 as the Director of Operations, to plan, 
co-ordinate and direct anti-insurgency measures, he encountered 
little of the initial recalcitrance shown by the state governments 
on the subject of resettlement. He was able to concentrate the 
resources of both Federal and state governments on a comprehensive 
programme of resettling squatters in New Villages, known as the Briggs 
Plan. By the end of 1952, most of the resettlement had been
2
completed: 470,509 squatters had been resettled in 440 New Villages.
3.2 Govemment-MCA Liaison
The colonial administration relied heavily upon the middle­
man services of the MCA to implement the New Village programme, for
1. Federation of Malaya, Detention and Deportation during the Emer­
gency in the Federation of Malaya, Council Paper No.24 of 1953, 
Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, p.14. By November 1950, however, 
new arrangements were made with the Peopled Republic of China 
and the' repatriation programme was resumed on a much diminished 
scale.
2. Reply fran the Chief Secretary to question raised by Leung Cheung 
Ling, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative Council, 10 September 
1952, p.355. Existing villages which were enlarged under the 
Briggs Plan were also termed "New Villages".
140
the government's acute lack of individuals expert in Chinese matters 
resulted in a "wholly inadequate liaison" between government, the 
villages and the resettlement areas.* In May 1950, Gurney informed 
the Colonial Secretary that the slowness in implementing the re­
settlement programme was due more to the shortage of officers 
having the administrative capacity to carry out their duties than 
to political unwillingness by the state governments to excise land
from Malay reservations, or reluctance of Chinese to be resettled,
2
or shortage of funds. MCA office-holders were therefore appointed 
to serve on the government bodies which were formed to administer 
Emergency affairs and to implement counter-insurgency programmes.
The most important of these was the Federal War Council created by 
Briggs, the Director of Operations, on 16 April 1950 to replace 
the Federal Legislative Council as the supreme emergency decision­
making body. Briggs also set up a chain of State and Settlement War
Executive Committees (SWEC) which took over the duties of State 
3
governments. A corresponding chain of Advisory Committees to the 
Federal War Council and the SWECs was established to keep 
"unofficials" informed about government policy and to obtain their 
advice on Emergency matters affecting the public. MCA representatives 
were invited to sit on the Federal War Council, a few of the SWECs
1. See Appendix A to the Agenda dated 10 November 1951 for the 
Federal War Council Emergency Meeting, LYK Papers, SP3, Box 8.
2. Telegram from Gurney to the Secretary of State of the Colonies 
dated 3 May 1950, C0717/201/52849/41(20).
3. For more information on the composition and functions of the 
Federal War Council and the SWECs, see, Short, pp.239-240; 
O'Ballance, p.107; Clutterbuck, pp.57-60.
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(Perak, for example) and on all the Advisory Committees. The 
inclusion of MCA office holders on these committees built up an 
effective linkage and communication system between the Association 
and Government from the grass-roots to the national level.
Deliberations between the two parties in the Emergency 
Chinese Advisory Committee (chaired by the Secretary for Chinese 
Affairs) resulted in the ixistitutionalisation of cooperation between 
the MCA and the local authorities in charge of squatter areas. The 
MCA was encouraged to form branches in all squatter areas where 
Communist activities were discemable, and local squatter repre­
sentatives were appointed as MCA office holders. These squatter 
representatives held regular fortnightly meetings with MCA officials 
from the state and settlement branches as well as the Chief Police 
Officers of their areas to discuss matters of mutual concern. The 
MCA squatter representatives also furnished regular security reports
on conditions in their villages to their respective District 
2
Officers. Through this system, the government obtained a regular 
flow of intelligence at the grass-roots level concerning the move­
ments of the Min Yuen and the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA, 
the military wing of the MCP). The squatter representatives were
1. Note of a meeting held at King's House on 29 November 1951,
TCL Papers, SP13, Item 164.
2. See "A Scheme for Promoting Liaison and Co-operation between 
Squatter Areas and Local Authorities prepared by a Sub-Committee 
of the Emergency Chinese Advisory Committee on 10 May 1949, and 
subsequently approved by the Members of the Advisory Committee”, 
mimeo., n.d., and "A Scheme for Promoting Liaison and Co­
operation between Squatter Areas and Local Authorities prepared 
and recommended by the Emergency Chinese Advisory Committee” , 
mimeo., 7 July 1949, TCL Papers, SP13, Item 144, No.3.
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entrusted with the responsibility of keeping the local population
informed about government emergency policies. They were required,
for instance, to disseminate information regarding the consequences
of paying protection money and supplying goods to terrorists, the
ways available for squatters to pass on to the government any
intelligence on the activities of terrorists, and the rewards offered
for such information.* The MCA headquarters and the state branches
prepared and distributed Emergency publicity in the form of written
propaganda, and MCA spokesmen and interpreters accompanied Government
2
Mobile Units during tours of squatter areas.
In early 1951, MCA representatives from various branches
ranging from state down to village levels were invited to sit on
"Consultative Liaison Committees" which comprised representatives
from the Police, the Special Branch and the Department of Chinese
Affairs. The main functions of the MCA representatives in these
committees were to assist Government in the screening, classification,
release, rehabilitation and resettlement of detainees and Surrendered
Enemy Personnal (SEPs). MCA representatives were also present while
3
police carried out the searching or screening of squatters.
1. "A Scheme for Promoting Liaison...", 7 July 1949, p.2.
2. Minutes of the first meeting of the Emergency Chinese Advisory 
Committee on 5 April 1949, p.4, TCL Papers, SP3, Item 144.
3. See circular issued by the Acting Commissioner of Police, W.D. 
Robinson, to all Chief Police Officers on the subject of co­
operation with the MCA, 19 February 1951; and memorandum by 
the Director of Operations entitled "Chinese Co-operation —  
MCA Resolutions", mimeo., 1 February 1951, MCA headquarters.
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Cooperation between the MCA and government was further 
strengthened through the appointment of more Chinese Affairs Officers 
at the state level under the control of the Federal and State 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs, and at the district level responsible 
to the State Secretary for Chinese Affairs and the District Officer. 
These Chinese Affairs Officers, a number of whom were Malayan 
Chinese, formed an important link between the government, the police 
and the Chinese community. At the lowest level, they dealt with all 
matters arising from squatter village committees.^  It was in this 
grass-roots interaction between the Chinese Affairs Department, the 
MCA and the squatter committees! that the most vigorous and fruitful 
exchange between the government and the Chinese community occured..
Relations between the MCA and government over Emergency 
affairs were not consistently cordial. Although MCA leaders were 
loyal government supporters, they often criticised the government 
for its heavy-handedness and insensitivity in the implementation of 
the New Village programme and other counter-insurgency measures 
directed at the squatter population. For example, in a widely 
publicised speech given a few months after the party's formation, 
party president Tan Cheng Lock stated that the insensitive handling 
of anti-insurgency measures by the authorities had caused much 
resentment and frustration among the Chinese. He stressed that such 
official reprisals against squatters for allegedly helping the 
guerillas as burning their villages and crops would drive them over
1. Appendix A to the Agenda dated 10 November 1951 for the Federal 
War Council Emergency Meeting,* See also, Short, p.240.
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to the Communist camp. On another occasion, Cheng Lock confided 
to an old friend, Sir George Maxwell, that the government must be 
blamed for the abuses and gross negligence arising from its re­
settlement policy; the evacuation of resettlement areas in Mawai,
Changang, Jenderam and Tras showed conclusively that "Something was
2
radically wrong" with the governments handling of resettlement.
The MCA Annual Report for 1954 concluded on a note which showed that
party leaders were generally critical of the manner in which the
3
government was implementing the counter-insurgency campaign:
Certain actions taken by the Government had the 
effect of embittering some sections of the masses 
rather than of winning their hearts and minds.
For example, there was the destruction recently 
of Nanong Sebrang New Village, and the removal 
of its Chinese inhabitants to another area 50 
miles away. This latter village has long been 
known as a complete resettlement failure and yet 
the Chinese of Nanong Sebrang New Village were 
moved there, much against their will.
Another source of irritation is the continued 
detention of people. Prolonged detention and 
often unjustifiable on security grounds without 
recourse to the Court of Law is bound to create 
resentment and this can hardly be regarded as a 
means for winning the hearts and minds of the 
people.
1. Address by Tan Cheng Lock at Taiping and Ipoh on 10 April!'1949 
on "The Chinese in Malaya", in Tan Cheng Lock, A Collection of 
Speeches, Ih Shih Press, Singapore, n.d., p.16.
2. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Sir George Maxwell dated 18 
December 1951, TCL Papers, TCL/V/232.
3. Report of the Hon. Secretary General of the MCA to be submitted 
to the Seventh Annual Meeting of the General Committee on 1955,
p. 10.
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These criticisms, however, did not aggravate relations 
between the MCA and Government, as the latter tolerated the "watch­
dog" role the party took to protect the welfare of squatters. The 
one occasion when official anger was aroused was when the party 
invited Victor Purcell and Francis Camell to prepare a report for 
the party concerning the impact of the Emergency on the Chinese 
community. At that time, Purcell was the Honorary Political Adviser 
to the MCA, a post which he held till April 1958."^ During the course 
of his fieldwork in Malaya, Purcell had an interview with Templer, 
the outcome of which was recorded in his report to the MCA. Purcell 
observed that the High Commissioner made concessions to the MCA and 
the Chinese "purely as a matter of political expediency in order to 
assist in the ending of the Emergency", and that Templer was not 
interested in long-term objectives related to Chinese welfare, and 
showed a complete lack of sympathy with Chinese aspirations. Purcell 
also stated that Templer said that the Federal Constitution was 
"undoubtedly as bad as it could be" from the Chinese viewpoint, but 
he would not change it since it might offend the Malays, who were
bearing 98% of the brunt of fighting the Communists} and he added:
2
"If you give the Chinese an inch they will take an ell."
1. Letter from Purcell to T.H. Tan dated 8 April 1958, MCA head­
quarters. Purcell asked the MCA to accept his resignation as Hon. 
Adviser to the party since the position had been dormant for some 
years.
2. Victor Purcell, "Report on a visit to Malaya from 20 August to 
20 September 1952 at the invitation of the Malayan Chinese Asso­
ciation by Victor Purcell and Francis Camell", mimeo., pp.2-3;
TCL Papers, TCL/VI/V. In a letter to Cheng Lock written after 
his departure from Malaya, Purcell said that Templer had "insulted 
and intimidated" him and Camell. He added that Templer made 
known his "hatred of the Chinese" to him, never dreaming that 
Purcell would dare to reveal what he said. Purcell to Cheng Lock, 
13 February 1953; TCL Papers, TCL/10/21a.
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Purcell's report, like his hook on the Emergency, was
strongly pro-Chinese and acutely critical of the government,
particularly Templer.^ Needless to say, Purcell's highly-charged
criticisms of the High Commissioner placed the MCA, his sponsor, in
an embarrasing position. For the most part, the MCA maintained a
discreet silence on the subject, but Cheng Lock tried to reduce
tension by manoeuvring diplomatically between the contenders. In
October 1953, Cheng Lock wrote to Purcell informing him of a recent
meeting he had with Templer: "... he /Templer/ told me that he was
certainly not anti-Chinese.... He was extremely friendly to me and
his idea was to clear up whatever misunderstanding there might be
between him and the Chinese here". At the same time, Cheng Lock
tactfully assured Purcell: "As far as I am personally concerned I
would always like to be guided by your advice and views in matters
2
affecting the Malayan Chinese community". Fortunately, no discern­
ible damage was done to the MCA's relationship with Templer by the 
Purcell incident.
1. Purcell, V., Malaya Communist or Free, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 
London, 1954. Some writers do not agree with Purcell's 
disparaging evaluation of Templer's administration of the Chinese 
during the Emergency. They point out that though Templer's 
collective punishment of the squatters of Tanjong Malim, Permatang 
Tinggi and Pekan Jabi was regarded by many as an unduly harsh 
method of forcing the Chinese to cooperate with the authorities, 
it was nevertheless his overall handling of counter-insurgency 
measures which succeeded in driving the MCP to retreat to the 
Malayan-Thai border. See, Short, pp.379-387; O ’Ballance, Ch.6; 
Henniker, Ch.9; Clutterbuck, pp.79-85.
2. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Victor Purcell dated 23 October 
1953, EYK Papers, SP3, Box 18.
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3.3 Party Activities During the Emergency
When Tan Cheng Lock addressed the inaugural meeting of the 
MCA in February 1949, he said: MIn some quarters there is an
inclination to blame the Chinese as a whole for the existence or 
continuation of terrorism in Malaya, from which they have suffered 
most atrociously and the greatest amount of injury".* In July of 
the previous year, Cheng Lock had written to Lord Listowel, Minister 
of State for Colonial Affairs, arguing that allegations about the 
Chinese refusing to cooperate with the government of Malaya were 
untrue. He stressed that the "overwhelming majority of the victims 
of the forces of terrorism" were Chinese, and pointed out: "... the 
Chinese community as a whole ... (is) in the most unenviable 
situation of being placed between two millstone /sic/ between which 
they stand to be crushed, or, to put it bluntly, between the devil 
and the deep sea. Should they give information or actively co­
operate with the Government against the Malayan Communist Party, 
they or/and their families would simply be slaughtered by the
guerrillas, whilst Government would be unable to protect them by
—  —  2
reasonably preventive /sic/ measures". Returning to the same theme 
a few years later, the MCA party president observed: "The Emergency 
was not only imperilling the lives of many Chinese and jeopardising 
the vital interests of our community, but there was also a tendency
1. Speech by Tan Cheng Lock on 27 February 1959 at the MCA inaugural 
meeting, Kuala Lumpur. Tan Cheng Lock, A Collection of Speeches, 
Ih Shih Press, Singapore, n.d. p.4.
2. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Lord Listowel dated 24 July 1948, 
TCL Papers, SP13, Item 133.
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to call into question our traditional sense of loyalty to this land 
which we have made our permanent home".^
MCA leaders were concerned to establish the Chinese 
community's loyalty to the government by taking the lead in mobilising 
Chinese support for the government counter-insurgency campaign. Once 
the party was established, the MCA top leadership began to look for 
many ways to raise party funds to undertake welfare work in the 
squatter resettlement schemes and to carry out other counter­
insurgency work. The party raised money initially by asking for
donations from Chinese business concerns and the community in 
2
general, a method used traditionally by voluntary associations to 
raise funds for public welfare. By the end of 1949, it devised an 
innovative method of fund raising in the form of a party sweepstake 
(lottery).
In December 1949, the party’s Honorary Treasurer, Khoo 
Teik Ee, instructed the state and settlement branches to set up sub­
committees to promote the sale of lottery tickets among MCA members. 
Each ticket would cost Malayan $1; 60% of gross sales would be
distributed in prizes and the balance of 40% would be retained by
the party for its welfare fund and for defraying administrative 
3
expenses. The first lottery, drawn at the end of February 1950,
1. Speech by Tan Cheng Lock at the Annual Meeting of the MCA Central 
General Committee, 21 April 1951, TCL Papers, SP13, Ucapan Tan 
Cheng Lock, Item 35.
2. Circular issued by the MCA Hon. Treasurer, Khoo Teik Ee, addressed 
to the general public, mimeo., July 1949.
3. Circular issued by Khoo Teik Ee entitled "Unlimited Sweep for 
Members Only", mimeo., 17 December 1949; and, memorandum by Khoo 
Teik Ee entitled "MCA Sweepstake", mimeo., 20 June 1950.
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increased party membership by almost 50%; total sales amounted to 
$346,656 of which $138,663 was retained for squatter resettlement 
work.'*’ From January 1951, the sweepstake was renamed the "Million 
Dollar Lottery", with prizes amounting to $600,000.
The MCA sweepstake was so popular that it was believed 
that lottery tickets were used as "unofficial" currency by some 
traders. Tan Siew Sin observed: "I understand that ... our lottery 
tickets are being used to finance trade between Malaya and neigh­
bouring territories and hence are practically being accepted as
2
legal tender in such countries...." While Siew Sin's claim appears 
somewhat extravagant, it is clear that the party lottery was an 
uncommonly successful method of raising party funds and attracting 
new members.
Between the holding of its first lottery in February 1950 to
the time when the government banned it in mid-1953 (for reasons
discussed in Chapter 4), the MCA raised several million Malayan
3
dollars, of which four million was spent on Emergency work. The
1. Extract from Federation of Malaya Political Report for February 
1950, C0537/52849/48/50(2).
2. Letter from Tan Siew Sin to Lau Pak Khuan dated 24 April 1952,
MCA headquarters.
3. The MCA headquarters compiled an inventory entitled "List of 
Welfare Expenditure approved by the Standing Finance Sub-Committee 
of the Malayan Chinese Association on Settlement, Re-settlement 
and regrouping of Squatters” . The inventory listed every item of 
expenditure incurred during the period when the lottery was held,
i.e. early 1950 to mid 1953. The nature of each item of expendi­
ture, the amount spent and the date it was paid out were all 
noted.
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major areas of Emergency-related expenditure were: (a) squatter 
resettlement, (b) adult education, (c) detainee welfare, (d) man­
power recruitment and (e) miscellaneous services.
3.3.1 Squatter Welfare
The resettlement of nearly half a million people who were 
forcibly moved to fenced-in areas with no infrastructure to support 
economic and social livelihood was an extremely painful experience 
for the evacuees. These squatters were also subjected to strict 
and often harsh police and military surveillance made possible by the 
promulgation of a series of Emergency Regulations. These legislations 
proscribed almost all civil rights; provided for detention without 
trial; allowed collective punishment of whole villages; imposed 
curfews, food control and gate searches; and severely restricted 
the movement of the squatters.^
It must be said, however, that the authorities attempted 
to make life tolerable in the New Villages by providing a measure of 
social amenities in the form of schools, clinics, community halls 
and recreational centres. Electricity (necessary for the lighting of
p
perimeter fences) and piped water were also brought to these areasf and
1. For more information on the control of the squatter population,
See Short, chs. 7, 9 and 15.
2. These facilities rarely existed in Malay villages during this 
period. Fearing that Malay hostility might be aroused, the 
Attorney-General cautioned the government not to over-concentrate 
its activities in the New Villages at the expense of the Malay 
villages. See Minutes of the Federal War Council Meeting on 8 
February 1952 (item 6), TCL Papers, SP13, Item 170.
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financial assistance was given to squatters to build homes, grow 
food and raise livestock. Most important, the Federal government 
worked hard to persuade the state authorities to alienate land to 
New Villages and grant land titles to squatters in order to strengthen 
their allegiance to the government. However, the state government 
moved slowly in alienating land to the New Villages. By the end of 
1954, only about 50,000 acres of state lands in the immediate vicinity 
of the New Villages had been alienated for squatters to grow food.^ 
Furthermore, the state government attached stringent time periods 
to the land titles. Penang, for example, granted temporary occupa­
tion licenses lasting 33 years for house, shop and agricultural lots. 
Malacca and Kedah made an allowance of 30 years, while Perak issued
titles for a maximum period of only two years, though this time limit
2
was later extended to 33 years.
Government expenditure on squatter resettlement and
welfare - which amounted up to $2,500,000 on land acquisition and
3
over $100,000,000 on general resettlement by March 1954 - was
1. Speech by Templer, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative Council, 
25 November 1953, p.756, and speech by Dr. Ismail, Member for 
Natural Resources, 31 March 1954, p.17.
2. See the following circular: "Land Tenure Policy in Regard to New 
Villages and Associated Agricultural Land", issued by the govern­
ment of the Settlement of Penang and Province Wellesley, mimeo., 
n.d., and "Land Titles for Re-settled Squatters", issued by the 
Perak State Secretariat, mimeo., 5 November 1952. See also: 
letters from the Hon. Secretaries of the Malacca and Kedah/Perlis 
Settlement and State Branches to the MCA Hon. Secretary General 
on the subject of land leases, dated 29 July 1952 and 16 July 
1952 respectively. MCA headquarters.
3. Speech by Dr. Ismail, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative 
Council, 31 March 1954, p.17.
152
augmented by MCA funds derived from its lottery. Although the MCA 
share of squatter expenditure - a total of $4,000,000 by the time 
the lottery was terminated in mid-1953 - was modest in comparison 
to the official outlay, its contribution was sometimes crucial in 
the implementation of a few key resettlement programs. For 
example, the first organised, large scale resettlement scheme at 
Mawai undertaken by the Johore government was made possible by the 
sum of $400,000 advanced from MCA funds.^ The government acknow­
ledged that the MCA had ,rplayed an important part in resettlement
schemes" and had "assisted with funds, materials and personal 
2
exhortation".
The bulk of MCA funds was spent on subsidising the govern­
ments education program in the New Villages. In 1952, for 
example, the government spent a total of $2,126,700 on the con­
struction and equipment of 228 schools in the New Villages, nearly
all using Chinese as the medium of instruction, with a total enrol-
3
ment of 46,745 pupils and 1,262 teachers . The MCA contributed a 
total sum of nearly $1,000,000 during that year towards the New 
Village education program, thus making it possible for nearly
1. Federation of Malaya, The Squatter Problem in the Federation of 
Malaya in 1950, Council Paper No.14 of 1950, Government Press, 
Kuala Lumpur, Appendix *D*.
2. Federation of Malaya, Resettlement and the Development of New 
Villages in the Federation of Malaya, 1952, Council Paper No.33 
of 1952, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, p.17.
3. Appendix to Templer's Annual Address, Proceedings of the Federal 
Legislative Council, 19 November 1952, p.495.
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three quarters of the New Villages to have schools by the end of 
1952.1
The MCA also assisted squatters financially in the 
building of houses and fences, and the purchase of livestock and 
agricultural products and other particulars to promote self- 
sufficiency. Finally, sums of money were spent in conjunction with 
government projects to provide social and recreational facilities 
in the New Villages. These included the construction of community 
centres, medical dispensaries and clinics, children's creches, 
youth clubs, basketball courts, and the establishment of boy scout 
and girl guide movements.
MCA assistance towards squatter welfare was not solely 
financial. The party also played a major role in bringing to light 
problems and abuses arising from resettlement, to ensure that the 
process was carried out in as humans a manner as possible. The 
MCA employed Y.C. Kang as Agent-General with special duties 
to enquire into the report on living conditions in newly set-up 
resettlement projects. Kang and other MCA leaders submitted several 
reports to the government recommending measures to mitigate the 
trauma of resettlement. These included: giving adequate notice 
(i.e. more than the usual notice of three days) on dates of removals 
steps to minimise squatter losses in personal property during 
removals; provision of proper sanitation facilities in the New 
Villages prior to the arrival of the settlers; provision of adequate
1. Minutes of the MCA Sixth Cabinet Meeting, 10 November 1952.
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financial and technical assistance to work the land upon arrival; 
and most important, careful selection of suitable sites for re­
settlement.^" This MCA watchdog role helped prevent excessive 
bureaucratic disregard for squatter welfare during resettlement 
moves.
Besides making representations on behalf of squatters
concerning adverse living conditions in New Villages, the MCA also
attempted to check abuses arising from over-zealous application of
the Emergency Regulations. For example, in early 1951, after a
series of terrorist incidents in the area, the inhabitants of
Sungkop Village in Kedah were collectively punished by the levying
of a $25,000 fine, and the closure of all shops for three months,
during which they were allowed to open for one hour per day. The
Kedah MCA finally succeeded in persuading the Mentri Besar (Chief
Minister) to reduce the fine to $5,*000 and reduce the length of
2
time for the closure of shops. Machap Village was another case 
where the MCA succeeded in tempering the harshness of punitive 
measures. Machap Village was known to have supplied food to the 
guerillas. The police intended to cut off this supply line by whole­
sale detention of squatters and immediate evacuation of the village.
1. Letter from the President, MCA Kedah/Perlis State Branch to the 
Agent-General, 16 September 1952; letter from the Hon. Secretary 
of the MCA Perak State Branch to the Perak State Agricultural 
Officer, 10 March 1953; and ’’Report of the MCA Agent-General: 
Yong Peng Resettlement”, mimeo., 7 June 1952.
2. Address by Soon Cheng Sun, President of the MCA Kedah/Perlis 
Branch, at the Special Meeting of the MCA Kedah/Perlis Branch 
on 3 May 1952.
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The Malacca MCA approached the authorities and persuaded them to 
drop the idea of detention. Evacuation was to go ahead,but a period 
of grace of one month was obtained before the villagers were to be 
moved to Machap Bahru.*
3.3.2 Adult Education
The MCA New Village adult education program, publicised
as having been started to ’’eradicate illiteracy, raise standards of
knowledge, improve living techniques and cultivate good citizens 
2
for this country”, formed the core of the counter-insurgency
psychological campaigns in the New Villages. A report prepared by
T.H. Tan, the Chief Executive Secretary of the party stated: "...
our work in the New Villages would go beyond the pale of a literacy
campaign. The task ahead of us was one of winning over the adults
3
of the New Villages from Communist influence, if not domination".
The chairman of the Social, Benevolent and Cultural sub-committee, 
Leung Cheung Ling who was entrusted with the running of the adult 
education and public library program, noted in a memorandum that the 
Chinese library units were formed in the New Villages "as a measure 
to combat the ideological war and to promote culture and education
1. Report of the Malacca MCA Branch to be submitted to the Second 
Annual General Meeting on 31 December 1952, p.4.
2. "Rules for the Formation of Literacy and Adult Education Classes", 
mimeo., n.d.
3. Report by the Chief Executive Secretary entitled "Adult Education", 
mimeo., 15 October 1952, p.l, TCL Papers, TCL/V/315.
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in Malaya”. The importance of psychological warfare as a platform
in the MCA Emergency program is reflected in Tan Cheng Lock’s
statement that the party existed "primarily ... to win the hearts
and mind of the people to the side of the free world of democracy,
and thus prevent the prople from going over to the side of the 
2
Communists” .
In its ideological venture to combat communism, the MCA 
was aided by the leading self-professed guardian of democracy - the 
American government. The Director of the United States Information 
Services (USIS) in Singapore informed the MCA that he would support 
its adult education program "to the limit of his budget" and 
assured the party that his USIS officials would work closely with 
MCA officials in the New Villages. The USIS did not make direct 
financial payments to the MCA but underwrote publication costs of 
"desirable literature", mainly textbooks in Chinese with a strong 
anti-Communist content for use in the adult education as well as the 
public library program.^
The MCA’s effort in opening public libraries was supported 
by another American body, the Committee for Free Asia, the fore­
runner of the Asia Foundation, which funds, up to the present day,
1. Letter from Leung Cheung Ling to the Hon. Secretary-General dated 
4 August 1954, TCL Papers, TCL/15/105.
2. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Templer dated 15 May 1953, MCA 
headquarters.
3. Report by the Chief Executive Secretary entitled "Adult 
Education", pp.1-2. The USIS is an overseas agency of the US 
government responsible for US official information artivities, 
and cultural and educational programs.
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educational and cultural exchanges between Malaysia and the US. 
Robert Sheeks, a member of the Committee for Free Asia, formed an 
Advisory Committee in conjunction with the MCA to supervise the 
running of the Malayan Public Library Association, which set up a 
number of public libraries throughout the country. By 1956, 85 
libraries had been established; smaller ones were located in the 
New Villages while larger operations were located in towns such as 
Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Taiping, Kuala Pilah and Raub.^
The party's adult education program, which started in mid
1952, was well attended. In 1953, the program ran a total of over
1,000 classes with an enrolment of some 35,000 students. It
employed 4,000 teachers, helped by a small number of MCA voluntary
teachers. Out of these 1,000 classes, 35% were courses on Chinese
language, 30% on English, 30% on arithmetic and 5% on Malay and
other subjects. The program was fairly widespread; in Johore for
example, out of 60 New Villages, 42 ran a total of 293 classes, with
2
an enrolment of 10,000 pupils.
An interesting collection of statistics was prepared by 
the party giving a breakdown of the age structure and occupation of 
pupils attending the classes. On a nation-wide basis, 20% of the 
attendants fell between the ages of 12 to 14 years, 50% between 15
1. Report of the MCA Hon, Secretary General to be submitted to the 
Eighth Annual Meeting of the Central General Committee on 20 May 
1956, p.2. TCL Papers, SP3, List of Printed Materials, No.21, 
and Malayan Mirror, Vol.2, ho,12, 30 June 1954.
2. Malayan Mirror, Vol.l, no.2, 28 June 1953.
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to 18 years, and 30% over 18 years. Occupation statistics based on 
the Selangor classes revealed that 34.0% of the attendants were 
rubber tappers, 20.0% domestic workers, 4.0% mining labourers,
2.5% farmers, 2.5% merchants and 37.0% were labourers including 
carpenters and other artisans. Of these attendees, 20% were classi­
fied as completely illiterate and 80% slightly illiterate.'*' The 
statistics showed that the Chinese working class within the younger 
age group constituted the largest single social group which took 
advantage of the MCA adult education program. While one is unable 
to draw any conclusions from the statistics regarding the efficacy 
of the program as a counter-insurgency psychological measure, it can 
be said that the program was popular because it offered opportunities 
for self-improvement for illiterate and semi-illiterate Chinese 
working class youths in the rural areas.
3.3.3 Detainees
The question of detainees interned under Emergency Regu­
lations 17, 17C and 17D, was an urgent consideration of Emergency 
policy. Emergency Regulation 17 made provisions for the detention 
of activists and suspects for a period up to two years without trial, 
during which the detainees need not be informed on what grounds they 
were being held. Regulation 17C provided for the deportation of 
detainees and their dependents other than those who were Federal
1. Report entitled "MCA Social, Benevolent and Cultural Sub-Committee 
Statistics on Literacy and Adult Education Classes” , mimeo.,
23 February 1953, LYK Papers, SP3, Box 2.
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citizens and British subjects. Regulation 17D paved the way for 
collective detention of groups of people who were suspected of 
having aided, abetted or consorted with bandits, of having 
suppressed evidence from the authorities or of illegally possessing 
arms."*" To ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of its control 
over the movement of the squatter population, the government intro­
duced a system of national registration whereby a person apprehended
by the police without his identity card was liable to immediate 
2
detention.
By the end of 1948, detention camps were opened to house 
detainees who were arrested as a result of the Emergency Regulations. 
Six detention camps had been established by March 1952, at Ipoh,
Port Swettenham (now Port Kelang), Muar, Tanjong Bruas, Kluang and
v 3Marjeedi (Johore Bahru). In addition, special rehabiliation centres
were established where detainees were taught elementary technical
skills such as carpentry and electric wiring so that they could find
4
employment upon their release. Squatter detainees who were consi­
dered suitable for resettlement after the police had no more case 
for detaining them were subsequently moved to New Villages. Mawai
1. Detention and Deportation during the Emergency in the Federation 
of Malaya, p.8. See also Short, pp.159, 184, 188.
2. Short, p.142.
3. Information provided by the Secretary of Defence, Proceedings of 
the Federal Legislative Council, 19 March 1952, p.33.
4. Detention and Deportation..., p.11.
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New Village, for example, which was financed largely from MCA funds, 
was resettled by detainees from the Majeedi Camp.
Between June 1948 and February 1953, 29,828 people were 
detained under Emergency Regulation 17. Out of these, 11,083 were 
eventually released. At the same time a further 10,146 were held 
under Emergency Regulation 17D, and an additional 24,036 detainees 
and their dependents were repatriated, almost all to China.'*’
The detention question was a major preoccupation of the 
MCA because the party considered the legal safeguards governing the 
detainees' right to appeal to be inadequate. A number of the MCA 
Federal Legislative Council spoke up against ;;the detention regula­
tions: Ng Sui Cam brought the Council's attention to the dispropor­
tionately large numbers of people who had been detained during the 
first few months of the Emergency, commenting that the very number 
indicated that the innocent had also been held together with the 
guilty. Leong Yew Kbh stated that many hundreds had been arrested 
without trial and inquiry and pointed out that though Advisory
Committees had been formed a few months previously to enquire into
2
the arrests, so far not one single arrest had been dealt with. On
another occasion, Tan Siew Sin wanted the government to take steps
to allay public anxiety regarding allegations that persons held in
3
police custody were subjected to physical violence.
1. Detention and Deportation..., p.6 and Appendix B.
2. Speeches by Ng Sui Cam and Leong Yew K6h, Proceedings of the 
Federal Legislative Council, 5 October 1948, B.474.
3. Speech by Tan Siew Sin, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative 
Council, 19 September 1951, p.210.
161
The major objectives of the MCA's work on detainees was 
to ensure that justice was properly administered and detainee 
welfare adequately safeguarded. As in the case of squatter welfare, 
work related to detainees necessitated constant communication 
between MCA office holders, the authorities and the squatter popu­
lation, which made up the largest number of detainees. Party 
| branches located in New Villages formed special sub-committees to
| keep a close watch on detainee problems. MCA local leaders used
the Consultative Liaison Committee - bodies formed in New Villages 
comprising representatives from the police, Special Branch, Depart­
ment of Chinese Affairs, and the MCA to assist the government in the 
| screening, classification, release, rehabilitation and resettlement
of detainees and Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs) - to advance the 
interests of detainees and their families and to seek redress for 
cases where justice had not been done.
In early 1951 the MCA prepared a comprehensive report out­
lining how the party could work with the authorities and how
detainees' welfare could be safeguarded. Its major recommendations 
1
were:
(a) that MCA representatives be allowed to assist 
officers in the Chinese Affairs Department in 
the screening of detainees to ascertain whether 
they should be held or released;
(b) that MCA representatives be appointed to the 
Boards of Inspection of the various detention 
camps;
1. Report to be submitted to the Annual meeting of the General 
Committee to be held on 21 April 1951, pp.3-4.
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(c) that liaison be established between the Chief 
Police Officers and the various MCA branches 
concerning all matters arising from detention;
(d) that each squatter area have a Chinese Council 
of Ketua (headmen) to act as liaison between 
security forces and inhabitants of the area;
(e) that any detainee must be notified of his right 
to lodge objections against his detention order;
(f) that the government revise its list of detainees 
and release on bond those whom the authorities 
had no real case against;
(g) that the government provide a definite scheme of 
employment for detainees and surrendered bandits;
(h) that deportees be transported at the expense of 
the government to their native places after 
arrival at any port in China;
(i) that wives and children of detainees who were to 
be deported be allowed to remain if they did not 
wish to accompany the deportees;
(j) that minors b o m  in the Federation and eligible 
to apply for Federal citizenship should not be 
deported.
These recommendations, most of which appeared to have been 
heeded by the authorities, helped to ensure that justice was 
administered as correctly as possible. Furthermore, the party 
collected case histories of detainees who were believed to have been 
wrongly detained. The four cases quoted below give an idea of the 
problems MCA representatives tried to deal with:*
CASE 1: Detainee No.7432, Ipoh Detention Camp. Interviewed
on 7 October 1952
The person was a Cantonese male aged 35, b o m  in Menglembu 
in Perak. He had some Chinese primacy education, owned a small tin 
mine and timber logging business, and was married with five children.
1. These case studies are kept at the MCA headquarters.
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He was arrested on 14 December 1951. His statement read:
In or about the month of August 1950, bandits came 
to our mining kongsi and took away the identity 
cards of the labourers.... I was in the kongsi at 
the time but the bandits were strangers to me....
The bandits came again to our kongsi after a month 
or so. They again robbed the labourers of their 
identity cards. On this occasion I was not there.
I have never given any food supply or contributed 
money to the bandits.
I have done nothing to merit this arrest and detention.
I imagine that someone else wanted me out of the way.
I cannot say who it was but in order to get me out of 
the way, I believe the services of a Surrendered 
Enemy Personnel was obtained to put me into trouble.
I say this because some time before my arrest, a 
young man of about 20 years approached me for a loan 
of $50. When he approached me for the loan, he was 
wearing civilian clothes. I did not know that he 
was a Surrendered Enemy Personnel at that time but I 
did not give him the loan. When I was arrested by 
the jungle squad, it was the same man who pointed me 
out to them. On that day he was wearing jungle green 
uniform similar to that of the jungle squad.
The MCA Agent-General's recommendation to the Secretary of 
Defence read: "I believe his statement made to me to be true ... I 
would therefore recommend that his case be given a quick review in 
order that he may not have to be detained longer than necessary".
CASE- 2: Detainee No.884, Port Swettenham Detention Camp.
Interviewed on 18 March 1953
The detainee was a Hokkien male, aged 20, b o m  in Dengkil 
in Negri Sembilan. He had three years of Chinese education and 
worked as a rubber tapper, He was arrested on 30 July 1952. He 
testified that soldiers came while he was tapping rubber and arrested 
him:
I was the only person arrested and the reason for my 
arrest was as follows:
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My identity card was asked for. I had only a 
temporary identity card which I produced. My 
original Identity Card has been handed in by me to 
the District Office for replacement on account of 
the card having been damaged. When I handed in the 
original I was given a temporary Identity Card.
When I produced my temporary Identity Card to the 
soldiers there were $2 in one dollar notes enclosed 
in this paper. I kept the temporary Identity Card 
in my purse and I forgot to take out the $2 when I 
went out to work in the morning.
I was therefore arrested because I had $2 enclosed 
in my Identity Card which was kept in my purse.
Asked if he had any enemies in the area, he replied:-
None, except one Lim Leong San who is a coffee 
shop keeper in Dengkil and who also sells cooked 
food (i.e. Mee Hoon). I quarrelled with him because 
I complained about the cup of "meehoon" supplied to 
me when I went to his shop for lunch. The vegetable 
had not been properly washed and there was a vegetable 
worm in the cup. I have had a few mouthfuls before 
I noticed the worm. I complained about it and I 
refused to pay him. .The price was $1.20. I believe 
that he (Lim Leong San) has informed against me 
either before or after my arrest.
After my arrest and detention my mother came to see 
me. My mother informed me that Lim Leong San had 
sent one Ah Khim Soh to see my father after my arrest. 
Ah;Kham Soh told my father that Lim Leong San could 
help me out if my father would spend a sum of $500.
My father did not entertain the proposal.
When he was asked whether he had given money or food to
the Communists he denied having done so.
The Agent-General*s recommendation was: "Judging from the 
detainee's demeanour and out-spoken attitude I believe that he had 
been truthful. The detainee struck me as a decent young man and a 
dutiful son.... If you should consider that it is not possible to 
release him now then I would suggest that he be sent to the
Rehabilitation Camp in Taiping".
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CASE 3: Detainee No.A/25895 in Majeedi Camp. Interviewed
on 28 April 1953
The detainee, aged 48, was arrested for being in the 
company of Communist guerillas. He was b o m  in China and came to 
Malaya 28 years ago. He owned about 22 acres of rubber land and a 
house in Triang New Village, and was married with five children.
He was arrested on 20 December 1951. He stated that he was visited 
and harassed by Communist terrorists because he was a member of the 
Kuomintang which he had joined soon after the liberation of Malaya 
from the Japanese. His statement read:
Sometime in 1949 the head of the Triang Kuomintang 
Branch named Tee Cheow Yearn was killed by bandits 
in Triang Town. About one month after Tee Cheow 
Yearn was killed, 3 bandits visited my house one 
night between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. My door was shut 
at the time. The bandits ordered me to open my 
door by speaking in Malay. I thought that the 
security people were outside and opened my door.
It was when they entered my house that I became 
aware that they were bandits. . . . One of the 
bandits held a short gun at me - pointing it close 
at my stomach. The other two bandits also had 
short guns. The bandit who held a gun at my stomach 
ordered me to produce my Kuomintang membership 
certificate. He said that he knew I was a Kuomin­
tang member. I was in great fright. I did not 
deny that I was a Kuomintang member but I said 
that I did not have a membership certificate. The 
bandit then said that if I did not produce it with­
in a week he would deal with me severely. The 
bandits did not search my house. They then went 
away. They did not take anything from me.
The Agent-Generalfs recommendation to the Secretary of 
Defence was that the order of detention and repatriation should be
cancelled.
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CASE 4: Detainee No.8449-A/206114, Ipoh Detention Camp
Interviewed on 31 April 1953
The detainee, aged 50, was b o m  in China. He was a rubber 
tapper, married with five children. He lived with his family in 
Sungei Patang Estate in Pahang behind estate labourers’ lines which 
were fenced in. He was arrested on 5 February 1952. Upon his 
arrest, he was told that a Surrendered Enemy Personnel had informed 
the authorities that he was a member of the Communist-led Labour 
Union. He denied that he was a member of the Labour Union and said
that the only party he belonged to was the MCA. His statement said:
... sometime in May 1950 bandits came to my house 
and took away my identity card and that of my wife.
The bandits came about 8 p.m. Two bandits entered
my house. Both were armed with (short) guns....
I recognised one of the bandits.... He was known 
as YIP WAI CH00N.... I knew him when he was a boy 
during the time when I was a vegetable gardener in 
Lanchang.... It was YIP WAI CH00N the bandit who 
took away our identity cards that night. I reported 
the matter to the Police at Karak. I did not give 
the name of the bandit. I was in great fear.
He went on to say that his brother had been murdered by bandits in
December 1949. After killing him, the bandits robbed his family.
He continued:
My sister-in-law told me that YIP WAI CH00N was one 
of the bandits who killed her husband. My deceased 
brother was also a member of the MCA. During that 
period, we were all afraid to admit to anyone that 
we were members of the MCA.
I did not know who was the S.E.P. who gave information 
against me, but if it was YIP WAI CH00N, then his 
motive would be to get me out of the way in order to 
save himself from being prosecuted for murder.
The Agent-General recommended that the Secretary of
Defence should reconsider the detention order of the above.
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Squatters were often forced, under threat to life and 
property, to give assistance to the guerillas, but duress was no 
excuse, for under Emergency Regulation 17 anyone was liable for 
detention even if he was only seen in the company of a guerilla.
The detainees in case studies 1, 3 and 4 were visited by guerillas
and this alone provided sufficient cause for their arrest. As can be
seen from Case 2, people might be arrested due.to false information 
given in order to settle personal scores. Moreover, informers gave 
false information because it was an easy way of extorting money 
from the victim's family, or more often, of obtaining money from the 
Special Branch which paid cash for such information. Since those 
accused were presumed guilty, it is likely that a high proportion of 
innocent people were detained.
MCA party records of the early 1950s confirm the case
studies' evidence that MCA and KMT supporters were singled out as
targets by the MCP.'*' Several hundred MCA members were murdered 
during the Emergency by Communist guerillas, and the party paid out 
compensation to families whose breadwinners had died at the hands 
of the MCP or were detained on apparently planted charges such as 
those described in case studies 3 and 4.
Given the fact that detainees had little means of redressing 
injustice, the MCA provided a crucial source of defence through its 
access to officialdom. The party’s efforts in obtaining the release
1. See, for example, Annual Report of the MCA Selangor State Branch 
1951, p.12. Annual Report of the MCA Muar Branch for 1952, p.3; 
Annual Report of the MCA Malacca State Branch for 1953, p.4.
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of detainees were not entirely futile, for various branches reported 
some successful results of their intervention with the authorities 
on behalf of detainees. For instance, the Negri Sembilan State 
branch managed to obtain the release of 50 people out of 105 listed 
for detention. In another case, the Kelantan State branch reported 
that on 9 March 1956, after having made representations to the 
Kelantan authorities, most of the 24 villagers from Gua Musang who 
were detained were released on bond.'*'
Apart from working for the release of detainees, the MCA
urged the government to improve conditions in detention camps and to
make the transition back to civilian life easier for Surrendered
Enemy Personnel. On 15 November 1949, for instance, the president
of the Johore State branch wrote to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs
about the sub-human living conditions in the Kluang Detention Camp.
He pointed out that the camp was grossly overcrowded; there were
1,883 detainees when the full capacity was fixed at 1,500. Inmates
there also suffered from malnutrition, and one detainee had died 
2
from beri-beri. The party also distributed money, clothing and food
to the inmates of detention camps. Party leaders used their influence
to obtain jobs for released detainees, and gave cash relief to help
3
them readjust to civilian life.
1. Minutes of the MCA Sixth Cabinet Meeting on 10 November 1952;
Annual Report of the MCA Kelantan State Branch for 1956, p.6.
2. Letter from Dr. M. Birchee, President, Johore Bahru MCA, to the 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs, 15 November 1949, MCA headquarters.
3. See, Annual Report of the MCA Muar Branch for 1952, p.3; Report 




When in 1951 the government passed an Emergency Bill an
the conscription of manpower, directing 20,000 men of all races into
the police force, the Chinese response was appallingly low. * Chinese
youths between the call-up ages of 18-24 years moved from place to
place to avoid service to call-up notices, 6,000 of them absconded
to Singapore and several thousand others to Indonesia, Hong Kong,
2
Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. The response to the bill 
came mainly from Malays.
On 3 July 1952, the Federal Legislative Council passed a
National Service Bill designed mainly to improve the recruitment of
Chinese youths to the police and armed forces. The government had
set up a Federation Regiment, and it hoped that 50% of its servicemen
would be Chinese. More Chinese were also desired for other divisions
such as the Boys’ Company, the Federation Armoured Car Regiment and
the Federation Engineer Squadron. However, the Chinese response was
again abysmally poor. Application for the Federation Regiment was 
3
81% Malay. By 31 October 1952, there were only 50 Chinese recruits 
in the Federation Regiment and 505 in the police force, or 0.003% > 
and 0.089% respectively of the male Chinese population over 19 years.
1. Speech by D.C. Watherston, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative 
Council, 20 September 1951, p.269.
2. Tan Cheng Lock, "Memorandum on Manpower Conscription (A Chinese 
View)", mimeo., 19 December 1951, p.l, TCL Papers, SP13, Item 146.
3. Singapore Standard, 4 December 1953.
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By November 1954, Chinese recruitment into the Federation Regiment 
improved slightly, but the overall percentage of Chinese in the 
armed forces remained at 5.1% of the rank and file, and 3.3% at the 
officer level. The situation was hardly better in the police force: 
out of 50,000 policemen, only 2,059,or 4.1%,were Chinese.^
MCA national leaders, seeing the call-up as much as a
claim upon Chinese to demonstrate their loyalty to Malaya as a
security measure, were as concerned as the government over the poor
Chinese response. Speaking during the debate on the National
Service Bill, Tan Siew Sin said: "We can probably never build up a
national consciousness in this country, the diverse races living in
this country can never feel a sense of oneness unless amongst other
2
things we have a National Army comprising all races". Moreover, 
during the first few years of the Emergency, two-thirds of all 
civilians killed by terrorists were Chinese, and it is not surprising 
that the party saw it was to the advantage of the Chinese if the
defence forces were strengthened and Chinese participation in them
^  3 increased.
Although the MCA believed in the need to increase Chinese 
participation in the defence forces, it argued that conscription as
1. Proceedings of the Federal Legislative Council, 18 November 1954, 
p.1036.
2. Speech by Tan Siew Sin, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative 
Council, 3 July 1952, p.300.
3. Circular issued by Tan Cheng Lock entitled "Direction of Man­
power: the Need", mimeo., 18 July 1951, TCL Papers, TCL/l/30e-f.
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required by the National Service Bill would not be supported by 
the Chinese community. Cheng Lock presented a memorandum to the 
Federal War Council outlining the reasons for Chinese failure to 
respond to conscription, and recommending an alternative scheme in 
the form of the Home Guard service.'*’ He identified the reasons 
for the failure of Chinese recruitment as: the low level of Malayan- 
centred political consciousness exhibited by the community, low 
awareness of Malaya as a nation state requiring sacrifice of lives 
in its defence, and lack of political incentives for Chinese to 
sacrifice their lives for their adopted country. Over and above 
these considerations was a cultural tradition which put low value 
on soldiering as a profession, as is evident in the Chinese proverb: 
’’Good steel is not made into nails, and good sons do not serve as 
soldiers” . Traditional Chinese antipathy towards soldiering was 
probably related to the practice of ancestor worship which required 
sons, especially the eldest born, to remain with and outlive their 
parents to carry on ancestral worship rites which underpinned the 
Chinese religious-cultural system.
The memorandum pointed out that Malayan Chinese conscious­
ness of duty, service, and group loyalty had not developed beyond 
that to family, clan, dialect group and community. Cheng Lock 
explained: ” ... universal conscription depends for public support on 
public education and ideals such as loyalty to the nation and social
1. Tan Cheng Lock, ’’Memorandum on Manpower Conscription....”
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justice which are not yet generally held by the Malayan Chinese.’1 
He argued that the concept of national service with its connotation 
of sacrifice for the defence of nation state, king and country, did 
not make sense to the ’’present mentality of the Malayan Chinese’’, 
and added that the spirit of a Malayan nationhood was still lacking 
within the community. The "concept of general social justice" was 
of far less importance than the preservation of the immediate 
interests of the individual family. This lack of recognition of the 
fact that Chinese had a duty towards the upkeep of law and order 
during the Emergency resulted in Chinese youths evading their 
obligations, "abetted and encouraged by parents and friends".
Cheng Lock further pointed out that Chinese lacked 
political incentives to sacrifice their lives for Malaya. While 
Malays were granted the privileges of citizenship under the Federation 
of Malaya constitution, most Chinese had been denied the "full status, 
rights and privileges of Malayan citizenship". They were therefore 
reluctant to shoulder the "duties, responsibilities and obligations 
of citizenship" demanded of them by the Manpower Regulations. Chinese 
community leaders likewise singled out disenfranchisement as a major 
reason for the poor Chinese response to the call-up. For example, when 
over 100 delegates representing 60 bodies - which included the MCA, 
CCC, huay kuans, trade guilds and 19 schools in Malacca - met to 
discuss the National Service Bill, they stated that "Chinese should 
be accorded equal political rights along with the other communities 
in Malaya" to make them feel it was their "bounden duty ... to
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protect and defend this country".
As national service was an untenable means of getting 
Chinese to join the armed forces, the MCA advised the government to 
find another course of action which would take into account "a 
traditional Chinese way of thought to bring the Chinese to battle". 
Cheng Lock argued that the only institutionalised method of 
committing more Chinese to fight the guerillas was through the Home 
Guard service, which was based on traditional principles of self- 
defence familiar to Chinese society. It may be recalled that 
lineages in nineteenth century Southeast China organised their men 
folk in local militias to defend their villages against outside 
attacks. Cheng Lock explained: "The Home Guard system makes use of 
the only universal loyalty, loyalty to family and locality". He 
listed the following advantages of the Home Guard system from the 
Chinese point of view: (1) a full time Home Guard service would 
introduce the Chinese gently to the military arts without arousing 
passive disobedience, which had been the reaction to the Manpower 
Regulations; (2) hardships caused by conscription into the police 
and armed forces and posting outside the locality would be avoided; 
parents would not lose sight of only sons, and they in turn would 
be at hand to perform the filial duties required of them;
(3) financial hardships caused to families would be largely elimi­
nated since the guard member could still help in the family agri­
cultural or commercial interests while off duty; (4) the home guard
1. Minutes of the Joint Meeting of Representatives of Chinese Asso­
ciations, Guilds, Societies and Schools in the Settlement of 
Malacca held to consider the National Service Bill on 16 March 
1952.
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would not have to fear bandit reprisals while at work since his 
duties would be within the perimeter fences of the New Village.*
The Home Guard system,implemented along the lines suggested
by the MCA, proved to be a successful means of getting Chinese to
defend lives and property during the Emergency. General Sir Gerald
Templer, who succeeded Gurney as High Commissioner, enlarged the
system in mid-1952, directing that 400 fully armed and fully
operational Home Guard units be formed to serve along side the
2
police and armed forces. The proportion of Chinese in the Home 
Guards grew steadily. By the end of 1950, out of a total of 30,000 
Home Guards, only 3,500 or 11.6% were Chinese. However, by September 
1954, 129 New Villages out of 323 were defended by Chinese Home
3
Guard units. The MCA Annual Report for 1954 noted: "... the policing 
and defence of a large number of New Villages have now been trans­
ferred to the hands of Home Guards whose personnel is mostly 
4
Chinese’!.
A special Home Guard unit, the Kinta Valley Home Guard 
(KVGH) was the country’s most successful local Chinese defence 
scheme. Unlike normal Home Guard units which were planned, financed
1. Tan Cheng Lock, "Memorandum on Manpower Conscription...."
2. See Templer’s Annual Address, Proceedings of the Federal Legisla­
tive Council, 19 November 1952, p.462. For more information on 
the formation and functions of the Home Guard, see, Short, pp. 
411-415.
3. Speech by Tan Cheng Lock at the Annual Meeting of the Central 
General Committee of MCA, 21 April 1951, TCL Papers, SP13,
Ucapan Tan Cheng Lock, Item 35, and Short, p.413.
4. Report of the MCA Hon. Secretary General to be submitted to the 
Seventh Annual Meeting of the General Committee to be held on 
15 January 1955, p.9.
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and operated by the authorities, the MCA played a major role in 
planning, partly funding and running the KVHG.* The KVHG comprised 
mainly ex-KMT and secret society elements and existed to protect 
the mining activities of Perak towkays, the majority of whom were 
MCA leaders.
Leong Yew Koh, a founder member of the MCA in Perak and 
a successful tin miner, recalled that the idea was the outcome of 
a meeting of the Perak State War Executive Committee. During the 
meeting it was said that 90% of the Chinese tin miners in Perak were 
paying protection money to the terrorists and that the government's 
suspicions had been confirmed by a confession signed by two repre­
sentatives from the Perak Chinese Miners' Association. The position 
of all Chinese miners in Perak was endangered by this state of 
affairs, as it rendered them liable to detention. Consequently, 
Leong submitted a scheme whereby the Chinese mines in Perak would be 
protected by a unit of Home Guard which would be financed by the 
Perak miners and the MCA. The existence of the KVHG would make it 
unnecessary for the miners to continue payment of protection money;
at the same time no further suspicions would be cast in their
2
direction.
1. Report of the MCA Hon. Secretary General to be submitted to the 
Seventh Annual Meeting of the General Committee to be held on 
15 January 1955, p.9.
2. See, Chong Wai Meng, "Report of the Perak Chinese Mining Asso­
ciation Home Guard Fund: period 16-4-52 to 30-11-54", mimeo., 
n.d.; LYK Papers, SP3, no.42; and Minutes of the Sixth Annual 
Meeting of the MCA General Committee on 27 December 1953.
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According to H.S. Lee, fighting men for the KVHG were 
recruited from the ex-KMTM and secret societies allied to it.* Lau 
Pak Khuan, the KMTM leader in Perak and founder member of the MCA, 
apparently resurrected the old KMTM guerilla unit in Perak, which had 
fallen apart since the end of the war and organised it into the 
KVHG. Lee stated that Templer was initially reluctant to sanction 
the scheme, as he felt that a well-trained and fully-armed KMT force 
paying loyalty to Taiwan might prove a liability to the Malayan 
authorities. Moreover, he objected in principle to a private army 
raised by private means to protect the interests of the Kinta tin 
miners. He opposed the idea of ’’allowing the Chinese to arm them­
selves for their own protection” since it contradicted his belief
that defence should be provided by the government for the collective
2
security of all Malayans. However, Templer finally sanctioned the 
scheme, as he was persuaded by the argument that the regular police 
and armed forces were unable to defend the Kinta mines effectively. 
Adequate defence of the Kinta Valley was a major consideration, for 
it was the country’s largest source of tin supply and tin and rubber 
were the government’s two biggest revenue earners.
Templer finally consented to the scheme also because he was 
assured by the MCA leaders that the unit would be disbanded when its 
services were no longer needed (which was the case). After approving 
the scheme the government contributed a generous two-thirds towards
1. Interview, H.S. Lee, 22 July 1975.
2 . Minutes of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the MCA General Committee 
on 27 December 1953, p.5.
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expenses incurred in setting up the force and assumed a measure of 
responsibility and control over its operation. The MCA, for its 
part, spent a total of $225,000 on the KVHG, a sum which exceeded 
its expenditure on its nation-wide recruiting drive for the police 
force (discussed below). During a meeting of the General Committee 
in 1953, a delegate from Negri Sembilan objected to what he 
considered the disproportionately large sum of money which the party 
had spent in Perak alone, by reason of the KVHG, and insisted that 
future expenditure be spread out more fairly among the other states.^- 
His objection reflected the feat that party members would become 
aware that the distribution of funds was controlled by a few leaders 
in the Central Working Committee, and that funds which should have 
been used for Emergency welfare work were being used to protect the 
vested interests of a privileged group within the party leadership, 
the Perak towkays.
At its peak, the KVHG was a well-organised and well-
2
trained force comprising 1,656 men and officers. The force was 
successful in carrying out its counter-insurgency duties as evidenced 
by decreasing incidents of Communist sabotage of tin mines and inti­
midation of mine owners and workers, which had previously occurred 
frequently.
In April 1952 the MCA forwarded a proposal to Templer to 
make good the shortage of Chinese in the police force. The party 
pledged to recruit 2,000 Chinese policemen. In return, the government 
was asked not to enforce the National Service Bill except in case of
1. Minutes of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the MCA General Committee 
on 27 December 1953, p.7.
2. "Report of the Perak Chinese Mining Association...11, p.l.
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external emergency. Incentives recommended by the MCA included the 
granting of citizenship to recruits after three years’ satisfactory 
service in the force, payment of a bonus sum of $200 to each recruit 
and postings as near the recruits’ homes as possible for a minimum 
period of one year after the period of training.*
The government decided to let the MCA recruit Chinese 
policemen on its behalf, because it was uncertain about its own rate 
of success through the National Service Bill, Addressing a Federal 
War Council meeting on 8 February 1952, the Federal Chief Secretary 
said that though the Federal Legislative Council had already accepted 
the National Service Bill in principle, the government would not 
enforce it. He explained that the government was not totally con­
vinced that compulsory conscription would necessarily produce the 
desired results: ”... what we have to weigh is the probability of a 
lot of trouble with young men running away into the jungle when 
Registration is proclaimed coupled with the demand for manpower which 
the scheme will require to work it, against the alternative of keeping
the registration machinery in the background while attempting to meet
2
our demands by voluntary enlistment”. At the same meeting, the 
Deputy Chief Secretary divulged that the government was willing to 
try a recruiting drive along the lines suggested by the MCA starting 
from April 1952.
1. Malayan Chinese Association, ’’Scheme on Recruiting of Chinese 
into the Police Force for Submission to H.E. the High Commissioner” 
mimeo. , 21 April 1952. See also Tan Cheng Lock, ’’Plan to Mobilise 
MCA Resources to Produce 2,000 Police Recruits", mimeo., 8 April
1952.
2. Minutes of the Federal War Council meeting bn 8 February 1952 
(item 2), TCL Papers, SP13, Item 170.
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Another explanation for the government's willingness to 
introduce the MCA recruitment scheme may be that at least some 
official opinion did understand and was sympathetic to the Chinese 
problem. Thus a memorandum prepared by a Major N.D. Poulsen of the 
Buffs stated that even if the accusation against the Malayan Chinese' 
unwillingness to play their part in the anti-terrorist war was true, 
this ignored the fact that the Chinese in Malaya had in the past 
received little encouragement from the British to make them feel 
politically committed to Malaya as their new home. The British had 
never encouraged them to take up citizenship or urged them to play 
an active part in the country's political welfare. He pointed out 
that as a result of this historical background the Chinese were now 
"in the unenviable position of being treated as foreigners, or at 
least second-class citizens". At the same time, they were "expected 
to behave like patriotic Malayans". He suggested that if the 
government expected the Chinese to join the defence forces in large 
numbers it should offer two major concessions: more generous 
citizenship provisions and better salary scales in the forces.^"
While the government agreed to the grant of citizenship, 
it objected to the idea of financial incentives. Templer wrote to 
Cheng Lock:^
1. Major N.D. Poulsen, "The Recruitment of Chinese for the Army
in Malaya", mimeo., 17 October 1953, pp.l, 3-5, MCA headquarters.
2. Letter from Templer to Tan Cheng Lock dated 24 April 1952, MCA 
headquarters.
I consider that any scheme for obtaining Chinese 
recruits which is based on the payment of a bounty 
would be wrong in principle and would be tantamount 
to a breach of faith with those Chinese who have 
already joined the force under existing conditions 
of service without bounty or any other allowances.
A system which depends on the payment of a bounty 
would be an admission that the Police rates of pay 
are insufficient and would cause dissatisfaction 
and complaints from members of other racial commu­
nities already in the force.
The subsidising of police recruits by a party or 
organisation strikes at the essential impartiality 
and independence of the Police and should be 
rejected on those grounds alone.
Malay members of the Federal War Council likewise opposed the 
proposed MCA bonus payment to Chinese police recruits, pointing out 
that the payment of money subsidies to Chinese recruits would 
immediately upset Malays serving in the police force.^
Despite their reservations, the authorities did not stop
the MCA from paying out subsidies once the recruitment scheme was
launched. As it was widely known that Chinese youths balked at
serving in the defence forces because they found more lucrative
employment in the private commercial, mining and agricultural sectors,
the government decided to tolerate these payments as a temporary
measure to obtain much needed Chinese police manpower. The MCA for
its part was aware that it had to offer bonus payments and to play
up the issue of economic security - that a career in the police force
guaranteed long-term employment and a pension - rather than appeal
2
to the youths’ sense of duty.
1. Minutes of the War Federal Council Meeting on 4 January 1952 
(Item 3), speech by Mustapha Albakri, TCL Papers, SP13, Item 170.
2. An MCA official advising the party on the recruitment drive 
stated that few Chinese would ’’act from the duty incentive” when 
deciding to join the police force. Ho Yung Chi, ’’Memorandum on 
Recruitment of Chinese Policemen”, mimeo., 2 May 1952.
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The MCA recruitment drive was a well organised and inten­
sive campaign. Before its scheme received official sanction, the 
party had set up at every MCA centre special subcommittees to deal 
with recruitment under the Manpower Regulations. In its drive to 
recruit the quota of 2,000 youths for service in the regular police 
force, the MCA headquarters alerted all branches to publicise the 
time of arrival of recruiting teams, the qualifications required for 
service, the terms of service and the emoluments provided. Branch 
officials were told that their propaganda work should not be confined 
only to the towns, but "it should reach the level of villages 
including all schools".* They were also to make known to the Chinese 
that recruits would not have to eat Malay food, that the police 
headgear was not a Malay cap but a survival from a former British 
Regiment, and also that many of the instructors in the Training Depots 
were in fact Chinese. Such information was given to reassure Chinese 
recruits that becoming a policeman did not involve adopting a more 
Malay life-style, an approach which shows the MCA perceived racial 
incompatibilities to be obstacles to Chinese joining a Malay- 
dominated Police Force. Above all, the MCA wished it to be known to
recruits that three years’ full time service would automatically
2
give them Federal citizenship.
1. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Bingham, Secretary for Chinese 
Affairs, 9 May 1951, TCL Papers, TCL/V/91; and Circular from the 
MCA Agent-General to the Eon. Secretaries of all State/Settlement 
Branches entitled "Chinese Recruits for Regular Police Force",
10 April 1952.
2. Circular from the MCA Agent-General to the Hon. Secretaries of 
all States/Settlement Branches entitled "Chinese Recruits for 
Regular Police Porce", 28 April 1952.
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After an unpromising start, the recruiting campaign 
headed by Yap Yin Chung - the Recruiting Liaison Officer responsible 
for mediating between government recruiting officers, District 
Officers, Resettlement Officers, members of village committees and 
local MCA officials - successfully attained the target quota. Yap 
reported that the MCA's campaign had "broken to some extent the 
'barriers' and age-old customs" inhibiting the Chinese from entering 
a military-type profession. But he emphasized that the majority of 
the applicants were drawn by the widely rumoured "welfare" the MCA 
gave to recruits.^"
The total number of recruits at the end of the campaign was
2,059. When a member of the Central Working Committee (CWC) suggested
that the party spend another $200,000 to raise a further 1,000
Chinese policemen, this proposal was vetoed, as the CWC considered
that the party had already spent "hundreds of thousands of dollars to
2
recruit a mere fraction of the Police Force". At the same time 
when, during a session in the Federal Legislative Council the Secre­
tary of Defence complained that 2,059 new recruits for the Police 
Force were insufficient, Leong Yew Koh retorted that the Federal War 
Council had been satisfied with the number of 2,000 recruits when the 
MCA submitted its recruitment scheme, and the MCA and the Chinese 
community should not now be blamed for not providing more than the 
agreed quota. ^
1. Memorandum by Yap Yin Chung entitled "Recruiting", mimeo., 24 
April 1953, LYK Papers, SP3, no.66-67.
2. Minutes of the MCA Central Working Committee on 4 April 1954, p.10.
3. Speech by Leong Yew Koh, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative 
Council. 19 November 1954, p.1081.
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The MCA campaign also raised recruits for the armed 
forces. By the end of June 1953, it recruited 855 Chinese youths 
for the Federation Regiment, Boys' Company and Federation Engineer 
Squadron.^" Although this figure was considered inadequate by the 
government, no special drive was launched to increase it. While 
the MCA succeeded in getting more Chinese to join the Home Guard 
service and police force through special incentives and appeals to 
traditional concepts of self-defence, it realised that Chinese 
cultural prejudice against a soldiering career in the regular 
defence forces was too strong to be overcome.
3.3.5 Miscellaneous Services
In addition to its work on squatter welfare, adult educa­
tion, detainees and manpower recruitment, the MCA carried out a 
number of other social-service activities.which mirrored those 
performed by the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and huay kuans. For 
example, the MCA paid for burial expenses of destitute members and 
gave financial relief to flood and fire victims. During Chinese New
Year, the most important festival celebrated by Chinese, the MCA
2
gave ang pow (gifts of money) to the old and poor. The settlement
1. Yap Yin Chung, "Progress Report on Recruiting", mimeo., 25 July
1953.
2. See, e.g. , Annual Report of the MCA Kelantan Branch for the year 
ended 30 June 1952, p.2; Annual Report of the MCA Muar Branch 
for 1952, p.3; Annual Report of the Penang and Province 
Wellesley Branch for the year ended 30 June 1954, p.3; and 
Report of the Working Committee to be submitted to the Annual 
General Meeting of the MCA Malacca Branch 23 September 1955,
pp.6-7.
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of disputes arising from family or business differences was a major 
service provided by party leaders. The Muar branch, for example, 
reported that it settled 296 cases of family disputes for the 
period 1955-1956. Other branches similarly singled out the settle­
ment of family disputes as an important item of their general 
welfare work within the Chinese community.^ Some state branches 
even set up special bureaus to provide miscellaneous welfare and 
advisory services for the Chinese public. In March 1954 the Penang 
and Province Wellesley Settlement Branch established an Advice and 
Service Bureau to ’’give and render service, where possible, to all 
members of the Chinese community, besides its own members, in all 
matters affecting their personal affairs, their dealings with the 
Government, and in their duties and their rights as law-abiding 
citizens of this country1’. It was stated that the Bureau rendered
service mainly to the poor and distressed ’’who did not know where to
2
turn to for help when such help was urgently needed’’. The Perak 
State Branch set up a similar bureau, called the Public Services 
Bureau, which performed several services including giving aid to all 
Chinese on immigration citizenship and other legal matters, obtaining 
employment for the poor, and advising on cases of family and business
1. MCA Muar Branch: Report of the Association’s affairs for the 
period 1955 to 1957, p.2; Report of Dindings District Branch, 
included in the Report of the Working Committee MCA Perak Branch 
to be submitted to the Annual General Meeting to be held on 26 
October 1952, p.12; and MCA Kampar Sub-Branch: Annual Report for 
the Fourth Term 1-7-55 to 31-5-57, p.l.
2. MCA Penang and Province Wellesley Branch: Report for the year 
ended 30 June 1954, p.5.
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disputes.
The MCA also contributed a considerable amount of money to
non-Chinese charitable organisations such as the Red Cross (Red
Crescent) Society and St. Johnrs Ambulance Brigade, which carried
out important medical work in the New Villages. The party Annual
Report for 1952 stated that when teams of the British Red Cross and
the St. John's Ambulance Brigade arrived in Malaya to do work in
the squatter areas, the Association "extended to them financial aid
to the tune of nearly $500,000, enabling them to get the necessary
2
transport for their work in the New Villages". The MCA also spent 
$210,000 towards the expenses of raising 25 teams of nurses and 
welfare officers for work in the New Villages. Another charitable 
organisation doing welfare work in the Kinta New Villages, the St. 
Michael's Catholic Action, received a sum of $51,250 from the MCA. 
Smaller sums of money were given to a number of public organisations 
working among the orphaned, poor, sick and aged of all races. Among 
the recipients of such aid were the Little Sisters of the Poor Home 
for the Aged (Singapore), the Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus 
(Malacca), the Home of the Aged (Penang) and the Ramakrishna 
Orphanage (Penang). On one occasion, the party contributed money to 
defray the expenses of Buddhist monks proselytising in the New
1. MCA Perak State Branch: Report of the Working Committee to be 
submitted to the Sixth Annual General Meeting to be held on 28 
Decembe r 1954, p .3.
2. Report of the Hon. Secretary of the MCA to be submitted to the 
Fifth Annual General Committee to be held on 31 January 1953, 




The final increment of miscellaneous expenditure was spent
on Malay welfare. In July 1952 the MCA set up a Malay Welfare Fund
2
consisting of $500,000 from its lottery proceeds. Out of this
fund, money was released for the welfare of Malay policemen,
soldiers, squatters and detainees. Gifts of money during Hari Raya
(the end of the Muslim fasting month) were distributed among Malays
held in detention camps throughout the country. $3,000 was alotted
to Malay settlers at Kampong Sepial in Pahang, and $5,000 was given
towards the building of married quarters for Malay soldiers stationed 
3
in Singapore. The MCA thus did not ignore the needs of the non- 
Chinese; however, compared to the volume of time, energy and money 
which the party expended on behalf of its members and the Chinese 
community at large, the attention it gave to the other races was 
modest indeed.
3.4 The MCA and the Emergency: Some Conclusions
From the beginning of the outbreak of the Emergency, the 
government was fully aware that the Chinese community in Malaya were 
reluctant to commit themselves to the official side in the terrorist 
war. This reluctance stemmed from a number of reasons, the main ones
1. "List of Welfare Expenditure...."
2. Straits Times, 14 July 1952. For more information on the Malay
Welfare Fund, see Chapter 5.
3. "List of Welfare Expenditure...."
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being: fears of reprisals from terrorists if they cooperated with
the authorities; a genuine desire on the part of others to support 
the Communist cause; deep-rooted prejudices which held them back 
from serving in the armed forces; unfamiliarity in dealing with 
affairs outside the scope of their immediate family, clan and dialect 
group concerns; and more generally, hostility towards being 
controlled by a government which was overwhelmingly non-Chinese.
The government realised that a successful conclusion of 
the war depended upon its ability to break these attitudes, especially 
among the squatters. To achieve this, it had to use the mediatory 
services of a group of community leaders brought together in the MCA. 
The party proved to be the ideal "political broker" between Govern­
ment and squatters for the following reasons: firstly, the loyalty
of its leaders to the anti-Communist cause was unquestionable. They 
were successful capitalists who had as much to lose as the British 
and Malay leaders if the MCP were to win the war. Secondly, they 
were established public figures within the Chinese community before 
they came together in the MCA. As traditional association leaders, 
they had built up an impressive and comprehensive structure of 
patron-client relationships withiit the community. This meant that 
to a considerable extent they could influence political behaviour 
and command the loyalty of members of the community. Thirdly, a 
number of these leaders were trilingual. Thus the party could commu­
nicate between an English and Malay-speaking official elite on the 
one hand and a Chinese-speaking (Mandarin and all other dialects 
included) squatter population on the other.
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The enthusiasm which the MCA leaders displayed in carrying
out their Emergency duties did not derive solely from purely selfish
and opportunistic motives relating to the protection of capitalist
class interests. They also believed that they had a responsibility
to alleviate the hardships inflicted on the Chinese masses during
the Emergency. For its vigorous contribution towards the terrorist
war the MCA received its share of casualties, For example, it lost
more than 300 office bearers and members due to Communist reprisals.
The party's belief in the success of its own role in the fight
against Communism is succinctly expressed in the following words of
Cheng Lock: "I am perfectly positive that without some such Chinese
organisation as the MCA as a counter to the MCP, the danger of
Communism establishing its rule over Malaya will be increased ten- 
2
fold". The government likewise acknowledged that the MCA played a
significant role in facilitating its counter-insurgency program and
praised the party for serving as a rallying point in the anti- 
3
Communi st crus ade.
1. During the MCA 19th Annual Meeting of the Central General 
Assembly in 1969, it was proposed that the party should erect a 
monument in Kuala Lumpur to commemorate the deaths of these "MCA 
Patriots" who "sacrificed their lives in order that the people of 
Malaya may live in peace and harmony". Annual Report of the 
Secretary General to be submitted to the 19th Annual Meeting of 
the Central General Assembly to be held on 17 March 1969, p.7.
2. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Templer, 15 May 1953, MCA head­
quarters .
3. See, Extract from Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (n.d.), 
C0537/4761/52849/48/49(28) and Federation of Malaya, Despatch 




THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MCA INTO A POLITICAL PARTY
Concerned that the MCA's deep involvement in welfare 
work during the early years of the Emergency had given it a 
reputation of being a prototype CCC-huay kuan, the national party 
leadership decided to emphasise the party's political dimension.
In late 1951, they seized upon the opportunity presented by the 
introduction of local elections in the country to reorganise and 
streamline the MCA'.into a modern day political party. When the 
reorganisation campaign was over in late 1953, although the party 
still retained some basic CCC-huay kuan characteristics, it had 
been largely transformed into an efficient political organisation 
capable of working in conjunction with the UMNO in electoral 
politics and in spearheading the independence involvement in 
Malaya.
4.1 Party Organisational Structure Prior to Reorganisation
From its beginning the MCA had a rationalised and stream­
lined hierarchy of branch organisations, with a corresponding 
hierarchy of Working Committees at each level. At the apex of the 
organisational pyramid was the party headquarters, which controlled 
and supervised the affairs of all branches. Decisions of the party 
headquarters were made by the Central Working Committee, the highest 
organ in the Association. Immediately below the CWC were the State 
Working Committees, which supervised the affairs of the state
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branches and had supervisory powers over the district branches and 
the District Working Committees. The district branches, in turn, 
supervised the area branches and the Area Working Committees.*
A number of sub-committees were created at each level of 
the organisational hierarchy to look after specific areas of party 
affairs. The first sub-committees set up in the CWC were welfare, 
legislation, political, youth and women, publicity, social, 
education and benevolent, financial and economic, labour. From 
1949 to 1952, due to the party’s involvement in Emergency welfare 
work, the active sub-committees were welfare, financial and economic, 
and publicity. After the reorganisation campaign and with the 
party becoming increasingly preoccupied with political issues, the 
legislation, political, education and youth sub-committees became 
the most active sections in the party.
The pyramidal format of party branches and committees 
rested upon a structural base comprised of the traditional Chinese 
associational network in Malaya.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the MCA was launched with 
the cooperation of leaders from the most important Chinese associa­
tions in the country, and its subsequent growth was due largely 
to the work done for the party by the CCC-huay kuan leaders. The 
setting up of state branches was left to the initiative of CCC 
strongmen in each state: Lau Pak Khuan and Leong Yew Koh in Perak, 
Wong Shee Fun in Johore, Ng Sui Cam in Penang, Foo See Moi in
1. Rules of the Malayan Chinese Association.
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Kelantan, Wu Cheok Yee in Trengganu, Lim Teng Kwang in Perlis and
Kedah, Lee Tee Siong in Negri Sembilan and H.S. Lee, Khoo Teik Ee
and Yong Shook Lin in Selangor. The fact that Chinese association
leaders were the founders and promoters of the MCA resulted in the
party being physically accommodated on the premises of Chinese
associations, most notably the Chambers of Commerce. All the
state branches (except Negri Sembilan) were housed on the premises
of the offices of CCC. Below the state branch, Chinese association
premises were likewise used to accommodate the local party branch
or were used as venues for party meetings. For example, the Muar
District Branch held its meetings at the Chei Chih Assembly Hall;
the Bukit Merah District Branch was located at Hung Kang (Teochew)
Huay Kuan; and the Bentong District Branch was found at the
Bentong Chinese Town Hall.'*’ Area branches were less frequently
found on the premises on Chinese associations, since these asso-
2
ciations were seldom located in New Villages and small towns; 
they were commonly housed in the local Chinese village school or 
the community hall. The administration of party affairs was 
normally attended to by employees of the CCC or huay kuan which 
accommodated the party branch; this same body of CCC-huay kuan 
personnel aided the MCA in carrying out Emergency activities such
1. Infonnation obtained from the list of addresses of party 
branches for the period 1949-50 kept at the party headquarters.
2. The social uprooting of people and the mixing of various 
dialect groups in New Villages impeded the formation of many 
dialect-based associations in those areas except for a few 
mutual aid and recreational societies. See, Nyce, pp.111-25 
and Newell, pp.37, 39.
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as squatter and detainee welfare, and the manpower recruitment 
drive
The extent to which the MCA was enmeshed in the Chinese
associational network is further illustrated by the following
reports of two state branches: Malacca reported that when the first
Working Committee was formed, a representative from every major
Chinese association in the state was invited to sit in the 
2
Committee. In Johore, after the state branch was established,
the state chairman acknowledged the crucial role played by Chinese
associations, going so far as to claim that if it had not been for
the work done by the Chinese associations the party would not have
3
been formed in Johore.
4.2 Internal Party Dynamics
The dependence of the MCA westernised leaders upon the 
linkage services of CCC-huay kuan leaders to provide a widespread 
organisational as well as membership base for the MCA meant that 
the latter constituted the real power-brokers within the new party. 
Possessing a large degree of autonomous power, these Laukeh leaders 
were able to run state and local branches much in accordance with
1. ’’Report by the Agent-General on a visit to Penang and Province 
Wellesley”, c.April 1952, mimeo., p.3. Malayan Mirror, Vol.I, 
no.14, 31 December 1953, p.5.
2. Minutes of the inaugural meeting of the MCA Malacca Branch held 
on 11 March 1949.
3. ’’Brief Report of the MCA Johore State Branch”, mimeo., n.d.
(c.1951), TCL Papers, TCL/7/10.
193
their own wishes. The lack of centralised control and supervision 
over local party affairs resulted in the MCA becoming, in Tan Siew 
Sin's words, like "a capitalist organisation with no coherent aims 
... drifting helplessly about like a ship without a rudder".*
The westernised top leadership felt the need to curb the 
powers of the Laukeh party bosses partly because of its desire to 
impose centralised control and partly because of concern over the 
negative public image generated by the Laukeh leaders' conduct of 
party affairs. Since the Laukeh leaders did not view the MCA as a 
political party but rather as another CCC-huay kuan, they tended to 
regard office holding in the MCA as a right and privilege owing 
them because of their high social status within the CCC-huay kuan 
establishment and to conduct their party responsibilities in the 
same manner as they conducted association affairs. As such leaders 
were the patrons dispensing largesse in local communities, they 
conducted the MCA's business in a highly personalised and occa­
sionally opportunistic manner, with little public accountability 
for their actions. They were thus frequently subject to allegations 
of corruption and abuse of power.
Relations between the national leadership and the Pahang 
state branch chairman, Ong Seong Tek, vividly illustrate the 
cavalier manner in which the state leader conducted party affairs 
and the extent to which power at the state level was concentrated 
in single hands. Ong Seong Tek, the foremost CCC leader in Pahang,
1. Letter from Tan Siew Sin to Y.C. Kang dated 9 February 1952, 
MCA headquarters.
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set up the MCA state branch in 1949 and remained chairman till 
1954. During his five year term of office, Ong did not convene 
a single meeting of his Working Committee or call for the election 
of new office holders.'*’ While the rest of the squatter community 
in the country benefitted from the welfare work carried out by the 
party, the squatters in Pahang were neglected to a large extent 
as a result of the state chairman's lack of interest in discharging 
his duties. Despite repeated requests from party headquarters to 
the state chairman to fulfill his obligations, Ong continued to 
treat the MCA in Pahang imperiously, ignoring requests from head- 
quarters to produce and submit audited accounts of the branch's 
finances for the scrutiny of the party’s auditors. At one point 
he even moved the state branch office to his shop premises in Kuala 
Lipis, thus creating the impression that the MCA in Pahang was the 
personal property of its state chairman. Finally in 1953, the 
party headquarters decided to take legal action against him on the 
grounds that he had failed to submit the financial statements of 
the Pahang state branch for the years 1949 to 1953. The party won 
the law suit, Ong resigned, and in November 1954 the Pahang State 
Committee met for the first time since 1949 and elected a new state 
chairman and Working Committee.
While there is little evidence to suggest that the first 
Pahang chairman engaged in personal profit-making, a serious
1. The following account is based on: Report on the Pahang Branch 
by T.Y. Chen dated 11 April 1953; letters from T.Y. Chew to 
the Chief Executive Secretary dated 14 May and 24 July 1953; 
and "Pahang Branch Accounts: Ourselves vs Mr. Ong Seong Tek", 
circular sent out by T.H. Tan, Chief Exec.Sec., to all members 
of the CWC, dated 11 November 1954.
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controversy arose over corruption by party officials of the 
Singapore branch. During 1952, MCA headquarters discovered that a 
considerable sum of money ($37,575) from the party sweepstake held 
in Singapore had not been remitted to the Central Welfare Sub- 
Committee. Investigations revealed that the sum of money had been 
misappropriated by a number of senior office holders in the 
Singapore Working Committee. The findings compiled by the party 
headquarters read: "It is clear ... that not only the President but 
other members of the Singapore Branch thought that there was no 
harm in utilising the funds of the Association for their own 
private purposes and it is surprising that no report was ever made 
that these substantial sums of money were missing from the Asso­
ciation^ funds".^ When the party headquarters asked the Singapore 
Committee to make good on the loss of party funds, the latter,
instead of making amends, tried to re-elect itself and vindicate
2
itself of any guilt in the affair.
Faced with this blatant flaunting of party discipline, 
the Chief Executive Secretary, T.H. Tan, advised Cheng Lock to 
proceed with legal action, arguing that "... unless the Singapore 
branch is handled firmly, the whole future of the MCA is at stake 
.... A political association of our size if it is incapable of 
taking firm action within its own house cannot hope to achieve
1. Memorandum on the missing money in the Singapore Branch, 
unsigned, typescript, n.d. (c. January 1953), p.5.
2. Letter from T.H. Tan to Cheng Lock dated 13 April 1953, LYK 
Papers, SP3, Box 6.
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anything outside. So far, you have repeatedly attempted concilia­
tion, only to meet with open challenge to your authority".^ He 
suggested that the president appoint a protem committee and remove 
the present one even if it entailed calling in the police: ” ... I 
do not see how the Singapore Branch troubles can be eased over. I 
have a feeling that, in the end, we shall have no alternative but
to lay information before the Deputy Public Prosecutor and let the
2
whole crowd go to jail". Cheng Lock eventually succeeded in 
working out a compromise acceptable to both sides, and the incident 
did not develop into an embarrassing public scandal. The guilty 
parties agreed to pay up token sums of money and to remit $80,000 
from the Branch's coffers to the headquarters. The state chairman 
was allowed h face-saving gesture: he remained in office for 
another year before a new chairman was elected.
A wider dimension was added to the Singapore incident 
through the involvement of the Johore state chairman in the affair. 
His son was an office holder in the Singapore Committee and was 
believed to have been implicated in the scandal. The state chair­
man of Johore shielded his son's involvement when investigations 
were made, thus implicating himself. When headquarters wanted the
guilty parties to resign, the chairman of the Johore Branch retorted
3
that "he was not prepared to resign unless the MCA was liquidated".
1. Letter from T.H. Tan to Tan Cheng Lock dated 13 April 1953,
LYK Papers, Sp3, Box 6.
2. Letter from T.H. Tan to Tan Cheng Lock dated 24 March 1953,
LYK Papers, SP3, Box 6.
3. Memorandum on the missing money in the Singapore Branch, p.3.
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His reaction illustrates the confidence of a party strongman who 
believed he could make or break the party in the region under his 
control. The state chairman's grip over the party apparatus in 
Johore was so secure that despite this incident he remained as 
chairman from the inception of the state branch in 1949 till 1961.
The MCA received numerous complaints from party members 
about alleged abuse of power and corrupt practices by local party 
bosses. For example, a member of the Klang District Branch wanted 
headquarters to investigate a missing sum of party funds which he 
believed had been embezzled by the branch secretary and treasurer.*- 
In another instance, three members of the Seremban District Branch 
wrote to the party’s Chief Executive Secretary alleging that a 
senior office holder in the branch was "always making tea-money" 
getting stall licenses for individuals who needed them. They 
'Complained that .MCA office holders should discharge these 
services on behalf of the Chinese community without having to be 
bribed.^
In a third case, a member of the Mersing District Branch 
wrote to the Agent-General to draw his attention to "the corruptible 
ways /of/ the President of the MCA of Mersing...." He said that 
the branch chairman would not allow any other office holder or 
member to look at the branch's financial statements; this, he
1. Letter signed by a member of the MCA Klang Branch to Tan Cheng 
Lock dated 29 January 1953, MCA headquarters.
2. Letter signed by three members of the Seremban Branch to the 
Chief Executive Secretary dated 8 June 1955, MCA headquarters.
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thought, was because the branch chairman was syphoning off party 
funds for his private use. He also complained that this corrupt 
office holder never found time to attend to the needs of poorer 
members: ’’When poor people come to see the MCA president for help 
he is usually too busy or /is/ in Singapore. But when rich people 
come to see him he is not too busy and even his brothers will go 
all out to help."'*’ Such incidents indicate why the MCA developed 
a reputation of being a party dominated by self-seeking opportunists 
and corrupt towkays, and as it became apparent that party head­
quarters could not prevent local bosses from abusing their office, 
the MCA's reputation became severely damaged. It should also be 
pointed out, however, that some state chairmen worked selflessly 
for the benefit of the MCA and its constituents, and did not abuse 
the power concentrated in their hands. The behaviour of the Penang 
state chairman is a case in point. Party headquarters reported
that the state chairman was doing all he could to work for the good
2
of the party and that there was no abuse of power in the state.
It appears, therefore, that the degree of cooperation which party 
headquarters obtained from the various state branches depended 
almost entirely upon the personality and temperament of the indivi­
dual state strongman.
1. Letter signed by a member of the Mersing Branch to the Agent- 
General dated 22 May 1952, MCA headquarters.
2. "Report by Agent-General on a visit to Penang and Province 
Wellesley", p.4.
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4.3 Goals of the Reorganisation Campaign
The major impetus behind the reorganisation campaign in 
late 1951 was the national leadership^ decision to involve the 
MCA in the local election of Kuala Lumpur scheduled to take place 
in February 1952. In order to court Malay cooperation in the 
Kuala Lumpur election, the MCA leaders wanted to instil confidence 
in potential Malay allies that their party was not simply a social 
welfare organisation but an effective modern day political party 
capable of winning elections. Thus, they hoped to overcome such 
negative opinions as that of the top ranking UMNO leader, Dr.
Ismail bin Abdul Rahman, who averred that the MCA was largely a 
social welfare association whose members joined in the hope of 
benefitting from the party lottery.^"
While the immediate impetus for the reorganisation was 
the Kuala Lumpur election, the national leadership had also felt 
the need to place the MCA on a new footing due to growing concern 
generated by over-involvement in Emergency social welfare activities, 
and the lack of centralisation and direction in party policies and 
organisation. Tan Cheng Lock brought up the need to reorganise 
the party for the first time in June 1950) when he expressed concern 
that the MCA had failed to become the centralised political party 
that the national leadership wanted it to be. He was also worried 
that the MCA's raison d'etre revolved so much around the Emergency 
that at its termination the party would become moribund: "... the
1. Dr. Ismail told MCA leaders that this was his initial opinion 
of their party. Minutes of the Alliance Roundtable Meeting 
held on 21 February 1953.
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MCA is very far indeed from being a well-organised and disciplined 
body. It is in fact a rather loosely-knit association of persons 
scattered all over the country, most of whom may not even know what 
precisely are the basic aims and objects of the Association. It 
is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, and there is little 
doubt that if we go on as we do the MCA will pass out of existence
after the end of the Emergency11
The basic objective of the reorganisation program was to
centralise party machinery and improve coordination between party
headquarters and branches in order that the rank and file would be
better informed about the party's political objectives and be
2
mobilised for political action. Cheng Lock wanted the MCA to be 
a modern political party participating in elections, but at the 
same time he recognised that Chinese interests would have to be 
represented to the government authoritiesj which would be colonial 
or Malay-dominated. In this respect, he anticipated that the MCA 
would have to play a "fact-finding and advising" role representing
Chinese interests to the authorities in much the same way as a
western pressure group would operate. Cheng Lock likened the role 
of the reorganised MCA to that of "a Pressure Group on the American 
Model and not precisely a Political Party on the English
1. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Leong Yew Koh dated 24 June 1950, 
TCL Papers, TCL/2/131.
2. See pamphlets entitled "Memorandum on the Organisation of
the MCA", 28 October 1951, and "Progress Report on Re­
organisation, Centralisation of Funds, Headquarters Building, 
Labour Organisation and Investment" by Tan Cheng Lock, Paper 
No.1 of 1953, MCA headquarters.
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Model”.* Cheng Lock’s suggestion that the MCA’s principal function 
resembled a pressure group was an astute assessment of the fact 
that the party he helped to form could never govern Malaya directly, 
but had to work through its powerful Malay allies for the protection 
of Chinese political interests.
A further important consideration behind the reorganisa­
tion drive was the encouragement given by the High Commissioner,
Sir Henry Gurney, to MCA leaders to secure greater Chinese working 
class support through labour programs aimed at undercutting the 
MCP's influence with the Chinese proletariat. While the High 
Commissioner was happy with the MCA's performance in Emergency 
social welfare work, he was dissatisfied by the MCA's failure to 
provide effective political leadership, especially in counter­
insurgency programs directed at winning the allegiance of the
2
Chinese working class. On 20 September 1951 Gurney urged the MCA
national leadership to reorganise and strengthen the Association in
order that it would be considered by the Chinese community at large
3
to be an attractive political alternative to the MCP.
1. Memorandum entitled "The Organisation of the MCA as a
Political Pressure Group", by Tan Cheng Lock, mimeo., 19 April
1951, TCL Papers, SP13, Item 177 no.35.
2. Note from Gurney to Tan Cheng Lock, n.d., TCL Papers, SP13,
Item 158.
3. Speech by Henry Gurney, Proceedings of the Federal Legislative 
Council, 20 September 1951, p.300.
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4.4 The Demise of the Campaign
In early 1952 a reorganisation committee headed by Tan 
Cheng Lock was set up to implement the campaign. The committee 
drew up a blueprint aimed at democratising the party machinery to 
enable the rank and file to have a greater say in party matters
[
I through a system of widened responsible participation. The blue-
}
I
[ print also envisaged the establishment of a widespread network of
E
!
channels of communication linking the party to the Chinese community, 
especially the rural squatter population and the urban labour 
movement. However, not all of the proposed changes were fully 
instituted. Although a Central Party Office was set up to conduct 
political relations at the centre with the colonial administration 
and non-Chinese political bodies, there was no increased centrali­
sation of the party apparatus after the reorganisation campaign was 
terminated in mid-1953. The appointment of a Chief Executive 
Secretary and an Agent-General to be the watchdogs of the party 
headquarters over the state branches did see an improvement in the 
coordination of party activities, but there was no diminution in 
the autonomy of the state branches.
The inconsistency between avowed objectives and achieved 
results of the reorganisation campaign stemmed largely from the top 
leadership's own attitude towards the whole notion of reorganisation. 
It is apparent that the national leadership only paid lip service
1. Memorandum by Tan Cheng Lock entitled "Democratising the MCA", 
mimeo., 14 September 1952, LYK Papers, SP3, Box 8.
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to the proposals to democratise the party and ensure greater grass­
roots participation in the management of party affairs. An exami­
nation of the way leadership handled the "reorganisation" of 
Chinese labour demonstrates all too clearly that it did not intend 
to transform the Association into an organisation which would give 
prominence to the interests of the Chinese working class.
In early 1953, the party launched its "unionisation of
Chinese labour" campaign and issued a 15-point Labour Manifesto.'*’
The Manifesto made a general statement that the MCA would ensure
that Chinese labour receive better working and living conditions
and fair wages. A special labour organiser, B.H. Tan, was
appointed to take charge of the Labour Sub-Committee. Tan was
charged with two duties: to encourage Chinese workers to join the
existing trade union of their craft, and to form trade unions
2
among Chinese workers in areas where none existed. Given the fact 
that organised labour in the country was dominated either by Indian 
trade unionists or pro-Communist labour organisers, B.H. Tan was 
directed to concentrate his efforts among the Chinese New Village 
population.
1. "The MCA Labour Manifesto", mimeo., c.February 1953, LYK Papers, 
SP3, Box 6. See also "A Note on the Labour Sub-Committee of 
the Malayan Chinese Association", mimeo., c. early 1953, TCL 
Papers, SP13, Item 127.
2. B.H. Tan’s duties were described in a progress report of the 
MCA’s activities prepared by the Chief Executive Secretary 
dated 7 September 1953, mimeo., p.4.
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The scheme was never properly initiated. It appears that
the Labour Sub-Committee’s most significant achievement was the
unionisation of some 4,000 workers in B.H. Tan's own state of
Negri Sembilan.^ A year after his appointment, Tan fell out
completely with the MCA leadership, accusing the party of being
insincere and hypocritical in its unionisation drive. He said that
the MCA was "afraid that the scheme might turn out to be a hideous
2
Frankenstein ... which would devour them in the end". The party
defended itself by saying that its efforts to enter the labour
arena were obstructed by the Indian-dominated Malayan Trade Union
Congress, a justification too transparently weak to warrant serious 
3
consideration. The party leadership finally made a complete 
volte-face on the subject. On 6 May 1954 it issued a press release 
stating that the party had never had a policy of forming Chinese 
labour unions. At the same time, it tried to save face by 
insisting that it was nonetheless concerned with the welfare of 
the Chinese working class. All this heightened the reputation of 
the party as a towkay party and alienated the Chinese proletariat.
1. Progress report of the MCA's activities prepared by the Chief 
Executive Secretary dated 7 September 1953, mimeo., p.5.
2. Quoted from a party press release issued by Leong Yew Koh, 
Secretary-General of the MCA, dated 6 May 1954.
3. Letter from C.H. Yin, a party labour organiser, to Leong Yew 
Koh dated 25 May 1953. Yin said that the Malayan Trade Union 
Congress Central Committee opposed the MCA's entry into the 
labour movement as the move was construed as an attempt by the 
MCA to dominate the economy of Malaya through the control of 
labour. LYK Papers, SP3, No.66-71 (single bundle).
A significant point which emerges from the reorganisation 
campaign was the curious fact that the very leaders who advocated 
the necessity of regarding the MCA as a political party behaved in 
a completely contradictory manner on the occasions when it suited 
their interests to treat the MCA essentially as a huay kuan. For 
example, when in October 1952 the government decided to ban the 
party sweepstake in Singapore on the grounds that political parties 
were prohibited from gaining income from lotteries, Cheng Lock 
suggested that the Singapore Branch of the Association be retained 
as a purely social welfare party and not be reorganised. Instead, 
he would form a separate organisation to be called the "MCA 
National Election Party" which would carry out political goals.^
The scheme was not accepted by the government of Singapore, and 
the incident only made party members and outside observers more 
confused about the purposes of the MCA.
A second incident reveals an even more alarming departure 
from the avowed principles of the reorganisation. The party head­
quarters was looking for a means of activating the Youth Section, 
which had existed only on paper because the party lacked financial 
resources and physical facilities for looking after it. In October 
1952 the CWC entertained the idea of affiliating its Youth wing to
a wealthy and famous Chinese association in Kuala Lumpur, the Chen 
2
Woo Association. The party proposal was that the Chen Woo be
1. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to M.J, IlogaiOjAttorney-General of 
Singapore, dated 5 October 1952. TCL Papers, TCL SP13,
Item 89-166 (single bundle).
2. The Chen Woo Association, housed in a large building in the 
heart of Kuala Lumpur, is the city's major cultural, dramatic . 
and recreational huay kuan.
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given charge of the MCA Youth and Sports Section, which would 
accordingly be renamed the ”MCA-Chen Woo Department”. The merger 
did not materialise, but the incident itself illustrates the 
willingness of the party leadership to let a Chinese association 
have control over an integral part of its organisation for reasons 
of financial expediency.
The inconsistency of behaviour found among the leaders 
who called for reorganisation makes sense if one remembers that 
these leaders were also the most important Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce and huay kuan leaders in Malaya. While they wanted to 
modernise the Association by fashioning it along the lines of a 
western political party, they themselves were nonetheless too 
rooted in the Laukeh political culture to pursue a consistent 
course of reorganisation. Even the most cosmopolitan leaders such 
as Cheng Lock occasionally acted more like a parochial association 
leader. For example, on one occasion he engaged a stratagem commonly 
used by Chamber of Commerce and huay kuan strongmen to rig MCA branch 
elections. This involved the enrolment and payment of members of 
the huay kuans under their leadership to attend the party election 
to vote them into office. In mid 1953, Cheng Lock decided to 
stand for the post of chairman of the Singapore Working Committee, 
which would replace incumbent office bearers who were stepping
down as a result of the lottery fund scandal discussed earlier. In
this connection, he consented to the payment and recruitment of 1,500
members from the Chiang Chew Kong Kuay (a territorial huay kuan of
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his dialect group) in Singapore to attend the forthcoming branch 
meeting and vote him into office, an event which duly took place.*
Ironically, the factor which finally dispelled the image 
of the party as a social welfare organisation came not as the 
result of the party's reorganisation program but from an action 
taken by the government. This was the banning of the party sweep­
stake in June 1953, a ban imposed as a result of the MCA's parti­
cipation in the February 1952 local elections held in Kuala Lumpur 
in a coalition arrangement with the UMNO. The High Commissioner, 
General Templer, in deciding to ban the lottery explained that its
proceeds gave the Association an unfair financial advantage over
2
other political parties contesting the elections. Another 
consideration which led Templer to instruct the MCA to terminate I 
its lottery was the fact that the bulk of the most pressing 
Emergency welfare and squatter resettlement work had been accom­
plished by mid 1953 and thus the MCA's financial contribution was 
no longer as vital to the government anti-insurgency campaign as it 
had been between 1949 and 1952. Deprived of its most lucrative 
source of party income, the MCA terminated its Emergency social 
welfare projects by the end of 1953. As a result of this withdrawal 
from welfare work, the image of the party as a social welfare body 
began slowly to erode.
1. See letter from C.H. Yin to Tan Cheng Lock dated 19 June 1953, 
LYK Papers, SP3, no.66-71 (single bundle).
2. Letter from the Financial Secretary of the Federation of Malaya 
to Tan Cheng Lock dated 5 June 1953, MCA headquarters.
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In sum, the reorganisation program developed and 
strengthened the political facet of the MCA and helped prepare it 
for the Kuala Lumpur election of 1952, but did not erase its CCC- 
huay kuan orientation, which constituted the organisational and 
ideological bedrock of the party in the pre-independence period.
By the end of 1953, although the MCA was no longer essentially a 
social welfare organisation, the reorganisation campaign had not 
transformed it completely into a mass-based political party. It 
remained a hybrid organisation of ideological and organisational 
features abstracted from western and Laukeh modes of socio-political 
organisation. Right up to independence in 1957, the MCA manifested 
its three facets - as a modem day political party through parti­
cipation in electoral politics and the independence movement, as a 
CCC-huay kuan which engaged in local community welfare work, and 




THE MCA AND THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNAL POLITICS
Between 1952 and mid 1957 the colonial administration
introduced measures to devolve power from the British Crown to an
independent indigenous government in Malaya.^ The process of
decolonisation raised the issue of how an independent government in
Kuala Lumpur would deal with the problems of political integration
and national unification in a country with an extreme degree of
2
cultural and structural pluralism. While the British government 
planned to introduce a political system based on the Westminister 
model of parliamentary democracy in independent Malaya, its major
1. British moves towards decolonisation were a major component in 
its overall strategy to defeat communism in Malaya. By intro­
ducing local government and promising self-rule, the Templer 
Administration was removing a key plank in the MCP platform, 
i.e. its call for Malayan independence.
2. The concept of pluralism used here is based on J.S. Fumivall’s 
definition, which states that a plural society comprises two or 
more entities living together but separated from each other by 
race, language, culture, religion and place of origin. Each 
entity possesses its own parallel set of values and institutions 
and pursues its life interests and goals more or less indepen­
dently of one another. Fumivall, J.S., Netherlands India, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1939. Studies which deal 
with the theoretical aspect and practical impact of pluralism
in Peninsular Malaysia include the following: Nagata, J. (ed.),
Pluralism in Malaysia: Myth and Reality, Contributions to Asian 
Studies, No. 7, Leiden, 1975; Lent, John A. (ed.), Cultural 
Pluralism in Malaysia: Polity, Military, Mass Media Education, 
Religion and Social Class, The Center for Southeast Asian 
Studies, North Illinois University, 1977; Rabushka, A., Race 
and Politics in Urban Malaya, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 
1973.
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goal was to foster a system based on cooperation among English- 
educated elites of the three major races, a political system which 
some writers have referred to as consociational democracy.*
The British government intended to hand over power to the
westernised elite of Malaya,who were to be entrusted with the
responsibility of working out a modus vivendi to contain the centri-
2
fugal tendencies inherent in the plural nature of Malayan society. 
The socialisation of English-educated leaders in western educational 
and political institutions gave them a common point of reference 
for resolving political differences and problems, especially those 
arising from racial issues, within a democratic framework. Sharing 
a common westernised outlook, these leaders, it was believed, might 
make political compromises to overcome the tendency toward 
-cultural: . fragmentation more readily than leaders from purely
Malay, Chinese and Indian backgrounds, who tended to display stronger 
primordial loyalties to their ethnic origins.
To obtain pluralistic consensus from the different ethnic 
groups, the westernised multi-racial leadership had two options -
1. The concept of consociational democracy was developed by Arend 
Lijphart in his case study of the Netherlands, The Politics of 
Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968, and in the 
following works: "Consociational Democracy", World Politics, 21, 
no.2, January 1969, pp.207-25; Democracy in Plui^l Societies, 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1977. R.K. Milne 
and D. Mauzy apply the concept to the Alliance and National 
Front coalition system of government in Malaysia in Politics 
and Government in Malaysia, Times Book International (revised
edition), Singapore, 1980, pp.352-56.
2. Interview, Malcolm MacDonald, 24 May 1977.
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one was to foster an integrated multi-racial political system and 
the other was to participate in an alliance of communally-based 
political parties. The British government's point of view was to 
turn over power to whichever arrangement emerged as the more viable.
In the early 1950s both altenatives existed, in the form of the 
multi-racial Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) and the communally- 
based UMNO-MCA Alliance. Most British officials originally appeared 
to favour the IMP as the preferred route to pluralistic consensus.
The IMP, however, fared disastrously in the local and state 
elections held between 1952 and 1955, and a sober assessment of poli­
tical reality made the colonial administration lose its initial 
optimism for the IMP as the vehicle for the transfer of political 
power to an independent Malaya. Attention was then focused on the 
UMNO-MCA Alliance, which emerged as the arrangement preferred by the 
Malay and Chinese elites and their respective constituencies to 
regulate inter-communal political relations in Malaya.
5.1 The Communities Liaison Committee
5.1.1 The Organisational Framework
To promote the concept of multi-racial westernised elite 
cooperation, the colonial government established the Communities 
Liaison Committee (CLC) in early 1949. The CLC was both the mani­
festation of the British concept of consociational democracy and 
the forerunner of successive multi-racial political coalitions such 
as the Alliance and the present-day National Front (Barisan Nasional). 
The viability of this institution stemmed basically from the affinity 
of class interests and social backgrounds of the UMNO and MCA leaders
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first brought together in. the CLC by the colonial authorities.
Apart from having similar westernised social backgrounds, UMNO and 
MCA national leaders had a common elitist ethos. Top ranking UMNO 
leaders came mainly from the landed Malay aristocracy and the 
higher reaches of the bureaucracy; their MCA counterparts came 
from wealthy towkay circles; the two groups thus shared a conser­
vative political and economic philosophy.
The architect of the CLC was Malcolm MacDonald, the 
Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia. Concerned at the atmos­
phere of racial tension generated by the heated argument between 
Malays and non-Malays over the Malayan Union and Federation proposals, 
and feeling the need to bring the conservative Malay, Chinese and 
Indian leadership together to confront the MCP insurrection, Mac­
Donald persuaded Datuk Onn and Tan Cheng Lock, together with their 
close colleagues, to work out their political differences behind 
closed doors with a view to minimising inter-ethnic friction.^-
Although the life span of the CLC was short - it began 
early in 1949 and was defunct by late 1951 - and although it was an 
organisation which attracted little public notice, its impact on 
the development of Malayan politics was far-reaching. The racial 
composition of the CLC and its.style of conducting business and agenda 
of subject matter set the trend for the subsequent regulation of 
communal coalition politics, and prepared the ground for the UMNO-MCA
1. MacDonald stated that he was successful in forming the CLC 
only because Onn agreed to its formation. Interview, Malcolm 
MacDonald, 24 May 1977.
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partnership in the Alliance. The Alliance inherited from the CLC 
an elitist style of conducting business and an agenda centring upon 
the resolution of racially salient issues, in particular citizen­
ship for non-Malays and special rights for Malays.
The CLC comprised six Malays and six Chinese, the majority
of whom came from the UMNO and MCA, and one representative each from
the Indian, Eurasian, Ceylonese (f>ri Lankan) and European communi- 
2
ties. The UMNO and MCA delegates dominated the proceedings of the
CLC, and negotiations in the committee were conducted mainly by these
two groups. Business was conducted in a highly elitist manner - all
meetings were held in secrecy, free from public scrutiny and without
reference to UMNO or MCA second echelon leadership and membership
opinion. The CLC members concurred that they would be unable to
reach consensus on racially sensitive issues if they had to take
into consideration grass-roots sentiments, which were often irrecon-
3
ciliable on matters pertaining to race. Upon reaching consensus,
1. Karl Von Vorys makes a similar observation when he states that 
the style and procedure of bargaining set by the CLC "rather 
persuasively suggested the method through which a definite 
settlement of the terms of intercommunal relations in-the future 
could be reached". Von Vorys K., Democracy Without Consensus: 
Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia, Princeton 
University, Princeton, 1975, p.104.
2. Although Onn was the leading figure in the CLC, Datuk E.E.C. 
Thuraisingham, president of the Ceylon Federation, was its 
chairman. MCA leaders who served on the CLC at one time or 
another, apart from Tan Cheng Lock, included: Yong Shook Lin, 
Khoo Teik Ee, Leong Yew Koh, Chin Swee Onn, Foo Yin Fong, Y.C. 
Kang, Toh Eng Hoe, Lee Kong Chiang, Dr. Ong Huck Chye and Lim 
Koon Teck.
3. Interview, Malcolm MacDonald, 24 May 1977.
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CLC decisions were turned over to the Federal Legislative Council 
to be acted upon, and the public only then got to know of them 
through press statements. The CLC*s insistence that its members 
observe the rule of secrecy concerning matters under discussion is 
illustrated by the occasion when it rebuked Cheng Lock for making a 
highly indiscreet public statement on the citizenship provisions of 
the Federation of Malaya Agreement then under discussion.1
5.1.2 Discussion of Citizenship and Special Rights
The CLC opened the dialogue on citizenship for non-Malays 
and special rights for Malays which dominated UMNO-MCA inter-party 
talks until final consensus was reached in the independence consti­
tution discussed in Chapter 7. The major preoccuption of the MCA 
delegates in the Committee was to overturn the stringent citizenship 
provisions of the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement; the UMNO 
delegates, on the other hand, wanted to obtain unequivocal non-Malay 
support for Malay special rights and have the government implement 
a special rights policy.
The Federation of Malaya Agreement citizenship clauses 
disqualified the overwhelming majority of Chinese and other non-
1. Defending his action, Cheng Lock stated: "Though I have made it 
a rule, in order not to mar the harmony at meetings of the 
Committee, to avoid any reference to controversial or delicate 
questions, I had no idea that a member of the Committee should 
also bind himself not to speak on such subjects by way of 
ventilating genuine fears or grievances outside the meetings of 
the Committee or make statements of fact in public which he 
considers true and accurate without doing so in any offensive or 
immoderate manner." Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to E.E.C. 
Thuraisingham dated 6 May 1949, LYK Papers, SP3, Box 11.
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Malays from becoming citizens. According to the MCA leadership, 
out of the 3,100,000 persons (59% of the total population) who had 
become Federal citizens by early 1951 through the process of auto- 
• matic operation of law and through application and naturalisation, 
the racial breakdown was as follows: 78% Malays (2,450,000 persons),
12% Chinese (380,000 persons), 7% Indian, Pakistani and Ceylonese 
(Sri Lankans, 210,000 persons) and 2% others (60,000 persons). Of 
the remaining 41% who were ineligible for citizenship, the large 
majority were Chinese.*
The MCA national leadership was determined to widen the 
Chinese citizenship base, both from a desire to establish the MCA 
as a Malayan-centred political party as well as the need to widen 
the party's political clientele. It was clear to the MCA leadership 
that so long as large numbers of Chinese remained citizenless and 
disenfranchised, the MCA could never be an effective force in 
Malayan politics. This viewpoint was understood and shared by the 
Laukeh second echelon leadership, who fully supported the top 
leadership in seeking a liberalisation of the 1948 citizenship 
clauses.
The MCA leaders in the CLC argued their citizenship case 
both on grounds of political ideals and pragmatic security concerns, 
as is reflected in a memorandum submitted by the party to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, James Griffiths, and the
1. The statistics were presented by Tan Cheng Lock in his address 
to the MCA Annual Central General Committee Meeting held on 
21 April 1951, TCL Papers, SP13, Ucapan TCL, Item 35.
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Secretary of State for War, John Strachey, in May 1950.*
To obstruct the natural legitimate aspirations 
of the non-Malays to become Malayan citizens 
and to cast doubt on their loyalty and bona fide 
intention to identify with this country would 
alienate them and militate against the success 
of the task of constructing Malayan nationhood 
and the solidarity of the anti-Communist united 
front.
The only effective way of weaning the China-born 
Chinese from being concerned with Chinese national 
politics is to make a generous offer to them, as 
for instance, under the original Malayan Union 
Schemes, of Malayan Citizenship, which alone can 
reconcile them to their loss of interest or 
participation in the Kuo Min Tang.
We cannot have it both ways, i.e., prevent the 
Chinese from embracing the Kuo Min Tang or any 
other Chinese National political party or object 
thereto and at the same time place obstacles to 
their becoming Malayan citizens.
The security argument made the case that the grant of citizenship 
would cause the Chinese population to identify itself with Malaya 
and the authorities* fight against the MCP. At the same time, it 
was argued th&t if all Chinese were treated as Malayan citizens, 
they would have less incentive to engage in unMalayan political 
activities through participation in the Kuomintang and other China- 
centred organisations. The argument based on political ideals 
stressed the need to bind the loyalty of Laukeh Chinese to their 
adopted home, and the need to generate a common spirit of Malayan 
identity through the grant of citizenship for all the domiciled 
races.
1. Tan Cheng Lock, "Confidential Memorandum on Malaya submitted to 
the Right Honourable James Griffiths, Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and the Right Honourable John Strachey, Secretary 
of State for War", mimeo., 19 May 1950, TCL Papers, SP13,
Item 169.
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The persuasiveness of the security argument helped to 
win the case the case for the MCA. Soon after the outbreak of the 
insurgency, and in view of the deteriorating security situation, 
the Gurney Administration embarked upon a political campaign to win 
the "hearts and minds" of the Chinese population, realising that the 
war could not be won through military means alone. The citizenship 
question and lack of land tenure for the squatter population were 
identified as the major stumbling blocks which prevented the autho­
rities from gaining the active support of the Chinese population. The 
CLC was thus setup with the main objective of removing Malay opposi­
tion on the question of citizenship; and the authorities of the 
individual states were pressurised into giving more secure land 
tenure terms for Chinese squatters in New Villages. Gurney 
instructed the British Advisers and Resident Commissioners to get 
the Malay District Officers and other government officials to 
persuade the Malay population to accept a liberalisation in the 
citizenship clauses: "They /the Malays^/ do not appreciate the true 
nature of the Communist threat to Malaya, which can never be 
successfully resisted by holding at arm's length nearly half the 
population of the Federation instead of enlisting the co-operation 
and help which most of them are anxious to give".*
Gurney left the initiative with Malcolm MacDonald to use 
the CLC as the vehicle to neutralise Malay opposition on the issue 
of citizenship for non-Malays. MacDonald played on Malay fears 
that the MCP could seize power unless the government acted upon the
1. Letter from Gurney to all British Advisers and Resident 
Commissioners dated 3 June 1950, C0537/6018(39).
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issue, explaining that Chinese supported the Communists because the 
MCP, unlike the government, promised citizenship and equal political 
rights for all races if they came to power. He said that the govern­
ment should pre-empt this appeal by offering the same deal to non- 
Malays;^ and, in the face of the Communist threat, the UMNO leader­
ship felt it had little choice but to give in to MacDonald's urgings 
and to help the MCA increase its popular standing within the Chinese 
community. It therefore consented to meet the MCA's demand for a 
liberalisation of the citizenship provisions.
It was, however, the MCA leadership's agreement to the
implementation of a Malay special rights policy that finally removed
UMNO opposition to the easing 6f citizenship conditions for non-
Malays. Onn told the CLC that the UMNO would agree to political
changes if Malaya got economic privileges in return. Central to
Onn's agreement to liberalise the citizenship provisions was the
establishment of the Rural and Industrial Development Authority
2
(RIDA) in mid 1950 with Onn as its Chairman.
The principle of special rights treatment for the Malay
community had been written into the Federation of Malaya Agreement 
3
(Clause 19d). The Malay leaders in the CLC reminded the non-Malay
1. Notes of Discussion of the CLC held on 30 December 1949.
2. See, letter from Onn to Gurney dated 16 May 1950 and letter 
from Gurney to Onn dated 18 May 1950, C0537/6018(24).
3. For a description of the term "special rights" and its applica­
tion in Malaysia up to the present, see, Means, G.P., "'Special 
Rights' as a Strategy for Development: The Case of Malaysia", 
Comparative Politics, Vol.5, no.l, October 1972, pp.29-61.
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representatives that the Malay community had an intrinsic and 
unquestionable claim to special rights treatment for the following 
reasons: (a) The Malay race should be accorded the status of primus 
interpares in relation to other races in Malaya because Malays (and 
the term included recent immigrants from the Indonesian archipelago) 
were the true indigenous people of Malaya.* (b) The colonial 
government recognised that the fount of authority and sovereignty 
in Malaya stemmed from the Malay monarchical institutions in the 
nine Malay states. The British administration in Malaya derived its 
legitimacy and authority from its treaty arrangements with the Malay 
sultans, and it had regarded Malaya as a Malay country from the 
inception of colonial rule in the country. (c) The Malay community, 
however, had to live with the fact that the other half of the popu­
lation which migrated to Malaya with the advent of British rule was 
not going to return to its countries of origin, China and India. As 
a by-product of colonial rule in Malaya, the immigrant races had 
come to enjoy the lion's share of Malaya1s economic wealth. It was 
therefore argued that if the immigrant races were to be accorded 
political rights in Malaya, the Malays should be accorded special
2 -
rights to give them a just share in the wealth of their motherland.
1. Technically speaking, the aborigines of Malaya are the earliest 
inhabitants in the land. However, their political, economic 
and social isolation from the mainstream historical development 
of Malaya - a fact dictated by their isolated existence in the 
interior highlands and the insignificant size of their population 
in relation to the total population of Malaya - has resulted in
a total lack of their impact on Malayan political life.
2. Notes of Discussion of the CLC held on 13 and 14 August 1949.
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The Malay representatives in the CLC outlined how the 
policy of special rights should be implemented and recommended 
three strategies to improve the economic position of their community. 
First, the government should subsidise Malay business ventures and 
set up trade schools to train Malay manpower to participate in the 
modem economic sector of the country. Second, a system of quotas 
should be introduced in certain industries where Malay capital and 
enterprise would be put to good use. The transport industry in 
rural areas having a predominantly Malay population was singled out 
as a sector where Malay special rights should be implemented; 
quotas to operate bus businesses should be introduced, and owner­
ship of shares be transferred to Malay hands so that bus companies
serving predominantly Malay areas would have at least 51% Malay 
2
share capital. Third, Malays should receive preferential treatment 
in the allocation of educational and employment opportunities; 
scholarships and jobs should be reserved for Malay applicants on a 
quota basis. Fourth, non-Malay businessmen and employers should 
voluntarily increase the proportion of Malay participation in all 
sectors of the countryrs economy, in particular the tin-mining, 
rubber and coconut processing, rice-milling, fishing, textile, road 
transport and retail trade sectors. A striking feature of these 
recommendations was the concern to create a Malay capitalist class.
1. See, Notes of Discussion of the CLC held on 18 and 19 February; 
14 and 15 March; 19 and 20 April; 13 and 14 August; 29, 30 
and 31 December 1949; and 21 February 1950.
2. Notes of Discussion of the CLC held on 9 and 10 February 1949.
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The privileges were aimed at improving the position of Malays who 
were in or wished to enter the bourgeoisie rather than be peasants 
and workers. The UMNO representatives in the CLC were mainly 
"feudal” leaders who saw the creation of a Malay bourgeois class 
as a solution to Malay economic backwardness, possibly because their 
westem-style upbringing had persuaded them that such a strategy was 
necessary for the Malays to achieve prosperity.'*’
The UMNO leaders* approach in the CLC dialogue on special 
rights was unaggressive and low-key. The emphasised repeatedly that 
they were seeking the voluntary cooperation of Chinese business 
interests to raise the economic performance of the Malays. They 
also urged the MCA leaders to ensure that Chinese business interests 
refrained from obstructing the establishment and development of 
fledgling Malay enterprises. The MCA leaders' response was ambiva­
lent: while they appeared sympathetic, they were in actual fact 
both unable and unwilling to comply with the UMNO's requests, 
which went against the interests of the Chinese business community 
that was their constituency. Although these westernised MCA leaders 
might feel it necessary to support pro-Malay economic measures and 
might not themselves be affected by such policies, they were unable 
to obtain the cooperation of the second rung Laukeh leadership to 
support Malay special rights policies which threatened Chinese 
business interests. For example, they were unable to prevent a 
combine of Chinese bus companies from blocking the successful
1. A major preoccupation of the New Economic Policy implemented 
since 1969 has been the creation of a Malay capitalist class, 
an objective which has been largely fulfilled.
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establishment of an UMNO-backed bus company.
As early as 1932 when he was a member of the Straits
Settlements Legislative Council, Tan Cheng Lock made the following
2
statement on the problem of special treatment for Malays:
... we are very sympathetic with the Malays and 
consider it the duty of the Government to assist 
them where they are badly handicapped in their 
competition with the other races. Let Government 
help them in every way so long as the interests 
of the non-Malays are not seriously and prejudi­
cially affected thereby and when and where 
necessary similar assistance and treatment will 
be extended to the other races.
Seventeen years later, speaking on the same subject in the CLC,
Cheng Lock raised the following questions: "I do not say that the
special position should not be upheld, but in what direction? Is
there going to be inequality as between the citizens themselves or
3
are they to be on equal footing?” Cheng Lock's query epitomised 
the divided mind of the MCA on the subject of special rights: while 
preferential treatment for Malays appeared a necessary thing, its 
implementation, or more precisely, the nature and scope of its 
implementation raised the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
reconciling non-Malays to the creation of two classes of citizenship 
in Malaya. Special rights by its very nature abnegated the principle 
of equal citizenship and equal opportunities sought by the MCA and
1. Notes of Discussion of the CLC held on 29 December 1949.
2. Tan Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems..., p.75.
3. Notes of Discussion of the CLC held on 13 August 1949.
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the non-Malay community at large. At the same time, by stressing 
equality of citizenship and the need to respect free enterprise and 
private property, Cheng Lock held on to a political card useful 
in minimising the effect of Malay demands on the Chinese
community.
The obstruction of Malay economic interests by Chinese 
combines and the inaction of the MCA leadership evoked a strong 
warning from Malcolm MacDonald. He stressed that unless the Chinese 
co-operated voluntarily in setting up Sino-Malay business ventures 
and increasing Malay participation in all sectors of the economy, 
the government could well be forced to legislate on behalf of Malay 
economic interests. He pointed out that the prevalent laissez-faire 
policy did not allow Malays to compete effectively with Chinese 
business interests, and the government might have no choice but to 
curb the free interplay of economic forces and ensure more effective 
Malay participation in economic life. MacDonald warned the MCA 
leaders:*
... one or two other communities, by their activities 
here, have put themselves in a much stronger position 
than the Malays are in, and if that position were 
a 1 lowed to develop without any kind of qualification 
or curb, the Malays would perhaps come to a situation 
in their own country where they would be so poor 
that they could not stand up themselves. Therefore 
it follows from the fact that the position of the 
Malays must be safeguarded in Malaya, that all sorts 
of steps should be taken, and that the High Commi­
ssioner is charged with the responsibility of seeing 
that they are taken, to safeguard the Malays, so 
economically they have a proper share in the wealth 
of Malaya.
1. Notes of Discussion of the CLC held on 13 August 1949.
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MacDonald's words are significant in that they presaged 
the basic economic policies which the Alliance Government subse­
quently introduced in Malaysia, especially the New Economic Policy 
implemented after 1969.
Apart from leading to the establishment of RIDA, the CLC 
dialogue on special rights ended inconclusively. However, it marked 
the first phase of a series of negotiations between the UMNO and the 
MCA which eventually culminated in the agreed common stand which was 
written into the independence constitution.
While MCA assurances to the UMNO on special rights, how­
ever guarded, appeared instrumental in gaining UMNO agreement to the 
liberalisation of citizenship for non-Malays, it should also be 
noted that Cheng Lock himself played a crucial role in gaining the 
friendship, confidence and trust of Datuk Onn, the UMNO president 
who was responsible for getting the UMNO General Assembly to approve 
the citizenship amendments. Before being brought together in the 
CLC, the UMNO and MCA presidents had not enjoyed an amicable 
relationship, as they had occupied opposing positions during the 
Malayan Union-Malayan Federation controversy, Datuk Onn leading the 
UMNO-orchestrated anti-Malayan Union movement and Cheng Lock heading 
the AMCJA-PUTERA. However, the experience of working together in the 
CLC built up a bond of trust between the two men, an outcome which 
MacDonald had planned and hoped for.* The following argument used
1. A British intelligence report suggested that Onn had softened 
his constitutional position as a result of the moderating 
influence exerted by Tan Cheng Lock and E.E.C. Thuraisingham 
in the CLC. Malayan Political Report for September 1949, 
C0537/4790(79).
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by Cheng Lock to further the Chinese case for more liberal citizen­
ship provisions is a good illustration of the manner in which he 
succeeded in winning the confidence and goodwill of the Malay 
members in the Committee, especially that of Datuk Onn:*
i
| ... if the Chinese are sincere and want to be
loyal and give their allegiance to this country,
| and to be regarded by the Malays as their true
| brothers and sisters, the Chinese should prove
I their sincerity by being willing to be also the
I subjects, in the same way as the Malays are, of
| the Malay Sultan of the State in which they are
| b o m  or in which they reside and want to settle
down. Only when the Chinese acknowledge the 
same sovereign as the Malays do, can they demons­
trate their will to be the equals and brethren 
of the Malays.
Cheng Lockrs words struck the right psychological chord in 
the political and emotional attachment of the UMNO’s leadership to 
the sovereignty of the Malay monarchical institution. In fact, the 
Malay response to Cheng Lock's speech was so favourable that the 
Committee resolved unanimously: "that the jus soli should be intro­
duced forthwith in each of the Malay States, so that all persons of 
Asiatic or Eurasian parentage who are b o m  in that State shall be­
come natural-bom subjects of the Rulers of that State, thereby
j
entitling them automatically to become at the same time Federal
! 2 
Citizens under the terms of the present Federal Constitution...."
Nonetheless, when the Federation of Malaya Agreement was 
amended in 1952 to liberalise the citizenship clauses, the principle
1, Quoted from Letter by Tan Cheng Lock to Yong Shook Lin dated 
19 January 1950, TCL Papers, SP13, Item 167.
2. Ibid.
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of jus soli was not incorporated into the amendments. This reflected
a shift in the power relationships within the UMNO as well as a
change in British views. Datuk Onn made the promise on jus soli to
the MCA in early'1950, but in August 1951, shortly before the
amendments came up before the Federal Legislative Council) he was
replaced by Tunku Abdul Rahman as UMNO president. Tunku Abdul
Rahman was unwilling to give in bn the point partly because he had
not participated in the CLC and did not feel bound by its decision,
but more important because the decision was unacceptable to the
UMNO second rung leadership and rank and file. Being newly-elected
to his office, the Tunku was reluctant to support the unpopular 
1
measure.
The colonial government's withdrawal of complete support 
for the idea of jus soli stemmed from its concern that the sudden 
granting of citizenship to large numbers of non-Malays, potentially 
more than 50% of the voting population, would be both destabilising 
and politically unacceptable to the Malays. MacDonald explained to 
the Colonial Secretary: "Actually, the High Commissioner and I 
think that these proposals are better than the Communities Liaison 
Committee's proposals, for we too felt concerned when we realised 
fully the very large number of non-Malays who would be admitted to 
citizenship under the Committee's proposals." He added that Malay 
agreement to an amendment of the 1948 citizenship clauses "depended 
on the numbers of non-Malays qualifying for citizenship being not
1. Interview, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 2 August 1976.
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too great in relation to the number of Malays who (would) qualify”.^
However, although the amendments did not include,jus soli,
they eased considerably the citizenship conditions and made possible
a significant increase in the number of Chinese and other non-Malay
citizens in Malaya. The percentage of Chinese who were citizens
2
increased from about 24% in 1950 to 50% by June 1953.
Other issues discussed by the CLC included the question 
of the introduction of local elections and self-government, the
6V
cultural position of Malays vis-a-vis the other races, and a 
national educational policy. Since citizenship and special rights 
occupied the centre stage, dialogue on these issues was mainly 
perfunctory and did not result in any major decisions or policies.
The Committee did not draw up a detailed timetable for the intro­
duction of elections and self-government, but merely recommended 
that elections be held as soon as the security situation improved. 
Guided by MacDonald, the CLC recommended that elections be held on 
a progressive basis, starting from the town and municipal councils 
to the state councils and finally to the Federal Legislative Council; 
it also advised that the franchise should be based on possession
1. Letter from MacDonald to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies dated 5 April 1950, C0537/6018(9).
2. Ratnam, pp.84, 92.
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of Malayan citizenship.
On the question of a common education policy, the CLC
members concurred that English and Malay should be taught as
compulsory subjects in every government and government-aided
2
primary school in the country. The Committee, however, was dead­
locked in its cultural discussions. The Malay members wanted to 
see Malay culture form the basis of the new Malayan culture, and 
the Malay language become the new Malayan national language. The 
MCA members rejected this position, arguing that it was unacceptable
to assume that non-Malays had to acknowledge the supremacy of Malay
3
culture and language over their own in an independent Malaya.
Neither party, however, pushed the matter at this point because of 
the overriding concern to reach consensus on citizenship and 
special rights.
5.2 The Experiment with Integrationist Politics
For a short period, from the middle of 1950 to the middle 
of 1952, it appeared that the coming together of the UMNO and MCA 
leadership in the CLC might result in the de-institutionalisation 
of communally-based politics in Malaya. During that period, Datuk 
Onn and Tan Cheng Lock led a campaign to decommunalise the structure 
of the UMNO and MCA and to make the newly-created multi-racial
1. Communities Liaison Committee Issues Statement of Policy (Press 
Release), dated 18 September 1949.
2. Ibid.
3. Notes of Discussion of the CLC held on 8 September 1949.
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Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) the leading political party in 
the country.
The move toward multi-racial politics was spearheaded by 
Onn and Cheng Lock and encouraged by high-ranking British officials, 
particularly Gurney and MacDonald. In 1949 Onn had first entertained the 
idea of forming a multi-racial party, the United Malaya National 
Party, to embrace the different racial groups. According to Cheng 
Lock, who urged Onn to establish such a party, Onn had consulted 
both Gurney and MacDonald and had received their support and 
encouragement on the project.^
Onn's motives for initiating a multi-racial party while he
was still the undisputed leader in UMNO, the strongest political
force in the country, remain unclear. R.K. Vasil has suggested that
Onn acted out of visionary ideals in wanting to turn Malaya into a
politically integrated multi-racial state, the strident chauvinism
displayed by Onn between 1946 and 1948 having been dictated by the
sheer need to ensure the political survival of the Malay race in the
face of the threat contained in the Malayan Union proposals. After
that threat was averted, Onn's more deeply-held political convictions
2
came to the surface. This interpretation does not appear to be borne 
out by subsequent events in Onn's political life, particularly when 
he returned to conservative Malay communal politics following the
1. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Sir George Maxwell dated 12 July 
1951, TCL Papers, TCL/V/148.
2. Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal 
Political Parties in West Malaysia, Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1971, pp.41-42.
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failure of his multi-racial experiment in the form of the IMP. At 
least as likely an explanation is that Onn simply misread the major 
political currents of the period. Lacking an appreciation of the 
strength of communally-based politics in the country or the potential 
of an alliance-type coalition of such parties, and more importantly, 
misreading the strength of the apparent British desire to turn over 
power to a completely multi-racial independence government, Onn 
made what appears to have been a major political miscalculation. In 
any case, Onnrs initiative reflected the only plausible and seriously- 
taken attempt at inter-ethnic politics involving high Chinese and 
Malay leaders in the history of Malaya and Malaysia, and its failure 
sounded the death knell for integrationist politics.^"
Over confident from his success in leading the UMNO 
crusade against the Malayan Union scheme, Onn believed he was strong 
enough to carry the UMNO with him in his move to decommunalise 
Malayan politics. He had hoped to use the UMNO as the vehicle for 
integrationist politics by opening the party to non-Malays and by 
changing its name to the United Malayan National Organisation. His 
manoeuvrings, however, were rejected by the party Central Working 
Committee and general assembly which instead accepted his resignation 
in August 1951. Faced with this failure, Onn formed the IMP 
(Independence of Malaya Party) on 16 September 1951 to pursue his 
political objectives.
1. Multi-racial parties formed since the IMP such as the People's 
Progressive Party, the United Democratic Party, the Democratic 
Action Party and Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia have never received 
the backing of top ranking Malay leaders.
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The IMP was supported from its inception by Cheng Lock
and a few other westernised MCA leaders such as Tan Siew Sin, Khoo
Teik Ee and Yong Shook Lin, who had become personal friends of Datuk
Onn. These MCA leaders were attracted to the IMP partly because of
their friendship with Datuk Onn» but mainly because the IMP's
platform promised to grant citizenship based on jus soli.to non-
Malays as well as equal rights and privileges for Malays and non-
Malays."^ Writing about his support for the IMP to his old friend,
Sir George Maxwell, Cheng Lock stated: MMy interest in the IMP is
primarily in support of the principle for which I have been
fighting all my life, that is, the issue of communal harmony and
2
equality in this country.” It may be recalled that shortly before 
the formation of the MCA, Cheng Lock had made an unsuccessful 
attempt to set up a multi-racial party himself.
Although Cheng Lock campaigned vigorously for the IMP, 
speaking at the inaugural meetings of IMP branches formed in Kuala 
Lumpur (16 September 1951), Johore Bahru (16 November 1951), Malacca 
(11 May 1952) and Penang (15 May 1952), he was unable to persuade 
the majority of the MCA top leadership and the second rung Laukeh 
leadership to support Onn’s new party. At the same time, the MCA 
leadership also rejected Cheng Lock’s attempts to decommunalise 
the MCA.
1. For a discussion of the IMP’s objectives, see Vasil, pp.71-72.
2. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Sir George Maxwell dated 18 
December 1951, TCL Papers, TCL/V/232.
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Between late 1950 and mid-1951, there were parallel moves
by both Onn and Cheng Lock to decommunalise the UMNO and the MCA as
a first step towards their goal of promoting an integrationist
political system in Malaya. Onn was unsuccessful in his attempts
to manoeuvre the UMNO onto a multi-racial course and open its doors
to non-Malay members enjoying full membership rights.* Cheng Lock
likewise failed when in April 1951 the party general assembly turned
down his proposal to accord non-Chinese associate members equal
2
voting and office-holding rights. The sharpest opposition to Cheng 
Lock's proposal came from the Selangor and Perak state branches, the
3
strongholds of the CCC-huay kuan establishment. Faced with Cheng
Lock's threat to resign as party president and seeing the necessity
of retaining his services as party spokesman in the CLC citizenship
talks, Cheng Lock's opponents struck a compromise with him. It was
agreed that associate members would be allowed to vote at party
meetings and to stand for public elections on the MCA ticket, but
4
would not be allowed to hold office in the party.
The compromise on the status of associate members had no 
impact on the existing structure of the MCA, which remained
1. See, Vasil, pp.41-50.
2. The party constitution of 1959 admitted non-Chinese associate 
members without voting or office holding rights. In 1951, 
associate members, located mainly in Singapore, comprised nearly 
10% of the party membership. Straits Times, 21 May 1951.
3. Straits Times, 15 May 1951.
4. Straits Times, 21 May 1951.
233
inaccessible to non-Chinese. Only one associate member, an Indian 
woman,was ever selected to stand on the MCA ticket during the party's 
entire history; and the reason for her selection during the Kuala 
Lumpur 1952 municipal elections was because the ward in question 
contained predominantly Indian voters.
!i
S After Cheng Lock was replaced as party president by Dr.
i
| Lim Chong Eu in March 1958, the party leadership abolished non-
|
| Chinese participation in the MCA in two stages. A revision of the
party constitution in 1959 abolished the rights of associate members
, to vote on party affairs and to stand for public elections on the
! MCA ticket. A further constitutional revision in 1967 withdrew the
category of associate membership from the party rules, thus closing 
the MCA completely to non-Chinese.*
5.3 The Institutionalisation of Communal Politics: Formation of 
the UMNO-MCA Alliance
The contrast to the IMP, the UMNO-MCA Alliance, formed in 
January 1952, developed rapidly as a successful and viable arrange­
ment for inter-ethnic political co-existence. Not only was the 
coalition arrangement acceptable to the Malay and Chinese electorate 
it also satisfied the British desire to see multi-racial power 
sharing in the soon-to-be independent Malayan nation state.
1. Constitution of the Malayan Chinese Association (Approved and 
adopted by the MCA General Committee at a meeting held on 22 
March 1959), China Press Ltd., Kuala Lumpur; and Constitution 
of the Malayan Chinese Association (Incorporating all amendments 
up to March 1969), Solai Press, Kuala Lumpur.
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The formation of the UMNO-MCA Alliance, a major turning 
point in the development of Malayan politics, institutionalised the 
country's political system on a communal basis. The Alliance was 
the brainchild of the Selangor UMNO and MCA.leaderships, particularly 
the chairman of the Selangor UMNO Election Committee, Datuk Yahaya, 
and Selangor MCA chairman H.S. Lee and Working Committee members 
Ong Yoke Lin and S.M. Yong. The initiative for forming the coalition 
came from the MCA leaders. Rejecting Cheng Lock's decision to 
support the IMP in the election, the Selangor MCA leadership searched 
for an alternative strategy which would enable the MCA to field its 
candidates on a communal ticket but within an inter-ethnic framework. 
A coalition arrangement with the UMNO appeared an attractive possi­
bility and Ong Yoke Lin, a schoolmate of Datuk Yahaya's, paved the 
way for talks between H.S. Lee and the UMNO leaders.*
Major contributing factors to the formation of the UMNO- 
MCA Alliance were: the intensity of communal feelings among the 
Malay and Chinese population at large; the organisational strength 
of the MCA and the UMNO within their respective communities; the 
financial resources of the MCA; and the desire on the part of both 
parties to be part of the government of Malaya on the attainment of 
independence.
1. Interview, H.S. Lee, 22 July 1975; and Ong Yoke Lin, 18 May 
1976. Tunku Abdul Rahman stated: "It was Ong Yoke Lin who got 
together with Datuk Yahaya and decided to form an Alliance to 
contest this election". Tunku Abdul Rahman, Looking Back, 
Pustaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, p.177.
235
Of these, the communal particularism of the Malays and
Chinese was the most important reason for the founding of the
Alliance. When the Selangor State Branches of the UMNO and the MCA
were preparing their separate strategies to contest the election,
the racial arithmetic of the Kuala Lumpur electorate was the foremost
consideration. The racial breakdown of the town was then roughly
62% Chinese, 23% Indian, Pakistani, Ceylonese, Eurasian and European
and 15% Malay.* The Chinese proportion of the electorate, however,
was substantially lower than its proportion of the total population,
as the franchise was weighted in favour of the Malay electorate.
Nonetheless, the Chinese voters of Kuala Lumpur still exceeded the
Malay voters: they formed 37.7% of the electoral rolls, compared to
2
33.8% Malay and 28.5% Indian. Franchise for the election was not 
based on Federal citizenship but length of residence (a minimum 
period of three years) in Malaya.
The significant feature was that despite the dispropor- 
tional representation of Chinese voters in the electoral rolls, 
Chinese formed the majority of voters in two electoral wards 
(Petaling and Imbi), Malay voters in one (Sentul) and Indian voters 
in the fourth (Bungsar). Thus, out of the total 12 seats in the 
four wards to be contested (three seats in each ward), six were 
"Chinese" seats and only three were "Malay" seats. The racial
1. Taken from O'Callaghan, D., "The 1952 Local Body Elections in 
Malaya: A Study of the Relationships between British Policy and 
Malayan Political Evolution", MA thesis, University of Auckland, 
1974, p.35.
2. Sunday Mail, 17 February 1952.
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arithmetic therefore suggested rather strongly that the MCA could 
capture at least six seats and the UMNO only three.
Although the Selangor MCA leadership was confident that 
the MCA would win the election by itself because of the majority of 
Chinese seats, it nonetheless wanted to contest the election on some 
sort of inter-ethnic platform. This consideration was dictated by 
the need to gain the approval of . the colonial administration and 
to pursue a multi-ethnic approach to political participation, since 
the British had made it clear that self-rule for Malaya would be 
withheld until there was political co-operation between the leaders 
of the different communities."*"
While the MCA leadership in Kuala Lumpur appreciated the
fact that they had to come up with some solution to promote political
co-existence with non-Chinese leaders, they did not believe that
Cheng Lock’s attempts to decommunalise the MCA and his co-operation
with Onn in the IMP was the desired solution to the problem. Cheng
Lock wanted the Selangor leadership to campaign on behalf of the
IMP, or better still, to field MCA candidates not on the party ticket 
2
but the IMP's. The chairmen of the Selangor MCA, H.S. Lee, decided 
against the advice of the party president. He and his members of
1. On a visit to the country in December 1951 just before the Kuala 
Lumpur elections, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver 
Lyttleton, reiterated that there would be no independence unless 
the leaders of the various communities could work together. See 
speech by Tunku Abdul Rahman given at the Alliance National 
Convention dated 23 August 1954.
2. Malayan Mirror, Vol.2, No.21, 16 November 1954, article entitled 
"How the Alliance Began, the First Roundtable Conference", by 
T.H. Tan.
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the State Working Committee felt that Cheng Lock’s vision of 
political Utopia in Malaya - symbolised by harmonious multi-racial 
co-existence under the leadership of the IMP or other such multi­
racial organisations - was mere wishful thinking. The cold facts 
of the matter, they thought, were that Chinese, Malays and Indians, 
for all the historical reasons which brought about a plural society 
in Malaya, were too deeply-rooted in their own communally-based life 
styles to abandon organisations which promoted their specific communal 
interests. The prevailing opinion in the MCA leadership hierarchy 
was that the Chinese masses, especially the Laukehs, would not vote 
for the IMP or any other multi-racial party in the Kuala Lumpur 
election.
The racial arithmetic of the Kuala Lumpur electorate made 
Datuk Yahaya realise the advantage of forging an electoral pact 
with the MCA. Datuk Yahaya*s decision was also influenced by the 
Penang UMNO’s experience in contesting the municipal election of 
Georgetown held on 31 December 1951, the first local government 
election staged in Malaya. Georgetown, the second largest town in 
Malaya after Kuala Lumpur, was also a predominantly Chinese town.
There the Chinese formed 73% of the population, the Malays 14%,
Indian, Pakistanis and Ceylonese 11%, and others 2%. The Chinese 
likewise formed the largest proportion of the electorate."*" The 
Penang UMNO contested the election in an electoral coalition with
1. O’Callaghan, p.31.
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the Muslim League. Opposing the UMNO-Muslim League coalition were
the Penang Labour Party and the Radical Party, ostensibly non-
communal organisations but regarded by the Malays as representing
2
the sectional interests of the Chinese. The Penang MCA did not 
contest the election, for reasons that probably had to do with a 
desire to launch the Association's political debut in the more
i
|
| important Kuala Lumpur election. The UMNO-Muslim League coalitionI
| performed poorly: it won only one seat out of a total of nine
contested. The Radical Party took six seats, the Labour Party one,
3
and the remaining seat went to an independent candidate. It 
appeared from the results that the Chinese voters had supported 
Chinese-based organisations and that the UMNO stood little chance of 
getting voted into power in electoral constituencies containing a 
majority of Chinese voters. Under these circumstances, Datuk Yahaya 
understandably found the MCA coalition proposition attractive.
The second factor which made coalition with the Selangor 
MCA attractive to the UMNO was the strength of the Association's 
organisation in Kuala Lumpur. The linkage services provided by the 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and huay kuan leaders who held office
1. The Muslim League in Penang is a communal organisation formed by 
the Indian Muslim community of Penang. Some of its members have 
since joined the UMNO, and the Muslim League is today an insigni­
ficant body limiting its function to social welfare work within 
the community.




in the MCA gave the party access to the Chinese community at large.
In Kuala Lumpur H.S. Lee, besides being the MCA state chairman, was 
among the most influential Chinese association leaders, as the chair­
man of the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Selangor 
Kwangtung Huay Kuan. Other prominent association leaders were 
represented on the Selangor MCA Working Committee, and they were 
confident that the Chinese would close ranks behind their communal 
organisations and the MCA when presented for the first time with the 
unfamiliar process of the western electoral system. At the same 
time, the recently-launched campaign to transform the MCA into a 
modem day political party with an effective election-participation 
machinery made the MCA an even more attractive political partner.
The organisational advantage which the MCA had over any 
other party which sought the Chinese vote was acknowledged by the 
IMP in a report analysing its disastrous electoral performance.
The report observed that the party had failed because it lacked the 
organisational structure and resources to mobilise the Chinese voters, 
adding: "... we are convinced that the Chinese voters did not vote 
for us because our party had nothing to offer them, and in the 
absence of any such inducements, Chinese voters as a whole fell on 
their traditional loyality /sic/ to a Chinese organisation, which has 
at least after all done something for them in the past".* There is 
no doubt that the Chinese organisation referred to by the IMP was 
the MCA and the work which the Association had done which won the 
support of the Chinese was its Emergency welfare work described in 
Chapter 3.
1. Taken from Vasil, pp.61-62.
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An interesting insight into the politics of the Chinese 
community in Malaya is offered by the IMP admission that it had to 
organise along "sectional or communal" lines in order to build a 
base within the Chinese society at large. Given the MCA hold over 
the Chinese association network during the 1950s, it meant that if 
another organisation were to compete with the MCA for the support 
of the Chinese community, two possible tactics were open to the 
competitor. It could attempt to win over the allegiance of the 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and huay kuans, say, by putting up a 
set of leaders to displace the pro-MCA leaders as office holders 
in the associations, and so dislodge the MCA from its position at 
the apex of the Chinese associational network. Alternatively, it 
could choose to by-pass the linkage services provided by the Chinese 
associations and build up an independent organisational structure to 
parallel the associational network within the community.
In Chapter 1 it was shown that when the MCP and KMTM were 
competing for the support of the Chinese masses during the inter-war 
years, the KMTM gained the allegiance of the Chinese associations 
and mobilised the Chinese through them. The MCP set about to build 
up an extensive network of trade unions as an alternative base with­
in the community , and succeeded in building up an independent 
structure which rivalled the traditional associational network to 
reach the Chinese masses, especially workers and students. It is a 
reflection of the degree of the MCP’s success that the government 
had to prohibit the activities of the MCP-led trade unions and close 
a number of Chinese schools between 1946 and 1948 to prevent the 
further growth of the Communist-inspired organisational structure
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within the Chinese community. By the early 1950s the traditional 
network had been largely restored, however, and thereafter it 
remained central to Chinese political mobilisation.'*'
In the Kuala Lumpur municipal election, the UMNO-MCA 
coalition alloted seven seats to the MCA and five to the UMNO. The 
MCA fielded six candidates, who were all well-known figures in the 
Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Selangor Chinese Assembly 
Hall and/or the various dialect huay kuans of Kuala Lumpur. These 
men were Ong Yoke Lin, Douglas K.K. Lee (the son of H.S. Lee),
Cheah Ewe Keat, Chan Chee Hong, Chan Kwong Hong and Y.T. Lee. In 
addition to holding office in Chinese associations, these men were 
also represented on the Boards of Managers of leading Chinese schools 
in Kuala Lumpur. The seventh MCA candidate, an Indian associate 
member, was slated to contest a seat in the predominantly Indian 
ward of Bungsar. The UMNO-MCA coalition won the elections hand­
somely, gaining nine out of twelve seats and 60.4% of the total vote.
The majority of MCA candidates selected to contest the 
municipal and state elections held between 1952 and 1955 similarly 
came from well-established Chinese Chambers of Commerce and huay
1. However, present day Chinese leaders agree that the influence 
exerted by Chinese associations over Chinese political behaviour 
have waned considerably since the 1950s. Interview, Lee San 
Choon, 21 November 1976; Lim Kit Siang, 30 June 1976.
2. The three seats the coalition failed to secure were in the 
Bungsar ward; the IMP won two seats and an Indian independent 
the third seat. Ampalavanar, R., The Indian Minority and 
Political Change in Malaya 1945-1957, Oxford University Press, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1981, p.118; and, O'Callaghan, p.57.
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kuan backgrounds. In the country’s first General Election held in 
1955, of the 15 candidates fielded by the party 13 were well known 
CCC-huay kuan leaders: Tan Siew Sin, Ong Yoke Lin, Tan Suah Kok,
Tay Hooi Soo, Too Joon Hing, Cheah Ewe Keat, Lee Eng Teh, Teoh Chze 
Chong, Lee Thuan Hin, Lim Teng Kwang, Leong Yew Koh, Chee Swee Ee, 
and Lim Kee Siong. Only two, Dr. Cheah Khay Chuan and Dr. L.H. Tan,
had no discernable links with the Chinese traditional associations.
In addition to racial arithmetic and the organisational 
strength of the MCA, the Alliance was given impetus by the financial 
resources available to the UMNO arising from a coalition arrangement 
with the MCA. Unlike the MCA, the UMNO did not have a regular and 
lucrative source of party funds as it was a party which drew its member­
ship from the rural and most economically-deprived sector of the 
Malayan population: farmers and fishermen engaged in the subsistence 
economy of kampung life. The upper levels of the party hierarchy com­
prised members of the Malay aristocracy, civil servants, religious 
teachers, petty landowners and kampung traders."*" The dearth of wealthy 
businessmen in the party resulted in a constant shortage of party funds.
For example, in July 1950, it was believed that the UMNO bank balance
amounted to only $35. The MCA, on the other hand, drew its income 
from a lucrative party lottery and, to a lesser extent, donations made
1. Funston, J., Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and 
PAS, Heinemann Education Books, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, ch.5.
2. Extract from Malayan Political Report for July 1950, C0537/ 
4790 C13).
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by wealthy business patrons. At one point the UMNO leadership 
considered launching a party lottery modelled along the lines of the 
MCA sweepstake to obtain income for the party. The scheme was 
dropped not on religious grounds but because, according to Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, UMNO members lacked the financial resources to 
subscribe to such a lottery and the party itself did not possess the 
organisational means and know-how to run the venture on a large 
enough scale to make it a profitable undertaking.1
The Selangor MCA was aware that Datuk Yahaya, the chairman
of the Selangor UMNO Election Committee, was concerned about his
party's shortage of money to finance the UMNO election campaign.
H.S. Lee accordingly proposed to Datuk Yahaya that his Working
Committee help out with the UMNO's election expenses as part of the
2
terms of the proposed coalition. The MCA's financial support to 
the UMNO, which contributed to the former gaining three out of the 
five seats contested in the Kuala Lumpur election, made Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, who had previously kept out of the internal settlement 
between the two Selangor parties, push for the idea of consolidating 
and formalising the ad hoc Selangor arrangement on a permanent 
Malayan-wide basis. According to T.H. Tan, the Chief Executive 
Secretary of the MCA, the Tunku had confided to him that "UMNO had
1. The UMNO Butterworth Branch unsuccessfully operated a small scale 
($50,000) lottery for a short period in 1952. Report by T.H.
Tan on a conversation with Tunku Abdul Rahman on 23 September 
1952, mimeo.; and, letter from T.H. Tan to Tan Cheng Lock dated
8 October 1952, MCA headquarters.
2. Interview, H.S. Lee, 22 July 1975.
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no money" and would benefit from "a share of the MCA financial 
resources".1
A report prepared by T.H. Tan, who subsequently became the
secretary of the Alliance Party, accounting for the source of money
used to finance the costs of the administrative and election
expenses of the Alliance up to the Federal Election of 1955, stated
2
that the MCA had borne the bulk of such expenses. The MCA contri­
bution towards the expenditure of the Alliance came from a sum of 
money which had originally been set aside for Malay welfare. In July 
1952 the party allocated $500,000 from the proceeds of its sweep­
stake to a Malay Welfare Fund, a move which was inspired by the 
discussions of the CLC on the need for non-Malays to help improve 
the economic well-being of Malays. The Association initially could 
not decide for what specific Malay projects the Malay Welfare Fund 
should be utilised. However, in April 1953 Cheng Lock informed the 
High Commissioner, General Templer, that the Fund would be used to
build Vocational Training Centres to train Malay youths as appren-
3
tices to work in light manufacturing industries. In the event, the 
Fund was not used for that purpose. Half of it was used to cement 
the MCA's ties with the UMNO in the recently formed Alliance: the 
money financed a good part of the Alliance's administrative and
1. Report by T.H. Tan on his conversation with Tunku Abdul Rahman 
on 23 September 1952.
2. T.H. Tan, "Memo on Alliance Party, National Council and Executive 
Committee, With Proposed Rules", mimeo., 18 November 1955, p.2.
3. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to General Sir Gerald Templer dated 
2 April 1953, MCA headquarters.
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election expenses. The remaining half was spent on cultivating 
Malay, particularly UMNO, grass-roots goodwill. Donations were made 
towards the building of mosques and kampong schools in UMNO strong­
holds, and towards meeting the special requests of a few top UMNO 
2
leaders. A portion of the Malay Welfare Fund was also spent on 
the welfare of Malay detainees discussed above in Chapter 3.
The Malay response towards the creation of the MCA Malay 
Welfare Fund as a means to obtain Malay goodwill was mixed. A 
number of Malay leaders, including a few within the UMNO, were 
indignant that the MCA thought it could buy Malay goodwill. An 
UMNO office holder in Kedah urged the Malays to reject the scheme, 
saying: "Malays cannot be valued at $500,000". Another UMNO leader
1. Circular from T.H. Tan to the members of the MCA Standing 
Finance Sub-Committee dated 3 May 1953.
2. Mosques which benefitted from the MCA Malay Welfare Fund included 
the Tiram Duku Mosque in Johore, the Pantai Kundor Mosque in 
Malacca, the Kampong Bahru and Jalan Pasar Mosques in Kuala 
Lumpur. See, "List of Grants towards the cost of Building or 
Repairing Malay Mosques", typescript. UMNO office holders who 
received MCA grants included the party Publicity Officer who 
received a grant of $1,000, and another office holder, the 
Chairman of the Kedah UMNO, who received a grant of $20,000 for 
medical expenses. Minutes of the MCA Hqrs. Standing Finance Sub- 
Committee meeting held on 17 December 1956; Letter from Senu 
Abdul Rahman, Secretary-General of UMNO to the President and 
Treasurer of the MCA dated 5 January 1956. Interesting enough 
the MCA turned down a request from the UMNO for a loan of $45,000 
which the UMNO wanted to buy out a Malay daily, the Majlis. The 
Association said the purpose of such a loan was outside the scope 
of the Malay Welfare Fund. Minutes of the MCA Hqrs. Standing 
Finance Sub-Committee meeting held on 17 December 1956. Another 
interesting application from the UMNO which was rejected was for a 
loan ffir $50,000 towards the building cost of its headquarters in 
Kuala Lumpur. Circular sent out by T.H. Tan to the MCA Hqrs. 
Standing Finance Sub-Committee dated 22 June 1954.
246
in Selangor described the MCA move as an attempt to "buy over Malays
at 20 cents a head".1 It was clear the scheme offended the moral
sensibility of many Malays and served to reinforce the notion held
by some Malays that Chinese thought money could buy anything. The
UMNO top leadership, on the other hand, saw the scheme as motivated
by a genuine desire on the part of the MCA to benefit the Malays,
2
and Tunku Abdul Rahman supported its implementation.
The MCA headquarters encouraged the MCA state branches to 
contribute financially towards the needs of various UMNO branches 
to strengthen the bond between the two parties in the Alliance.
The following cases illustrate the types of financial assistance 
which some UMNO branches received from the MCA. The Perak MCA 
financed the bulk of Alliance's expenses in local elections held in 
the state during 1954. It also donated $15,000 towards the building 
of a Malay hostel in Ipoh to accommodate trade apprentices and 
$2,000 towards the purchase of equipment in the Teluk Anson (Teluk 
Intan) Malay Trade Training School. The Penang MCA contributed a 
small sum towards the construction of the Penang UMNO office, The 
Johore MCA gave $12,000 to the UMNO branch in Tangkak to help defray 
its expenditure on the building of a local mosque. The Malacca MCA 
raised a sum of money towards the building of a Malay school in the
1. Straits Times, 30 July and 1 August 1952.
2. Minutes of the Alliance Roundtable meeting held on 3 February 
1953.
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state."*" The UMNO considered the MCA an attractive ally not only
because it was financially strong but also because it was a widely-
based party with members distributed throughout the country,
especially in the west coast states. The MCA’s membership had grown
so rapidly that by May 1954 there were 300,000 members in the MCA
2
compared to 200,000 in the UMNO.
The final reason for the formation of the Alliance was a 
desire on the part of both parties to attain independence for Malaya 
at the earliest possible date, and to become the first government in 
an independent Malaya. As the British Government insisted on seeing 
multi-racial political co-operation among the races before it left 
the country, a coalition of the two leading Malay and Chinese parties 
in Malaya appeared a suitable and acceptable arrangement. In 
addition to its acceptability to the colonial administration, the 
coalition pact between the UMNO and the MCA allowed them to present 
a multi-racial face to the Malayan people without having to dismantle 
the communal structure of their organisations. Both parties could 
present a multi-racial manifesto during elections aimed at protecting 
the interests of both the Malay and Chinese communities. At the 
same time, unlike the fate suffered by the IMP, they would remain 
communal bodies and thus retain the allegiance of the Malay and 
Chinese electorate.
1. See, Minutes of the Perak MCA Working Committee held on 24 August 
1954; Report of the Committee to be submitted to the Fifth 
Annual General Meeting of the Perak MCA Branch to be held on 16 
August 1953, pp.8-9; Report of the Penang and Province Wellesley 
MCA Branch for the Year Ending 30 June 1955, p.4; Minutes of the 
Johore MCA Working Committee held on 3 May 1953; and, Report of 
the Malacca MCA Branch for the Year Ending 30 June 1952, p.3.
2. "Statement by UMN0/MCA Alliance released in London 17 May 1954".
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The Selangor UMNO-MCA Alliance was a limited and ad hoc 
electoral pact. It did not produce a comprehensive manifesto out­
lining its stand on racial issues, but was merely a pragmatic agree­
ment between the two parties to field candidates on a joint ticket.
As was shown earlier, candidates were selected on the basis of the 
racial composition of each seat. The Alliance manifesto for the 
Kuala Lumpur election in February and the Johore Bahru election in 
December 1952 dealt purely with parochial, non-racial issues such as 
the improvement and extension of public services and amenities, 
better schools, housing, sewerage and drainage."*" It was not until 
the creation of the Alliance Roundtable in February 1953 that the 
Selangor ad hoc coalition was extended beyond the original limited 
pact.
5 .4 Consolidation of the UMNO-MCA Alliance
Although the MCA top leadership was divided over the 
question of whether the Association should affiliate itself politi­
cally with the UMNO or the IMP, the disagreement did not lead to any 
crisis or separatist movement within the party. Except for the 
single resignation of Yong Shook Lin, a founder member of the MCA, 
who identified himself completely with the IMP, the rest of the party 
top leaders eventually chose to work with the UMNO. Although Cheng 
Lock and Siew Sin had campaigned for the IMP and not the MCA during 
the Kuala Lumpur election, the poor performance of the IMP forced 
them to reconsider their views nn integrationist politics. Cheng
1. See, "Joint UMNO-MCA Manifesto to the Electors of the Johore 
Bahru Town Council Election" MCA headquarters. See also, 
O ’Callaehan. d .47.
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Lock could not effect an IMP-MCA partnership, because he did not 
hold the key to the MCA organisational strength and finances in 
Selangor and the other states, except for his home state of Malacca. 
Since the Selangor MCA power brokers had chosen the UMNO for an 
ally and had shown that they could deliver the Chinese vote, Cheng 
Lock had to accede to that political reality and to condone the 
UMNO-MCA Alliance.
Having succeeded in getting Cheng Lock to fall into line,
H.S. Lee and the Selangor leaders made no attempt to challenge his 
position; instead they sought his cooperation in extending the ad 
hoc Alliance arrangement to the other states outside Selangor and 
putting it on a more permanent basis. Urging Cheng Lock to take up 
the matter with Tunku Abdul Rahman, H.S. Lee wrote: "I myself feel 
that I am not in a position to encroach upon the sphere of influence 
of other leaders of the MCA in other States and Settlements. I 
therefore beg of you to give my suggestion your kind consideration.
If the UMNO-MCA could be established in the other parts of the 
country, it would go a long way to achieve a united Malaya” .^  It 
would appear that H.S. Lee refrained from challenging Cheng Lock's 
position, perhaps because he had no desire to become national 
president, but most probably because he realised his support base 
was limited to his Selangor home state. He realised that Cheng Lock 
commanded the overall support and allegiance of the MCA state leaders 
and was the only party leader capable of promoting the interests of
1. Letter from H.S. Lee to Tan Cheng Lock dated 18 February 1952, 
TCL Papers, TCL/9/33.
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the Alliance on a country-wide basis.
Although Cheng Lock actively backed H.S. Lee's plans for
the Alliance, he did not terminate his cooperation with the IMP
immediately. Indeed, for the period from early 1952 until mid 1953,
Cheng Lock politically cultivated both Tunku Abdul Rahman and
Datuk Onn. Following the IMP's disappointing showing at the Kuala
Lumpur polls, Siew Sin wrote to Datuk Onn: "You can rest assured
that IMP will be formed in Malacca in the near future and will
receive the active support of both my father and myself."^ At the
same time, starting from March 1952, Cheng Lock began talks with
Tunku Abdul Rahman concerning the institutionalisation and expansion
2
of the UMNO-MCA coalition arrangement.
It is not clear why Cheng Lock continued to support the 
IMP after he made his commitment to the UMNO. It might have been 
that, due to his friendship with Datuk Onn, Cheng Lock wanted to give 
him face by not breaking off their political ties immediately. It 
might also have been because Cheng Lock still harboured a hope that 
British patronage would help Onn reverse his political fortunes vis- 
a-vis Tunku Abdul Rahman and the UMNO. At that point, Onn was more 
obviously marked out for official favour than the Tunku. For 
example, when the Member System - a modified cabinet system - was
1. Letter from Tan Siew Sin to Onn dated 18 January 1952, TCL 
Papers, TCL 13/19. Siew Sin helped to form the IMP Malacca 
Branch in May 1952.
2. See letter from H.S. Lee to Tunku Abdul Rahman dated 7 March 
1952, TCL Papers, TCL/9/38.
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introduced in March 1951 with the objective of allowing appointed 
non-government officials and Malayan leaders to participate in the 
formulation of government policies, Datuk Onn was given the presti­
gious portfolio of Home Affairs. And again, the colonial government 
appointed far more IMP than UMNO leaders to the Federal Legislative 
Council until April 1955, when the Council was reconstituted with 
the introduction of elected members
However, with each electoral setback experienced by the
IMP, Cheng Lock moved farther away from Datuk Onn. The IMP
performed disastrously in all the elections it contested during 1952
and 1953 - out of a total of 134 local government seats contested,
2
it won only three seats. The UMNO-MCA Alliance, in contrast,
chalked up impressive victories. In 1952, it captured 32 (74%) out
of a total 43 contested seats in municipal and town elections. In
1953, it gained 64 seats (70%) out of 92 local government seats which
it contested. In 1954, it scored a 91% success rate, winning 69 out
of 76 contested seats. When the coalition contested the four state
elections held by October 1955, it scored a landslide victory,
3
winning all the seats in the State Councils. Onn reorganised the 
IMP into the Mai ay-communal Party Negara in February 1954, but this 
shift in tactics failed to halt the downslide in his political
1. See, Means, Malaysian Politics, p.137.
2. 0’Callaghan, p.75.
3. Malayan Mirror, 16 December 1954, Vol.2, No.23; 1 October 1955,
Vol.3, No.19.
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fortunes. The Party Negara .Jr6\\\e<i to win a seat in the
Federal Election held in April 1955, while the Alliance won 52 out 
of the 53 contested seats.^
Recognising that Datuk Onn's political career had no long­
term prospects, Cheng Lock decided to vest his, as well as the MCA's; 
political future in a close formal affiliation with the UMNO. On 
3 February 1953, the two presidents set up the Alliance Roundtable 
as a vehicle to institutionalise the UMNO-MCA Alliance on a pan- 
Malayan basis. This body functioned as the supreme decision-making 
organ of the coalition until early 1955, when it was reorganised into 
the Alliance National Council. The Alliance Roundtable directed the 
UMNO and the MCA State Branches to form UMNO-MCA Liaison Committees 
to run the affairs of the Alliance in each state. The UMNO-MCA 
State Liaison Committees were then instructed to set up similar 
Committees at the district, town, and rural area or village levels 
within each state. Each UMNO-MCA Liaison Committee at every level 
was to have an equal number of representatives (six each) from the
two parties, and it was to function as the co-ordinating body during 
2
elections. By early 1954, thirty UMNO-MCA Liaison Committees had
been established at the state, district, town and village levels
3
throughout the country.
1. For a discussion of the 1955 Federal Election, see, Ratnam,
pp.186-200,
2. Minutes of the 5th MCA Cabinet meeting held on 3 October 1952, 
p.10; Minutes of the 7th MCA Cabinet meeting held on 9 March 
1953, p.12; and T.H. Tan, Secretary to Alliance, "Memorandum on 
Alliance Organisation, Elections Machinery and Finance", mimeo.,
26 October 1954.
3. Malayan Mirror, 31 January 1954, Vol.2, no.2.
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By allying itself with the UMNO, the MCA made a shrewd 
investment in the long term political opportunities that would flow 
from UMNO goodwill. Whereas in the 1952 Kuala Lumpur election, the 
UMNO gained from the partnership, as only three out of the twelve 
seats contained a majority of Malay voters, this situation was highly 
atypical, save for municipal election's in Penang, Ipoh, Malacca 
and Seremban, which had Chinese majorities. Apart from these urban 
centres, the Chinese population was spread throughout the country 
and outnumbered by Malays, especially in the east coast states.
For example, in Johore Bahru, the third town to hold a local govern­
ment election in December 1952, Malays comprised 80.8% of the 
electorate, while Chinese made up only 13.7%, and Indians and others 
5.5%. All the seats contained a clear majority of Malay voters.^" 
However, the Johore UMNO-MCA coalition allotted three out of the 
total nine seats to the MCA. This pattern was similar for elections 
held at the state and federal level. For instance, when the election 
for the Johore State Council was held in 1954, there were 122,087
Malays (78.4%) who were eligible to vote compared to 26,400 Chinese 
2
(21.6%). And, in the country’s first General Election of 1955, 
Malays formed 84.2% of the electorate compared to 11.2% Chinese and 
4.6% Indian and others, in the 52 Federal constituencies in the 
country. Out of the 52 Federal Legislative Council seats, only two
1. O’Callaghan, pp.72-73.
2. Minutes of the Muar MCA sub-branch Working Committee held on
22 August 1955. The Muar MCA pointed out that the electoral roll 
for the Johore state election for the Muar District comprised 
44,555 Malay voters and only 9,721 Chinese voters, a percentage 
of 78.2 against 21.8.
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contained a majority of Chinese voters. The MCA nevertheless was 
allotted 15 seats for the election. Thus although Chinese voters 
then formed 11.2% of the electorate, the MCA was given a dispropor­
tionately generous share, 28.8%, of the seats to be contested. One 
can see, therefore, that the MCA relied to a significant extent on 
the goodwill of the UMNO and the backing of Malay voters to win 
seats in local government and Federal seats during the period prior
to the attainment of independence, a pattern which has persisted up
o
to the present day.
In return for its generosity to the MCA regarding the 
number of allocated seats, the UMNO anticipated continued access to 
the MCA electoral machinery and its sources of financial support.
In addition, by maintaining a strong alliance with the MCA, the 
UMNO was able to thwart all efforts by the IMP to attract MCA 
backing. Finally, because the UMNO leaders believed that many 
elements within the colonial administration favoured the IMP, it 
appeared all the more urgent that they demonstrate that the UMNO-
1. Ratnam, p.186.
2. For example, in the 1974 General Election, eight of the 19 
Parliamentary seats won by the MCA contained a majority of 
Chinese voters, compared to eleven with a Malay majority. Report 
on the Parliamentary (Dewan Rakyat) and State Legislative 
Assembly General Elections of 1974 of the States of Malaya and 
Sarawak, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, Appendix B. See 
also, Vasil, R.K., The Malaysian General Election of 1969, Oxford 
University Press, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, 1972, pp.38-39, 
and Table 4(a). The allocation of seats was and still is decided 
by the UMNO Supreme Council after consultations with the party's 
state leadership and other partners in the Alliance (National 
Front after 1969).
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MCA Alliance was the more viable alternative to the form of multi­
racial integrationist politics advocated by the IMP.
Angered and frustrated by his failure to win Chinese and 
Malay support, Datuk Onn led a campaign in the Federal Legislative 
Council to weaken the Alliance by seeking a ban on the MCA party 
lottery and attempting to discredit the party as the Kuomintang 
government’s "fifth column" in Malaya. As the Member for Home 
Affairs, Onn introduced a motion in September 1952 asking for a ban 
on the MCA lottery. On the grounds that income from the MCA 
lottery which was used to finance election expenses gave the Alliance 
an unfair advantage over other political parties, the colonial 
government decided to impose the ban, which took effect in Singapore 
in October 1952 and in the Federation from June 1953 onwards. How­
ever, far from decreasing the MCA's political activity, the lottery 
ban terminated the MCA’s social welfare activities and thus contri­
buted towards its evolution into a modem day political party, 
completing the work of the reorganisation campaign of 1952. For its 
development as a party, the MCA had other sources of income, prima­
rily in the form of contributions by wealthy towkay members and 
indeed from the entire Chinese business community, whose interests 
it represented. Backed by these Chinese capitalists, the MCA did 
not encounter difficulties in raising funds to finance its and the 
Alliance's election campaigns.**"
1. Since the early 1970s, Chinese capitalists have tended to contri­
bute directly to UMNO election campaign coffers. Thus MCA 
financial support has ceased to be important to the UMNO. This 
point was made by several Chinese leaders in interviews, including 
Philip Kuok on 18 May 1976.
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Onn's action against the MCA lottery precipitated the 
resignation of Tan Siew Sin from the IMP. In his letter of resig­
nation, Siew Sin declared: "By passing the solution on lotteries run 
by political organisations, the Party /_IMP/ has thrown a direct 
challenge at the Malayan Chinese Association. The resolution is 
couched in such strong language that the Party has compelled the 
Malayan Chinese Association to come to the conclusion that the Party 
is definitely hostile to the Association."'*'
Cheng Lock had maintained a discreet silence during the 
fracas between Siew Sin and Onn, but his own break with Onn came a 
few months later. The occasion was precipitated by Onn's denunciation 
of MCA leaders as political lackeys of Chiang Kai Shek and the 
organisation as a fifth column working for the Kuomintang Government 
in Taiwan. Onn focused the public's attention on the presence of 
well-known Kuomintang Malaya leaders in the MCA leadership hierarchy 
and the fact that these leaders were constantly visiting Taiwan to 
pay homage and to pledge their political support for the Kuomintang 
Government. He further stated that the MCA was controlled by the 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Malaya, which had been the strong­
hold of the KMTM:2
The Malayan Chinese Association and the Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce are carrying out a plan to 
make this country the 20th Chinese Province to 
owe allegiance to Formosa, which was the 19th
1. Letter from Tan Siew Sin to C.F. Gomes, Chairman, IMP Malacca 
Branch, dated 18 September 1952, MCA headquarters.
2. Address by Onn to the IMP headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, reported 
in the Malay Mail, 26 March 1953.
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Province.... The Malayan Chinese Association had 
assumed the role formerly played by consular 
representatives. The Chinese Chambers of Commerce 
had become the underground Kuomintang Party and is 
now dictating politics to the Malayan Chinese.
Association.
This accusation angered Cheng Lock so much that he terminated his 
political association with the IMP forthwith.
Faced with the necessity of having to win Malay support 
after the IMP was reorganised into the Party Negara, Datuk Onn 
mounted a series of attacks against the UMNO in order to discredit 
the latter's standing within the Malay community. Datuk Onn sought 
to weaken the UMNO by playing on Malay racial prejudices against the 
Chinese. For example, addressing a predominantly Malay election 
rally in Kuala Trengganu, Onn stated that the UMNO had come under 
the control of the MCA, and that UMNO leaders were selling out the 
interests of the Malay community to the MCA. He added that the 
identity of the UMNO had changed so much as a result of its partner­
ship with the MCA that the UMNO flag no longer displayed the kris 
(Malay dagger) but the chopstick, a metaphor with a political 
message which would not be missed by Malays.^” The Party Negara's 
dismal electoral performance indicated, however, that Onn's 
campaign failed to erode the bond of trust which existed between 
the UMNO and the majority of Malay voters.
When Onn tried to drive a wedge between the MCA and the 
UMNO by calling the MCA the Kuomintang Government's fifth column in 
Malaya, it did not produce a discordant note between the two
1. Onn's speech was reported in a letter from Tan Eng Aun, MCA 
Trengganu Branch, to T.H. Tan, MCA Chief Executive Secretary, 
dated 1 April 1954, MCA headquarters.
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partners in the Alliance, as the UMNO leadership did not let what­
ever private reservations it held on the subject of the Kuomintang 
presence in the MCA come between the two parties. In fact, the top 
UMNO leaders went out of their way to demonstrate their support for 
the MCA when Tan Siew Sin introduced a motion of censure in the 
Federal Legislative Council against Onn for making his speech about 
the MCA and the Kuomintang. Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dr. Ismail and 
Tuan Sheik Ahmad voted with the MCA members for the motion which, 
however, failed to get passed.* On another occasion, in a rare and 
unexpected display of solidarity between the UMNO and the MCA in 
Malacca, a leader from the UMNO Youth Section attended the Double 
Ten Celebration held by the Malacca Chinese Chambers of Commerce, 
which was also attended by a number of MCA office holders, including 
Tan Cheng Lock.**
It appears likely that the UMNO turned a blind eye to the 
problem of the Kuomintang presence in the MCA because it wanted to 
preserve the necessary spirit of unity and goodwill to enable the 
Alliance to get on with its task of attaining independence for 
Malaya. It was only when independence was imminent that Tunku 
Abdul Rahman wrote a discreet note to the MCA Hon.
Secretary-General suggesting that the Association should deal with 
the presence of ,run-Malayan elements" in its midst. He advised the 
MCA to carefully screen the political affiliations of potential 
members and to reject the applications of those whose political
1. Proceedings of the Federal Legislative Council, 7 May 1953, 
pp.395-6.
2. China Press, 12 October 1955.
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loyalty to Malaya was suspect because of an attachment to the 
political doctrine of either Peking or Taiwan.* We will see later 
that the UMNO made a distinction between the two sets of leadership 
within the MCA - the English-educated and/or Baba leaders, whom UMNO 
regarded as true and loyal Malayans, and the Chinese-speaking Laukeh 
leaders, who were regarded as pro-Kuomintang and Chinese chauvinists. 
During the independence negotiations between the UMNO and the MCA 
which worked out the Merdeka compact, the UMNO leadership ignored 
what it considered the pro-Kuomintang requests of the Laukeh leaders 
and worked only with the English-educated leaders of the MCA.
In conclusion, one can see that the period 1950-1955 was 
marked by two separate and opposed movements led by leaders from the 
UMNO and MCA to institutionalise politics in Malaya. Datuk Onn and 
Tan Cheng Lock sought to decommunalise the structure of the UMNO and 
the MCA and to create a multi-racial integrationist political system 
embodied by the IMP. On the other hand, Datuk Yahaya, H.S. Lee and 
Ong Yoke Lin worked to promote multi-racial political cooperation on 
a strictly communal basis but within the broader framework of the 
inter-ethnic Alliance coalition. It was the latter movement which 
succeeded in gaining the political support of the Malay and Chinese 
electorate throughout the country, first through the Selangor UMN0- 
MCA Alliance formed in January 1952 and ultimately through the 
permanent and nation-wide Alliance structure established between 
1953 and 1955.
1. Letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman to the MCA Hon. Secretary-General 
dated 21 June 1957, MCA headquarters.
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CHAPTER 6
THE MCA AND THE ALLIANCE CAMPAIGN FOR INDEPENDENCE
This chapter examines the position of the MCA during the 
period 1953-1955, when the UMNO-MCA Alliance initiated a campaign to 
attain independence for Malaya. The discussion takes place at two 
levels. The first level is an analysis of events which form the 
backdrop to the UMNO-MCA independence movement, and the discussion 
at the second level draws conclusions from the first to illustrate 
and highlight the manner in which the MCA had developed since its 
formation in February 1949. It is argued here that the period under 
review marked the peak of the party's popularity with the Chinese 
community at large; it was a high point in the party's political 
fortunes which has not occurred again up to the present day.
I have shown earlier on that a certain amount of ambiguity 
had surrounded the ideological identity of the MCA in the early 
years of its existence: whether it was a social welfare organisation
or a revived Kuomintang Malaya or the first Maiayan-centred Chinese 
political party formed in the country. By early 1954, however, the 
MCA had evolved into a clearly and highly effective Maiayan-centred 
political party, sharing the limelight with the UMNO at the fore­
front of the independence movement. The MCA's involvement in the 
politics of independence dispelled its original image as a social 
welfare organisation concerned only with the resettlement problems 
of the squatter population in the newly created New Villages. Its
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role in the independence movement also blurred the party's 
reputation as a revived KMTM, although, as is shown in the next 
chapter, the Kuomintang presence in the party continued to be a 
source of concern to the English-educated national leaders in the 
party and the UMNO, between mid-1956 and independence in August 
1957.
The discussion of the MCA's participation in the inde­
pendence movement serves also to throw more light on the way in 
which the relationship between the English-educated top leadership 
and the Chinese-speaking lower echelon leadership was developing 
during this period. When the party was formed the English-educated 
leadership relied heavily on the linkage services provided by the 
Chinese-educated leadership to create a widespread organisational 
base for the party. With the launching of the UMNO-MCA independence 
campaign, the Chinese-speaking leaders ceased to play as prominent 
a role as they had in the party's affairs during its early years. 
This was because they lacked the linguistic- ability and political 
expertise which was required,to deal with the British authorities 
and the UMNO national leadership in the politics of independence.
The Chinese-speaking MCA leaders including the pre-war KMT figures 
in the party were, as we shall shortly see, committed to the 
attainment of independence for Malaya, and were happy to let the 
English-educated leaders steer the party through the course of 
nationalist politics.
The relationship between the English-educated top 
leadership and the Chinese-speaking leadership and party rank and
262
file was essentially a happy and harmonious one, as all the 
groupings in the party from different social backgrounds shared the 
same objectives and preoccupations during this period. Beside the 
shared objective of attaining independence, the other key pre­
occupation was the settlement of the problem of Chinese education 
created by the enactment of the 1952 Education Ordinance. A 
further preoccupation of the MCA during the period was the party’s 
participation in the country's first Federal Election held in July 
1955. This involved the MCA national leaders in negotiating with 
the UMNO an election manifesto embracing a whole range of issues 
affecting the interests of Malays and non-Malays. Most fortunately, 
the negotiations between the MCA and UMNO English-speaking leaders 
produced a manifesto which satisfied the interests of the Chinese­
speaking elements in the MCA as well as the Chinese community at 
large. The Alliance platform on citizenship and Chinese education 
appealed to all social groupings within the Chinese community, the 
economic pledges satisfied the interests of the Chinese mercantile 
class and the promises on land policies attracted the support of 
the half million strong New Village dwellers.
6 .1 The UMNO-MCA Independence.Movement
By mid 1953, the political.leaders of Malaya knew it 
would be only a matter of time before the British Government gave 
Malaya her independence. The foremost question thus was: who
amongst them would be the recipient of power and form the government 
of independent Malaya. Of the.political parties formed in the
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country since the end of the Second World War, only three parties, 
the UMNO, MCA and IMP, were seriously considered by the British as 
suitable candidates for that role. As the UMNO and the MCA had 
combined their political fortunes with the formation of the Alliance 
in February 1952, the struggle for the leadership of the independence 
movement was between the Alliance and Datuk Onn's IMP.
The two objectives pursued by the UMNO-MCA leadership 
from mid 1953 to:late 1954 were (a) to outbid Datuk Onn in the 
competition for the leadership of the independence movement, and 
(b) to apply pressure on the British Government to speed up the 
timetable for self-government in Malaya. In the pursuit of these 
two objectives, the UMNO-MCA leadership employed two strategies, 
namely, the sponsorship of the Alliance National Convention, and 
the staging of a boycott by Alliance members of the Federal 
Legislative and Executive Councils and other government bodies in 
the country.
During the early 1950s, Datuk Onn was clearly the chief 
recipient of colonial political patronage. He was the leading 
Malayan figure in the wholly nominated Federal Legislative Council, 
holding the key post to the Member for Home Affairs. Despite the 
fact that the IMP was soundly defeated by the UMNO-MCA Alliance 
during the municipal and state elections held in 1952 and 1953,
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the colonial administration still nominated more IMP than UMNO-MCA 
leaders to the Federal Legislative Council. Onn continued to have 
the ear of the colonial administration despite the IMP's lack of 
electoral success largely because a number of high ranking British 
officials, including the High Commissioner, General Templer, and 
Malcolm MacDonald wanted the IMP to succeed as Malaya's first 
multi-racial political party. Templer in particular felt that 
Malayan political life ought to be de-communalised, and an all 
embracing multi-racial organisation like the IMP ought to have 
official support, for it represented the ideal of multi-ethnic 
political co-existence in a racially divided country.'1' After the 
IMP was disbanded and replaced by the Mai ay-communal Party Negara 
in February 1954, Onn retained the favour of the British authorities, 
largely because a coincidence of opinion existed regarding the 
timetable for self-rule in Malaya,with both parties feeling that it 
should take place at a later rather than earlier date.
Although no one doubted then that the British Government 
was committed.to the granting of independence for Malaya, there was 
some debate concerning the exact date of the handing over of power.
In mid 1953, General Templer felt that in view of the fact that 
the Emergency was then not under complete control, independence 
should not be granted in the immediate future. He thought that it 
would take up to another ten years before conditions in Malaya were 
stable enough for the British Government to hand over power to an
1. Interview, Sir Gerald Templer, 9 November 1978.
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elected indigenous government. The colonial administration's 
preference for a later rather than earlier date for independence 
was warmly supported by Onn and his followers. It was obviously 
to Onn's advantage to have a delay in the holding of a general 
election and independence, since he needed time to reorganise and 
revive his ailing political fortunes. Onn's view that independence 
for Malaya should not be an immediate consideration emerged from 
the proceedings of a National Conference which he convened in 
April 1953 to debate the matter.
The National Conference was attended by the IMP and ten
other organisations representing the Malay, Chinese and Indian
communities. All these were, however, very small organisations
which represented the interests of less than 15% of the total 
2
population. The National Conference recommended the following:
1. Interview, Sir Gerald Templer, 9 November 1978.
2. The conference was convened by Onn and three Chief Ministers 
(Mentri Besar), Datuk Panglima Gantangof Perak, Othman bin 
Mohamad, Acting Mentri Besar of Selangor, and Datuk Nik Ahmad 
Kam<l of Kelantan. The other ten organisations which attended 
the Conference besides the IMP were: the All-Malayan Muslim 
Association, the Eurasian Association of Malaya, the Straits 
Chinese British Association, the Ceylonese Federation of Malaya, 
the Federation of Indian Organisations, the Malayan Indian 
Association, the Malayan Indian Congress, the Malayan Pakistani 
Association, the Malayan Sikh Association, the Malayan Sinhalese 
Association. The last seven organisations represented the 
interests of the Indian, Pakistani and Ceylonese population 
which made up less than 10% of the total population. The 
Eurasian Association and the Straits Chinese British Association 
could at the most claim to represent the interests of less than 
2% of the total population. The Indian element predominated at 
the National Conference because Indian leaders in Malaya were 
then strong supporters of Datuk Onn and the IMP. For an 
account of the Indian involvement in the IMP, See Ampalavanar,
R ., chs. 5 and 6.
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(a) that the Federal Elections which were expected to occur in the 
immediate future to elect representatives to a reconstituted and 
enlarged Federal Legislative Council be postponed for at least 
another two years; (b) that there be an increase in the size of 
the nominated unofficial membership of the Council pending the 
elections; and (c) that the Member for Home Affairs, namely Onn, 
be accorded the status of "Deputy Leader of the Government" in the 
Council.* It appears that Onn had convened the National Conference 
to assure the colonial administration of his satisfaction in the 
prolongation of the colonial status quo. This pro-colonial bias in 
Onn's action at the time must not be construed as a lapse in the 
nationalist fervour which had driven him to organise the UMNO and 
to lead the campaign against the Malayan Union in 1946. In 1953 
Onn was as determined as other nationalist figures to see indepen­
dence realised in Malaya; his advocacy of a delay in the date of 
independence was merely a pragmatic move to buy time to reorganise 
his political resources to overcome the challenge posed by the 
UMNO-MCA coalition.
The UMNO and MCA leaders were, not surprisingly, highly 
critical of the activities of Onn. They boycotted the National 
Conference (turning down an invitation to attend) and roundly 
condemned its recommendations in no uncertain terms: "Instead of
recommending immediate steps to establish democratic self-rule in
1. Report of the Malayan National Conference, Charles Grenier 
and Son Ltd., Kuala Lumpur, August 1953, pp.7-9.
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the Federation, instead of granting the people - even if only by
measured stages - their right of self-determination, the Working
Committee of the National Conference proposes that the people, for
more years to come, shall be governed in a manner more undemocratic
than they are at present. The recommendations ... constitute a
deliberate attempt to put back Malaya's political c l o c k . T u n k u
Abdul Rahman in fact believed that the National Conference was
actually the brainchild of Malcolm MacDonald, who he felt had asked
Onn to act as the colonial administration's front man to forestall
the UMNO-MCA demand for immediate self-rule. MacDonald maintained
that the Tunku's allegation was unfounded and that the colonial
government had no vested interests in the proceedings of the
2
National Conference.
Having gained a clear advantage over other political 
parties in the local and state elections, the UMNO and MCA national 
leaders were naturally anxious to see independence granted at the 
earliest possible date. From the middle of 1953 until July 1955,
1. "Statement by the UMNO-MCA Alliance on the Report and 
Recommendations of the Working Committee of the Mentri-Mentri 
Besar Sponsored National Conference issued on 23 August 1953", 
mimeo.
2. See letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Tan Cheng Lock dated 24 
March 1953, and "Notes of a Conversation between Tengku Abdul 
Rahman and Datuk E.E.C. Thuraisingham" by T.H. Tan, mimeo.,
12 May 1953, MCA headquarters. Tunku Abdul Rahman told Thurai- 
singham that Malcolm MacDonald got Datuk Onn, Datuk Panglima 
Gantang of Perak and Datuk Nik Kamil to convene the National 
Conference. Malcolm MacDonald, on the other hand, informed me 
that he had not initiated the event but simply encouraged the 
other men to go ahead when they asked his advice on the matter. 
Interview, Malcolm MacDonald, 24 May 1977.
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when the country*s first general elections were held, the Alliance 
leaders initiated a series of coordinated measures which were 
designed to outmanoeuvre Onn's attempt to delay the date of 
independence and to gain British acceptance of the Alliance leader­
ship of the independence campaign. These moves were: firstly, the
activities of the Alliance representatives in the proceedings of 
the Election Committee; secondly, the sponsorship of the Alliance 
National Convention; and thirdly, the staging of a boycott of the 
Federal Legislative and Executive Councils and other government 
bodies.
In July 1953 the British Government appointed an Election 
Committee to investigate the question of holding a general election 
in Malaya. The membership of the Committee was dominated by Onn 
and his supporters, the Chief Ministers and IMP leaders; there 
were only seven UMNO and MCA representatives out of the total 
number of 46 appointed members.^ The findings of the Committee 
were released in January 1954 and the seven UMNO and MCA 
members of the Committee'-objecJted to the majority findings 
on three key points, namely the composition of the reconstituted 
Federal Legislative Council, the timetable for independence, and 
the eligibility of civil servants to stand for the elections. The 
majority report recommended that the appointed membership of the 
reconstituted Council be slightly larger than the elected membership
1. The UMNO and MCA members were: Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dr. Ismail,
Datuk Abdul Razak, H.S.Lee, Tan Siew Sin, Leong Yew Koh and 
Leong Cheung Ling. For a discussion of the work done by the 
Election Commission, see Ratnam, pp.175-183.
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(48 nominated and 44 elected members) and that there be a gradual 
transitional change to a wholly elected Council. This recommenda­
tion in effect meant that independence would be withheld for the 
time being, since power would only be handed over to a Council with 
ah elected majority. The majority report also recommended that 
civil servants should be debarred from standing for the elections. 
The Alliance minority report, on the other hand, stated that the • 
elected membership should be larger than the nominated membership 
in the reconstituted Council (60 elected and 40 appointed members). 
It also insisted that Federal Elections be held by November 1954, 
and that there be no delay in the timetable for independence. It 
lastly argued that civil servants should not be excluded from 
standing as candidates in the elections. This point was made 
because the exclusion of civil servants from standing in the 
elections would effectively prevent a large number of UMNO leaders 
from seeking candidacy in the elections, since a major part of the 
party leadership were government officials.^"
6 .2 The Alliance National Convention and Boycott of the Federal 
Legislative Council
To ensure that their views contained in the Election 
Committee report were not ignored by the British Government, the
1. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to 
Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative
Council, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1954. The percentage 
of civil servants in the Supreme Executive Council of UMNO for 
the years 1949-1955 is as follows: 79% in 1949; 61% in 1950;
58% in 1951; 68% in 1952; 63% in 1953; 63% in 1954; 50% in
1955. Figures taken from, Chandrasekaran Pillay, "Protection 
of the Malay Community: A Study of UMNO’s Position and Opposition 
Attitudes”, M.A. thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1974, p.7.
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UMNO and MCA leaders organised a campaign to draw mass support for
#
their cause. This consisted of sponsoring the Alliance National 
Convention, which held three meetings, on 23 August and 11 October 
of 1953 and on 14 February of 1954. In May and June 1954 the 
Alliance leadership staged a boycott of the Federal Legislative 
and Executive Councils and other government bodies to press the 
British Government to accept the views of the Alliance.
The proceedings of the National Convention, despite the 
attendance by four organisations other than the UMNO and the MCA, 
were entirely dominated by the Alliance leadership.^ The Alliance 
leaders had invited a number of Mala&norganisations to attend the 
Convention mainly to give it a more convincing image as a truly 
national affair. It was, however, the case that the UMNO and the 
MCA were indeed the most popularly-based Malay and Chinese parties 
in the country; their combined membership of 360,000 in mid 1953 
far outstripped the total membership of all other legal political
1. Fifteen organisations were invited to attend the Convention but 
only four bodies turned up - the Peninsular Malay Union, the 
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, the Kelantan Malay Union and the 
Pan Malayan Labour Party. The low level of acceptance by organi­
sations invited to attend the Convention was due mainly to 
dissatisfaction over the allocation of voting rights at the 
Convention - the UMNO and MCA allocated 14 votes each for them­
selves and gave only two votes each to other organisations. For 
further details of the Convention, see Means, Malaysian Politics, 
pp.144-50.
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parties in the country. The National Convention passed a number
of resolutions, including a call for an elected majority in the
reconstituted Federal Legislative Council, eligibility of civil
servants to stand for elections and Federal Elections to be held
not later than November 1954, demands echoing the Alliance recommen-
2
dations in the report of the Election Committee.
Whilst the Alliance-sponsored National Convention took a 
harder line on these issues than Onn's National Conference, the 
UMNO-MCA leadership was at the same time mindful to assure the
British Government that its program, for decolonisation was not a
radical alternative to Onn's proposals. During the National
Convention key speeches made by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dr. Ismail and
Tan Cheng Lock emphasised that an Alliance Government would be a 
loyal ally of the departing colonial power and would govern Malaya 
in such a manner that all British commercial and political 
interests in the country would be protected. The Alliance leadership 
also sought the goodwill of the Malay rulers by stressing that
1. This figure was given by Hashim Ohani, the leader of the 
Peninsular Malays Union in his address to the first session of 
the National Convention held on 23 August 1953. In mid 1954, 
the UMNO-MCA Alliance claimed a total membership of 500,000,
300,000 in the MCA and 200,000 in the UMNO. See "Statement
by UMN0/MCA Alliance released in London, 17 May 1954", mimeo., 
TCL Papers, TCL/8/52a.
2. Minutes of the Third Session of the National Convention held 
on 14 February 1954, MCA headquarters.
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it intended to uphold and guarantee the sovereignty of the Malay 
monarchical system in independent Malaya. The Sultans of the nine 
Malay states were given firm assurances by the Alliance leadership 
that all existing rights and privileges which the monarchs enjoyed 
under the terms of the Federation of Malaya Agreement would be 
preserved with the attainment of independence. The Alliance leaders 
took great care to emphasise that they had no desire to radicalise 
the political order in Malaya. They declared that they wished to 
attain independence only through ’’peaceful and constitutional 
means", and Dr. Ismail took pains to assure the Malay rulers that 
they would "form the pivot round which the loyalty and unity of the 
peoples of Malaya should revolve".^
The Alliance courting of Malay royal approval for their 
independence initiative was dictated by two considerations. The 
first was the coincidence of aristocratic class interests between 
the UMNO national leadership and the Malay monarchy, and the second 
was the allegiance showed by the Malay masses towards their Sultans. 
A sizeable number of the UMNO .top leaders had aristocratic 
connections —  Tunku Abdul Rahman being himself a scion of the Kedah 
ruling house. The elitist social origins of these top echelon UMNO 
leaders explain their desire to preserve the monarchical system in 
independent Malaya. The vested interests of the UMNO in this 
respect happily coincided with the political and religious status
1. See speeches by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dr. Ismail and H.S. Lee at 
the First Session of the National Convention held on 23 August 
1953 , MCA headquarters.
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enjoyed by the Sultans within Malay society. The Malay community 
has historically regarded the Sultan of each Malay state as the 
font of political and religious authority in that state. Their 
allegiance to the Sultans has survived the colonial era and remains 
much in evidence today.* It was thus both necessary and advanta­
geous for the Alliance coalition to safeguard the privileged 
position of the Sultans, since they possessed the influence to 
promote the cause of the Alliance through their hold over the Malay 
masses.
The Alliance courting of British goodwill through its 
pledges of maintaining good relations with the British Government 
after independence did not obtain for it the immediate assent of 
Whitehall for its independence proposals. In early May 1954 three 
Alliance representatives - Tunku Abdul Rahman, Datuk Abdul Razak 
and T.H. Tan - went to London to obtain the consent of the Colonial 
Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton, to implement the resolutions passed by 
the Alliance National Convention. Failing in their mission, the 
Alliance leaders decided to stage a boycott of the Federal Legisla­
tive Council and other bodies to pressurise the British Government 
into heeding the Alliance terms for independence.
The Alliance boycott, held between late May and July, 
called for all UMNO and MCA members of the Federal Legislative and 
Executive Councils, state, municipal and town councils, and other
1. For a discussion of this, see, Chandra Muzaffar, Protector? An 
Analysis of the Concept and Practice of Loyalty in Leader-Led 
Relationships within Malay Society, Aliran, Ganesh Printing 
Works, Penang, 1979.
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government bodies such as the Chinese Advisory Boards, not to serve
on these bodies until the Alliance demands were met by the British
Government. The boycott was observed by a total number of about
1,000 UMNO and MCA members (600 UMNO and 400 MCA) who resigned from
their positions in these b o d i e s E l e c t e d  MCA representatives
serving on the local councils in the New Villages were exempted
from joining the boycott. The Alliance leadership agreed that the
administration of the newly settled squatter population should not
be disrupted by the boycott in view of the Emergency. The MCA
leadership in particular did not want to undermine the political
advantage it enjoyed in the New Villages, an advantage created by
its social welfare work among the squatter population of the newly
2
created New Villages.
In addition to holding a boycott of government bodies, the
Alliance also staged a number of mass rallies attended by their
supporters to back up the national leadership’s call for an elected
majority in the Federal Council and immediate Federal Elections.
Rallies were held throughout the country in Juas and July; on 8
July, a 6,000 strong crowd assembled in Kuala Lumpur and similar
rallies were held in Seremban, Alor Star, Pekan and other towns in 
3
the country.
1. Memorandum from T.K. Tan to Datuk Abdul Razak, 4 June 1954, 
LYK P apers, SP3, No.49.
2. Letter from T.H. Tan to Goh Chee Yan dated 24 June 1954, MCA 
headquarters.
3. Malayan Mirror, Vol.2, No.13, 15 July 1954.
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Shortly after the implementation of the Alliance boycott, 
Sir Donald MacGillivray, who had recently succeeded General Templer 
as High Commissioner, held secret talks with Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
Datul Abdul Razak and H.S. Lee to settle the dispute between the 
Alliance and the colonial government. MacGillivray*s concessions 
to the Alliance leaders satisfied their demands on the composition 
of the reconstituted Federal Legislative Council and assured them 
of the intention of Whitehall to grant independence to Malaya at 
the earliest possible date.*" Having secured their objective, the 
Alliance leaders called off the boycott. They were now firmly in 
control of the independence movement, having successfully beaten 
off Onn’s challenge for the leadership of the movement.
The decision of the colonial government to switch its 
patronage from Onn to the Alliance leaders and its acquiescence in 
the latter's demand for immediate self-rule stemmed from a re- 
evaluation of the political situation. By mid-1954 British 
officials had become convinced that the depth of communal feelings 
in the country made the Alliance coalition a viable and realistic 
mode of inter-ethnic political regulation. It was also evident 
that the Alliance leadership had the widespread backing of the 
Malayan people in its call for immediate self-rule. Furthermore, 
Onn had abandoned the IMP and had returned to the fold of communal 
politics. Whitehall therefore decided that it had much to gain by 
accommodating the wishes of the Alliance leaders who had pledged to
1. Letter from D.C. MacGillivray to Tunku Abdul Rahman dated 
6 July 1954, MCA headquarters.
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safeguard British commercial and political interests in Malaya 
after independence. If Whitehall were to ignore the guarantees of 
the Alliance to protect British interests and to introduce the 
Westminster model of parliamentary democracy in Malaya, a Malay 
and/or Chinese radical nationalist alternative to the Alliance might 
develop in the country as a result of popular discontent and 
frustration bred by a continuation of colonial rule. Finally, the 
British Government felt confident enough to hand over the reins of 
power to an indigenous government, as it felt that the Communist 
threat was sufficiently under control by mid-1954.
6.3 The Impact of the Independence Campaign on the MCA
The MCA's participation in electoral politics after 1952 
provided the first overt evidence that it had begun to function 
effectively as a Malayan-centred political party. The rise of 
independence politics in Malaya and the MCA's role in the movement 
brought the party into the limelight of the Malayan nationalist 
movement alongside the UMNO. The MCA's involvement in the indepen­
dence movement in 1953-1955 not only firmly established its nationa­
list credentials but contributed towards its popularity within the 
Chinese community. It is argued here that the period 1953-1955 was 
in fact the high point of the party's popularity with the Chinese 
populace. This phenomenon resulted from the existence of a strong 
bond of unity and shared interests between the English-educated top 
leadership and the Chinese-speaking lower level leadership. This 
bond was created by a number of factors, the most important ones 
being the pursuit of independence, the settlement of the problem of
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Chinese education arising from the 1952 Education Ordinance, and 
the wide appeal of the UMNO-MCA Federal Election Manifesto of July 
1955 to the various social groupings within the MCA and to the 
Chinese community at large.
The objective of attaining independence was shared by all 
the leaders of the MCA regardless of differences in class and social 
backgrounds. Anti-colonial sentiments had been generated during 
the inter-war years within the Chinese community in Malaya as a 
result of the anti-colonial drive spearheaded by the Kuomintang and 
the Communist Party in China. KMTM and CPM leaders in Malaya 
propagated the belief that it was the patriotic duty of Chinese to 
combat colonialism whether it existed in Malaya or China. When the 
nationalist movement in Malaya came to a head during the early 
1950s, the Chinese-speaking leadership and membership of the MCA 
were thus strongly sympathetic to the cause.
The English-educated leadership of the party was drawn 
from the same small westernised social group as the UMNO top leader­
ship which was deeply committed to the objective of an independent 
Malaya. The commitment of these English-educated leaders to the 
cause of independence is made evident as early as 1926 when Tan 
Cheng Lock, then a member of the Straits Settlements Legislative 
Council, had argued for political autonomy in Malaya.
After World War Two when Cheng Lock and other English-educated 
leaders took the initiative of forming the MCA, they included the 
pursuit of self-government for Malaya as a key party objective.
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When the process of decolonisation.reached its final 
stages in Malaya, the English-educated and Chinese-speaking leaders 
of the party performed separate but complementary functions to 
achieve the objective of immediate independence. The English- 
educated leaders assumed complete control of party policies whilst 
the Chinese-speaking leaders mobilised the support of the party 
rank and file as well as that of the traditional Chinese associations. 
That the English-educated leaders had complete control over party 
policies is most clearly demonstrated by their presence on all the 
committees and working parties which were set up by the UMNO-MCA 
coalition to steer the Alliance successfully through the course of 
its independence campaign. The following is a list of the MCA 
representatives on the various committees set up by the Alliance 
between 1953 and 1957 to draw up the coalition's policies and to co­
ordinate its activities during the independence movement:^"
(1) The Alliance Roundtable (set up in February 1953 to coordinate 
the activities of the newly formed Alliance, its two key aims 
were the formulation of an Alliance strategy to obtain an 
early Federal Election and independence, and the extension 
and consolidation of the UMNO-MCA.coalition on a nation-wide 
basis. The Roundtable was reorganised as the Alliance National 
Council in February 1955 and functioned henceforth as the
1. The following lists are compiled from the minutes of the Alliance 
Roundtable the minutes of the Alliance National Convention; 
the Report to the Alliance National Executive Committee by the 
members of a Special Committee to scrutinise Alliance Platform 
papers prepared by members of the Roundtable; minutes of the
Alliance Ad Hoc Political Working Committee.
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supreme decision-making body of the Alliance, which was 
extended to include the MIC). MCA representatives: Tan Cheng
Lock, Tan Siew Sin, H.S. Lee, Leong Yew Koh, S.M. Yong, Ong 
Yoke Lin, T.H. Tan, Leung Cheung Ling (temporary member).
(2) The Special Committee of the Alliance National Convention 
(set up in mid-1953 to draw up the agenda and resolutions which 
were presented to the National Convention). MCA representatives: 
Tan Cheng Lock, Tan Siew Sin, H.S. Lee, Leong Yew Koh, S.M. Yong, 
Ong Yoke Lin, T.H. Tan.
(3) The Working Party to prepare the Alliance Federal Elections 
Manifesto of July 1955. MCA representatives: Tan Che- ng Lock, 
Tan Siew Sin, H.S. Lee, Ong Yoke Lin, T.H. Tan, Leong Yew Koh, 
Leung Cheung Ling.
(4) The Alliance Ad Hoc Political Working Committee (established in 
March 1956 to draw up the Alliance proposals for the Indepen- . 
dence Constitution). MCA representatives: Tan Siew Sin, Ong 
Yoke Lin, Leong Yew Koh, H.S. Lee, Lim Chong Eu, Ng Ee Teong,
Too Joon Hing, Yong Pung How, T.H. Tan.
It is clear from the above that a handful of MCA leaders 
monopolised the conduct of party policies during the independence 
movement. They were all English-educated (H.S. Lee, Leong Yew Koh. 
and Leung Cheung Ling were however also educated in Chinese),top- 
ranking leaders of the party. These representatives were appointed 
by Tan Cheng Lock acting in consultation with the party Central 
Working Committee (CWC). The CWC in turn derived its authority
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from the party General Committee which comprised the elected repre­
sentatives of the party branches. The fact that the party General 
Committee gave wide powers to the MCA representatives on the 
Alliance committee to promote the cause of independence is evident 
in the following resolution passed by a meeting of the General 
Committee on 13 June 1954:*
The General Committee ... resolves that the MCA 
members of the Alliance Roundtable be and are 
hereby empowered to take such actions and/or 
such decisions as they consider necessary in 
the interests of the Federation and its peoples 
in their progress towards independence.
The above resolution clearly acknowledged acceptance of concentrated 
powers in the hands of a few English-educated top leaders by the 
Chinese-speaking lower level leaders and party rank and file. These 
few men were given unlimited authority.to make decisions on behalf 
of the MCA and the Chinese community at large in matters relating 
to the independence of Malaya.
It is pertinent here to note the role played by Tan Cheng 
Lock in the independence campaign. We have seen that Cheng Lock 
initiated the formation of the MCA with a view to using the party 
to work for the cause of self-rule in Malaya. He pursued this goal 
with total dedication, working actively on all the committees which 
were set up by the Alliance to obtain independence. His health took 
a turn for the worse in early 1955 and he played a less and less
1. Minutes of the meeting of the MCA Central General Committee 
held on 13 June 1954.
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active role in party affairs after that time. Although he sat 
on the Working Party which prepared the Alliance Federal Election 
Manifesto, his role was largely nominal and he was not responsible 
for the drawing up of any major policy paper. Poor health 
prevented him from participating in the intra-Alliance negotiations 
which produced the Alliance constitutional proposals. In contrast, 
his son, Tan Siew Sin, played an active role in the affairs of the 
Alliance throughout his period. When Cheng Lock’s health failed 
after 1955, Siew Sin in fact became the de facto president of the 
party, until March 1958 when Lim Chong Eu succeeded Cheng Lock as 
the party president. However, before his health declined, Cheng 
Lock played an active and crucial role in party affairs, especially 
those related to the problem of Chinese education, as we shall 
shortly see.
Whilst the English-educated leaders handled the party's 
relations with the UMNO in coordinating the Alliance independence 
campaign, the Chinese-speaking leaders performed the vital task of 
proving to the British authorities that the MCA possessed the
1. Interview, Tan Siew Sin, 24 June 1976. Tan Siew Sin said 
the following^Tunku Abdul Rahman's collection of memoirs: 
"You will recall that my father, though still nominally 
President of the MCA had, in fact, been out of action since 
the accident and illness which overtook him in 1955, and 
which had incapacitated him mentally." Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
Looking Back, p.177.
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political clout to mobilise mass Chinese support to back up the 
Alliance demands. The MCA in 1954 claimed a membership of
300,000 which was almost entirely Chinese-educated and/or Chinese- 
gpeaking.
When the National Convention passed its resolutions to 
press for an elected majority in the reconstituted Federal Legis­
lative Council and immediate independence, the MCA Chinese-speaking 
leaders brought their influence to bear upon the Chinese Chambers 
of Commerce and huay kuans to back up the Alliance demands. They 
convened mass meetings of Chinese associations to draw up petitions, 
copies of which were forwarded to the High Commissioner, the 
Colonial Secretary and the Malay rulers. In Selangor, 57 Chinese 
associations, ranging from the influential Selangor Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce and the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall to the major 
dialect/regional huay kuans in the state to smaller bodies such as 
the clan associations, trade guilds, social, cultural and 
recreational societies, held a mass meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 
February 1954 to support the resolutions passed by the National 
Convention. Similar meetings were held by Chinese associations in 
the other states; in Perak, the National Convention got the support 
of 25 Chinese organisations; in Negri Sembilaij, 51 bodies; in
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Malacca, 16 bodies; and Kelantan, 9 bodies.
When the Alliance national leaders decided to hold a boy­
cott of the Federal Legislative Council and other government
bodies, the success of this move depended on the willingness of the
lower level leaders in both the UMNO and the MCA to observe the
boycott. The Alliance'national leaders who were members of the 
Federal Legislative Council would absent themselves from the Council, 
but the boycott of the State, municipal and local Councils, and 
other local government bodies would have to be observed by the lower 
level Alliance leaders. The willingness of the MCA Chinese-speaking 
leaders to comply with the wishes of the Alliance national leaders
was expressed at a meeting of the party General Committee on 13
2
June 1954 where the following resolution was passed:
In accordance with this resolution, those MCA 
members who were appointed by the Federal, State 
or Settlement Government to the membership of 
the Federal Executive and Legislative Councils, 
the Councils of State and Settlement Councils,
State Executive Councils and Settlement nominated 
Councils, Municipal Councils, Town Councils and 
Town Boards will resign from such Councils, and 
those MCA members who were elected to these 
Councils will not participate in such Councils.
1. Letter from H.S. Lee to the Secretary of the Federal Elections 
Committee dated 12 October 1953; letter from T.H. Tan to the 
Chairman of the Federal Legislative Council Elections Working 
Committee dated 14 October 1953. See also, Minutes of a 
meeting of Chinese Public Organisations in the State of Selangor 
held on 21 February 1954; Minutes of a meeting of Chinese 
Associations and Guilds in the State of Negeri Sembilan held
on 21 February 1954; and Minutes of the Meeting of Representatives 
from' all Chinese Organisatidhs in Kelahtan held on 28 February 
1954.
2. Minutes of the meeting of the MCA Central General Committee held 
on 13 June 1954.
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The MCA national leaders organised meetings of Chinese 
associations to back up the boycott. In Selangor, for example,
H.S. Lee, Chairman of the State Branch and President of the 
Selangor Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Chinese Assembly Hall,
f
| chaired a meeting of 120 Chinese associations which gathered to
| endorse the party resolution on the boycott.^
i
It may be said that the MCA national leaders did get the
j
j  majority of the party leaders at the State and lower levels to heed
the Alliance boycott,. The boycott was effectively implemented in
Selangor, Malacca, Johore, Pahang, and Negeri Sembilan, partially
2
observed in Perak, and largely ignored in Penang. The Alliance 
national leadership had decided to make the observation of the boy­
cott a voluntary affair, and had not planned to impose disciplinary 
actions to enforce the boycott. In the event, the nmber of 
rebellious leaders lower down the UMNO and MCA party hierarchy were 
few, and the Alliance national leaders appeared satisfied with the 
overall results of the boycott, which saw some 1,000 Alliance
i
resignations from government bodies.
To sum up, one can see that the degree of the effective­
ness of the MCA's role in the Alliance independence campaign
1. Letter from H.S. Lee to the Hon. Chief Secretary, Federation 
of Malaya dated 22 June 1954, MCA headquarters.
2. The poor response from Perak and Penang was a result of the 
unwillingness of local party leaders to observe the boycott. 
Letter from Ong Seong Tek, Chairman of the Pahang State MCA to 
T.H. Tan, Chief Executive Secretary, dated 31 July 1954; Annual 
Report of the Malacca Settlement MCA for 1955; Minutes of a 
meeting of the Muar MCA Working Committee held on 22 August 
1954; Minutes of a meeting of the Penang Settlement MCA Working 
Committee held on 14 July 1954.
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depended on the extent to which Chinese community leaders, both 
inside and outside the MCA, were prepared to support the MCA's 
efforts. The widespread response of the Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce and huay kuans to the proceedings of the Alliance National 
Convention and the boycott of government bodies demonstrated that 
the MCA indeed had the support of the traditional leadership of the 
Chinese community. It may well be the case that the appeal of 
independence by itself was strong enough to attract Chinese support 
for the MCA, and it was the party's championing of independence that 
created its popularity with the Chinese community, a popularity 
which reached its peak in 1952-1955. However, it is not valid to 
maintain that it was solely the issue of independence, and the MCA's 
championing of the cause, that explains why the party was at the 
heights of its popularity with the Chinese during the years. In 
1956 and up to August 1957, the MCA was still engaged in the move­
ment to attain independence for Malaya, yet the unity which had 
existed between the English-educated national leaders and Chinese­
speaking leaders within the party, and between the party and the 
Chinese community at large, suffered a severe setback. A group 
of Chinese-educated leaders in the party broke away in 1956 to 
challenge the English-educated leaders' handling of the Alliance 
proposals for the Independence Constitution, as we shall see in the 
next chapter. To gain a clearer understanding of the reasons why the 
MCA reached its greatest appeal to the Chinese community in 1953- 
1955, we have to consider other issues which preoccupied the 
attention of the MCA as well as the Chinese public at large during 
that period; in particular, the issue of Chinese education.
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6.4 The MCA Initiative on Chinese Education
The whole question of Chinese education in Malaya is a 
complex and wide-ranging subject; the discussion here seeks mainly 
to examine the manner in which the MCA gained political capital out 
of the issue in 1952-1955.^
During the first half of the 1950s, as a result of the 
enactment of the 1952 Education Ordinance which threatened to 
destroy the whole system of Chinese vernacular education in Malaya, 
the Chinese community was totally preoccupied with the issue of 
Chinese language and education. There was a spontaneous outcry 
from Chinese community leaders and educationalists for the repeal of 
the Education Ordinance, and attempts were made to mobilise Chinese 
opposition to the Education Ordinance in a coherent and united 
manner. At the same time, the efforts of the community were also 
taken up by another major educational issue - the setting up of 
the Nanyang University in Singapore. The vociferous outcry against 
the 1952 Education Ordinance on the one hand, and the ardent 
support for the Nanyang University project on the other, were aimed 
at obtaining the common objective of promoting the cause of Chinese 
language and education in Malaya.
1. For a discussion on the development and significance of
Chinese education within the context of Malayan post World War
Two politics, see Tham Seong Chee, "Issues in Malaysian
Education: Past, Present and Future" in JSEAS, Vol.10, no.2,
September 1979; Enloe, C.H., Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case
of Malaysia, Research Monograph Series, Centre for Southeast
Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1970, 
chs. 2-5.
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The 1952 Education Ordinance was based on the Barnes
Report (released on 19 September 1951) which recommended an overhaul
in the existing educational system in the country. The report
called for the abolition of the separate vernacular schools and the
creation of an integrated system of national schools where only the
Malay and English languages would be taught.^- At the same time
that the Barnes report was being prepared,; the colonial government
had also appointed another Committee to make recommendations on
Chinese education. The resultant report, the Fenn-Wu Report,
advised against the findings of the Barnes report; it insisted
that Chinese and Indian vernacular schools not be abolished but be
incorporated into the proposed Malay and English national school 
2
system. The colonial administration however ignored the recommen­
dations of the Fenn-Wu Report and the Education Ordinance was 
completely based on the findings of the Barnes Report.
The publication of the Barnes Report immediately
galvanised the leaders of the Chinese community into fighting for
its repeal. They were convinced that the recommendations sounded
3
the death knell for Chinese education and language in Malaya.
1. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on Malay Education, 
Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1951 (known as the Barnes 
Report).
2. Federation of Malaya, Chinese Schools and the Education of 
Chinese Malayans: The Report of a mission invited by the Federa­
tion Government to study the problem of the Education of Chinese 
in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1951 (known as the 
Fenn-Wu Report).
3. Malayan Mirror, Vol.5, 15 August 1953.
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Chinese education in Malaya had been set up through the patronage
of community leaders of the traditional associations, particularly
the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and dialect/regional huay kuans.
On 31 March 1954, the Chinese student population in Malaya stood
at 31% (251,174) of the total student enrollment (803,803) in the
country.^" The 250,000 odd Chinese students were enrolled in 1,200
schools, the majority of which received partial financial backing
from the government in the form of grants-in-aid. As grants-in-aid
per student paid to Chinese schools were lower than grants-in-aid
2
paid out to English, Malay and Indian medium schools, the running 
of Chinese schools still depended to a considerable extent upon the 
financial endowments made to them by the huay kuan leaders.
Hundreds of Chinese associations and educational bodies 
sent petitions and letters to the government, criticising the 
Barnes Report and requesting that the proposed Education Ordinance 
be based on the Fenn-Wu Report. The following quotations, one taken 
from the memorandum prepared by the Associated Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce (ACCC), and the other by Chinese school governors and 
school teachers, illustrate the tone of the Chinese response to the
1. Federal Legislative Council Proceedings, Council Paper 96 of 
1955, 30 November 1955: Second annual report for 1954 of the 
Members of Education as.required by Section 10 of the Education 
Ordinance 1952.
2. See Fenn-Wu Report, p.11.
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issue. The ACCC memorandum is quoted at some length because it 
lucidly expresses the reasons why the Chinese community found the 
Barnes Report objectionable:
The /BarnesT  Committee propose that Chinese and 
Indians should eventually abandon their own 
languages and cultures and accept instead those 
of the English and Malays. Such action is 
considered to be "Maiayanis ation", without which 
there is no national unity. We quite agree that 
a true Malayan must have a Malayan outlook. But 
true Malayanisation ... is a successful digestion 
and combination of four cultures and ways of life 
dominant in Malaya, namely, Western, Muslim, Indian 
and Chinese. To favour only two and ignore the 
others is basically unjust, and will undoubtedly 
create a sense of fear and suspicion in the minds 
of those thus neglected, which might easily cause 
resentment and opposition, This will also contri­
bute to communal misunderstanding and national 
disunity.... Self-government is not only a form 
of government, but an expression of a combined 
life. To think that such a government relies on 
the uniformity of language and culture is to
1. "Memorandum on the Report of the Committee on Malay Education 
and the Report on Chinese Education presented by the Associated 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce of Malaya", mimeo, n.d.; Memoran­
dum on the Select Committee on Educational Policy and the 
Education Bill 1952" presented by the meeting of Representatives 
of Chinese School Committees and Teachers in the Federation of 
Malaya to the High Commissioner, mimeo., 14 November 1952.
Other petitions and memoranda sent in by the Chinese included: 
"Opinions and Views of Negri Sembilan Chinese on the Barnes 
Committee’s Report on Malay Education", prepared by the Repre­
sentatives of Chinese Educational Institutions and Public Bodies, 
Negri Sembilan, mimeo., 18 August 1951; "Memorandum on the two 
reports on Malay and Chinese Education" prepared by Represen­
tatives of a meeting of Chinese Teachers* Union of various 
States and Settlements of the Federation of Malaya, mimeo., 14 
September 1951; "Memorandum on the Barnes Report" prepared by 
the Representatives of a meeting of Chinese Educational 
Institutions and Public Bodies of Perak, mimeo., 16 August 1951; 
"Memorandum on Malay and Chinese Education in Malaya" prepared 
by the Representatives of a meeting of the Chinese Schools and 
Chinese Associations in Johore", mimeo., 18 September 1951.
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underestimate its significance; and to compare 
loyalty to Malaya with willingness to accept 
bilingual (English and Malay) system, as does 
the Barnes Report, borders on ignorance.
Chinese form almost half of the population in 
the Federation and the great majority of them 
are prepared to take Malaya as their homeland.
By right their language should be taken as one 
of the official languages. But, to our great 
disappointment and dismay, its very existence 
is even now in peril.
The Fenn's Report on Chinese education is in 
direct conflict with the Barnes Report in the 
understanding of Malaya and Malayan culture.
The latter believes that the formation of a 
Malayan culture and a Malayan nation, for that 
matter, presupposes the need to cherish two 
languages (English and Malay) and to extinct 
the others (principally Chinese and Indian).
To the former, however, a Malayan culture may 
be achieved by mutual toleration and cooperation 
among all the existing races.... Unless we 
purposely choose the autocratic and the unjust, 
we are bound to agree in principle and method 
with the Fenn’s Report.
The letter from the Chinese school governors and Chinese school
teachers sent to General Templer read:
It is generally admitted that Chinese culture 
is one of the best in the world, and for this 
alone it may well deserve to be preserved and 
nurtured in Malaya. In addition, Chinese form 
about half the population in the Federation 
.... Your Excellency appreciates that the 
United Nations Charter stipulates that non self- 
governing governments should give due respect 
to the cultures of different peoples....
The unity of a nation does not, as contended by 
Dr. Fenn in his Report on Chinese education, 
depend on the singleness of tongue or the 
uniformity of languages.... In Malaya today, 
it appears to be politically more expedient to 
win the hearts of the people than to insist on 
the restriction of language.
The above passages indicate that Chinese objections were basically
founded on two premises. Firstly, there was the insistence that
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any ethnic group had a right to preserve its cultural heritage, 
especially in the case of the Chinese in Malaya as they formed 
nearly half of the total population of the country. Secondly, it 
was considered extremely unjust to create a sense of Malayan 
identity and consciousness among the various races by excluding 
the cultural heritages of the immigrant races. It was argued that 
such a method of Maiayanis at ion could only cause inter-racial 
dissent rather than harmony.
The fears generated by the findings of the Barnes 
Committee led the teachers of Chinese schools to form the United 
Chinese School Teachers' Association (UCSTA) on 25 August.'*’ (The 
UCSTA was the first pan-Malayan Chinese school teachers organisation 
and it functioned more as a pressure group lobbying for the 
interests of Chinese school teachers than as a trade union.) When 
the colonial administration brushed aside the objections of the 
Chinese community and enacted the Education Ordinance based upon 
the Barnes Report, Chinese response was immediate and widespread.
The strength of Chinese anger aroused by the Education Ordinance is 
forcibly demonstrated in a letter written by Lim Lian Geok, the 
chairman of the newly-formed UCSTA, to Tan Cheng Lock, conveying his 
wish that Cheng Lock make known the following view of the UCSTA 
(which by August 1954 had a membership of 7,300 teachers in 1,200 
schools, with a student enrollment of 260,000 and 23 branches
2
throughout the Federation) to the High Commissioner, MacGillivray:
1. Nanyang Siang Pau, 25 August 1951.
2. Letter from Lim Lian Geok to Tan Cheng Lock dated 1 November 1954, 
MCA headquarters.
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Chinese here on becoming citizens of Malaya will 
do their duties and demonstrate their loyalty, 
but will never give up their mother tongue and 
culture. If Chinese education is not recognised 
as part of the educational system, then the 
Chinese are looked upon as conquered slaves and 
will never submit to the rule /of government/.
It is clear from the above that the Chinese-educated and Chinese­
speaking population, which formed nearly 90% of the total Chinese
population in Malaya, would question the legitimacy of a government 
which acted against the interests of Chinese language and education. 
Although this claim made by Lim Lian Geok may have been exaggerated, 
it nevertheless indicates the extent to which Chinese passions were 
aroused whenever the community saw perceived threats to the position 
of Chinese education and language.
From the very start, the leadership of the campaign to 
fight the 1952 Education Ordinance came under the control of the 
MCA. This occurred because of two factors: the relationship between 
the MCA and Chinese educational bodies and the huay kuan patrons of 
Chinese schools, and the personal commitment of Tan Cheng Lock to
the cause of Chinese education in Malaya.
The Chinese-speaking leaders of the MCA who were the 
leaders of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and huay kuans were also 
the patrons of Chinese schools. They were the governors and 
managers who sat on school boards and committees which financed and 
managed the running of the schools. A central body for Chinese 
school governors and managers was set up with the formation of 
the United Chinese School Committees’ Association (UCSCA) on 21 
April 1954.^ The UCSCA was as deeply concerned as the UCSTA about
1. Nanyang Siang Pau, 21 April 1954.
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the threat posed by the Education Ordinance to Chinese education.
The commitment of Cheng Lock to the cause of Chinese 
education was a great boon to the Chinese-speaking leaders, who on 
their own would not have the necessary language and political 
skills to mount a campaign that would be a real source of concern 
to the colonial government. The importance of Cheng Lock's involve­
ment in the Chinese education campaign lay not so much in his 
access to the highest circles of British officialdom in Malaya, but 
in his personal relationship with Tunku Abdul Rahman and in the 
political alliance between the MCA and UMNO. Although it was 
Templer's administration that passed the Education Ordinance and it 
was his successor, MacGillivray, who approved the release of the 
1954 White Paper on Educational Policy,'*’ Cheng Lock and other 
national MCA.leaders knew that it would finally be the Alliance and 
not the colonial administration which would decide the fate of the 
Education Ordinance. The colonial administration was about to wind 
up its affairs of government in Malaya and to hand over power to the 
indigenous government soon to be chosen by the Malayan electorate.
So although it had formulated an educational policy and enacted a 
bill to implement the policy, the colonial government could hardly 
justify the vast financial outlay which was required to train the 
manpower and construct the infrastructure for a system of national
1. The 1954 White Paper on Educational Policy stated the colonial 
administration's intention to implement the 1952 Educational 
Ordinance.Federation of Malaya, Educational Policy: Statement 
of the Federal Government on the Report of the Special Committee 
on the Implementation of Educational Policy together with the
Report of that Committee, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1954.
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schools at a time when it was about to leave the country. Given 
these circumstances, the MCA national leaders realised that it 
would be up to the Alliance (since the coalition stood the best 
chances of winning the forthcoming Federal Elections) to decide 
whether the 1952 Education Ordinance would be retained and imple­
mented or be replaced by a policy drawn up by the new Alliance 
government. The vital factor, therefore, was the attitude of the 
UMNO national leadership towards the question of Chinese education. 
Only if the UMNO were to cooperate in the MCA's efforts to fight 
the repeal of the Ordinance would Chinese grievances be redressed.
In the meantime, it was to the political advantage of the 
MCA national leaders to do all they could to persuade the British 
authorities to repeal the Ordinance which had provoked such anger 
and consternation within the Chinese community. It was obvious 
that this was an opportune moment for the MCA to gain the widespread 
support of the Chinese masses. The championing of the cause of 
Chinese education at a time when its very existence was threatened 
would generate mass Chinese backing for the MCA. Whilst the party's 
involvement in the issue no doubt stemmed from this consideration, 
it was, however, not the only reason why the MCA fought the 
Education Ordinance so vigorously in 1952-1954. We have to look at 
Cheng Lock's role in the matter to understand why the. MCA was so 
deeply committed to the cause of Chinese education in the early 
1950s.
Cheng Lock's interest in Chinese education and language 
stemmed from a deep personal regard for his Chinese heritage which 
in his opinion sprang from one of the world's most ancient and
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greatest civilisations. Although he was completely English-educated,
he had taken great trouble to study Chinese classical works and had
written a number of tracts on Chinese philosophical thought.'1 One
of his most abiding beliefs was that Chinese in Malaya should never
lose their cultural heritage and that the promotion of Chinese
education in the country was crucial to the preservation of that
heritage. As early as 1923, Cheng Lock had advised the colonial
government that it should never contemplate doing away with Chinese
and Indian vernacular schools, for the Chinese and Indian languages
should be used as the means to inculcate a sense of Malayan loyalty
among the offsprings of newly arrived Chinese and Indian immigrants 
2
in the country. After the MCA was formed, Cheng Lock continued to
champion the cause of Chinese education and language, as is shown in
the following speech given in 1952 to a group of Chinese 
3
educationalists:
While politically the Malayan Chinese must be one 
and united with the rest of the permanent popula­
tion of Malaya, culturally they must be independent 
and must maintain a very strong intellectual and
spiritual life of thei r own.... The Chinese must
be brought into harmony with their native Chinese 
ethos in order that they may preserve their tradi­
tions, customs, institutions and manners and be 
conversant with the Chinese classics and culture.
Thus only can they become good Chinese as well as 
good Malayans.
In April 1953 Cheng Lock set up the MCA Chinese Education 
Central Committee (MCA Chinese Education CC) to lead and coordinate
1. These include: "Ancient Chinese Philosophy", 3 February 1949 
and "An Outline of Taoism", n.d., TCL Papers, SP13, Item 177 
No.42 and Item 176.
2. See speeches by Tan Cheng Lock in the Proceedings of the Straits 
Settlements Legislative Council, 29 October 1923, B185, and 26 
October 1925, B175.
3. Speech delivered by Tan Cheng Lock at the Conference of Chinese 
School Committees and Teachers on 9 November 1952 in Kuala 
Lumpur.
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the campaign to fight the 1952 Education Ordinance. Cheng Lock's
speech delivered at the second meeting of the MCA Chinese Education
CC is noteworthy for the stress he placed on the MCA's duty to
champion the cause of Chinese education and his belief that the
Chinese would become loyal Malayan citizens only if they had the
freedom to uphold their cultural traditions:'1
... the MCA ... must protect the Chinese not 
only politically but economically, culturally, 
educationally, and in every other respect.
Because if the Chinese don't know any Chinese, 
they are not Chinese (without knowing Chinese 
culture); they cannot be Chinese if they do 
not practise Chinese customs and traditions....
Our idea is to be good Malayan Chinese as well 
as real, genuine Chinese culturally, racially, 
intellectually, religiously, and at the same 
time, we must be politically at one with the 
rest of this country in order to create what is 
most imperative - a united Malayan nation 
working and living in perfect harmony with each 
different component part.
The MCA Chinese Education CC espoused the following
objectives: (a) to study, decide and act on the policies pertaining
to Chinese education in the Federation; (b) to help or represent
Chinese schools in any negotiations with the Government on all
igatters relating to Chinese education; (c) to unite school
committees and teachers for the purpose; of promoting the cause
of Chinese education; (d) to discuss, promote and manage affairs
2
pertaining to the development and betterment of Chinese schools.
1. Speech delivered by Tan Cheng Lock to the Second Meeting of 
Representatives of Chinese School Committees and Teachers in 
the Federation and Representatives of the MCA held on 19 and 
20 April 1953.
2. Minutes of the Second Meeting of Representatives of Chinese 
School Committees and Teachers in the Federation and Represen­
tatives of the MCA held on 19 and 20 April 1953.
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The membership of the MCA Chinese Education CC comprised 
three groupings: representatives of the MCA, representatives of
the UCSCA (the patrons of Chinese schools), and representatives of 
the UCSTA (the school-teachers). The committee collated the views 
of the three parties on the threat posed by the 1952 Education 
Ordinance to Chinese education and language. The findings were 
published in a report presented to the government and "to all those 
charged with the responsibility of shaping the Malayan Nation of 
the future through education".1 The memorandum was a summary of 
the views on Chinese education, language and culture expressed by 
Cheng Lock and other Chinese bodies noted above.
Besides presenting the MCA Education Memorandum to the 
colonial government, Cheng Lock also sought a number of private 
meetings with Templer and his successor, MacGillivray, to seek a 
satisfactory settlement of the problem. The meetings and corres­
pondence between these men revealed that the colonial government 
would not repeal the Ordinance; on the contrary, the 1954 White 
Paper on Education stated that the colonial administration intended 
to proceed with the gradual implementation of the 1952 Education
Ordinance, although this had not materialised by the time indepen-
2
dence was declared in Malaya.
1. Memorandum on Chinese Education in the Federation of Malaya,
by Tan Cheng Lock, President MCA and-Chairman MCA Chinese 
Education Central Committee, 31 March 1954, Art Printing 
Works, Kuala Lumpur.
2. See, letters from Tan Cheng Lock to General Templer dated 12 
May 1953, and Templer’s reply dated 6 July 1953; letters 
from Tan Cheng Lock to MacGillivray dated 21 October 1954 and
6 November 1954, and MacGillivray's letter to Tan Cheng Lock 
dated 15 October 1954, MCA headquarters.
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The impact of the MCA’s leadership of the campaign to 
fight the 1952 Education Ordinance was not in any way undermined 
by the fact that Cheng Lock's negotiations with Templer and 
MacGillivray had not resulted in the revocation of the Ordinance.
The rallying of the party to the cause of Chinese education and 
Cheng Lock's outspoken views on Chinese culture proved potent enough 
to generate widespread Chinese confidence in the party. The control 
asserted by the party over the patrons of Chinese schools and 
Chinese school teachers in the MCA Chinese Education CC gave the 
party a powerful hold over the allegiance of the Chinese community 
at large.
The high regard which the Chinese community had for the 
MCA during this period was due very much to the personality of 
Cheng Lock as the party president, and his strong championing of 
Chinese culture in Malaya. Lim Lian Geok, the chairman of the UCSTA, 
paid homage to Cheng Lock's leadership of the Chinese community in 
the following words: "Sir Cheng Lock is known for his genuine love
of Chinese culture, and could be said to be the real leader of 
Chinese in Malaya. He deserves the respect of our community 
including the teachers."1
Popular Chinese support for Cheng Lock was materially 
translated into votes for the MCA during the local and State 
elections held from 1952 to 1955 and during the country's first
1. Speech by Lim Lian Geok taken from the Minutes of the Second 
Meeting of the MCA Chinese Education Central Committee held 
on 21 August 1954.
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Federal Elections. The party's performance in General Elections 
held since independence has not matched the success it enjoyed at 
the polls during this period. While there are several reasons which 
explain the MCA's declining popularity with the Chinese electorate 
since independence, especially during the 1960s, one key issue has 
been its handling of the issue of Chinese education and language. 
After the MCA became a partner in the ruling Alliance government it 
had to honour the pledges made by the Alliance on Malay language 
and education in the Malayan Constitution (discussed in the next 
chapter). The constitutional pledge to make Malay the sole national 
language of Malaya placed severe constraints on Cheng Lock's 
successors in the MCA. Lim Chong Eu, Tan Siew Sin, Lee San Choon 
and Neo Yee Pan, the MCA party presidents since Cheng Lock's time 
until the present, have not lacked concern for the position of 
Chinese education and language, but the political partnership of 
the MCA in the Alliance government and the subordinate position of 
the MCA to the UMNO in the coalition made it difficult if not 
impossible for these men to champion causes such as the widespread 
demand by the Chinese community during the 1960s to make Chinese 
an official language, and the campaign to set up a Chinese university 
(Merdeka University) during the 1970s.
The other popular issue related to Chinese education and 
language in the first half of the 1950s, aside from the campaign to 
fight the 1952 Education Ordinance, was the project to set up a 
Chinese university to provide tertiary education for graduates from 
Chinese secondary schools in Malaya and Singapore who otherwise
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would have normally gone to Chinese universities in Kong Kong and 
Taiwan. The proposed Nanyang University was to be built in 
Singapore on a piece of land donated by the Hokkien huay kuan in 
Singapore. The building and running of Nanyang University was to 
be largely financed by endowments made by individual Chinese 
philanthropists (such as Tan Lark Sye and Aw Boon Haw), Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce, huay kuans and business houses. The colonial 
administrations of Singapore and Malaya approved of the project 
and Malcolm MacDonald gave it his warmest support.^*
The overwhelming backing of the Chinese community for
the project is reflected in the countless editorials and reports
carried in the major Chinese dailies, for example, the Nanyang
Siang Pau, the Sin Chew Jit Pau and the China Press, during the
first half of 1953 when the campaign to raise money for the project
took off. Leaders of Chinese associations in every state in the
Federation set up Nanyang University State Committees to raise
funds for the project; by the end of July 1954, it was reported
2
that the various Committees had raised nearly $2,500,000.
The national leaders of the MCA spoke out in favour of 
Nanyang University from the very start. Tan Cheng Lock was a keen 
advocate of the project, and other leading MCA figures such as 
Leong Yew Koh and H.S. Lee publicly pledged their support for the
1. Nanyang Siang Pau, 24 January and 19 February 1953.
2. Nanyang Siang Pau, 8 August 1953.
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university. Several party branches passed resolutions backing the
project and held meetings to discuss ways and means of helping to 
2
finance it. A year later, in August 1954, the MCA became a member
of the Nanyang University Council, the body responsible for super-
3
vising all activities connected with setting up the university.
An important development in the MCA's involvement in the
Nanyang University was the endorsement it obtained from the UMNO for
the project. UMNO blessing for the project was contained in the
manifesto drawn up by the MCA and UMNO national leaders for the
Alliance National Convention held on 23 August 1953. The manifesto
stated that the Alliance pledged its support for "the proposed
Nanyang University as well as other universities that may be
established in the future, so as to benefit all the communities of
4
Malaya".
The involvement of the MCA in the Nanyang University 
project greatly enhanced the party’s reputation as the custodian of
1. Nanyang Siang Pau, 11 and 27 July 1953. See also letter from 
Tan Cheng Lock to Goh Hon Sien, Hon. Secretary, MCA Singapore 
Branch, dated 15 February 1954 in which he stated that he 
strongly supported Nanyang University. LYK Papers, SP3,. , 
no.34.
2. See, e.g. Minutes of the Working Committee of the Penang MCA 
Settlements Branch dated 23 March 1953 and 24 March 1954; 
Minutes of the Working Committee of the Taiping MCA Branch 
dated 15 March 1953; Annual Report of the MCA Negri Sembilan 
State Branch for the year 1955, p.2.
3. Minutes of a Meeting of the MCA Central Working Committee held 
on 21 August 1954.
4. "Manifesto to be tabled at the Malayan National Convention", 
mimeo,, 29 May 1953.
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Chinese cultural and educational interests. Chinese-speaking party 
towkay leaders in each state were involved in the campaign to raise 
funds for the building of the university and made generous contri­
butions themselves. They were also represented in every Nanyang 
University State Committee. The result of the commitment of both 
the English-educated and Chinese-speaking party leaders to the 
Nanyang University project was a great strengthening of unity 
between the top and lower echelon party leadership. It also contri­
buted greatly to the popularity of the party with the Chinese 
community at large.
6.5 The Alliance Election Manifesto of July 1955
UMNO endorsement of the proposed Nanyang University at the 
meeting of the Alliance National Convention held on 23 August 1953 
reflected the concern of the party's top leadership to conduct its 
newly formed political partnership with the MCA in as supportive and 
harmonious a manner as possible. The willingness of the national 
leaders of UMNO to accommodate the MCA's wishes on Chinese interests 
can be seen in the pledges made on issues affecting Chinese political, 
economic and cultural interests in the Alliance Manifesto for the 
country's first Federal Elections held in July 1955.* Before I
1. Although the MIC became the third partner in the Alliance Party 
and took part in the Federal Elections on the Alliance ticket, 
its leaders played no role in the drawing up of the Election 
Manifesto. This was because the contents of the Manifesto had 
already been decided upon by the UMNO and the MCA leaders before 
the MIC joined the coalition in April 1955. The MIC President, 
K.L. Devasar, informed the UMNO.and MCA that he was happy to 
accept the Manifesto as it stood and that the MIC did not seek 
any changes in it. See "Statement by K.L. Devasar for incorpo­
ration into the Minutes of the Alliance/MIC meeting held on 
February 1955", mimeo., n.d.
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proceed to discuss these pledges, it is pertinent first to under­
stand why the UMNO was so supportive of the MCA during this period.
The most compelling motivation behind the UMNO top leader­
ship’s wooing of the MCA was its ambition to become the first 
government of independent Malaya. The British Government had 
attached a precondition to the granting of Malayan independence: 
it would hand over power only to a multi-racial government and not 
an exclusively Malay government (although the Malay component in 
it would be the superior force). The UMNO top leadership therefore 
had to seek allies from the leaderships of the Chinese and Indian 
communities, more particularly the former because of the greater 
numerical significance of the Chinese population in Malaya, in 
order to realise its ambition of gaining power. The MCA, with its 
widespread organisational network founded upon the Chinese 
association base, and the large financial resources of its towkay 
leaders, was at the time the most influential and effective Chinese 
party in the country. The electoral usefulness of the MCA to the 
UMNO was made apparent during' the first municipal, local and state 
elections held in the country when the organisational and financial 
assets of the MCA contributed towards the massive victories won by 
the newly formed Alliance.
While the UMNO wished to promote a harmonious relation­
ship with the MCA by being considerate of Chinese interests, it 
also knew that it could afford to make generous election pledges
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to non-Malays since election promises, unlike constitutional 
guarantees, need not always be honoured. The function of an 
election manifesto lay primarily in its effectiveness as a vote- 
catching device; it had to appeal to as wide a section of the 
electorate as possible. The UMNO was prepared to hold out attrac­
tive promises to both Malay and non-Malay voters in the country’s 
first general elections; the problem of sorting out the conflicting 
interests of Malays and non-Malays would be faced after the all 
important objective of winning the elections was first achieved.^
A crucial factor which the UMNO top leadership had to 
bear in mind when drafting the Alliance Election Manifesto was the 
imperative need to retain the goodwill and support of its Malay 
voters whilst concessions were made to non-Malay voters. This 
meant that the UMNO national leadership had to maintain a careful 
balance in its pledges on issues affecting both Malay and non- 
Malay interests, a far from easy task since these interests were 
often diametrically opposed. The UMNO and the MCA national 
leadership, however, successfully performed this balancing act 
during the Federal Elections.
The 1955 election results showed that the Alliance 
Manifesto had appealed to the Malayan electorate regardless of
1. There were no citizenship requirements for non-Malays to be 
eligible to vote in the 1955 Federal Elections. There were 
also no language or property qualifications, only a resi­
dential qualification requiring the voter to have lived in the 
Federation for the last five years preceding the elections. 
Voters had to be over 20 years of age. Report of the Committee 
Appointed to Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal
Legislative Council, p.18.
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racial and class background. The Alliance party won a landslide
victory, gaining 51 out of a total of 52 contested seats, and
polling 80% of the popular vote.^ The success of the UMNO and MCA
leadership's wooing of Malay and non-Malay votes lay in a number
of carefully thought out strategies. The first of these was that
it held out, as far as it possibly could, equally attractive
pledges on racially salient issues to both the Malay and non-Malay
voters. Where this golden mean could not be achieved because of
the sheer depths of racial passions aroused by the issues concerned,
the UMNO and MCA national leadership avoided giving offence by
declaring that the responsibility of making the decisions on these
issues lay not with the Alliance but with an outside party - the
independence Constitutional Commission, which was to be appointed
to investigate the terms of independence for Malaya. Another
strategy which the UMNO and MCA top leaders employed to retain
their hold over the allegiance of their Malay and Chinese supporters
was to control information that was allowed to filter down to the
Malay and Chinese grass-roots during the election campaign. This
was achieved mainly through the publication of two versions of its
2
Election Manifesto. The comprehensive version contained the full
1. Party Negara, in contrast, failed to capture a single seat and 
polled a mere 7.6% of the total, vote. Ratnam, pp. 186-200.
2. The full Manifesto is a 42-paged booklet entitled Menuju Kearah 
Kemerdekaan (The Road to Independence) : Alliance Platform for 
the Federal Election^, printed by the Alliance National Council 
in 1955, the abridged version is a 4-paged pamphlet entitled 
Alliance Manifesto for Federal Elections, TCL Papers, SP13,
List of Printed Materials, no.37.
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text of the Alliance pledges and policy statements and was intended 
only to have a limited circulation amongst the country’s political 
elite - the British officials and members of the Federal Legisla­
tive Council and other opinion makers of the country. The main 
purpose of this version was.to show the country’s inner circle that 
the Alliance leadership had a clearly thought oiit policy on every 
major issue and was qualified to govern the Malayan 
people. The other version of the manifesto, specially designed for 
mass consumption and circulation, was an abridged and censored 
summary of the comprehensive manifesto. Parts of policy statements 
in the comprehensive manifesto pertaining to racially salient issues 
such as citizenship, special rights, land, and agriculture were 
omitted in the abridged version lest it provoke the hostility of 
either the Malay or non-Malay voters. Finally, the Alliance leader­
ship contrived to take the heat out of racial sentiments by focusing 
the attention of all its voters on the immediate objective of 
Malayan independence. The Alliance leadership had judged correctly 
that independence would be its trump card in the election campaign, 
having staged the National Convention to press for immediate self 
rule and holding the boycott to press the British Government to 
accept the recommendations of the National Convention. In the eyes 
of the Malayan populace, the Alliance coalition had done more than 
any party to promote the smooth handing over of power in Malaya; 
certainly its record on that score was far more impressive than 
that of the other parties contesting the elections, including its 
most serious challenger, the Party Negara. By making the attainment 
of independence the key plank in its electoral platform, the
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Alliance national leadership cleverly appealed to supra-communal 
sentiments and successfully got the Malayan electorate to submerge 
racial and class differences to achieve the higher objective of the 
colonial emancipation of the Malayan people.
The ensuing discussion of the manifesto examines the role
played by the MCA English-educated leaders in drawing up the
manifesto, and how this MCA influence was reflected in the resulting
election platform of the Alliance. Responsility for formulation
of the election platform was given to five UMNO and seven MCA
representatives. The MCA drew up the following paper: "Finance and
Economic Policies" by H.S. Lee; "Education" by Leung Cheung Ling
(a leading MCA representative on the MCA Chinese Education CC);
"Consequences of the Alliance Assuming Responsibility without
Financial and Economic Powers" by Tan Siew Sin; "Housing and Town
Planning in the Federation" by Ong Yoke Lin; "Alliance Organisation,
Elections Machinery and Finance" by T.H. Tan; "Cost of the
Emergency in the Federation" by Tan Cheng Lock; and "Economic Aid
1
to Malays" by Leong Yew Koh.
1. Leong Yew Koh's paper on "Economic Aid to Malays" was not a 
policy paper on Malay special rights, but was merely a comment 
on the UMNO papers on the subject. . The UMNO representatives 
who drew up policy papers for the Manifesto were: Tunku Abdul 
Rahman - "Politics" (this included papers on the Position of 
Rulers and Constitutional Reforms, Malayanization of the Services, 
Citizenship, National Language, Form of Government); Datuk 
Razak bin Hussein - "Administration", "Alliance Believes in 
Free Malaya" and "Local Government". Dr. Ismail bin Datuk Abdul 
Rahman - "Agricultural Policy", "Land Policy" and "Medical and 
Health". Bahaman bin Samsuddin - "Social Services". Aziz bin 
Ishak - "Information Services". Information taken from "Report 
to the Alliance National Executive Committee", mimeo., 18 
March 1955.
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The MCA papers on economics, finance and education 
contained clear-cut policies which were beneficial to Chinese 
interests. Although the platform papers on special rights, 
citizenship, land, agriculture and fisheries were drawn up by the 
UMNO representatives, Chinese interests in these fields were not 
adversely affected; on the contrary, the pledges on land and 
agriculture were positively attractive to Chinese voters. All in 
all, the various planks in the Alliance election platform satisfied 
the different class interests of the Chinese community, from the 
capitalist towkays to the petty traders down to the squatter 
population in the New Villages. Chinese hopes and expectations were 
high, and a sense of well-being and harmony prevailed between the 
different social groups within the MCA, and between the party and 
the Chinese community at large.
Aside from independence, two other major issues - citizen­
ship and education - were issues which would draw the support of 
Chinese voters regardless of class and social origins. Although it 
is true that all Chinese resident in Malaya were unhappy about the 
stringent conditions governing the acquisition of Malayan citizen­
ship in the Federation of Malaya Agreement, the problem of Chinese 
education was in fact the "hotter" issue with the Chinese community 
at large, because the very existence of Chinese education in Malaya 
was threatened by the 1952 Education Ordinance and the 1954 White 
Paper on Education. The pledges made by the Alliance on Chinese 
education helped reduce fears regarding these policies. The 
Alliance promised to review the 1952 Education Ordinance and it was 
clear that an Alliance government would oppose the aims of the
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Ordinance since the Manifesto (in the version designed for mass 
circulation) stated that the Alliance would allow "vernacular 
schools their normal expansion" and would "encourage rather than 
destroy the schools, languages or culture of any race living in 
this country".* The MCA efforts to fight the 1952 Education 
Ordinance had finally produced positive results; it now stood to 
reap the goodwill of the Chinese community during the Federal 
Elections.
The UMNO was willing to accommodate the interests of 
Chinese education because it was able to make similar promises 
regarding the development of Malay education and language in the 
Manifesto. The Alliance promised that more money would be allocated 
to finance the expansion of Malay government schools as well as 
privately-run Islamic schools, which predominated in the rural areas. 
Most important, the Manifesto promised to make the Malay language 
the national language of the country. This pledge reflected the 
personal commitment of the UMNO English-educated leadership to the 
issue as much as popular demands by the Malay community at large. 
Tunku Abdul Rahman's statements on the question showed the deep 
commitment he felt about the status of the Malay language. When the 
1952 Education Ordinance was debated in the Federal Legislative 
Council, the Tunku obviously did not favour the intention of the 
colonial administration to abolish Chinese and Indian schools in the 
country. In his speech defending the right of the different
1. Alliance Manifesto..^,, p.3,
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communities to be educated in their own language, he also made an 
important point regarding the status of the Malay langugge: "Let 
the Chinese be taught in their schools, let the Indians be taught
in their schools.... Our only concern is that ... Malay must remain
! 1
i an official language of this country.’' The Alliance therefore
|
promised to uphold the right of the different races to an education
I
j in their mother tongues; however, the Malay language was to be
i
| accorded a more privileged status than the Chinese and Indian
languages. Malay voters could then deduce that the usage of the 
Malay language was to have top priority in the educational system 
of an Alliance-governed independent Malaya.
Citizenship for non-Malays was the other issue affecting the 
interests of Chinese from all class and social backgrounds. The stringent 
citizenship provisions of the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 
prevented the overwhelming majority of Chinese then resident in the 
country from getting the franchise. The MCA national leaders had 
since that time argued persistently for the liberalisation of the 
citizenship provisions, particularly for the granting of citizenship to
j non-Malays based on the principle of jus soli, as has been shown in the
earlier discussion of the proceedings of the Communities Liaison Commi­
ttee. Whilst the Chinese voters wanted a pledge from the Alliance to 
grant jus soli to non-Malays, the Malay voters completely opposed it.
It is not an exaggeration to say that citizenship was the most divisive 
of all the racially salient issues in the first half of the 1950sy
1. Proceedings of the Federal Legislative Council, 20 September 
1951, p.260.
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the Malay community had fought for the demise of the Malayan Union 
because it promised to grant citizenship based on jus soli to non- 
Malays and the community was not prepared to see the advantage it 
had gained taken away in 1955. The Alliance leadership, therefore, 
had to work out a way of dealing with this seemingly intractable 
issue.
It decided that the only way of resolving the conflicting 
interests of Malay and non-Malay voters was to actually disclaim 
that it was going to make any decisions on citizenship. In the 
abridged Manifesto, the Alliance stated that it would press the 
British Government to appoint a special Independent Commission to 
investigate the terms of Malayan independence and make recommendations 
on constitutional reforms. One of the main duties of this 
Commission would be ”to study the nationality problem in the country 
so that it can be satisfactorily resolved". The public stand of the 
Alliance on citizenship was this; it did not hold out any promises 
to non-Malays, but instead attempted to reassure them that the 
problem would receive serious consideration in the immediate future.
The MCA leadership, however, knew that the UMNO national 
leaders had conceded far more to the non-rMalay demands on citizen­
ship than what the Alliance had made known in public. The Alliance 
position on the matter in its full Manifesto designed for limited 
circulation and the Tunku’s views in an election policy paper on 
citizenship make this clear. The Alliance top leadership could 
afford to be less circumspect on the issue of citizenship in its 
comprehensive Manifesto because it was protected by the restricted 
circulation of the document. In this document, the Alliance
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expressed its willingness to grant citizenship to the large
majority of non-Malays resident in the country, although this was
Expressed in more an implicit than explicit form;^
As a result of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 
of 1948, a problem of a large alien population
has been created in the Federation..., An inde­
pendent Malaya cannot tolerate this state of 
affairs.... To meet this situation, it is 
essential that Independent Malaya must create 
unity and a common loyalty among her peoples, 
and this will not be achieved if half her 
population were to remain aliens.
While the willingness of the Alliance to grant citizenship to the 
majority of non-Malays was implicitly made in the above, the state­
ment on the same subject made by Tunku Abdul Rahman in his platform 
paper was totally explicit and clear-cut. The Tunku stated that the 
UMNO and MCA national leaders had privately agreed that citizenship
based on jus soli should be given to non-Malays as part of a deal in
2
which Malays would be guaranteed special rights;
The principle of jus soli is almost universally 
adopted and practised. In the Federation, if 
this principle were adopted, the special position 
of Malays must be safeguarded, because Malays are 
weak economically and they have a genuine fear 
that their legitimate interests might be relegated 
to the background; if the principle of jus soli 
is recommended by the Special Independent Commission 
to be written into the Constitution, the Alliance 
pledges that the special position of the Malays 
will be safeguarded and likewise written into 
the Constitution,.., The Alliance ... feels that 
the genuine aspirations of non-Malays and the
1. Menuju Kearah Kemerdekaan, p .36.
2. Paper on citizenship prepared by Tunku Abdul Rahman, 18 March. 
1955.
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legitimate interests of Malays could be met by 
accepting the principle of jus soli and the 
principle of the special position of Malays be
written into the Constitution of the Federation
of Malaya..,.
The above is quoted at some length because, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, the issues of citizenship and special rights dominated 
the intra-Alliance talks to draw up the Alliance proposals for the 
Independent Constitution, and the Tunku's views as expressed above 
were an important point of reference for the UMNO and MCA negotia-
tions. Tunku Abdul Rahman also made an announcement of the same
fact to a meeting of the MCA General Committee which was convened in 
June 1954 to get the support of the MCA Chinese-speaking leaders for 
the Alliance boycott of government bodies. Addressing the MCA 
delegates, the Tunku said: "... the principle of jus soli has been 
accepted by UMNO1’.'*'
Despite the fact that the UMNO's views on jus soli were 
only aired in private to the MCA top leaders, and on one occasion 
during a closed session of a meeting of the MCA General Committee, 
the Alliance leaders were careful to ensure that Malay sentiments be 
placated if news of this private assurance given to the MCA should 
leak out. Both the MCA and the UMNO top leadership were in agreement 
that the goodwill of Malay voters was paramount to the interests of 
the Alliance during the Federal Elections because Malay voters then 
formed 84.2% of the total electorate; Chinese voters formed 11.2%
1. Speech by Tunku Abdul Rahman at the Central General Committee 
Meeting of the MCA held on 13 June 1954.
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and the others a mere 4.6%.^ Therefore, while the UMNO national 
leaders wished to please their MCA friends and accommodate Chinese 
interests, they would not do so at the expense of alienating the 
Malay vote.
The insurance taken out by the UMNO to retain the loyalty
of its Malay supporters during the Federal Elections was its pledges
on special rights. While the Alliance did not make any specific
promises on citizenship in its widely-circulated Manifesto, that was
not the case with special rights. The abridged Manifesto stated
that the Alliance would ’’safeguard the special position of Malays”;
and the comprehensive Manifesto declared; ”... the Alliance pledges
that the special position of the Malays will be safeguarded and
2
written in the Constitution.,..”
The MCA leaders made no objections to the public statements 
made on the special position of the Malays because they were 
satisfied with the private assurances given to them by the UMNO on 
citizenship. Besides, they felt that the Manifesto's pledges on 
Chinese education were enough to draw in the Chinese vote. Further­
more, the Alliance platform on economics and finance, land and 
agriculture were also beneficial to certain class interests within 
the Chinese community; the platform on economics and finance 
attracted the support of the capitalist towkays, and the policies
1. Ratnam, p.186,
2. Alliance Manifesto.,.., p.l; Menuju Rearah Kemerdekaan, 
p.37.
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on land and agriculture held out security of land tenure to the 
half million strong Chinese New Village population. At the same 
time, the class interests of Chinese petty traders, farmers and 
fishermen were likewise accommodated.
The Alliance platform on economics and finance was drawn 
up by H.S. Lee, one of the most successful Chinese businessman in 
Malaya and also the president of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, 
the bastion of Chinese capitalist interests in Malaya. It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that capitalist interests in the 
country should be so well served by the Alliance economic plank. In 
fact, the larger part of the economic plank was based on recommen­
dations submitted to the Alliance National Council by members of the 
Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce.^ These economic policies 
emphasised a strong commitment to free enterprise and other classic 
features of a capitalist economy such as the granting of tax 
exemptions for newly established business enterprises and the 
relaxation of exchange controls to attract foreign investment into 
Malaya. In addition, there would be no nationalisation of local 
private industries, British and other foreign concerns in the 
country. The UMNO national leaders left the task of drawing up the 
Alliance economic platform to the MCA leaders, because they felt 
that they lacked the commercial experience and background to deal 
with business policies. It must be remembered that there were hardly 
any UMNO leaders who were then engaged in commercial and industrial
1. ’’Memorandum on Federal Elections” by Henry T.W. Wong, Secretary 
of the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, mimeo., 6 
January 1955, TCL Papers, TCL/111/295.
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enterprises; the present breed of successful Malay entrepreneurs is 
very much the product of the New Economic Policy introduced in the 
country after 1969.
The Alliance agrarian platform, drawn up by the UMNO 
leadership, reflected awareness of two important considerations: 
that Malay voters formed nearly 85% of the total electorate, and 
that these voters were mainly poor farmers and fishermen. The UMNO 
leadership had always believed that the level of welfare for such 
deprived Malays should be improved, and this belief had formed the 
basis for its insistence on Malay special rights; the numerical 
importance of the Malay rural vote in the Federal Elections made it 
even more pertinent and necessary for the UMNO to take immediate 
action in this respect. The Alliance Election Manifesto consequently 
placed a great deal of emphasis on agrarian policies which were 
designed to benefit the majority of the Malay population living in 
rural areas. Both the Alliance Manifestos, the comprehensive and 
abridged versions, spelt out in careful detail the types of measures 
which an elected Alliance Government would implement related to land, 
agriculture, fisheries, rural welfare and so on.^
1. The major promises made by the Alliance in these areas consisted 
of the following: (a) Land policy - to develop and expand Malay 
reservations which were unsuitable or inadequate for farming; to 
establish land settlement schemes to provide land and livelihood 
for the landless, (b) Agriculture - to improve the marketing and 
transport systems serving agriculture; to make loans easily 
available to farmers and smallholders; to provide agricultural 
education; to improve farming methods; to diversify crop 
cultivation; to establish and expand cooperative societies for 
farmers. (c) Fisheries - to increase catch by employing the most 
efficient methods of fishing; to provide proper storage and 
transport facilities for the fishing industry; to help fishermen 
in finding suitable employment during off-seasons. In addition 
to the above, the Alliance pledged to improve the overall quality 
of life for rural Malays by improving and expanding educational, 
medical, housing and other social welfare services in the 
countryside.
317
While it is clear that the Alliance agrarian platform 
sought primarily to benefit Malay interests, the MCA leadership did 
play a part in influencing the platform in a manner which was 
advantageous to Chinese interests. The MCA leadership's influence 
on the Alliance agrarian platform is discernible in three ways:
.in persuading the UMNO leadership to exclude a comprehensive 
program of drastic economic reforms from the Election Manifesto; 
in obtaining a pledge from the UMNO to ensure security of land 
tenure for Chinese agriculturists; and in getting the UMNO to soft 
pedal on a pledge made to Malay fishermen which would have harmed 
the interests of Chinese middlemen in the fishing industry.
When the UMNO and MCA delegates met to discuss the 
contents of their Election Manifesto, the UMNO leaders had already 
formulated a program to improve Malay welfare.* However, none of 
the recommendations contained in the UMNO memorandum were included 
in the Alliance Manifesto, as the UMNO and MCA leaders agreed that 
the elections were not an opportune time to publicise the contents 
of the document.
The UMNO memorandum had.recommended that government should 
introduce radical economic reforms to increase the Malay standard 
of living. It declared that there should be "drastic and direct 
Government involvemeht" in every sector of the Malayan economy to 
ensure that Malays would have "rapid and active participation in 
the economic life of the country". The document then outlined the
1. "United Malays National Organisation: A Memorandum on the 
Economic Position of Malays", mimeo., February 1953.
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types of special rights which Malays would have in education, 
agriculture, industry, trade and commerce. Malay special rights in 
these areas were to be implemented through the legislative and 
executive arm of the state. The scope and range of state inter­
ventionist action envisaged by the UMNO to implement Malay special 
rights was indeed far-reaching. In the agrarian sector, for example, 
the UMNO’s proposals for improving rural Malay welfare, radical by 
any standard, involved the abolishing of private enterprises 
connected with the processing, transporting and marketing of agri­
cultural produce, and their replacement by state-run cooperatives.
The memorandum declared that only government-sponsored cooperatives 
should be allowed to exist to service the needs of Malay farmers and 
"all other private undertakings should be abolished by law” . It 
added that in mainly Malay areas ”no individual produce buyer should 
be permitted to operate". The memorandum further stated that private 
marketing organisations would be banned and replaced by state 
marketing boards; and State Agricultural Banks would be the sole 
source of credit for Malay agriculturalists. In other words, the 
major purpose of these agrarian reforms was to eradicate the role 
of the middlemen in the subsistence economy of the Malay peasantry.
It was widely held that the dealings of middlemen, most of them 
Chinese,had created Malay rural poverty, chiefly through the 
practice of charging exorbitantly high interest rates on credit 
loaned to Malay agriculturalists. Therefore, the UMNO sought to 
abolish non-Malay control over the Malay peasantry, even though 
these middlemen provided services which included the financing, 
processing and marketing of the produce of the Malay peasant
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household, and the provision of agricultural goods and other daily 
necessities, albeit often on terms unfavourable to the Malay 
peasant clients.
The memorandum likewise argued that state legislative and 
executive action should be implemented in the fields of education, 
trade, commerce and industry to increase the level of Malay perfor­
mance in these areas. The memorandum proposed that, among other 
things, Malays should receive preferential treatment in the distri­
bution of educational grants and places in educational institutions, 
and in the allocation of business licenses and bank loans. It also 
stated that "in the management of estates, factories and mines, the 
employment of a percentage of Malays on the staff should be made 
compulsory”. In addition, it should also be compulsory for '’estates, 
factories and mines to employ a percentage of Malays where a large 
number of labourers (are) employed".^ The UMNO memorandum on the 
economic position of Malays was carefully studied by the MCA 
national leadership and its reaction was noted in the election 
policy paper, prepared by Leong Yew Koh, called "Memorandum on the 
Economic Aid to Malays”. A study of this paper reveals that the 
MCA national leadership had no objections to the UMNO claim that 
Malays ought to receive special treatment to improve their economic 
welfare. The paper stated that "the political stability and well-
1. There is a striking similarity in the principles underlying 
these measures proposed by the UMNO in 1953 and those subse­
quently implemented by the National Front Government under its 
New Economic Policy after 1969.
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being of the country" depended upon a marked improvement in the 
standard of living of Malays. The MCA national leadership also 
agreed with the UMNO that government legislation should be intro­
duced to bring about an improvement in Malay welfare. However, the 
MCA top leadership sharply disagreed with the UMNO on the scope and 
extent of government intervention on behalf of the Malay community. 
It argued that legislation benefitting the welfare of Malays should 
only be implemented if existing non-Malay economic interests were 
left unharmed. The MCA top leadership outlined the areas where 
Malay special rights should and should not be introduced.^
In the agrarian sector, the MCA top leadership was 
adamantly opposed to the proposed banning of private enterprise as 
a means of safeguarding the interests of the Malay peasantry. 
Specifically, it completely disagreed with the UMNO that the function 
of the middlemen be eradicated. Its argument appears to have been 
based on two premises. First, the prohibition of private enterprise 
in the rural areas would severely damage the business interests of 
Chinese petty traders and retailers living there and performing,
1. The MCA memorandum recommended that Malays should receive special 
treatment in the following areas: (a) loans to be made easily
available to Malays by state-controlled banks to enable them to 
set up businesses in urban and rural areas; (b) education centres 
and training facilities to be set up to equip Malays with the 
necessary managerial, commercial and technical skills to parti­
cipate in commerce and industry; (c) licenses to be reserved 
for Malays in forestry, saw-milling, tin mining, rubber and other 
agricultural produce enterprises, and in other businesses such 
as the running of restaurants, hotels, petrol kiosks, rice and 
provision-dealing and public transportation; (d) land to be set 
aside in urban centres for Malays to run their businesses; and 
(e) where absolutely necessary, the government would legislate 
to promote the economic interests of Malays.
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amongst other services, middleman services for Malay kampung 
dwellers. The business interests of wealthy towkays in the bigger 
urban centres would also be adversely affected, for they had 
considerable financial dealings with the rural Chinese petty 
bourgeois class, particularly through credit and goods provided to 
rural Chinese traders. Since urban towkays and rural petty traders 
constituted the backbone of the MCA leadership from the national 
down to the grass-roots level, the MCA top leadership discouraged 
the UMNO from restricting, let along banning, their business 
activities.
Apart from the vested interests which the MCA top leaders 
had in arguing against the banning of private enterprise in the 
agrarian sector of the economy, the leaders had another reason for 
believing that such an action would not solve the problem of Malay 
poverty. A curtailment of Chinese business activities would not 
result in an increase in Malay wealth because, they reasoned, the 
wealth of Malaya lay not in the hands of the Chinese but with British 
and other foreign concerns. The MCA argued that British and other 
foreign companies controlled a much greater share of the country's 
wealth than Chinese business houses. Because of this, the MCA 
leaders argued, the source of Malay poverty did not stem from 
the activities of Chinese businesses in the rural and urban areas. 
They tried to persuade the UMNO top leadership that the solution 
to Malay poverty lay in limiting the control exerted by foreign 
interests in the plantation, mining, industrial and commercial
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sectors of the Malayan economy.
The MCA top leadership was greatly concerned that Chinese 
support for the Alliance not be alienated during the country*s 
first Federal Elections. They therefore persuaded the UMNO leader­
ship to avoid all mention of the contents of both the UMNO and MCA
j
i memoranda on the economic position of Malays in the Alliance Election
i
i
[ Manifesto. They assured the UMNO national leadership that they
| supported the latter*s claim for Malay special rights; however,
they pointed out that the elections were not a suitable occasion for 
publicising the MCA*s stand on the matter, as it would surely drive 
away non-Malay support for the Alliance.
The UMNO national leaders complied with the MCA*s views 
on the matter, largely because they themselves had no desire to 
introduce highly communally divisive issues into the elections 
campaign. Although the non-Malay electorate was not more than 15% 
of the entire electorate, it was important to the UMNO national 
leaders that they have the goodwill of the non-Malay community,
' because the issue of independence was at stake and the Alliance
! coalition could not afford to lose the support of any racial group
in the country. The whole matter was thus left out of the Election 
Manifesto and the Chinese public was hot informed about the private
1. See article by Tan Siew Sin in the Malayan Mirror, Vol.l, no.2, 
28 June 1953. Tan Siew Sin provided statistical evidence to 
back up his claim that British and other European companies 
owned and controlled a greater share of the country's wealth 
than Chinese companies. The same conclusions were reached by 
a non-Chinese who studied the problem. See Puthucheary, J.J., 
Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy, Donald Moore, 
Eastern Universities Press, Singapore, 1960.
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MCA national leaders’ agreement to the case for Malay 
special rights. One may note that the UMNO national leaders on 
their part had not disclosed their private views on citizenship for 
non-Malays to the Malay public for the same reason of wishing to 
avoid controversial and high-charged communal issues in the elections 
campaign.
A second feature which bore the mark of MCA influence on 
the drawing up of the Election Manifesto was the platform on 
fisheries. In the comprehensive Manifesto, the UMNO leadership 
pledged to improve the standard of living of Malay fishermen through 
various measures. One of these read: ”to find ways and means of 
preventing the fishermen from being indebted to middlemen”. Since 
many MCA lower echelon leaders and supporters were engaged in middle­
men activities in the fishing industry, the inclusion of a pledge to 
make Malay fishermen less dependent on the services of middlemen 
in the popularly-circulated Manifesto would be injurious to the 
standing of the MCA within the Chinese community at large. The 
English-educated MCA top leaders likewise needed the linkage 
services of the Chinese-speaking business leaders in the party to 
mobilise grass-roots Chinese support for the Alliance in the 
elections. Recognising these political facts, the UMNO leaders 
agreed to exclude the fisheries pledge in the broadly-circulated 
Manifesto. The inclusion of the pledge in the comprehensive 
Manifesto, however, was deemed necessary by the UMNO national leaders 
for they wanted to show Malay community leaders that they were 
aware of the major problem of indebtedness faced by Malay fishermen 
(and farmers) and were prepared to deal with the issue.
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The third area of MCA influence on the Alliance agrarian 
platform was the policy pertaining to land. The MCA national leaders 
made a positive contribution here by obtaining a pledge from the 
UMNO to ensure security of land tenure for Chinese agriculturalists, 
especially the newly settled squatter population in the New 
Villages. In the comprehensive Manifesto, the Alliance promised to 
replace the practice of issuing land licenses based on Temporary 
Occupation Licenses (T.O.Ls.), which were normally valid for one 
year, with longer term leases. The Manifesto stated that this would 
give "the occupiers of land security of tenure, and ... a ’touchable, 
seeable stake' which they would, in consequence, protect and 
develop". Furthermore, good agricultural land was to be made avail­
able to all farmers irrespective of race.
The promise contained in the Alliance Election Manifesto 
to secure an improvement in the deal for Chinese squatters stemmed 
largely from the efforts of the MCA national leaders, who, besides 
being sympathetic to the plight of the squatters, were also aware 
that the land issue was the key reason behind the alienation of the 
majority of the rural Chinese population from the authorities during 
the Emergency. The MCA national leaders had consistently argued 
that Chinese squatters had to be given greater security of land 
tenure if the government was to make any headway in weaning the 
Chinese rural population from supporting the Communists during the 
opening years of the government anti-insurgency campaign. The MCA 
national leaders argued that the Alliance coalition had to hold out 
the promise of security of land tenure to the half million Chinese 
New Villagers if the coalition wished to gain the allegiance of that
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sector of the Chinese community, and at the same time diminish the 
influence exercised by the MCP over the rural areas populated by 
Chinese agriculturalists. This point was forwarded in a party 
document drafted by Tan Siew Sin in February 1952 and subsequently 
circulated to the members of the Alliance Roundtable in mid-1954.
The paper declared:^
The squatters, most of whom are of Chinese origin, 
should be given permanent titles to the land they 
occupy, thus giving them a stake in the country, 
and such land should not be less than five acres
for each family. They must also be assisted with
a view to increasing production per man per acre.
It appears that the UMNO national leaders were responsive to the 
argument of the MCA on the subject, largely because the circumstances 
created by the Communist insurgency made it necessary for the 
Alliance, in its aspiration to form the first government in inde­
pendent Malaya, to appear at least to have the interests of the 
squatter population at.heart, Although the Emergency was well under 
control militarily in early 1955, the MCP could nevertheless 
continue to remain a significant thorn in the side of the authorities
if land grievances amongst the.Chinese New Villagers were left to
fester. The UMNO agreed that it was politically intelligent to 
offer greater security of land tenure to Chinese squatters, for 
this would kill two birds with one stone: the MCP would.find the
New Villages a less fruitful base to operate in, and the MCA would 
receive more positive commitment.from the Chinese lower classes 
living in the rural areas. These potential MCA supporters included
1. A Statement of the Aims and Objectives of the Malayan Chinese 
Association (printed pamphlet), n.d., (c.1954).
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not only the full-time farmers but also seasonal agriculturalists, 
who comprised plantation workers and tin mine labourers temporarily 
made redundant by a fall in the demand for labour in the plantations 
and mines in the vicinity of the New Villages,
While the UMNO national leaders were aware that.it was 
politically desirable to remove a major source of discontent 
prevalent among the rural Chinese population, it also had to 
consider how the Malay peasantry would react to pledges of liberal 
land tenure to Chinese farmers in the Alliance Manifesto. The UMNO 
national leaders were not blind to the fact that the Malay peasantry 
would regard any liberalisation of the existing system of Chinese 
land tenure as a serious encroachment upon its traditional rights 
to agricultural land in Malaya, which had been upheld by the 
colonial government and enshrined in the system of Malay Reserves. 
Because the UMNO national leaders wished to please the MCA on the 
matter and yet retain the support of the Malay masses at the same 
time, they agreed that a pledge ensuring greater security of land 
tenure for Chinese agriculturalists would be included in the compre­
hensive Manifesto but would be worded more ambiguously in the 
abridged Manifesto distributed to the masses. The abridged Manifesto 
stated that the Alliance would "ensure, the security of land tenure 
to agriculturalists", and "ensure vegetable growers of.security of 
tenure by replacing Temporary Occupation Licenses with Leases".
The significant difference between the two Manifestos is that where- 
aa the comprehensive Manifesto promised to replace T.O.Ls. with 
longer term land leases, the abridged Manifesto deliberately did not 
state whether the land leases would be short or long term ones.
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Furthermore, the comprehensive Manifesto promised to make agricul­
tural land freely available to all farmers regardless of race. The 
abridged Manifesto did not mention this pledge. It would appear 
that the differences between the two Manifestos were created by the 
Alliance national leadership to allow MCA election campaigners to 
assure the New Villagers that they faced brighter prospects 
concerning security of land tenure under an Alliance Government; at 
the same time UMNO campaigners could tell Malay kampong dwellers 
that an Alliance Government would not whittle away their established 
rights to rural land. In its quest for power in 1955 the Alliance 
leadership chose to balance itself rather precariously between the 
conflicting land claims of Malays and non-Malays; the problem was 
so intractable that it was felt best to leave it aside for the time 
being.^
A final pledge in the Alliance Manifesto, for which the 
MCA was responsible, was the labour plank aimed at getting the vote 
of the non-Malay rural and urban proletariat. A large part of the 
labour movement in the country, like the Chinese squatter population, 
had come under the influence of the MCP in the period immediately 
after the Second World War in Malaya. Whereas the Alliance pledges 
on land were an attempt to weaken the Communist hold over the New 
Village population, its labour pledges were designed to appeal to
1. It was not until the early 1970s that the UMNO leadership began 
to redress the land grievances of Chinese New Villagers; the 
problem, however, has yet to be satisfactorily resolved from the 
squatters’ viewpoint, See, Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Beyond the Tin 
M i n e s p p ,232-235.
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the predominantly Chinese tin mining labourers, the predominantly 
Indian rubber estate workers, and the mixed Chinese and Indian urban 
unskilled and semi-skilled work force. The Alliance promised, among 
other things, to ensure a fair deal for workers; to achieve full 
employment; to provide training facilities for workers; to promote 
the growth of healthy and strong trade unions; and to encourage the 
expansion of workers’ cooperative shops in rubber estates and other 
areas with a concentrated work force. While it may be said that 
the implementation of an enlightened labour policy would be 
inimical to the capitalist interests represented in the MCA - the 
towkays who were the employers of labour in business, manufacturing, 
mining and plantation enterprises - it was nevertheless necessary 
for the party to woo the support of the urban and rural Chinese 
proletariat during the election campaign.
In conclusion, it can be said that the MCA’s activities in 
the independence movement during the period 1953-1955 constituted a 
watershed in the development of the party, both in terms of the role 
it played in the nationalist politics of Malaya and in its relations 
with the Chinese community. At the s up ra~r communal level, the MCA’s 
joint efforts with, the UMNO to grasp the initiative in the indepen­
dence campaign established it as a leading Malayan nationalist party 
By mid-rl955, it had evolved from its social welfare origin into a 
well-organised political party with a larger membership and greater 
financial resources than the UMNO. The party’s cooperation with the 
UMNO in sponsoring the National Convention and holding the boycott 
of the Federal Legislative Council and other government bodies was 
instrumental in speeding up the timetable for independence in Malaya
329
The MCA English-educated national leaders won the goodwill 
and friendship of the UMNO top ranking leaders as a result of their 
whole-hearted support for the Alliance independence campaign. UMNO 
goodwill and trust in the MCA’s top leadership in turn made it
possible for the MCA to advance the interests of the Chinese community
at large, as is seen in the liberal pledges on the educational,
economic and political position of the Chinese community made in the
Alliance Election Manifesto of July 1955. The Alliance pledges on 
education and citizenship gave the MCA the support.of Chinese voters 
from different class and social backgrounds. The Manifesto’s 
economic platform appealed to Chinese capitalist interests, and the 
agrarian and labour platforms attracted the sympathy of the Chinese 
rural and urban proletariat. The Alliance election pledges raised 
the hopes of the Chinese community and created widespread support 
for the MCA* there were high expectations amongst the Chinese that 
their interests would be well served by an Alliance Government in 
independent Malaya.
The efforts exerted by the MCA national leadership to fight 
for the repeal of the 1952 Education Ordinance and the sincerity of 
Tan Cheng Lock’s commitment to obtain a better deal for Chinese 
education and language between 1952 and 1955 created widespread 
Chinese confidence in the English-educated leadership of the party.
A strong bond of party solidarity existed between these two ranking 
English-educated leaders and the Chinese-speaking lower echelon 
leaders and party rank and file. United by the common objective of 
gaining independence as well as by the mutual desire to protect the
existing system of Chinese eduction, the MCA reached the zenith of 
its popularity with the Chinese community during this period.
330
CHAPTER 7
AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION AND DEFEAT 
OF THE BREAKAWAY MOVEMENT
This chapter discusses the drawing up of the Alliance 
constitutional proposals for independence, commonly referred to as 
the Merdeka (independence) compact or bargain, and its impact upon 
the development of the MCA from early 1956 to the declaration of 
independence in August 1957. The Merdeka compact produced two 
countervailing trends in the MCA: at the supra-communal level, the 
party continued to play as pivotal and important a role as it had 
done in the years 1953-1955 discussed in the preceding chapter; at 
the intra-communal level, the standing of the MCA within the Chinese
community began to decline. Although the MCA leaders were successful
.o-a
in bring^Chinese concerns into the political mainstream while at the 
same time negotiating the bargain which led to independence, a wide 
segment of the Chinese community was dissatisfied with the compromises 
made by the English-educated top echelon leaders on the issues of 
special rights and language, and a breakaway movement emerged from 
within the party.
7.1 The Merdeka Compact
The Merdeka compact was presented to the Reid Constitu­
tional Commission, which had been appointed by the British 
Government to make recommendations regarding the terms of Malayan
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independence. However, the constitutional proposals ultimately 
recommended by the Reid Commission differed significantly from the 
Merdeka compact, particularly on the subject of special rights, 
language and a number of other racially-salient issues. The Reid 
proposals on these issues benefitted non-Malay interests more than 
the Alliance proposals, yet the MCA national leadership supported 
the UMNO in arguing for the inclusion of the Alliance, not the 
Reid, proposals in the Federation of Malaya constitution. It is 
vital that we understand the motives of the MCA top leadership in 
supporting constitutional proposals which were highly unpopular 
with the lower echelon party leadership and membership, and with 
the Chinese community at large.
The MCA top leadership's seeming disregard of Chinese 
objections to the Merdeka compact gave rise to a breakaway movement 
within the Party. A key question is: why did the movement fail to 
supplant the MCA top leadership which had negotiated the unpopular 
constitutional proposals? In other words, we have to examine the 
process in which the English-educated leadership overcame the 
challenge to its position, reimposed control over the party rank 
and file, and regained the allegiance of the Chinese community.
1. The Alliance Party, after five months of negotiations, April- 
September 1956, submitted their constitutional proposals to 
the Reid Commission in a document entitled "Memorandum to the 
Reid Constitutional Commission", mimeo., 27 September 1956. 
Although the memorandum contained the constitutional views of 
the Alliance, it did not represent the final Alliance position 
on special rights and language. These matters were resolved 
in mid 1957 after the Alliance leaders held further negotiations 
to define their final viewpoints following the release of the 
Reid proposals in February 1957.
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To do this, we will turn our attention to the role played by the 
British Government and the UMNO in influencing and manipulating 
the relationship between the MCA top leadership, the breakaway 
movement, and the Chinese community at large.
The Malay, Chinese and Indian Alliance leaders are, or 
were, the founding fathers of independent Malaya, for it was they 
who successfully led the campaign for self-rule and prepared the 
blueprint upon which the Federation of Malaya constitution was based. 
Where differences existed between the constitutional proposals 
forwarded by the Alliance and the.Reid Commission, it was the 
Alliance proposals which were eventually incorporated into the 
final draft of the Malayan constitution.
The Merdeka compact was drawn up by an elite group of 
English-educated Alliance leaders who formed a sub-committee to 
prepare the documents. The UMNO was represented by Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, Datuk Abdul Razak bin Hussein, Dr. Ismail bin Datuk Rahman, 
Ismail bin Mohamed Ali, Mohamed Khir Johari, Senu bin Abdul Rahman, 
Rahman bin Haji Talib, Abdul Kadir bin Shamsuddin, Abdul Aziz bin 
Ishak and Mohamed Daud. The MCA negotiating team comprised Tan 
Siew Sin, Leong YewKoh, H.S. Lee, Ong Yoke Lin, Dr. Lim Chong Eu,
Ng Ee Teong, Too Joon Hing, Yong Pung How and T.H. Tan, who 
functioned as rapporteur for the negotiating sessions. A conspicuous 
MCA absentee was Tan Cheng Lock, the party president, who could 
not attend the negotiations because of poor health. The MIC 
representatives were V.T. Sambathan, K. Ramanathan, K.L. Devasar,
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B. Kaher Singh, V. Manickavasagam and A. Krishnadas.
Citizenship, special rights and language were the three 
major issues which caused division and dissent not only among the 
Alliance negotiators, but also among the second echelon party 
leadership and membership, and among the different communities at 
large. The popular sentiments of the different communities 
regarding these issues were reflected clearly in vernacular and 
English press reports of the period.
Typical of the uncompromising and unchanging views of the 
Malay community were press editorials and reports; resolutions 
passed by some UMNO branches; statements of leaders such as Datuk 
Onn of the Party Negara, Boestaman of the Party Rakyat and Dr. 
Burhanuddin of the Pan Malayan Islamic Association (forerunner of 
Party Islam); and the deliberations of the Second Malay Congress. 
These different sources of Malay public opinion expressed four basic 
common viewpoints on the constitutional question: (1) that citizen­
ship based on jus soli not be given to non-Malays, (2) that Malays 
have an unquestionable and perpetual claim to special rights,
(3) that the Malay language become the sole national and official 
language in independent Malaya, and (4) that the ceremonial and 
substantive foundations of the new Malayan nation state be based
1. The Merdeka compact was essentially a bargain between the UMNO 
and the MCA. The MIC, being a small and poorly organised party 
which represented less than 10% of the population, played a 
relatively minor role in determining the outcome of the 
negotiations. For a discussion of the MIC role in the negotia­
tions, see Ampalavanar, pp.195-199.
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upon the Malay cultural and political heritage.
UMNO second echelon leaders such as Datuk Mohamed Haniffah
sounded constant warnings to their national leaders not to concede
any ground related to citizenship, special rights and language to
2
the non-Malays at the Alliance constitutional negotiations.
Equally strong cautioning came from Malay vernacular press editorials.
A leader writer in the Warta Negara pointed out that the UMNO was
formed in 1946 to unite and lead the Malay community in opposing
the Malayan Union. He stated that the main reason why Malays
opposed the Malayan Union was because it promised equal citizenship
rights to Malays and non-Malays. He then concluded that the
victory of the Malays in aborting the life of the Malayan Union
would be a hollow one if the UMNO were now to give in to the MCA
3
demand for jus soli and equal citizenship rights.
Of the Malay political leaders, Datuk Onn was the most 
vocal and active in calling for a hardline stand. When the Reid 
Commission released its findings, Datuk Onn organised a number of 
mass rallies, including a 2,000 strong rally in Province Wellesley 
on 10 March 1957, to denounce the Reid proposals which recommended 
that a time limit be placed on the implementation of Malay special 
rights, and that Chinese and Indian be official languages for a
1. See, e.g., the following press reports: Utusan Melayu, 5 March
1953, 28 April 1956, 12 March 1957, 5 May 1957. Majlis, 31
August 1955, 17 April 1956. Warta Negara, 26 March 1956, 4 
January 1957,, Straits Times, 3 April 1956.
2. Straits Times, 13 April 1956.
3. Warta Negara, 16 April 1956.
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period of time after independence. More significantly, Datuk Onn
convened a meeting attended by political rivals of the UMNO such as
Dr. Burhanuddin of the Pan Malayan Islamic Association and Boestaman
of Party Rakyat. The organisers called the meeting the Second
Malay Congress, explaining that it was the successor to the First
Malay Congress convened by Datuk Onn in March 1946 to oppose the
implementation of the Malayan Union. The objective of the Second
Malay Congress was to prevent Malays from losing their birthrights
under the proposed independence constitution in the same way that
the First Malay Congress sought to protect the Malay position which
2
was threatened by the Malayan Union scheme.
Chinese public opinion (like Indian public opinion) was 
diametrically opposed to the Malay position. Laukeh leaders of 
influential and powerful huay kuans and Chambers of Commerce, such 
as the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, the Perak Chinese Association 
and the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, and school teachers 
organised in the United Chinese School Teachers Association (UCSTA), 
were the most vocal champions of Chinese rights. These leaders 
wanted the following.concessions granted to Chinese and other non- 
Malays in the Federation of Malaya constitution: (1) citizenship
1. Utusan Melayu, 12 March 1957.
2. The Second Malay Congress passed five resolutions during its 
five-day sitting: (1) that Malay special rights not be governed 
by a time limit; (2) that Malay be the sole national and 
official language; (3) that Islam be the official religion;
(4) that Malayan nationality be called "Melayu” nationality;
(5) that independent Malaya be named "The Federation of Malay 
States". Utusan Melayu, 10 April and 8 May 1957.
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based on jus soli for all non-Malays in Malaya born before and after 
the date of independence; (2) citizenship for those born outside 
Malaya after a continuous residential period of five years and 
without a qualifying language test in Malay or English; (3) equal 
political, economic and cultural rights for all Malayan citizens
| regardless of race; (4) recognition of Kuo Yu (Mandarin) as an
j
| official language, together with Malay, Tamil and English; and
[
I (5) multi-lingualism in the country's legislative and executive
assemblies.^
Typical of highly-charged Chinese feelings and arguments 
justifying the Chinese right to citizenship and equal rights is the
i
vexed editorial cry of a Chinese daily: "What is the meaning of
independence for Chinese if Malays become the masters and non-Malays
2
the slaves of Malaya?" The vernacular press warned the MCA
national leaders that if they disappointed the expectations of the
community in their negotiations with the UMNO, the MCA would lose
3
the support and allegiance of the community.
1. These views were contained in the memoranda submitted by Chinese 
associations to the Reid Commission. See, e.g., Associated 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce: Memorandum to the Chairman and 
Members of the Independence Constitutional Committee for the 
Federation of Malaya, Charles Grenier and Co. Ltd., Kuala Lumpur, 
June 1956; "The Constitution for Independent Malaya and 
Political Equality for All People of Malaya", memorandum 
submitted by the Representatives of Registered Chinese Societies 
and Associations in the state of Negri Sembilan, mimeo, July 
1957; and, Memorandum to be Submitted to the Reid Constitutional 
Commission by Chinese Organisations in Malacca, Wah Seong Press 
Ltd., Malacca, 28 July 1956,
2. China Press, 25 April 1956.
3. Sin Chew Jit Poh, 13 April 1956.
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Given the irreconcil able differences between the Malay 
and Chinese communities, the UMNO and MCA leaders at the Alliance 
constitutional negotiations knew that no one set of compromises 
would satisfy everyone. Moreover, the negotiations would have been 
greatly complicated had the leaders attempted to consult grassroots 
opinion at every stage of the deliberations. In the case of the 
MCA, the party’s English-educated representatives insisted on and 
obtained the mandate of the party general assembly to make the final 
decisions on behalf of the party and the Chinese community at 
large.^ The westernised leaders succeeded in getting the mandate 
because Laukeh party leaders and members approved of, and had 
confidence in, the westernised leaders’ handling of party matters 
to that point. In particular, the Laukeh elements in the party 
were pleased with the westernised leaders' championing of Chinese 
education and their campaign against the 1952 Education Ordinance, 
as well as with their successful efforts to obtain a satisfactory 
deal for Chinese interests in the Alliance Election Manifesto of 
July 1955.
The Merdeka compact worked out by the UMNO and MCA dealt 
with a whole range of issues pertaining to the political and 
administrative structure of independent Malaya, as well as the
1. See, ’’Sequel of Action Taken by MCA on Constitutional Proposals", 
mimeo., August 1957.
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constitutional position of the different races in the country. The 
delegates devoted most of their time to working out an agreement 
on citizenship, special rights and language. Final agreement was 
reached only after much heated argument, offering and withdrawing 
of tentative compromises, and arduous and protracted bargaining.
On the issue of citizenship, the UMNO leaders agreed to
the following basic terms: (1) citizenship based on jus soli would
be automatically given to all those b o m  in Malaya on and after the
date of independence; (2) those who were b o m  in Malaya before
independence would qualify for citizenship after having resided in
the country for five out of seven years preceding the date of
application for citizenship; those not b o m  in Malaya would qualify
2
after a period of eight out of twelve years. The UMNO, after 
holding off pressure from the MCA for several years - ever since 
Tan Cheng Lock first brought up the issue at the Communities Liaison 
Committee deliberations in 1949-50 - had at last decided to agree 
to the MCA demand for jus soli. UMNO's decision marked a momentous 
watershed in the history of Chinese political development in Malaya.
1. The Alliance proposals in the "Memorandum to the Reid Constitu­
tional Commission" were arranged under the following headings:
(I) Composition of new state, (2) Name of new state, (3) Head 
of State, (4) Their Highnesses the Rulers and Conference of 
Rulers, (5) the Legislature: the Dewan Negara and Dewan Rakyat,
(6) Elections, (7) Powers of both Houses, (8) the Executive,
(9) the Judiciary, (10) Division of Legislative and Executive 
Powers between the Federal Government and State Government,
(II) Fundamental rights, (12) Principles of National Policies, 
(13) Common Nationality and Citizenship, (14) Special Position 
of Malays, (15) Definition of Malay, (16) Language, Religion and 
other miscellaneous issues, (17) Amendments to the Constitution.
2. Ibid., pp.11-16,
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It gave citizenship and franchise to nearly half the Chinese 
population, thus enabling the community as a whole to play an 
effective role in the political life of the country.
The UMNO finally agreed to jus soli because of three 
considerations - pressure from Whitehall, the need to provide a 
stable and strong foundation for the new Malayan nation state, and 
the desire to gain concessions from the MCA on special rights and 
language.
The British Government had emphasised to the Alliance 
leaders, time and again, that power should be shared by Malay and 
non-Malay leaders (although Malays would be the dominant partners), 
and that future generations of Chinese and Indians should not be 
excluded from playing a legitimate role in the political, economic 
and cultural life of independent Malaya. The UMNO leaders believed 
that Whitehall would only grant independence if nearly all non- 
Malays could become Malayan citizens.'*' Coupled with the pressure 
from Whitehall was UMNO's own desire to provide a solid and strong 
basis for the new Malayan state. Granting citizenship based on jus 
soli to the immigrant Chinese and Indian population would lay the 
cornerstone of the foundations for independent Malaya since their 
loyalty and allegiance would be bound to their new country of 
adoption.
The final UMNO motivation behind its citizenship decision 
was the usefulness of jus soli as a bargaining counter to obtain
1. Interview, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 2 August 1976.
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unqualified MCA support on Malay special rights and the sole status 
of Malay as the official and national language of independent 
Malaya. MCA support for the UMNO was crucial in the light of the 
Reid proposals which recommended placing restrictions on the 
implementation of special rights policy and recognised Mandarin and
Tamil as official languages for a period of time after independence.
The Alliance proposal on special rights as submitted to 
the Reid Commission gave a comprehensive elucidation of the issue 
and raised a number of important points:*
While we accept that in independent Malaya all 
nationals should be accorded equal rights, 
privileges and opportunities and there must not 
be discrimination on grounds of race or creed, 
we recognize the fact that the Malays are the 
original sons of the soil and that they have a
special position arising from this fact, and also
by virtue of treaties made between the British 
Government and the various sovereign Malay States.
The Constitution should, therefore, provide that 
the Yang di-Pertuan Besar should have the special 
responsibility of safeguarding the special 
position of the Malays. In pursuance of this, 
the Constitution should give him powers to reserve 
for the Malays a reasonable proportion of lands, 
posts in public service, permits to engage in 
business or trade, where such permits are 
restricted and controlled by law, grant scholar­
ships and such similar privileges accorded by the 
Government; but in pursuance of this further
1. "Memorandum to the Reid ...", p.17. The memorandum further 
stated: "For the purpose of providing for the special position 
of Malays, it is necessary to have a definition of Malay....
We therefore suggest the following as a definition: 'A person 
shall be deemed to be a Malay if (1) He practices the religion 
of Islam; (2) He habitually practices Malay customs; (3) He 
habitually speaks the Malay language; and (4) He is a person, 
or the descendant of a person, who at the commencement of the 
Constitution, (a) was domiciled in the Federation of Malaya, oic 
(b) had been born in the territories comprised in the Federation 
of Malaya, ^r (c) had been born of parents one of whom had been 
born in the territories in the Federation of Malaya'", p.18.
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responsibility of safeguarding the legitimate 
interests of the other communities, the 
Constitution should also provide that any 
exercise of such powers should not in any way 
infringe the legitimate interests of the other 
communities or adversely affect or diminish 
the rights and privileges at present enjoyed by 
them.
The phraseology above indicates that the MCA negotiators 
agreed to a number of significant points. Firstly, the MCA 
recognised that Malays had an undisputed claim to special rights 
treatment because of this status as sons of the soil, i.e. > 
Bumiputras. Secondly, the MCA acknowledged that Malays had a 
political position superior to that of non-Malays. Since the 
British Government acquired legitimacy for its colonial rule in 
Malaya through treaties made with Malay sultans, the traditional 
rulers of Malay society, the MCA accepted that modem day Malay 
political representatives stood to inherit sovereignty from the 
departing colonial power. Thirdly, the MCA conceded that the 
Sultans, being the traditional font of authority in pre-colonial 
Malaya, would be invested with more than a ceremonial role in 
independent Malaya. The Malay head of state, the Yang di-Pertuan 
Besar (Agong), would possess substantive powers to safeguard the 
special position of Malays. He would have powers to reserve lands, 
government posts, business permits, and other privileges for Malays. 
Fourthly, the MCA expected the "legitimate interests" and rights 
and privileges of other communities would not be adversely affected 
or diminished by the implementation of special rights policy. 
Finally, the Alliance proposal on special rights did not stipulate 
whether there should be a time limit governing the implementation
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of SDecial rights. This oversight was deliberate, as we shall soon 
see.
The question of language was the only area where the 
Alliance delegates did not show an initial common stand. The 
delegates submitted two sets of proposals to the Reid Commission. 
The first represented the joint views of the UMNO, MCA and MIC, and 
the second represented the views of the MCA and MIC only. (A final 
common stand was produced only after further negotiations were held 
in view of the Reid proposal recommending multi-lingualism.) The 
joint UMNO-MCA-MIC viewpoint stated that Malay would be the national 
language, provided there was "protection of the languages and 
culture of all races, and of their schools and cultural institu­
tions".1 It was also agreed by all that English would be recognised 
as an official language for a maximum period of ten years after 
independence.
The MCA and MIC asked for the recognition of Kuo Yu and
Tamil as official languages for a period of time after independence.
They wanted "the use of English, Kuo Yu and Tamil in Councils with
the permission of the Chairmen or Speakers for a minimum period of
ten years and thereafter until such time as the legislative should
decide that the use of language other than Malay is no longer 
2
necessary". The MCA delegates had insisted upon the submission of




the above proposal largely because MCA Laukeh leaders were organising 
a breakaway movement to champion the cause of multi-lingualism. In 
the face of MCA insistence, the UMNO had reluctantly agreed that the 
Alliance would submit two sets of proposals on language and that the 
final Alliance position would be worked out after the Reid > 
Commission released its findings.
7 .2 The Reid Constitutional Proposals
The Reid Constitutional Commission toured Malaya from 
March to May 1956, consulting and collating the views of public 
organisations and influential individuals on constitutional 
reform.^ The Commission published its report in February 1957 and 
the differences between its findings and the Alliance constitutional 
proposals triggered off further negotiations between the Alliance 
partners. Whitehall appointed a Constitutional Working Party 
comprising three representatives of the British Government, four 
representatives of the Malay Rulers and four representatives of the 
Alliance coalition (Tunku Abdul Rahman, Datuk Abdul Razak, Ong Yoke 
Lin and Sambanthan) to resolve the differences between the Reid and 
Alliance constitutional proposals. The Alliance delegates had the 
clear cut support of the Malay rulers in the Working Party, for the 
Alliance proposals on the position of Malay rulers benefitted their 
interests more than the Reid recommendations.
1. The Commission comprised Lord Reid, and four other members: 
W.J. McKell from Australia, B. Malik from India, Abdul Hamid 
from Pakistan, and Ivor Jennings from Great Britain.
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The most significant difference between the Merdeka 
compact and the Reid report was the difference in emphasis placed 
on the political and cultural identity of the new Malayan nation 
state. Whereas the Merdeka compact generally emphasised the 
symbolic and substantive Malay character of independent Malaya, the 
Reid Report placed greater emphasis on the multi-racial aspect of 
independent Malaya. On matters related to special rights, language, 
religion, the position of Malay rulers and Malay land reservations, 
the Reid Report wanted a greater parity in the treatment of Malay 
and non-Malay interests than was found in the Merdeka compact.*
One may assume that the Reid Commission favoured a 
generally balanced treatment of Malay and non-Malay interests be­
cause it felt that institutionalised favouritism for one race, be 
it political, cultural or economic, would be potentially damaging 
to the long term stability of independent Malaya. The Reid 
Commission probably believed that the singling out of Malays for 
privileged treatment would generate hostility, envy and frustration 
in non-Malays, and impede the process of national integration and 
nation-building. However, it recognised that Malays needed special 
help to improve their economic position, which was far behind that 
of non-Malays. It therefore recommended that Malays should have 
special rights, but only for a limited period of time in order to 
fulfill the objective of advancing the Malay position without 
harming the long term political stability of Malaya. It recommended
1. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Federation of Malay Consti­
tutional Commission: Appendix II, Draft Constitution of the
Federation of Malaya, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, February 
1957. See particularly pp.7, 126-135, 150-152, 173-174, 183.
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that special rights not be included in the permanent section of the
constitution, but be written as transitional and temporary clauses
which would be reviewed for possible removal after a period of
1
fifteen years after independence.
On the subject of language, although the Reid report
recognised that Malay would become the national language, it also
recommended that Kuo Yu, Tamil and English be official languages
for a period of ten years or more as determined by the Malayan 
2
Parliament. The Reid recommendation on multi-lingualism recognised 
the multi-ethnic nature of Malayan society and the implicit 
desirability of independent Malaya functioning as a pluralistic 
entity in government, commerce, education, culture and other 
aspects of community life. The proposal also widened the base for 
political activity, as non-English and non-Malay-speaking Chinese 
and Indian leaders would be able to participate in the political 
processes of independent Malaya. The UMNO, in contrast, wanted to 
use only the Malay language as the language of government and the 
basis for state education and state culture, a policy which would 
exclude vernacular-speaking non-Malay leaders from the corridors of 
power.
The Reid proposal on religion, like language, recognised 
the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of Malaya. The 
Alliance proposal had recommended that Islam became the official 
religion of Malaya, provided that: ’"The observance of this principle




shall not impose any disability on non-Muslim nationals professing
and practising their own religions, and shall not imply that the
State is not a secular S t a t e . T h e  Reid Report was silent on the
question of an official religion. Instead of endorsing the Alliance
proposal, it merely stated that the Sultan of each state should
remain the head of Islam in his state and should continue to be
2
responsible for the supervision of Islamic affairs.
On the question of the constitutional position of the
Malay rulers, the Reid Report recommended that the role of the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong and the Sultans be strictly ceremonial in character.
The Commission proposed that all substantive powers and functions
of government at the federal and state level be invested with the
elected representatives of Parliament and the state assemblies.
The only area where Malay rulers would exercise real power was in
3
overseeing Islamic matters of their states. The Alliance, in 
contrast, had proposed that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong have real 
powers in several areas to protect the special position of the 
Malays.
In the case of Malay land reservations, the Reid Report 
proposed placing restrictions upon the creation of new Malay reserves 
in any state after independence. The Alliance, however, wanted 
State governments to have the authority to increase Malay reserves
1. ’’Memorandum to the Reid p. 19.




up to a maximum of 50% of the total area available for private use 
in any state. Furthermore the Alliance wanted the system of Malay 
reservations to be introduced to Malacca and Penang, the two former 
Straits Settlements, on the same terms as the Malay states.^-
The Reid Report's and the Merdeka compact's views on
citizenship differed over the question of dual nationality, and not
the liberal terms governing the acquisition of Malayan citizenship
by non-Malays advocated by both. As expected, the Reid Report
proposed that non-Malays born on or after the date of independence
would automatically become Malayan citizens. Others born in Malaya
before the date of independence or outside Malaya could apply for
citizenship after fulfilling a relatively short period of residence
in the country and passing a simple language test in Malay or
English. Unlike the Merdeka compact, which did not endorse dual
nationality, the Reid Report recommended that Malayan citizens could
2
also become Commonwealth citizens. Non-Malays could thus become 
citizens of Malaya as well as of their former motherlands or other 
countries which were then member countries of the Commonwealth.
7.3 The Constitution of Independent Malaya
The Constitutional Working Party set up to resolve the 
differences between the Reid Report and the Merdeka compact over­
whelmingly decided in favour of the Merdeka compact. The constitution
1. Report of the Federation of Malaya..., pp.150-152; "Memorandum 
to the Reid...", p.9.
2. Report of the Federation of Malaya..., pp.128, 131-133.
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of independent Malaya thus reflected the dominant Malay 
perspective on national policy, state religion and culture, and 
state education.
Islam was recognised as the official religion, and Malay 
the sole official and national language. English, but not Mandarin 
and Tamil, was recognised as an official language for a period of 
ten years after independence. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Malay 
rulers became more than ceremonial heads of state. They possessed 
substantive powers and functions to safeguard the special position 
of Malays and to oversee the implementation of special rights policy. 
They remained the supreme authority of Islam in the Federation and 
in the Malay States. The constitution also decided against the 
restrictions on the creation of Malay reservations favoured by the 
Reid Report. Clauses pertaining to Malay special rights were 
written into the permanent and not temporary section of the consti­
tution and there was no time limit restriction on the implementation 
of special rights policy.*
While the constitution gave Malays special treatment in 
areas such as government employment, business opportunities, 
education and land rights, it also contained provisions safeguarding 
non-Malay interests. In the case of economic opportunities, the 
constitution stated that the implementation of Malay special rights
should not adversely affect the legitimate interests of non-Malays.
2
Article 153, for instance, stated:
1. Sheridan, A., The Federation of Malaya Constitution: Texts, 
Annotations and Commentary, Singapore, University of Malaya Law 
Review, Oceana Publications, New York.
2. Ibid., p.142.
Nothing in this Article shall operate to deprive 
or authorise the deprivation of any person of any 
right, privilege, permit or licence accrued to or 
enjoyed or held by him, or authorise a refusal to 
renew to any person any such permit or licence, 
or a refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or 
assignees of a person any permit or licence when 
the renewal or grant might reasonably be expected 
in the ordinary course of events.
and:
Nothing in this Article shall empower Parliament 
to restrict business or trade solely for the 
purpose of reservations for Malays.
The constitution also contained a provision /Article 89(42/ which 
stipulated that the creation of future Malay land reserves would 
not impinge upon the existing land holdings of non-Malays.
Constitutional provisions safeguarding the right of non- 
Malays to practise and propagate their religions and languages also 
existed. Article 11(1) and (3) provided for freedom of worship and 
the right of all religious groups to maintain and propagate their 
religious beliefs. On the question of language, while Article 152 
recognised Malay as the sole official and national language, it 
also stated: "no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using
(except for official purposes), or from teaching or learning, any 
other language; and nothing ... shall prejudice the right of the 
Federal Government or of any State Government to preserve and 
sustain the use and study of the language of any other community in 
the Federation."*
It was only in the area of dual nationality that the Reid 
position prevailed. Although the Alliance was against the proposal
1. Sheridan, p.140.
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which recommended that Malayan citizens could become Commonwealth 
citizens as well, the constitution recognised dual nationality. 
However, the concept of dual nationality as defined in the consti­
tution was more nominal than real. The constitution made clear that 
the Federation of Malaya Government would not give the rights and 
privileges held by Malayan citizens to Commonwealth citizens, and 
the Government also possessed the right to refuse Commonwealth 
citizens entry into Malaya.^" The Alliance leaders, therefore, were 
not perturbed by the provision of dual nationality in the 
constitution.
In the above areas which were racially-salient, the 
British Government decided to base the constitution of independent 
Malaya upon the Alliance rather than the Reid proposals. This 
decision stemmed from a number of considerations, a major one being 
the political standing of the Alliance coalition in Malaya. Having 
been elected in the July 1955 Federal Election as Malaya's first 
indigenous coalition party to exercise limited home rule, the 
Alliance was to inherit power from the colonial administration upon 
its departure from Malaya. Since the Alliance would rule Malaya 
until 1959, when general elections were scheduled to be held,
Whitehall felt that the Alliance constitutional proposals should be 
given special priority. It appeared more sensible to accept the 
Alliance constitutional arrangements for the Malayan people than to 
impose a settlement worked out by a foreign constitutional commission. 
Moreover, the Alliance position, which reflected basically the UMNO
1. Sheridan, p.35.
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position, received unconditional support from the Malay rulers 
as well as from the MCA and MIC representatives in the Constitutional 
Working Party.
One might speculate if the British Government would have 
as readily consented to the Alliance position if the MCA leaders 
had not endorsed the UMNO viewpoint. Since Chinese then made up 
almost 40% of the population, MCA's support of the UMNO position, 
particularly on the issues of special rights and language, might 
well have been an important factor in making up the British mind to 
incorporate the UMNO viewpoints in the independence constitution.'. 
Also, the British Government was mindful of the fact that the UMNO 
was, and was likely to remain, the dominant element in any ruling 
coalition government of Malaya. It is pertinent, at this point, 
to ask why the MCA top leadership finally accepted the UMNO view­
point on special rights, language and other racially-salient issues 
when acceptance of the Reid proposals would have benefitted the 
Chinese community more.
7.4 MCA Acceptance of the UMNO Constitutional Position
With all the activity surrounding the Alliance negotia­
tions, the presentation of the Reid Report and the final framing of 
the constitutional proposals, the momentum towards independence was 
quickened. The final round of Alliance negotiations, held between 
March and July 1957, took place in an atmosphere of euphoria.
There was a universal desire to secure the immediate realisation of 
independence and a strong determination to overcame all outstanding 
barriers along the last stretch of the road to independence. The
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MCA, the weaker of the bargaining partners, Was anxious not to be 
cast in the role of presenting obstacles that would delay 
independence.
The MCA representatives went into the negotiating room 
with one basic objective - the attainment of citizenship based on 
jus soli for non-Malays. To obtain this objective, the MCA top 
leaders were ultimately prepared to make concessions on special 
rights, language and other issues sought by the UMNO. The MCA top 
leaders realised that if they failed in their bid to obtain jus
soli, not only the political but the economic future of Chinese
would be severely threatened. On the eve of independence, MCA 
leaders were successful businessmen without a secure political base. 
They knew that the attainment of jus soli and further relaxation
of residential and language test requirements governing the
acquisition of citizenship would enfranchise the majority of 
Chinese and thus enable them to protect their considerable economic 
stake in the country's economy, concentrated in particular in the 
urban retail trade, the plantation and mining sectors, and in the 
construction, transportation, light manufacturing and services 
industries. Chinese votes and party funding from Chinese business 
quarters would guarantee a secure political base for the MCA in 
independent Malaya.
The MCA top leaders also knew, however, that the security 
of their political base depended upon the continued political 
patronage of the UMNO. They recognised the fact that the degree of 
political influence which the MCA would enjoy in independent 
Malaya would be dependent upon the degree of UMNO cooperation. The
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British Government, in keeping with its objective of making Malays 
the dominant political element in independent Malaya, had drawn up 
Federal and State constituencies in such a manner that Malay repre­
sentation in independent Malaya would overshadow non-Malay represen­
tation for a long period to come.* For the MCA to win more than a 
few seats in Parliament and the state assemblies, it needed to rely 
on UMNO largesse to allocate to it seats containing a majority of 
Malay voters, and on UMNO political clout to deliver Malay votes to 
MCA candidates.
During the Alliance negotiations, the desire to cultivate
and retain UMNO goodwill was heavy in the mind of the MCA top
leaders. UMNO political patronage was seen as being more essential
to the MCA than relations with major Chinese pressure groups, the
huay kuans and Chambers of Commerce. The following metaphor
describing the relationship between the Malays (i.e. UMNO), the MCA
and Chinese associations reflected thinking which was typical of the
top leaders: "Nothing can compensate the Chinese for falling out
with the Malays, but if the tail /Chinese associations/ is allowed
to wag the head /MCA/, the MCA and the Chinese shall be in mortal 
2
danger". The MCA top leaders believed that the political fate of 
the MCA and the Chinese community depended upon the UMNO. They felt 
that no amount of independent action by the MCA or the Chinese
1. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Constituency Delineation 
Commission, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1954.
2. Memorandum on the subject of Citizenship of Chinese with regard 
to the Reid Constitutional Commission (probably written by T.H. 
Tan), mimeo., 11 April 1956. TCL Papers, TCL/12/lla.
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associations would succeed in attaining the objective of jus soli or 
any other critical goal. Therefore, in their desire to maintain a 
long term collaborationist relation with the UMNO, the MCA top 
leaders were prepared to sacrifice the demands of the Chinese asso­
ciations regarding the constitution, with the exception of jus soli, 
to the needs of the UMNO.
The MCA leadership had a stake in the continued pre­
eminent position of the UMNO in Malay society. The compromises it 
made on special rights and language stemmed from this very need to 
help the UMNO maintain its position at a time when widespread 
Malay anger arising from Chinese demands could be used by Malay 
opposition leaders against the UMNO. The proposals of the Reid 
Constitutional Commission on racially-salient issues received 
vociferous Malay disapproval and hostility.^" The angry Malay 
reaction to the Reid recommendations, in particular those on multi­
lingualism and a time restriction on special rights, provided a 
timely opportunity for the UMNO's rival to organise and mobilise 
Malay opposition to the Reid proposals and to warn the UMNO against 
agreeing to them. Datuk Onn of Party Negara, Dr. Burhanuddin of 
the Pan Malayan Islamic Association, and Boestaman of Party Rakyat 
organised the second Malay Congress to galvanise anti-UMNO feelings 
and to articulate Malay opposition to the Reid proposals. Faced 
with an obvious movement to undermine its standing within the Malay 
community, the UMNO top leaders felt they could not afford to make 
"Reid-like" concessions on special rights and multi-lingualism to
1. See, e.g., the following press reports: Warta Negara, 27
February 1957, 21 March 1957. Utusan Melayu, 7 and 12 March 
1957, 4 May 1957.
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the MCA. The UMNO, however, still agreed to jus soli for it was a 
precondition required by the British Government before it handed 
power over to the Alliance, and also because it represented the 
UMNO’s own thinking on the matter.
Even in the case of jus soli, the UMNO could not be seen
as being the party responsible for making the concession. Steps
were taken by the Alliance top leaders to mask the fact that the
UMNO had already agreed to jus soli in the Alliance negotiations in
mid 1956, well before the Reid Commission published its findings in
February 1957.* UMNO's acceptance of jus soli was not revealed to
the Malayan public, who were told instead: ’’The three parties of the
Alliance - UMNO, MCA and MIC - deadlocked on the controversial
question of jus soli ... decided today to pass the baby on to the
2
Reid Constitutional Commission” . Malay hostility towards the UMNO 
would be neutralised if it was believed that the British Government 
and the Reid Commission were responsible for giving jus soli to 
non-Malays. The MCA leaders were anxious to help the UMNO leaders 
overcome any potential opposition movement, for the efficacy of the 
UMNO's political patronage lay in its pre-eminent position in Malay 
society.
The MCA top leaders' concessions on special rights and 
language were a demonstration of goodwill and a willingness to give 
public support to the concept that Malays deserved favoured treat­
ment. The MCA top leaders' rationale that Malays had a claim to
1. Minutes of the Alliance Ad Hoc Political Subcommittee held on 
11 and 25 June 1957.
2. Singapore Standard, 11 July 1956.
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special rights is reflected succinctly in a party press release 
distributed to party publicity officers:^"
Ever since the advent of the British to Malaya, 
the Malays have enjoyed their special position.
The present Federation of Malaya Agreement 
acknowledges this fact. So in admitting that 
the Malays are in a special position, we are not 
doing anything new. On the other hand, if we 
do not accept the special position of the Malays, 
we shall be denying to them what is already theirs.
The circular further stated:
We wish to point out that despite the racial 
position of the Malays, the other communities 
in this country have not suffered. We all have 
prospered during the last 150 years, and there 
is every reason to believe we shall continue to 
prosper, as long as there is goodwill and co­
operation amongst the races living in the 
country. We should also remind the Chinese that 
the Malays are also in a very special position, 
on account of their voting strength. And yet 
during the Federal Election they did not use 
that special position to the detriment of others.
On the contrary, the Malays, through the good 
offices of the UMNO, used their voting strength 
to help the Chinese in particular.
The MCA leaders believed that UMNO goodwill up to the time of 
independence had benefitted the Chinese community politically; 
they wanted to assure the community that as long as the spirit of 
goodwill and cooperation prevailed between the UMNO and MCA, Chinese 
interests after independence would not be damaged by their agreement 
to accept the special position of Malays.
The MCA top leaders believed that the consitution itself 
afforded grounds for their optimistic assurances to the Chinese 
community. They felt that the constitution contained sufficient
1. MCA press release, mimeo., 30 October 1956.
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safeguards protecting non-Malay interests. In their acceptance of 
Malay special rights, the MCA delegates at the Alliance negotiation 
had insisted upon the inclusion of constitutional safeguards 
providing for the freedom of non-Malays to preserve, practise and 
propagate their religion, culture and language. The MCA delegates 
were particularly concerned that non-Malay economic interests would 
not be seriously weakened by the implementation of Malay special 
rights. Tan Siew Sin, for example, had insisted that the legal 
language describing the provision on special rights should be worded 
as carefully and as unambiguously as possible so that the legitimate 
interests of non-Malays would not be impinged on. He and the other 
MCA delegates gave special attention to negotiating the wording of 
Article 153(a): ’’Nothing in this Article shall empower Parliament 
to restrict business, or trade solely for the purpose of reservations 
for Malays” .*
In addition to the written constitutional safeguards, the
MCA leaders believed they had the assurance of the UMNO leaders that
special rights would be reviewed after a period of 15 years after
independence and eventually terminated. The UMNO delegates at the
Alliance negotiations had initially agreed that a time limit on
2
special rights should be written into the constitution. However,
1. Minutes of the Alliance Ad Hoc Political Subcommittee held on 
26 April 1957. See also the minutes of 2 and 5 April 1957.
2. Minutes of the Alliance Ad Hoc Political Subcommittee held on 
26 July 1956. Reporting back to the MCA Central Working 
Committee, Yong Pung How and Ng Ee Teong stated: ”It had been 
agreed by the Alliance that provisions should be included in 
the Constitution for the ’special position of Malays’ to be 
reviewed after 15 years....” Memorandum from Yong Pung How and 
Ng Ee Teong to the MCA CWC, mimeo,, 20 October 1956.
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more careful consideration of the subject convinced them that such 
a move would not be acceptable to the Malay community, a judgement 
which was in fact vindicated by the hostile Malay response to the 
Reid proposal on special rights. The UMNO delegates therefore 
decided that a time limit qualification on special rights should 
not be included in the Alliance memorandum to the Reid Commission.
The MCA leaders agreed to the UMNO position, for they believed that 
the UMNO intended to abolish special rights eventually. Their 
confidence stemmed from the fact that Tunku Abdul Rahman had 
verbally informed the Reid Commission that while the UMNO opposed 
the inclusion of a constitutional time limit proviso, the Alliance 
nonetheless intended to review the policy 15 years after indepen-- 
dence, with a view to its eventual termination.*
A final explanation for the MCA leaders' acceptance of 
the UMNO position was their belief that the constitution itself 
could be amended at some future date. They thought that as more 
non-Malays became enfranchised Malayan citizens, and if the number 
of non-Malay voters exceeded Malay voters with changes in demographic 
patterns, the non-Malay communities would one day possess the means 
to amend the constitutional provisions pertaining to special rights, 
language and other racially-salient issues. However naive this 
argument may appear, it was nonetheless effectively used by the 
party top leadership in persuading the rank and file to accept the 
UMNO position, as illustrated by the final meeting of the Party 
General Committee held to discuss the draft constitution. Joining
1. Minutes of the Alliance Ad Hoc Political Subcommittee held on 
2 April 1957.
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in the debate, Dr. Lim Chong Eu successfully argued that the 
constitution was amendable and that the meeting should accept the 
draft constitution as the MCA's immediate objective - independence 
with jus soli for non-Malays - was already assured.^-
The MCA top leaders believed that the Merdeka compact
represented a fair deal for the Chinese community. Jus soli had
been obtained and written constitutional safeguards existed to
protect non-Malay interests in the face of Malay special rights.
Moreover, these leaders were confident that the spirit of goodwill
and trust between the UMNO and MCA would act as a bulwark against
2
the erosion of the non-Malay position. The MCA top leadership's 
confidence and optimism, however, was not shared by a group of 
Laukeh party leaders who spearheaded a campaign to press for greater 
protection of Chinese interests in the independence constitution.
7.5 The Abortive Breakaway Movement
It may be recalled that popular Chinese demands regarding 
the constitution centred on three issues - citizenship for non- 
Malays based on jus soli, equal rights for all Malayan citizens, 
and the status of Mandarin as an official language. Chinese demands 
for the recognition of these issues by the colonial administration
1. Minutes of the MCA General Committee Meeting held on 7 July 1957.
2. The optimism of the MCA leaders was in fact borne out by the 
fact that during the first twelve years after independence, 
1957-1969, the UMNO under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman 
refrained from implementing an assertive Malay national 
language and special rights policy.
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had existed for some years before the beginning of the independence 
constitution negotiations.
When the MCA westernised leadership mounted its campaign 
for jus soli in the early 1950s, it had the strong and energetic 
backing of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, the huay kuans, 
educational bodies and other pressure groups within the community. 
When the Reid Commission toured Malaya from March to May 1956 to 
sound out the views of the Malayan people on the independence 
constitution, several Chinese organisations submitted their views ■ 
to the Commission. Typical of the impassioned arguments justifying 
the demand for jus soli and equal citizenship rights were the 
following views of the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce:*
Chinese popular opinion has repeatedly reminded 
us of the fact that by the terms of the Federation 
of Malaya Agreement 1948, a very large section of 
the non-Malay population was deprived of their 
birthrights and their political franchise. Now 
that a new Constitution is to be written, they 
naturally expect to see their rights and privileges 
restored so that in this newly-born independent 
and democratic Federation of Malaya, all nationals 
will become equal subjects enjoying equal rights 
and privileges and fulfilling equal duties, 
obligations and responsibilities.... It is our 
firm conviction that the principle of Jus Soli 
should be restored as an absolutely necessary 
provision in the New Constitution, if the 
country is to have peace and prosperity when 
independence is attained.
The memorandum submitted by the representatives of Chinese organi­
sations in Negri Sembilan argued for the necessity of jus soli and
1. Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce: Memorandum to the 
Chairman and Members of the Independence Constitutional
Commission.
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equal rights in a similar vein, stating that unless political 
equality were given to non-Malays, "the granting of independence 
to Malaya would bring about unrest and eventual chaos". It further 
warned that unless non-Malays were given a stake in the new nation 
state which was worth fighting for, Malaya would "from the moment 
of its birth /be/ a ready-made Hot Bed for Communism” .* According 
to this line of reasoning, the MCP stood a good chance of renewing 
its armed struggle if a discontented and largely disenfranchised 
Chinese population still existed to fuel its activities after 
independence.
The call for Mandarin to be recognised as an official
language was first raised in 1952 by the Associated Chinese Chambers
of Commerce in connection with the controversy over Chinese
education stirred up by the Barnes Report. The organisation had
requested the High Commissioner, General Templer, to recognise
Mandarin as an official language and to drop the Barnes Report in
2
favour of the Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese education. Although 
General Templer ignored the request, the cry for the recognition of 
Mandarin as an official language was taken up by the Chinese press,
3
Chinese associations and educational bodies. In mid-1953, Tan 
Cheng Lock, the party president, wrote to General Templer asking
1. Memorandum entitled "The Constitution for Independent Malaya...."
2. "Memorandum on the Report of the Committee on Malay Education 
and the Report on Chinese Education presented by the Associated 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce", mimeo., c.1952.
3. See, e.g., the following press reports: China Press, 11 August 
1954; Nanyang Siang Pau, 7 August 1954, 3 March 1955, 28 
September 1955.
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him to recognise Mandarin, English, Malay and Tamil, as the official
languages of Malaya.1 A year later, the MCA Chinese Education
Central Committee resolved that the MCA should play a key role in
2
getting Mandarin recognised as an official language.
When the Alliance constitutional talks began in April
1956, the MCA top leaders took great care to consult the views and
opinions of party branches and Chinese associations and they
obtained their mandate to make decisions on behalf of the party and
3
Chinese community at the Alliance talks. However, Laukeh party 
leaders were fearful that the outcome of the talks would not 
satisfy their demands. Their apprehension stemmed from the reali­
sation that the MCA was the weaker bargaining partner compared to 
the UMNO, and that the leaders, being English-educated, might not 
be assertive enough on Chinese language issues. The Laukeh
1. Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to General Templer dated 12 May 
1953, MCA headquarters.
2. Minutes of the MCA Chinese Education Central Committee held on 
21 August 1954.
3. The views of party branches and Chinese associations coincided 
because of the overlap in leadership and membership between 
them. Their views were contained in several memoranda submitted 
to the MCA Headquarters and the Reid Commission. See, e.g., the 
following: "Memorandum to the Chairman and Members of the 
Independence Constitutional Committee Appointed for the Federation 
of Malaya" submitted by the MCA Penang and Province Wellesley 
Branch, mimeo., July 1956, and entitled memoranda submitted by
(a) the Selangor Hokkien Association dated 3 March 1956;
(b) the MCA Baling Branch and Chinese Community dated 29 March 
1956; (c) the Perlis Chinese Chambers of Commerce dated 18
April 1956; (d) the Rubber Trade Association of Selangor and
Pahang dated 16 April 1956; (e) the Lower Perak Chinese Asso­
ciation dated 19 April 1956; Cf) the MCA Kuala Lipis Branch 
dated 26 April 1956; (g) the Trengganu Chinese Chambers of
Commerce dated 10 May 1956; and (h) the Federation of Kwangtung 
Association dated 1 June 1956. Mimeo.
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leaders therefore decided to organise a breakaway Chinese political 
party, comprising all the Chinese associations* to take over the 
leadership of the community from the MCA should the MCA top leaders 
fail to obtain the full range of the constitutional demands of the 
community. ^
The breakaway movement was spearheaded by four leading 
MCA huay kuan figures, known popularly as the Big Four. They were 
Lau Pak Khuan, a founder member and one-time president of the Perak 
MCA, chairman of the Federation of Registered Chinese Guilds and 
Associations (which claimed a membership of 1094 organisations), and 
chairman of other leading associations such as the Perak Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce, the Perak Chinese Mining Association and the 
Federation of Kwangtung Associations; Leong Chee Cheong, chairman 
of the Federation of the Selangor Chinese Guilds and Associations; 
Cho Yew Fai, vice-chairman of the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall; 
and Lim Lian Geok, chairman of the United Chinese School Teachers' 
Association. Lau Pak Khuan, the leading light of the movement was 
at the time one of the most influential huay kuan leaders in the 
country
1. Kwong Wah Yit Poh, 20 April 1956; Straits Times, 18 April 1956.
2. Lau Pak Khuan was a colourful, interesting and important figure 
in Perak-based Chinese politics in that period. He played a 
leading role in founding the Perak MCA and, later, without giving 
up his leadership in the party, became the President of the 
National Association of Perak (NAP) , a small Malay-based party 
founded by the Panglima Bukit Gant an g to rival the UMNO in Perak.
It is not clear why Lau joined the NAP, but it may be conjectured 
that he acted, in part, out of pique because of personal disagree­
ments with the party national leadership regarding party policies, 
and because he felt the national leadership had not given him due 
recognition for his services to the Perak MCA. G.P. Means is 
mistaken when he notes that Lau was the president of the NAP before 
he was the president of the Perak MCA and the Perak Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce. Actually the sequence was the reverse.
Means, Malaysian Politics, p.220, fn.18.
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Leong Chee Cheong*s involvement in the movement is a 
point of interest. The issue of multi-lingualism was first raised 
by him in January 1955 when he sent a petition to Tan Cheng Lock on 
behalf of the Federation of Selangor Guilds and Associations.
Leong wanted the MCA to press for the recognition of Mandarin as a 
language of communication in the Federal Council and state 
assemblies. He argued that Chinese-speaking MCA Laukeh leaders 
were, in his opinion, better qualified than the English-educated 
leaders to represent Chinese interests as the former came from the 
less elitist backgrounds of the Chinese-speaking and Chinese- 
educated masses . He stated: "most of them /English-speaking Chinese 
leaders/ are not conversant with social conditions especially the 
life of labourers. Their views cannot therefore represent the public 
opinion / s i c / " L e o n g ' s  request was politely rebuffed by the party 
top leaders. T.H. Tan, the Chief Executive Secretary informed 
Leong that it was then premature and unwise to insist on multi­
lingualism for it would retard the Alliance’s "progress towards
self-rule through the resistance of those at present in authority
2
to changes in our electoral laws". H.S. Lee, the MCA Selangor
chief and a powerful huay kuan leader in the state, was asked by
3
the party headquarters to persuade Leong to drop his demand.
Although the demand was formally withdrawn, Leong continued to fight
1. Letter from Leong Chee Cheong to Tan Cheng Lock dated 5 January 
1955, MCA headquarters.
2. Letter from T.H. Tan to Leong Chee Cheong dated 21 January 1955, 
MCA headquarters.
3. Minutes df the MCA Central Working Committee meeting held on 
21 February 1955.
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for his position outside the formal party structure as evidenced 
by his leadership role in the abortive breakaway movement.
The Big Four sponsored a mass meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 
27 April 1956 attended by 900 delegates representing 400 organisa­
tions. There were two items on the agenda - to draw up a list of 
demands of the community regarding the constitution and to form a 
mass-based party, to be called the Chinese General Association, as 
a movement to rival the MCA.'*' The meeting drew up four constitu­
tional demands: citizenship based on jus soli for anyone b o m  in 
Malaya; citizenship for aliens who had lived in the country for 
five years and without passing a language test; equal rights and 
privileges, and equal duties and obligations for all Malayan
citizens; and acceptance of Malay, Chinese and Indian languages for 
2
official use. The meeting, however, dropped the proposal to form 
a mass-based party comprising the Chinese associations. In its 
place, a smaller body called the Council of Representatives of 
Chinese Guilds and Associations (CRCGA), headed by Lau Pak Khuan and 
a 15-man Working Committee, was set up. A mass-based Chinese 
opposition party failed to materialise at the meeting because two 
of the four leading sponsors, Cho Yew Fai and Lim Liang Geok, with­
drew their support for the project at the very last minute. The 
withdrawal of Cho Yew Faifs and Lim Lian Geok's support for the
1. Kin Kwok Yit Pau. 28 April 1955.
2. "A Declaration of the Meeting of Representatives of Registered 
Chinese Organisations in Malaya for the Acquiring of Citisen- 
ship Rights” , mimeo., 27 April 1956.
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proposed Chinese General Association at a critical juncture, for 
reasons discussed below, broke the momentum of the breakaway move­
ment and prevented the emergence of a serious threat to the MCA's 
political pre-eminence within the Chinese community.
Lacking the open mass backing of Laukeh leaders, Lau Pak 
Khuan's CRCGA conducted an ineffective campaign to press for Chinese 
rights.* Its activities were largely confined to helping and co­
ordinating the efforts of Chinese organisations in preparing their 
memoranda to the Reid Constitutional Commission. It continued,
with little avail, to press the MCA top leaders to obtain the full
2
range of Chinese demands at the Alliance negotiations. The most 
significant and most publicised activity of the CRCGA was the 
despatching of a delegation to London to meet the Colonial Secretary, 
the outcome of which is discussed below.
The MCA top leaders viewed the emergence of the breakaway 
movement with alarm and took immediate steps to check its momentum 
and to abort its growth. They manoeuvred to break the unity of the 
Big Four and succeeded in drawing Cho Yew Fai and Lim Li an Geok
1. Lau also formed a second body, the Perak People’s Constitutional 
Rights Committee, which comprised Perak-based MCA leaders such 
as Ong Chin Seong and Peh Seng Khoon, as well as some Indian 
leaders such as D.R. Seenivasagam, B. Kanapathi Pillai and John 
Emmanuel. The body was shortlived, and apart from organising a 
mass rally attended by some 3,000 people in Ipoh, did not 
appear to conduct any other significant activities, Kin Kwok 
Yit Pau, 30 April 1956; Straits Times, 21 April 1956.
2. China Press, 11 March 1957; Sin Lit Pau, 17 April 1957. See 
also letter from Lau Pak Khuan addressed to Tan Cheng Lock 
dated 28 August 1956 in which Lau asked the MCA to support his 
movement.
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back to the MCA camp. Both Cho Yew Fai and Lim Lian Geok stated 
that they eventually decided against breaking ranks with the MCA 
because of the top leadership's plea for Chinese unity 
at a time when Malays and Chinese were locked in fierce bargaining 
over the independence constitution.^" The MCA top leaders had 
successfully appealed to the Laukeh leaders not to weaken their 
bargaining strength at the Alliance talks by splitting up the 
Chinese community. At the same time, however, the MCA appeared to 
have benefitted from the emergence of the breakaway movement, for the 
UMNO was under some pressure to concede, at the very least, to the 
most minimum MCA demand for jus soli since this concession would 
help the MCA to destroy the threat from Lau Pak Khuan's CRCGA.
The English-educated leaders further appealed to the Laukeh 
leaders to place their trust in the track record of the English- 
educated leaders on Chinese education and language issues. The 
English-educated leaders had persistently championed the cause of 
Chinese education and language, and they had spearheaded the campaign 
to obtain the repeal of the 1952 Education Ordinance which threatened 
the extinction of the Chinese language in state schools. They had 
also obtained a deal from the UMNO in the Alliance 1955 Federal 
Election Manifesto On Chinese education and language which was 
satisfactory to the Laukeh leaders. Their most recent achievement 
was the MCA's role in the preparation of a new education policy 
contained in the Razak Report.
1. Sin Chew Jit Poh, 14 and 25 April 1956.
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The colonial administration appointed an Education
Commission in 1956 under the chairmanship of Datuk Abdul Razak, the
Minister of Education, to formulate a new education policy to
replace the 1952 Education Ordinance. Too Joon Hing, a MCA delegate
to the Alliance negotiations, was the Assistant Minister of
Education and one of the four MCA members on the Razak Education
Commission. The Razak Education Report of May 1956, subsequently
enacted as the Education Act of March 1957, recognised the principle
of using the mother tongue as the medium of instruction, thus making
Chinese education a permanent feature of state education, at least
at the primary school level. Provisions existed making the study
of the Chinese language available to Chinese pupils in English-
medium schools; in addition, there were safeguards for the continued
existence and expansion of private Chinese secondary schools.^" The
Laukeh leaders were on the whole pleased with the Razak Education
Report and with the success of the MCA top leaders in achieving 
2
Chinese goals. Furthermore, the MCA top leaders assured the Laukeh 
leaders that, despite UMNO's objections, they would include proposals 
recommending Chinese as an official language and multi-lingual ism 
in the Alliance memorandum to the Reid Commission.
The plea for Chinese unity and satisfaction with the top 
leaders' performance on Chinese education were two of many considera­
tions which persuaded Cho Yew Fai and Lim Lian Geok to formally 
disassociate themselves from the breakaway movement. On the basis
1. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Committee, Council 
Paper 21 of 1956, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
2. Sin Chew Jit Poh, 9 May 1956.
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of the writer’s examination of party documents of the period, it 
may be conjectured that the Laukeh leaders accepted the top leader­
ship’s argument that the institutionalised collaborationist basis 
of political cooperation between the UMNO and MCA in the Alliance, 
and the goodwill and trust of the UMNO, were indispensable to the 
attainment of any Chinese political goal. The emergence of an 
opposition Chinese party, working ag£w$t the UMNO and challenging 
the needs of the Malay community, would, according to this line of 
argument, wholly undo the progress made by the UMNO and MCA in 
achieving a successful and stable political relationship and in 
attaining the imminent realisation of independence. One could also 
say that the Laukeh leaders had a nagging fear that should they 
persist in setting up a mass-based Chinese opposition party at a 
time when the constitutional debate had raised the temperature of 
racial tension, not only would they destroy the realisation of 
independence, but their action might also cause the outbreak of 
racial hostilities.
Although the MCA top leaders moved swiftly to check the 
momentum of the breakaway movement, their success in winning back 
the allegiance of most of the Laukeh leaders owed more to the mani­
pulations of the UMNO than to their own actions. UMNO took advan­
tage of the dependence of MCA leaders on UMNO largesse, a cliente- 
listic relationship paralleled in many respects by the dependence 
of the Laukeh leaders on the English-educated leaders. Laukeh party 
leaders needed the sophisticated cosmopolitan network of English- 
educated leaders to articulate and represent their interests at the 
multi-racial political centre. The English-educated leaders, in
370
turn, were UMNO's political clients, dependent ultimately on the 
UMNO for their political effectiveness.
UMNO leaders skilfully manipulated events at this critical 
juncture and wcnj. successful in aborting the growth of the breakaway 
movement by steadfastly refusing to negotiate with the Laukeh 
leaders and blocking their access to Whitehall. By discrediting the 
nationalist credentials of the breakaway movement as a Kuomintang- 
inspired movement, the UMNO succeeded in ensuring that the movement's 
delegation to London received an unsympathetic reception from the 
Colonial Office. UMNO's characterisation of the breakaway movement 
as a Kuomintang-inspired movement had a valid basis.
The Laukeh leaders associated with the breakaway movement 
and the Big Four who sponsored the mass meeting of 27 April 1956 
all had Kuomintang backgrounds. The Big Four, Lau Pak Khuan, Leong 
Chee Cheong, Cho Yew Fai and Lim Li an Geok; and other leaders of 
the breakaway body such as Peh Seng Khoon, Ong Chin Seong, Yap Mau 
Tatt, Toh Seang Ong, Tan Kee Gak, Ong Keng Seng, Chung Swee Thye 
and Tan Seng Soon, were well-known leaders of the KMTM before and 
immediately after World War Two. Lau Pak Khuan had been a high- 
ranking KMTM office-holder; he was a member of the KMTM Central 
Supervisory Council in 1945-1946 before the KMTM was banned following 
the outbreak of the Emergency. Even after the ban on the KMTM and 
the absorption of most of its leaders and supporters into the MCA, 
these ex-KMTM men continued to display their affiliation and soli­
darity with the Chiang Kai Shek Government. The ex-KMTM men in the 
MCA displayed their support for the Kuomintang Government in various 
ways, most conspicuously through the public celebration of the Double
371
Ten Anniversary up until 1956. In 1954, for example, Cho Yew Fai, 
one of the Big Four, was the toastmaster in the Double Ten celebra­
tion ceremony organised by the huay kuans in Kuala Lumpur. In his 
speech to the celebrants, Cho had stated that Chinese in Malaya 
should make every effort to promote the cause of the Kuomintang 
Government in its struggle to regain the motherland.'*'
The loyalty of the ex-KMTM to Malaya was questioned by
the UMNO and other Malay leaders. The following Utusan Melayu
editorial reflected typical Malay opinion vis-a-vis the huay kuan
leaders who supported the breakaway movement: "Most of the Chinese
associations and guilds are based on narrow chauvinism in that they
are led by leaders who are generally inclined towards the Kuomintang
2
and are imbued with narrow chauvinism". When the CRCGA delegation
arrived in London to present its views, the Colonial Secretary,
Lenno^-Boyd, was asked by Tunku Abdul Rahman not to receive the
delegation. The UMNO president stated that the delegation was a
Kuomintang group which was illegal in Malaya and whose loyalty to
3
the country was suspect. Defending his activities and the CRCGA,
Lau Pak Khuan stated: "Our loyalty to Malaya is not in doubt. It 
is because of our loyalty that we are trying to ensure fair treatment 
and cordial relations between different communities after independence. 
But there cannot be harmonious relations when nearly half the
1. China Press, 12 October 1954.
2. Utusan Melayu, 26 March 1956.
3. Utusan Melayu, 7 May 1957.
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population is dissatisfied’*.
Lau’s defence that the CRCGA was a loyal body acting in
the interest of Malayan Chinese failed to remove the taint of its
Kuomintang connection in the eyes of Whitehall. Lenno^-Boyd
initially refused to receive the CRCGA delegation, but after the
final round of constitutional talks between the British Government
and the Alliance delegation was over, he decided to meet Lau and i
the other CRCGA delegates, primarily to censure them on their
activities. He advised Lau and his colleagues to be ’’loyal Malayans"
and to accept the constitution as worked out by the British Govern-
2
ment, the Alliance and the Malay rulers. Whatever Lenno k-Boyd's 
personal views on the case for Chinese rights were, he could not 
deal with the CRCGA because of the doubts raised by the CRCGA’s 
links with the Kuomintang Government. He could not be certain if 
the body constituted a "fifth column" representing the foreign 
policy ambitions of Taiwan towards Malaya or it was a genuinely 
Malayan-centred Chinese body.
Condemned by the UMNO and denied access to the British 
Government, the majority of huay kuan leaders shied away from 
continuing to support the breakaway movement after the initial burst 
of organising activities. These Laukeh leaders formed the backbone 
of the Chinese mercantile class in Malaya and they needed the 
largesse of official patronage and access to government goodwill to 
pursue their economic activities. Therefore, while the CRCGA
1. Straits Times, 20 April 1957.
2 . Straits Times, 2 June 1957.
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represented the Chinese position more accurately than the MCA, it 
was an ineffective body because its Laukeh backers did not openly 
support it for fear of jeopardising their own private interests.
The MCA top leaders cleverly used the Kuomintang taint of 
the CRCGA to silence the opposition of the lower echelon party 
leaders and rank and file to the Merdeka compact. When the crucial 
Party General Committee meeting was convened to approve the White 
Paper on the Constitution, the top leaders indicated that only the 
"Kuomintang diehards" in the party would oppose the draft constitu­
tion. A party second-rung leader and ex-KMTM man, Chin See Yin, 
described the move as a "cleverly concocted attempt to avoid debate 
on the White Paper". The tactic succeeded in silencing rank and 
file protest and the meeting duly approved the draft constitution.*
Tan Siew Sin and Ong Yoke Lin, two of the MCA representa­
tives to the Alliance constitutional negotiations, had earlier 
asked for the expulsion of ex-KMTM party leaders who were involved 
with the breakaway movement. They wanted "rebels" such as Lau Pak 
Khuan, Yap Mau Tatt, Leong Chee Cheong and Toh Seang Eng to be 
expelled. They also asked for the dismissal of other ex-KMTM and
CRCGA supporters who held office in the state branches of Perak,
2
Negri Sembilan, Johore, Penang, Selangor and Malacca. The intention 
to sack the ex-KMTM and CRCGA men from the party turned out to be 
more of an exercise in bluster than an actual threat. The MCA
1. Straits Times, 4 July 1957. Minutes of the MCA General 
Committee Meeting held on 7 July 1957.
2. Minutes of the MCA Central Working Committee meeting held on 
4 May 1957.
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support base was sustained by these same huay kuan leaders and 
their removal would irreparably damage the strength of the party.
The predicament of the English-educated leaders was nicely observed 
by Chin See Yin in his letter to the party Honorary Secretary- 
General: "As many important members of the Working Committees of 
the local MCA are the supporters of the Pan Malayan Federation of 
Chinese Guilds and Associations /CRCGA/, I don’t see how such 
Working Committees could investigate and submit the names of members 
who acted in any way injurious to the interests of the Association 
/MCA/. It would be the case of the ’pot* calling the ’kettle’ 
black” .* The MCA contained so many ex-KMTM huay kuan leaders who 
supported the CRCGA that it was not possible for the top leaders to 
contemplate taking disciplinary action against the culprits.
7.6 The Reconciliation of the MCA and the CCC-Huay Kuan 
Establishment
The futility of supporting the breakaway movement due to 
lack of UMNO and British patronage made its leaders amenable to the 
reconciliatory overtures of the MCA top leadership. Realising the 
impracticality of taking disciplinary action against the Laukeh 
leaders, the top leadership worked to obtain the cooperation of the 
Laukeh leaders to concentrate the party’s energy on a matter of 
immediate urgency. This was a massive citizenship campaign involving 
all MCA branches and Chinese associations to help Chinese who were 
eligible for citizenship obtain that right during the first year of
1. Letter from Chin See Yin to the MCA Honorary Secretary-General 
dated 24 May 1957, MCA headquarters.
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independence when applicants were exempted from the Malay and 
English language test. The MCA top leaders dropped all action to 
expel Lau Pak Khuan and his CRCGA colleagues and Lau, in return, 
pledged the services and backing of the Chinese associations for 
the MCA citizenship campaign.^" The reconciliation between the MCA 
top leaders and the CRCGA leaders was formally marked by a Conference 
of Chinese Associations convened by the MCA on 10 November 1957 to 
inaugurate the MCA citizenship campaign, which too)c up most of the 
party's organising energies well into the early independence period. 
Public esteem was shown to the Big Four - Lau Pak Khuan, Leong Chee 
Cheong, Cho Yew Fai and Lim Lian Geok - when the Conference appointed 
them to sit on the 15-men Working Committee set up to direct and 
supervise the citizenship campaign.
The return of the CRCGA to the fold of the MCA and the re­
imposition of the authority of the westernised leadership over the 
Laukeh leadership and rank and file was welcomed by the UMNO.
Tunku Abdul Rahman was particularly pleased that the MCA top 
leadership had successfully persuaded the Laukeh leaders to drop 
the celebration of the Double Ten Anniversary on 10 October 1957, a 
few weeks after the declaration of independence in Malaya. The UMNO 
president lauded the "fine gesture" of the Chinese community for
demonstrating its "single loyalty" to the new nation state by
2
ceasing to observe the Double Ten, after having celebrated the
1. Nanyang Siang Pau,, 1 November 1957.
2 . Straits Times, 12 October 1957.
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event for an uninterrupted period of 46 years (except during the 
Japanese Occupation of Malaya). The demise of the Double Ten 
Anniversary in October 1957, symbolising the loyalty and allegiance 
of Laukeh Chinese towards their new motherland, was the first of 
many subsequent steps taken by Laukeh Chinese to strengthen the 
bond of brotherhood between the Chinese and Malay communities in 
independent Malaya.
The Laukeh leaders of the breakaway movement had started 
off by challenging the MCA westernised top leadership's hold over 
the Chinese community and had ended up by closing ranks with the 
party, thus reaffirming the supremacy of the westernised leaders 
and the pre-eminence of the MCA. They sealed their reconcilation 
with the MCA by helping the party to spearhead a mammoth citizenship 
drive and by placing the large manpower and the financial resources 
of the huay kuans at the disposal of the MCA. It was the joint
effort of the MCA and Laukeh huay kuan leaders in helping several
thousands of Chinese to obtain their citizenship rights that resulted 
in the integration of the Chinese community as a legitimate entity




The MCA’s pre-independence years 1949-1957 coincided 
with a political watershed in Malaya’s history, a period marked by 
the early and most turbulent phase of the Emergency, the moves 
towards decolonisation and the final grant of independence. The 
period was also a cross roadsin the development of Chinese politics 
in Malaya. The stringent citizenship terms of the Federation of 
Malaya Agreement 1948 disqualified over three-quarters of the Chinese 
population for citizenship, and the outbreak of the Emergency in 
June 1948 gave birth to the belief that most Chinese either actively 
supported the Communist terrorists or were uncommitted in their 
loyalty to the Federal Government. The formation of the MCA in 
February 1949 radically changed the existing state of affairs for 
the better. Between 1949 and 1957, it succeeded in destroying the 
myth of Chinese as being disloyal Communist sympathisers or 
apolitical; it linked up Chinese concerns with mainstream Malayan 
nationalist developments; it forged a political alliance with the 
premier Malay party, the UMNO; it brought Chinese influence to bear 
upon the independence constitution; and it obtained citizenship 
rights which ensured that the Chinese community had a legitimate 
political role to play in independent Malaya.
The MCA's achievements in those years made it the pre­
eminent mass-based Chinese political party in the country. It
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commanded mass support because its policies and activities were 
relevant to and fulfilled the needs of the community, both those 
created by the exigencies of the Emergency and others related to 
the community’s ambivalent and vulnerable legal and political 
position arising from its lack of citizenship and access to the 
political centre.
It may be recalled that the Chinese community faced an 
uncertain political future upon the conclusion of the Japanese 
Occupation in Malaya. The British plan of awarding a common 
citizenship to Malays and non-Malays under the Malayan Union scheme 
of March 1946, as a means of forging an integrated Malayan identity, 
fell apart as a result of intense Malay opposition orchestrated by 
the UMNO. The MalayftUnion scheme was replaced by the Federation 
of Malaya Agreement in February 1948. The stringent citizenship 
provisions under the new constitutional arrangement critically 
affected the position of the Chinese community whose plight was 
further compounded by two other concurrent events - the outbreak 
of the MCP insurrection in Malaya and the Communist victory in 
China.
The termination of the civil war in China, marked by the 
victory of the Chinese Communist Party in Peking in January 1949, 
ended the constant two-way flow of traffic of Laukeh Chinese 
travelling between Malaya and China. Dating back to the earliest 
days of mass migration to Malaya, Laukeh Chinese had maintained 
regular and close ties with their home villages and towns in China, 
returning for their education, to get married and raise families, 
and to retire. The Communist victory in China forced the majority
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of Laukeh sojourners to regard Malaya as their only permanent home. 
Fearing persecution from a Communist government which had confis­
cated their properties and businesses, or not wishing to live 
under Communist rule, the majority of Laukeh Chinese abandoned all 
intention of resettling back in China. Ironically, their new-born 
commitment to their home of adoption coincided with the passage of 
the Federation of Malaya Agreement which rendered them stateless 
persons in Malaya.
The outbreak and onset of the MCP insurrection further 
exacerbated the political dilemma of Laukeh Chinese. The MCP and 
KMTM had been locked in political rivalry to gain the allegiance 
of the Chinese community during the inter-war years. On the 
whole, the capitalist section represented by Laukeh huay kuan 
leaders tended to support the KMTM while the working class and 
petty bourgeoisie tended to sympathise with the MCP. The Japanese 
Occupation changed the pre-war patterns of political allegiance.
The MCP was the only credible war-time resistance movement and its 
influence within the Chinese community grew so much that it became 
the ascendent political force, with its power established in a 
number of small towns, upon the reoccupation of the country by 
British troops. During the BMA period, the KMTM resuscitated its 
organisation in an attempt to revive its pre-war rivalry with the 
MCP.
The demise of the MCP came, however, not from the 
challenge posed by the KMTM, which proved to be insubstantial, but 
from the colonial authorities. As the Malayan Union Administration
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stepped up its restrictions on and surveillance of Communist 
labour and political activities, the MCP lost the position of 
influence it had enjoyed during the BMA period. Thwarted in its 
attempt to gain power through working within the constitutional 
framework and with the colonial authorities, the MCP leadership 
opted for armed insurrection in June 1948 to establish a Communist 
state in Malaya. The insurrection called into question the loyalty 
of the Chinese community, for the revolt was a Chinese-led movement, 
and a sizeable proportion of the community had sympathised with its 
leadership because of allegiances built up during the Japanese 
Occupation and because of its promotion of Chinese labour interests 
in 1946 and 1947.
The only significant elements of the community which 
were hostile to the MCP revolt were the Anglophile SCBA leaders 
and Laukeh huay kuan leaders who had spearheaded the revival of 
the KMTM during the BMA period. The SCBA was an insignificant 
social movement in terms of numbers and influence, and the KMTM 
became inoperative following the imposition of Emergency rule. The 
anti-Communist section of the community therefore did not possess 
an institution to articulate and organise its interests.
The formation of the MCA in February 1949 filled an 
institutional void within the Chinese community which had been 
created by the insurgency. It came into being out of the realisa­
tion by the British authorities, Malay leaders and Chinese towkays 
that a Chinese political party was needed to mobilise the Chinese 
masses behind the government's anti-insurgency campaign. Both in
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organisation and method of operation, the MCA was an effective 
and innovative vehicle to serve and articulate the. needs of the 
Chinese political right. It combined the resources of both 
English-educated and traditional community leaders, with the 
former drawn mainly from the SCBA, and the latter from the huay 
kuans and the defunct KMTM. The westernised leaders brought to 
the party their knowledge of western political ideas and modern 
party organisation, and the traditional leaders provided a wide­
spread organisational base structured upon the existing huay kuan 
network. Laukeh support at the lower echelons of the party wedded 
to top echelon westernised leadership made the MCA a mass-based 
party capable of dealing with urgent post-war problems in an 
innovative and capable manner.
The first few years of the MCA were occupied by the 
immediate problems and needs of the community created by the insur­
gency, in particular those spawned by the New Village resettlement 
program. While the Laukeh huay kuan leaders in the MCA were 
content merely to involve the newly-found party in local level 
Emergency welfare work, the westernised leaders wanted the MCA to 
take off in a new direction and participate in the fast-changing, 
history-making events which were transforming Malaya from a colony 
into a new nation state. The MCA had carried out social welfare 
activities because of the exigencies of the Emergency. However, 
the westernised leadership wanted the MCA to become an overt 
political party having influence at the political centre and not 
just performing social welfare work like a prototype Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce-cum-huay kuan. The westernised leadership
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believed that the foremost objective of the MCA was to rectify 
the precarious legal status of the largely disenfranchised Chinese 
population. To achieve this goal, as well as to play an effective 
role at the multi-ethnic centre, MCA leaders had to collaborate 
with Malay political leaders who would hold the key to power in 
independent Malaya.
In 1951-1952, the party president, Tan Cheng Lock launched 
a reorganisation campaign to dispel the party's image as a social 
welfare organisation, and to centralise and modernise party organi­
sation and machinery in order to prepare the party for participation 
in electoral politics. The colonial administration introduced local 
elections at the municipal level - in Penang in December 1951 and 
Kuala Lumpur in February 1952 - as measures to prepare Malaya for 
eventual self-rule. When the MCA national leadership made prepara­
tions for the party to.take part in the Kuala Lumpur local elections 
and in subsequent local and state elections, it was acutely aware 
of the severe handicap it faced arising from the numerically 
inferior position of Chinese voters compared to Malay voters. To 
overcome this handicap, the MCA national leaders looked around for 
suitable Malay partners with whom to enter into an electoral pact. 
The party president, Tan Cheng Lock, and his son, Tan Siew Sin, 
initially favoured forming a liaison with Datuk Onn's IMP to contest 
the Kuala Lumpur elections, but party chiefs such as H.S. Lee and 
Ong Yoke Lin, who headed the MCA in Kuala Lumpur, preferred to work 
with the UMNO. It was the latter which emerged as the winning 
combination and out of this initial tentative MCA-UMNO electoral 
pact in Kuala Lumpur, the Alliance party was created. The
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Alliance coalition grew from strength to strength, winning land­
slide victories in every local and state election held during 1952- 
1954. The MIC joined the Alliance on the eve of the Federal 
Election of July 1955, which the coalition won handsomely, capturing 
51 out of 52 seats, to become Malaya*s first popularly-elected 
coalition party to exercise limited home-rule.
During the transition from performing Emergency welfare 
work to participating in electoral politics, the MCA was essentially 
a hybrid organisation, possessing a modern party machinery at the 
national level but still remaining a traditional huay kuan-type 
organisation at the base. The party headquarters was administered 
by westernised party bosses who were taken up with the running of 
an effective election-winning machinery, the consolidation of the 
party*s relations with the UMNO, and the advancement of the party*s 
interests in the Alliance independence campaign. The party 
machinery at the grass-roots level was controlled by Laukeh towkays 
who exercised influence within local Chinese communities through 
their domination of local commerce and patronage of Chinese 
education. These Laukeh bosses ran local MCA branches, which were 
frequently located in the premises of huay kuans, in the same 
manner in which they ran the huay kuans and Chinese. Chambers of 
Commerce. Exercising influence which was frequently limited to 
encapsulated local communities, the Laukeh towkays needed the 
sophisticated cosmopolitan network of the westernised top echelon 
leadership to extend and advance their economic and other general 
interests. The Laukeh towkays* mobilisation of the Chinese grass­
roots and generous contributions to party coffers in turn enabled
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the westernised leadership to command the attention of the UMNO.
In 1954 and 1955, the MCA, in conjunction with the UMNO, 
succeeded in applying pressure on the British government to speed 
up the time-table for independence. The Alliance coalition also 
succeeded in displacing its political rivals, in particular, Datuk 
Onn's IMP, in spearheading the independence movement. After the 
Alliance victory in the Federal Election of July 1955, the MCA top 
leadership more aggressively propounded Chinese concerns within the 
independence movement. The UMNO top leadership accepted the MCA 
as a comrade-in-arms in the independence movement although many 
MCA party positions, especially at the lower levels of the party 
hierarchy, were held by well-known ex-KMTM leaders. The UMNO 
leaders' acceptance of the MCA stemmed largely from their knowledge 
that MCA party policy was dictated and decided by the westernised 
party elite whose nationalist credentials were impeccable, 
especially those of Tan Cheng Lock, Tan Siew Sin and others who 
had no previous associations with the KMTM. These leaders 
consciously pursued a policy to wean Laukeh Chinese away from their 
hitherto China-orientated activities, to inculcate in them a new 
sense of Maiayan-centred political affiliation, and to establish 
the MCA as the first Maiayan-centred Chinese nationalist party.
In mid-1954, the British Government decided to grant 
independence to Malaya by the end of 1957. The electoral success 
of the Alliance meant that the British Government could fulfil its 
intention of handing power over to a multi-ethnic government in 
which the Malay element was dominant. Whitehall was prepared to 
grant independence at an earlier rather than later date because
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the Communist insurrection had been militarily checked and self- 
rule for Malaya would furthermore enable the Alliance to destroy 
any residual appeal of the MCP, which had been conducting its 
struggle in the name of Malayan independence.
The projection of Chinese concerns into Malayan 
nationalist politics on the eve of independence involved a series 
of complicated bargaining processes among the MCA, the UMNO, the 
Malay rulers, the colonial administration and the British Govern­
ment. The objective of the MCA in all its manoeuvres was to achieve 
the maximum constitutional safeguards for Chinese in independent 
Malaya. Working from a much stronger bargaining position, the 
UMNO likewise sought to achieve the same objective on behalf of 
the Malay community. The UMNO, MCA and MIC national leaders opened 
negotiations to draw up a Merdeka compact for the Malay, Chinese 
and Indian communities in April 1956. Although the British Govern­
ment had appointed an Independence Constitutional Commission, the 
Reid Commission, to recommend a new constitution, it eventually 
accepted the Alliance proposals as the basis of the independence 
constitution, in the belief that the Alliance Merdeka compact 
represented the wishes of the majority of the Malayan 
people more accurately than the Reid proposals. Furthermore, MCA 
leaders in the Constitutional Working Party had readily endorsed 
the UMNO position on special rights and language, although the Reid 
recommendations on these issues benefitted Chinese interests more.
The MCA top leadership accepted the UMNO terms on special 
rights and language, which removed a time limit restriction on the 
implementation of Malay special rights policy, and which recognised
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only the Malay language as the national language, because of its 
priority on other issues and its weaker bargaining position 
compared to the UMNO. UMNO's superior negotiating position 
emanated from the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948, which ensured 
the supremacy of the Malay position through clauses which enshrined 
Malay special rights and others which withheld citizenship from 
the large majority of the non-Malay population.
Fully aware that Chinese without citizenship would remain 
stateless persons deprived of a legitimate role in the political 
processes of independent Malaya, the MCA top leadership made the 
attainment of citizenship based on jus soli its topmost priority 
at the Alliance independence negotiations. As early as the CLC 
talks of 1950, Tan Cheng Lock had pressed UMNO leaders to agree to 
give citizenship based on jus soli to non-Malays. The MCA's efforts, 
backed enthusiastically by Malcolm MacDonald (the British 
Commissioner General to Southeast Asia, who had played a leading 
role in convening the CLC talks) , met with partial success in 1952 
when Datuk Onn, the UMNO president, agreed to a liberalisation of 
the 1948 citizenship provisions. The liberalisation enabled nearly 
half of the non-Malay population to become Malayan citizens, but 
the principle of jus soli was not conceded.
The MCA top leadership continued to exert pressure on 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Datuk Onn's successor in UMNO, to accept its 
position on jus soli. During the closed-doors top level UMNO-MCA 
party talks of 1954 which paved the way for the holding of the 
Alliance National Convention and which prepared the 1955 Alliance 
Election Manifesto, the MCA leaders obtained Tunku Abdul Rahman's
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consent that the UMNO would accept the principle of jus soli for 
non-Malays. At the Alliance independence negotiations, the MCA top 
leaders found they had to agree to the UMNO position on special 
rights and language in order to see the principle of jus soli 
written into the independence constitution.
The MCA leaders who had negotiated the Merdeka compact 
had few misgivings that they had "sold out" the political, economic 
and cultural birthrights of future generations of Chinese. They 
firmly believed that the attainment of citizenship based on jus soli 
was the precondition to Chinese political survival, from which all 
subsequent Chinese rights and privileges in independent Malaya 
would ensue. In making the concessions on special rights and 
language, the MCA leaders had hoped that the spirit of cooperation 
and goodwill which marked the UMNO-MCA relationship in the pre­
independence period would help safeguard Chinese economic and 
cultural interests after independence.
Up to 1956, the MCA had enjoyed a position of unrivalled 
pre-eminence in Chinese politics. The party's initial Emergency 
welfare work, its subsequent electoral alliance with the UMNO, its 
participation in the independence movement and other activities 
such as working for the repeal of the 1952 Education Ordinance, 
formed the basis of its widespread popular appeal within the 
Chinese community. However, between April 1956 and July 1957 the 
party's political dominance came under threat when a group of 
second echelon Laukeh leaders spearheaded a breakaway movement to 
protest against the top leadership's compromises on special rights 
and language. After an initial promising start, plans to form a
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mass-based Chinese party to rival the MCA fell apart and support 
for the breakaway movement was confined to an insignificant body 
led by Lau Pak Khuan. The demise of the breakaway movement served 
further to underscore the essential weakness of the Chinese 
bargaining position in that the UMNO could manipulate the situation 
to its advantage.
The UMNO, the power broker of independence politics, was 
opposed to the breakaway group's demands for equal rights for 
Malays and non-Malays, and for Chinese to be recognised as an 
official language. UMNO leaders raised fears that the breakaway 
movement might be a Kuomintang-inspired plot which would enable the 
Chiang Kai Shek Government to interfere with the Alliance formula 
for national integration and nation-building. The fact that the 
breakaway movement was led by prominent ex-KMTM leaders lent 
potential substance to the UMNO allegation, although there was no 
evidence that Taiwan intended to use the Chinese community as a 
fifth column to advance its interests in Malaya. Worried about the 
Kuomintang connections of the breakaway movement, Whitehall decided 
not to receive the delegation sent to London to press its case, and 
Laukeh leaders who had initially supported the breakaway movement 
hastily re-pledged their allegiance to the MCA top leadership. 
Fundamentally dependent on the UMNO for their commercial success, 
the dissident Laukeh leaders were as ever reluctant to compromise 
their private interests, a proclivity which prevented the emergence 
of a mass-based Chinese opposition party in 1956-1957.
The collaborationist politics of the MCA was undoubtedly 
a highly successful means of political articulation in the development
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of mainstream Chinese politics in the pre-independence period of 
1949-1957. Chinese community leaders regarded collaborationist 
politics as being equally vital to the realisation of independence 
as to the advancement of specifically Chinese interests. After 
independence, the MCA mode of collaborationist politics to get 
Chinese votes faced competition from two other channels of political 
articulation - Chinese-based opposition politics and multi-racial 
integrationist politics. These two streams of political articulation 
were already present in the pre-independence period, as exemplified 
by Chinese-based opposition parties such as the Labour Party, the PPP 
and the multi-racial IMP. However, the Labour Party and PPP did not 
command significant support and they played no role in the indepen­
dence campaign. The IMP, which called for a delay in the time-table 
for independence, was likewise relegated to the background of the 
political scene. The widespread consensus of Chinese community 
leaders that collaborationist politics as practised by the MCA 
represented the best way of achieving the popularly desired goals of 
independence and citizenship based on jus soli further prevented the 
rise of Chinese opposition politics during the period. The more 
chauvinistic and opposition-minded leaders were at that stage willing 
to drop their demands and patch up their differences with the MCA, 
as evidenced by the fall-off in support for Lau Pak Khuan's break­
away group.
The rise of Chinese-based opposition politics in the post­
independence period stemmed from the changing needs of the community 
and the increasing inability of the MCA to satisfy those needs. With 
the attainment of independence and citizenship based on jus soli,
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Chinese economic and cultural needs have assumed greater salience.
In the 1960s, Chinese community leaders clamoured unsuccessfully 
for the recognition of Chinese as an official language. In the 
1970s and early 1980s, with the implementation of the New Economic 
Policy, the community’s overriding concerns have been to protect 
its commercial and educational interests. The MCA leadership’s 
ability to champion Chinese interests since independence has been 
hampered by its compromises with the UMNO in the Merdeka compact, 
which recognised Malay political and cultural dominance and which 
guaranteed Malay economic and educational privileges. In a society 
where the New Economic Policy shapes national policies on special 
rights, and where preventive laws such as the Internal Security Act 
forbid the questioning of any racially salient issue, it is difficult 
for any group to preach multi-racial policies asking for the 
abolition of special rights. The MCA, therefore, continues to 
espouse and practise intra-coalition bargaining with the UMNO as the 
most effective way of promoting Chinese interests.
The MCA’s desire to continue to enjoy the fruits of 
political power as a member of the present day ruling Barisan 
Nasional (National Front) coalition government further explains its 
reluctance to take an anti-UMNO posture on education iand othe'r' 
issues of major concern to the Chinese community. Due to the heavy 
pro-Malay rural bias in the delineation of Parliamentary and State 
constituencies, a substantial number of MCA Members of Parliament 
and State Assemblymen get elected to office more from pro-UMNO 
Malay votes than pro-MCA Chinese votes. Now that the Gerakan
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Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Movement), a former Chinese- 
based opposition, is a member of the Barisan Nasional Government, 
the UMNO is even more able to exert a restraining influence on the 
chauvinistic impulses in the MCA by the implicit threat to increase 
patronage of the Gerakan at the expense of the MCA through the 
allotment of seats at election time.
The MCA’s seemingly excessive accommodation of the UMNO 
since 1957 spawned widespread support for Chinese-based opposition 
parties such as the Labour Party, the UDP, the PPP, United Democra­
tic Party (UDP), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Gerakan 
(before it joined the Barisan Nasional Government in 1 9 7 2 ) These 
parties are, or were, multi-racial organisations in theory, but 
their espousal of equal political, cultural and economic rights 
for Malays and non-Malays have caused Malays and others to consider 
them as narrow chauvinistic Chinese opposition parties. The basis 
of their appeal to the Chinese electorate has lain mainly in their 
representation of Chinese economic and educational interests as 
well as in their critical appraisals of the government’s implemen­
tation of the New Economic Policy and other national policies.
The second non-MCA channel of Chinese political articulation, 
multi-racial integrationist politics, is an insignificant political 
force compared to opposition politics. The most vigorous proponent 
of multi-racial integrationist politics in the pre-independence 
period was the IMP. Although Tan Cheng Lock was the MCA party 
president, he and his son, Tan Siew Sin, associated themselves with
1. Means, Malaysian Politics, chs. 14, 18 and 21.
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the IMP for a period of time because they believed that Malayan 
politics should be based along integrationist and not mutually 
exclusive communal lines. The devastating defeat of the IMP in 
the Kuala Lumpur local elections and in subsequent local and state 
elections in 1952-1954 demonstrated that the Malay and Chinese 
masses were highly race-oriented in political ideology and poli­
tical behaviour. Lack of appeal for the concept of multi-racial 
integrationist politics led Datuk Onn, Tan Cheng Lock and other 
advocates to return to the framework of communally-based politics.
The integrationist approach today remains more an ideal 
than a practical proposition. Proponents of the cause still argue 
that the demise of communally-based politics and parties is essen­
tial to the long-term stability of the Malaysian pluralist state.
They believe that the existence of communally-based parties serves
only to heighten racial competition and division, pointing out that 
a truly Malaysian identity and consciousness would arise only if 
political ideology and behaviour were based on compatible class 
interests cutting across racial lines. Most of the English-educated 
intelligentsia involved in politics are sympathetic toward the 
integrationist approach, but they are unwilling to leave the 
communally-based parties for a cause having so little popular 
appeal. These individuals are found in all of the Chinese-based 
parties, mostly in parties with an integrationist ideological 
veneer like the Gerakan and DAP (such as Lim Kheng Yaik, Paul Leong, 
Goh Cheng Teik and Alex Lee from the former and Lim Kit Siang and 
Lee Lam Thye from the latter), and less commonly in the MCA (such
as Ling Liong Sik and Tan Tiong Hong). The multi-racial \
i: 'i :• a  ' '  :
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integrationist school is likely to remain an insignificant and 
dormant strain in Malaysian Chinese political thinking until such 
time when respected Malay leaders lend it their support.
All the three different channels of Chinese political 
articulation - collaborationist, opposition and integrationist - 
possess one common raison d'etre, that of advancing the Chinese 
position in pluralist Malaysia. For the time being, only collabo­
rationist and opposition politics are practical strategies. There 
is a clear awareness that collaborationist politics benefit from 
the existence of opposition politics and vice versa. The MCA 
benefits from pressures applied to the UMNO from public clamour on 
Chinese issues raised by the DAP in that UMNO top leaders may be more 
accommodating to Chinese interests in private Cabinet-level negotia­
tions. The DAP in turn benefits from the MCA’s collaboration with 
the UMNO, for the MCA's low profile representation of Chinese 
interests results in the DAP winning the Chinese protest vote, which 
is believed to fluctuate between 30%-50% of the total Chinese popular 
vote in every general election, thus making the DAP the largest 
opposition party in Malaysia.
While the interplay of collaborationist and opposition 
politics provides the dynamics for Chinese government and opposition 
leaders to forward their common cause of advancing Chinese interests, 
it nevertheless forms the very basis of the Chinese political dilemma 
in Malaysia. Chinese voting strength is necessarily fragmented 
between collaborationist and opposition parties and cannot be 
harnessed as an effective and united political force in order that 
Chinese representation in the country's legislative assemblies may
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be as coherent and united as the Malay voice. Chinese unity as the 
basis for Chinese political strength will remain an illusory goal 
so long as the UMNO follows the present policies of selective 
accommodation of Chinese concerns and the two-pronged strategy of 
collaborationist and opposition politics is regarded as the most 
effective means of achieving Chinese goals.
A number of major weaknesses are evident in the present
i
day position of the MCA. Its belief in collaborationist politics 
and continued reliance on the UMNO for political patronage and 
concessions prevent it from taking independent stands on Chinese 
issues which could help it capture Chinese electoral support. On
I
I
i the other hand, when party leaders in Cabinet private negotiations
succeed in attaining significant concessions on Chinese issues, 
they cannot publicise their successes too widely for fear of under­
mining UMNO’s dominant position within the Malay community.^
i
Having chosen to remain in the political straight jacket of colla­
borationist politics, MCA leaders will find their political acumen 
and wits stretched to the maximum in order to retain the party’s 
position as the premier Chinese political organisation in Malaysia.
Another source of the MCA's current political weakness, 
apart from the difficulties of operating within the constraints of
1. MCA leaders informed the writer that they have succeeded in 
obtaining a number of significant concessions from the UMNO.
Two major concessions have been UMNO’s agreement that the New 
Economic Policy would only affect Chinese business enterprises 
set up after 1969, and that the non-Malay quota in every 
university in the country would be raised to at least 40% 
by 1990.
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collaborationist politics, is the loss of wholehearted backing from 
huay kuans, Chinese Chambers of Commerce, educational bodies and 
other Chinese pressure groups. Although the leaders of these 
organisations no longer play as decisive a role in Chinese community 
politics as in the pre-independence period, they are still able to 
mobilise voters and articulate Chinese concerns. Their political 
and social roles at the grass-roots have been increasingly taken 
over by Chinese political parties and by national and state level 
government institutions such as those responsible for health, 
education, social welfare, housing, employment and labour,
Functions of traditional Chinese organisations which stemmed from 
prototypes originating in China are increasingly less relevant to 
the post-independence needs of Malaysian Chinese, and the roles of 
Laukeh huay kuan leaders as local level political brokers have been 
taken over by a new generation of Malaysian-bom Chinese leaders.
Leaders of huay kuans and other Chinese public bodies no 
longer give their wholehearted support to the MCA, because of 
disaffectation arising from perceived MCA ineffectiveness in 
advancing Chinese educational and economic interests. For example, 
a blow to the MCA was the decision by the United Chinese School 
Teachers Association and the United Chinese School Managers 
Association, known collectively as the Tung Chiao Chung, to give 
its backing to the Gerakan during the 1982 April General Election. 
Leaders of the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce and well- 
known huay kuans have influenced Chinese voting behaviour in 
favour of the DAP during the 1974 and 1978 General Elections,
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because of the opposition leaders' representation of Chinese issues, 
in particular, the Merdeka University issue.'*' Cut off from its 
once close links with Chinese traditional organisations and other 
pressure groups, the MCA is even more dependent on UMNO largesse, 
and as a consequence becomes even more vulnerable to UMNO manipula­
tion in the Barisan Nasional coalition. UMNO leaders, for their 
part, no longer view the MCA as the sole, or most authentic, 
advocate of Chinese interests. With the continued viability of 
the DAP as the opposition voice of Chinese interests and the Gerakan 
within the Barisan Nasional, the MCA voice threatens to become 
fainter.
Whatever weaknesses and conundrums the MCA faces at the 
present, during the period covered by this study;the mode of 
collaborationist politics practised by the party's far-sighted and 
able leadership represented a successful means of achieving Chinese 
goals, and best served Chinese needs and interests at the crucial 
juncture of Malaya's transition from colony to independent nation 
state.
1. The Chinese community, led by the Associated Chinese Chambers 
of Commerce, the Tung Chiao Chung and the DAP, has long sought 
government permission to set up a private university, Merdeka 
University, which would use Chinese as the main medium of 
instruction. The government has refused to grant permission 




I. MCA Party Records (1949-1957)
MCA party records are found at the party headquarters in Kuala
Lumpur. They comprise:
(A) Annual Reports, minutes, memoranda, reports, circulars, 
press releases, correspondence, petitions, party accounts 
related to Emergency welfare expenditure, and miscellaneous 
unpublished documents.
(B) Party Publications
Rules of the Malayan Chinese Association, Ling Wah Press, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1949.
A Statement of the Aims and Objectives of the Malayan Chinese
Association (pamphlet), Kuala Lumpur, c.1954.
Constitution of the Malayan Chinese Association (Approved and 
Adopted by the MCA General Committee at a meeting held on 
22 March 1959), China Press Ltd., Kuala Lumpur.
Constitution of the Malayan Chinese Association (Incorporating 
all Amendments up to March 1969), Solai Press, Kuala Lumpur.
Tan Cheng Lock, Memorandum on Chinese Education in the Federation 
of Malaya, Art Printing Works, Kuala Lumpur, 1954.
Tan Siew Sin, The Bandit’s Trump Card, Pincraft Ltd., Kuala 
Lumpur, 1949.
_____________, Blue Print for Unity: Selected Speeches and State­
ments of Tun Tan Siew Sin, MCA headquarters, Kuala Lumpur,
1972.
_____________, Malayan Chinese Association: Statement on Citizen­
ship , Lien Pang Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1949.
Malayan Mirror (fortnightly party newspapers 1953-1957).
II. Alliance Documents (1952-1957)
As the MCA Chief Executive Secretary; T.H. Tan, was the secretary 
for the Alliance, the following Alliance documents were kept at 
the MCA headquarters:
Minutes, memoranda, reports, circulars, press releases, corres­
pondence, election manifestos and miscellaneous unpublished party 
papers.
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III. CCC-Huay Kuan Records (1949-1957)
(A) CCC-huay kuan records related to MCA and government matters 
were located at the MCA headquarters:
Memoranda, petitions, correspondence and miscellaneous 
documents including:
Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce: Memorandum to the 
Chairman and Members of the Independence Committee for the 
Federation of Malaya, Charles Grenier and Co. Ltd., Kuala 
Lumpur, 1956.
Memorandum to be Submitted to the Reid Constitutional 
Commission by Chinese Organisations in Malacca, Wah Seng 
Press, 1956.
(B) Registrar of Societies
These documents include annual reports of the objectives, 
rules, names and occupations of office holders and size of 
membership of all registered Chinese associations and 
organisations in Peninsular Malaysia.
IV. Unpublished Official Records
(A) In the United Kingdom
The main source for post-war Chinese activities in Malaya 
is the series of Colonial Office papers deposited at the 
Public Records Office:
C0537 Colonies, General Supplementary Original Correspon­
dence (1945-1950).
C0717 Malay States, Original Correspondence (1945-1951)
C0273 Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence (1945-1947)
(B) In Malaysia
The Arkib Negara Malaysia (National Archives of Malaysia) in 
Kuala Lumpur is the major repository of unpublished official 
records. The relevant files consulted relate mainly to the 
immediate post-war period - the BMA, the Malayan Union and 
the Federation of Malaya.
Secretary for Chinese Affairs files (1920-1948).
BMA files (1945-1946).
BMA, Chinese Affairs files (1945-1946).
Malayan Union files (1946-1947).
Prime Minister’s Department, Malayan Union files (1947). 
Federal Secretariat files (1948).
Selangor State Secretariat files (1945-1948).
Director of Education files (1947-1948).
Deputy Commissioner of Labour files (1947).
Department of Information files (1946-1948).
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Federated Malay States Census Papers 1901, Govt. Printer, Kuala 
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1911.
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Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements 
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Malayan Union Advisory Council Proceedings (1946-1948).
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Malayan Press Comment on the White Paper on Malayan Union, Press 
Intelligence Publication, B.M.A., 1946.
Official Statement on the Malayan Union Citizenship Proposals 
Issued by H.E. The Governor, Malayan Union, on 18 April 
1946. Summary of Views on the Proposals Received from 
Persons, Organisations and other Sources, Govt. Printer, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1946.
Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Consultative 
Committee Together with the Proceedings of Six Public 
Meetings. A Summary of Representations Made and Letters and 
Memoranda Considered by the Committee, Govt. Printer, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1947.
del Tufo, M.V., Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of Population, 
H.M.S.O., London, 1947.
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Federal Legislative Council Proceedings (1948-1957).
Report of Committee Appointed by His Excellency the High
Commissioner to Investigate the Squatter Problem, Council 
Paper no.3 of 1949, Govt. Press, Kuala Lumpur.
The Squatter Problem in the Federation of Malaya in 1950, Council 
Paper No.14 of 1950, Govt. Press, Kuala Lumpur.
Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans. The
Report of a Mission Invited by the Federation Government 
to Study the Problem of the Education of Chinese in Malaya, 
Govt. Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1951.
Report of the Committee on Malay Education, Govt. Printer, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1951.
Resettlement and the Development of New Villages in the Federation 
of Malaya, 1952, Council Paper No.33 of 1952, Govt. Press, 
Kuala Lumpur.
Detention and Deportation During the Emergency in the Federation 
of Malaya, Council Paper No.24 of 1953, Govt. Press, Kuala 
Lumpur.
Educational Policy: Statement of the Federal Government on the 
Report of the Special Committee on the Implementation of 
Educational Policy Together with the Report of that 
Committee, Govt. Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1954.
Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Question of
Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, Govt. Press, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1954.
Report of the Constituency Delineation Commission, Govt. Printer, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1954.
Smith, R.C., Report of the First Election of Members to the 
Legislative Council of th.e Federation of Malaya, Govt.
Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1955.
Report of the Education Committee, Council Paper No.21 of 1956, 
Govt. Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
Fell, H., 1957 Population Census of tho Federation of Malaya
(Reports no.1-14), Dept, of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, 1957.
Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission:
Appendix II Draft Constitution of Malaya, Govt. Press, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1957.
Dewan Ra'ayat Debates, vols.l-V (1957-1963).
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Report on the Parliamentary and State Elections, 1959, Govt. Press, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1960.
Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Rafayat) and State Legislative 
Assembly General Elections, 1964, of the States of Malaya,
Govt. Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1965.
Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Rakyat) and State Legislative 
Assembly General Elections of 1974 of the States of Malaya 
and Sarawak, Govt. Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975.
Fernandez, D.Z.t New Villages in Peninsular Malaysia Created
During the Emergency 1948-1960, Dept, of Statistics, Kuala 
Lumpur, c.1975.
Suffian bin Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, 
Govt. Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1976 (2nd edition).
VI. Private Papers
(A) Tan Cheng Lock Papers
There are two collections, one at the Arkib Negara in Kuala 
Lumpur, and the other at the Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies in Singapore. The papers deal with matters related 
to the MCA, the Alliance, the Communities Liaison Committee, 
the Federal War Council, the Emergency Chinese Advisory 
Board as well as personal correspondence, speeches and other 
miscellaneous items.
(B) Leong Yew Koh Papers
These are kept at the Arkib Negara and include MCA party 
papers, Alliance minutes and correspondence, Chinese Advisory 
Board minutes and Perak War Executive Committee minutes.
VII. Newspapers
The following newspapers were consulted through three sources:
(1) the MCA Press Digest Section at the party headquarters (daily 
English translations of Chinese, Malay and Indian newspapers)
(2) the Arkib Negara and (3) the New Straits Times library 
(catalogued cuttings of English newspapers).






(B) Chinese Language (MCA Press Digest and Arkib Negara)
Min Sheng Pau (1945-1947).
Nanyang Siang Pau (1952-1957).
China Press (1952-1957).
Sin Chew Jit Pau (1952-1957).
Kwong Wah Yit Pau (1952-1957).
Sin Pao (1952-1957).
Sin Lit Pau (1952-1957).
Kin Kwok Yit Pau . (1952—1957).
Sin Pin Jih Pao (1952-1957).
Malayan Nan Pao (1952-1957).
Chin Shing Jit Pao (1952-1957).










(D) Indian Language (MCA Press Digest)
Tamil Murasu (1952-1957).
Tamil Nesan (1952-1957).
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